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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
FROM: RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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100P-1-1635
28 July 1954

TO	NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. A/C/STC	1603 L	2 August	2	[]	<p>Mr. [] prepared the Report proper, prior to his departure, on leave.</p> <p>Distribution: DD/P C/FI C/WH WH/[] [] Chrono</p> <p>22.4.1</p>
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28 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT: Report on activity **L** **J** in Guatemala City,
4-16 July 1954

1. Our mission was accomplished against the background of a government structure in flux. Castillo Armas had entered Guatemala City one day before our arrival; the Junta was in a process of reorganization; a firm and clear-cut policy as to how to deal with the Communist problem after the overthrow of the Arbenz regime did apparently not exist, except possibly to the extent that the Junta wanted to avoid the appearance of a police regime and wished to proceed "democratically."

2. Our primary objective was to assure the acquisition of documentary evidence which would expose the Communist conspiracy and its foreign ties in Guatemala. Pursuant to headquarters directives, received after our arrival at the station, we also were to make available documentary evidence to a State Department team (Mssrs. Miron Burgin and Vasquez) which had been dispatched without our knowledge and arrived simultaneously with us.

3. Upon arrival we ascertained that the overthrow of the Arbenz regime had been executed without any planning toward scientifically breaking the Communist Party; nor had any thought been given to the systematic arrest of Communist leaders. Automatic arrest lists were lacking. The Guardia Civil arrested about 2,000 persons, but the bulk of the arrestees were Indian peasants, jailed to prevent outbreaks. Some of the top Communist leadership had sought asylum in the (Mexican, Chilean, Salvadoran, Argentine) Embassies. It still is our estimate that a great number of the medium Party leadership are free. Our efforts to induce the Chief of the Guardia Civil to begin systematic arrests of significant Communists failed. (Appointment of new Chief was already under discussion and the man we saw became Governor of Dept. of Guatemala.)

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4. We also found confusion and lack of planning concerning the acquisition and control of the documentary Party materials. Immediately after the overthrow of the regime there appears to have existed a situation whereby any interested person could grab Communist documents and papers. The only act revealing of a plan seems to have been the locking up of CP and front organization premises. Nobody could tell us exactly how much and what was in these premises until we made a personal inspection.

5. We discovered the following indications of the uncoordinated "grabbing" process:

- a) The Chief of the Guardia Judicial had entered Party headquarters and obtained some documents for his private file.
- b) The files of the SAMF, the CP controlled railroad workers union, had been shipped by the Army to the Guardia Civil.
- c) The Chief of the Guardia Civil received two sacks full of propaganda materials, books and notes of a medium level Party functionary, and gave them to the Station.
- d) The station obtained some documents from the private files of Arbenz, Alfonso Martinez and Capuano.
- e) According to a station report, Castillo Armas' advisor, [redacted] had bought some of Cruz Wer's papers from a boy on the street.
- f) The Junta itself took control of the documents in the Palace. Col. Cruz Salazar showed us some of these on the occasion of our visit to the Palace, and handed us a few.

6. The chaotic condition in which we found the documentary materials during our inspection can best be gleaned from the pictures which were taken in order to convey a sense of reality. It is evident that anti-Communist elements had raided CP and front premises. The physical security of the premises was farcical in two instances.

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E. g. , we were shocked when we discovered that no guard had been posted at Party headquarters, the obvious hub of the conspiracy. Upon our arrival on the scene, excited neighbors told us that they had seen lights in Party headquarters at night, had seen the shadows of persons and heard voices. (We initiated the posting of a Military Police guard at Party headquarters, but the damage may have been done) Similarly astonishing was our experience when we attempted to enter the premises of FUD, the Communist student organization, which also was unguarded. A neighbor whose backyard was adjacent to the yard of FUD, kindly invited us to climb over his wall and inspect the premises of FUD. These experiences illustrate the inefficiency of the anti-Communist forces.

7. However, when we entered the premises of PGT, CGTG, FUD, and other Communist organizations we were surprised by the mass of documents which still had remained there, and we came to the conclusion that the Communists themselves must have been surprised by their defeat. Other evidence discovered later also indicated that Arbenz' resignation came as a shock to many of his followers and some Communist dominated organizations, and we believe that the Communists themselves, in their optimism, are responsible for the fact that we still were able to find what we consider the quantitatively greatest catch of documents ever left behind by a Communist Party and its auxiliaries.

8. Before we say a word about these documents, we wish to point out that the simple act of gaining access to them was complicated by the confusion existing in the government structure. It took us a great deal of running from Guardia Civil to General Staff and vice versa, until the military finally admitted (and possibly learned to its own surprise) that the Military Police was responsible for the physical guarding (such as it was) of the premises, giving us at last the necessary papers and an accompanying officer (Col. Soto) to make it possible for us to make the inspection. We mention this small fact only in order to illustrate the confusion prevailing in the days after Castillo Armas' return.

9. Concerning the documents themselves, we wish to upgrade our previous (cabled) estimate of about 100,000 papers which had been made prior to the inspection of the CNCG (Peasants' Union).

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At present the estimate is closer to 150,000 pieces of scattered papers. Note also that no documents from the provinces have come in as yet.

10. It was physically impossible to read and exploit all of the documents found. Mr [] inspected as many documents as possible and earmarked the most significant ones which were brought to headquarters. Appendix B gives a general description of the documents inspected. The most significant documents were found in Station files (especially, the Arbenz materials).

11. The documents have, of course, a great local significance. From them a considerable portion of the CP complex can be reconstructed, and many individuals active in the Communist machine can be identified. The extent of government penetration can be determined. Connections with the Soviet-controlled international fronts, and Communist organizations are also reflected. In short, these documents could put a domestic security service on its feet. (The problem, of course, is to create a reliable domestic security service in Guatemala).

12. How much "national intelligence" of U. S. interest there is in these documents, cannot be stated now. The State Department team believes (and we concur) that a good study of the workings of the Communist complex can be made, provided an adequate field research team is assigned for an extended period (3 men for 10 months, according to our estimate). The photographs taken show that the papers will have to be organized before they can be exploited. On the basis of the documents selected by Mr. [] it can be stated that the most significant documents found so far are evidence to the depth of the Communist penetration of the National Palace and the general strength of the movement in the country, but not as yet to the aspects that we are most interested in, namely the elements of Soviet support and control of Communism in Guatemala.

13. Such evidence will have to be dug out, laboriously and painfully, and may not be contained in the documents. Additional live sources (defectors, interrogations) will have to be developed for this purpose. At this moment there are no independent station

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assets through which to develop them. However, we believe that recommendations made by us have served to lay the groundwork for opening joint operations with special local authorities through which the intelligence and counteraction interests of our organization and the U. S. Government can be achieved.

14. Before we go into the recommendations which we made, we should like to add that during the 10 days of our visit we met several local officials and, thanks to Mr. [] knowledge of Spanish and professional attitude, enjoyed their cooperation for action support purposes. Our general conclusion was that at least on the working level there existed a sincere desire to clean out the Communist mess. This desire, however, was not matched by efficiency and professional attitude. We feel that the biggest job this organization could do in Guatemala is to assist in the building of a professional security service and to enter into joint operations with the locals.

The officials whose cooperation we enjoyed are:

- a) Colonel Ruben Gonzalez Sigui, former chief of the Cuartel General of the Army, and Chief of the Guardia Civil until 14 July 1954. Among other services rendered, he had made up upon our request a list of the 2,000 or so arrestees which we transmitted to the Station.
- b) Miguel Angel Mendizabal, Chief of the Guardia Judicial, who had been for 6 years with the Second Section (G-2) of the General Staff of the Army. Mendizabal stated he had received training from an FBI agent, Edwin Sweet, now believed to be in Mexico, while he, Mendizabal, was a policeman with the Guardia Civil, about 7 years ago, prior to his assignment with the Second Section. Mendizabal made available to us a series of valuable CP documents which he had personally removed from Party headquarters, as well as an extensive alphabetical list of Party functionaries, foreign Communists, and Communist controlled premises.

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- c) We met Col. Victor Manuel Gordillo, who had been associated with the Second Section (G-2) of the General Staff of the Army under the Arbenz regime. He made available to us a list of top Communist leaders including their biographies, as well as structural data on the CP. This work had been done secretly under the Arbenz regime, and indicates that G-2 had been aware of the Communist threat. Col. Gordillo also introduced us to a G-2 agent, identified as [] a stocky man of about 50, who asserted that he was a member of PAR and in this capacity had the opportunity to observe Communist elements in the PAR. G-2 considered this agent a most valuable asset and offered us to assume control over him, a highly unusual gesture which indicates the degree of G-2 desire to cooperate.
- d) Col. Soto, of the Cuartel General, was our guide on our inspection trip, and identified the location of several Communists premises previously unknown to us. Col. Soto was recently transferred from his job in the Cuartel General to a post with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
- e) The Chief of the Cuartel General was extremely cooperative when we advised him that no guard was posted at CP headquarters. He immediately despatched a detail of Military Police to accompany us, break into the premises, and posted a guard there. This took place in the evening hours.
- f) Col. Oscar Mendoza, former Military Attache in Cuba and newly appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army, cooperated in introducing us to officers of the Second Section, and provided us with the documentation enabling us to inspect Communist premises.

15. Appendix A contains our recommendation of 5 July 1954 to COS for the Ambassador. It is our understanding that the Ambassador passed the substance of these recommendations to the Junta on

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6 July 1954. Based on the briefing received from COS upon arrival on 4 July 1954, and on a long discussion with ESSENCE on the morning of 5 July 1954, we concluded that the Guardia Civil was not an effective security force, but felt on the other hand that there was considerable anti-Communist citizens' initiative in the country. Hence, we proposed the creation of an anti-subversive squad and the setting up of a high-powered, Junta-controlled investigative group (somewhat on the order of a "Royal Commission") to centralize all information, expose and liquidate Communism, and coordinate all necessary anti-CP operations (interrogations, arrests, defections, penetrations). Subsequently incipient action indicated that the recommendations had been accepted. On 7 July 1954, Col. Elfego Monzon indicated to us in the presence of COS that the Junta would create a "Grupo A" (the investigative group) and "Groupo B" (the anti-subversive squad). On 8 July 1954, the Chief of the Guardia Civil took us to the premises of the old Jefatura of the Armed Forces (former U.S. Embassy building) which as he indicated, would be the working headquarters of the investigative group where documentation would be centralized. On 9 July, we were invited by the Chief of the Guardia Civil to his office where we met with Mario Sandoval and Domingo Goicolea, who were introduced as constituting the board of the investigative group, along with Juan Miron, who was not present. These representatives stated that they would also be responsible for the preparation of a Whitebook on Communism, and for the anti-Communist "education" of the peasants along Christian lines. At the meeting of 9 July, the representatives of the group declared that they would obtain proper credentials from the President to ensure cooperation from every government agency. They were in full accord with the necessity for arrests of Communist leaders, defection operations and clean-up of Government agencies. They were fully cooperative, and we gained the strong impression that, once this group was activated and staffed out, this organization would be able to get to the core of the Communist conspiracy in Guatemala, and obtain the strategic information which may not be included in the mountains of papers located so far. We also feel that the group was the instrumentality through which it could be possible not only to wipe out and expose Communism, but also to reinforce the sadly inadequate security forces of this country and so to strengthen the current government and prevent a Communist come-back.

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16. At the meeting we also advised that the group select at least one clerical supervisor and 6 clerks to process the documentation which would be centralized in the old Jefatura. The two representatives agreed that they would not ship the records to the Jefatura until they had a staff for processing. (Unfortunately, through some undetermined foul-up, some of the records were actually shipped to the Jefatura and dumped there in a most disorderly manner.)

17. Another meeting with the group was arranged for the 10 July 1954, 11:00 A. M. at the Jefatura (old U. S. Embassy). This meeting did not materialize since Domingo Goicolea had to leave town on a special mission. Attempts were made to call a morning meeting for 12 July 1954, but no meeting materialized as the 12th July was "Anti-Communist" day. Mr. Krieg of the Embassy's Political Section arranged a morning meeting with the group at the Jefatura for 13 July 1954. This meeting did not materialize. Only Mr. Bernabe Linares (former Police Chief under UBICO) was present, and advised that he, GOICOLEA and Armando Sandoval were now members of the group. Another morning meeting was arranged by Mr. Krieg for 14 July 1954 but only Linares was present, and no discussions on the work plan could be held. At that time it was not evident what had caused the slowing up of the process of forming the group. It should be noted, however, that the government structure was still in flux (e. g. , the replacement of the Chief of the Guardia Civil took place on 14 July 1954), and that government reorganization may have caused the delay.

18. On the afternoon of 14 July we visited the Jefatura again. (Party and other Communist records and documents had already begun rolling into the building). We met part of the group who asked us to attend a meeting of the whole group on 15 July, 08:30, to give them technical advice on the function and organization of the group. Apparently Mr. Burgin and Vasquez had been already advised through the Embassy. We discovered later from Mr. Burgin that Mario Sandoval, by now Secretary to the President, had been at the Jefatura prior to our arrival in the afternoon, and had demanded that the group start functioning. He also indicated that GOICOLLEA was tied up with family matters, and that the group may have to proceed without GOICOLLEA.

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19. At 08:30, 15 July, we attended the meeting at the Jefatura which was chaired by COS. Present were Armando Sandoval, Bernabe Linares, Col. Domingo Rosales, Raul Midence, and Juan Miron. It was apparent that the group (investigative committee) present was still an informal one, had no formal authorization from the Junta, and that the subversive squad was not a reality. A former member of the group, one Calderon, had been removed because he believed he could write a Whitebook on Communism in 4 (four) days, certainly an underestimation of the problem.

We put before the group the question of authorization again, and the group agreed that it should be given a charter (constitution) by the Junta to empower it to conduct a nationwide investigation and obtain the cooperation of government agencies, including Guardia Civil.

The group agreed that the Committee should consist of a three man directorate, one of the members to be chairman, and that two alternates should be appointed.

The group agreed that a Judge with nationwide authority should be attached to the Committee in order to issue warrants and subpoenas.

The group agreed that immediate instructions should go out to all departmental governors and heads of the departmental Guardia Civil in order to forward all pertinent files on pro-Arbenz parties to headquarters (Jefatura) for study.

The group agreed that special funds should be allotted to the committee. The group agreed to prepare a workplan for a meeting on 16 July 1954, 1430, for our technical advice.

Mr. Linares pointed out that the primary function of the Committee should be the study of the documents in order to reconstruct the CP complex out of which further investigative leads would grow.

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The investigation of government departments and the Foreign Ministry was also discussed, and included in the scope of the program. A suggestion was made to "freeze" all records of government agencies. Another, to obtain the names of all government employees for checking.

Col. Domingo Rosales was tentatively put in charge of physical security of the Jefatura and the documents.

The group felt in general that the project was an entirely novel one for Guatemala, and it was obvious that our advice would be accepted with gratitude.

20. After the meeting COS went to see Mario Sandoval and also planned to see Castillo Armas in order to ensure speedy implementation of the group's recommendations.

21. On 16 July we assembled in the Jefatura in the presence of Bernabe Linares, Col. Domingo Rosales, Juan Miron and COS. COS advised that he had seen Castillo Armas the preceding evening and that a "Committee for the Defense of Democracy" would be created by presidential decree, with sufficient authority to conduct a nation-wide investigation of Communism. The Committee would consist of Domingo Goicolea (chairman), Armando Sandoval and Juan Miron, and two alternates, Raul Midence, and one Lopez. COS stated that Bernabe Linares would be in charge of the investigation, and Col. Domingo Rosales in charge of security and personnel. We recommended to Juan Miron that the first step to be taken was to establish a warroom on the CP and all auxiliaries; to put up on the walls the structure and personnel of the CP complex so that significant arrest and investigative action, based on facts, could be taken.

22. The net result of our trip can be summarized as follows:

- a) We gained a first-hand appraisal of the available documentation and the cooperativeness of local government personnel.

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- b) We ensured centralization of records and complete access to them.
- c) We developed valuable contacts for the station (see para 14)
- d) We initiated the organization of investigative facilities towards further acquisition of information on the CP complex.

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APPENDIX A

Recommendations of 5 July 1954 to COS for Ambassador

1. Energetic anti-communist action is needed urgently and is sorely lacking:
 - a. Communist Party men continue to hold the government positions they held under Arbenz, e. g. , Inspectores del Trabajo and of the DAN, etc.
 - b. Communists who took asylum in Embassies have left those Embassies and returned to active life in the city, some under assumed names.
 - c. The frontiers are open and the escape of communists is not blocked.
 - d. Men responsible for the torture and murder of anti-communist under Arbenz have not been arrested even though their identities are known. It is reported that a Col. Prera of the Guardia Civil blocked these arrests.
 - e. The CGTG is still active. The closing of its central office is not enough to curb the activities of its communist leaders and communist members who are accustomed to clandestine activity.
2. The Junta should designate and fully empower a man with whom we can deal in the elimination of communists from all positions of influence in Guatemalan government and society; in their arrest, detention and interrogation; in the seizure and study of key documents in the communist conspiracy; and in the effective denial of the claim of communists to the right of asylum and salvo conducto.
3. There is urgent need for:
 - a. A central repository of information on the Communist Party, its members, fronts and related groups.
 - b. A secure, capable, energetic, anti-subversive squad in the Guardia Civil.

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c. A thorough check of all:

- 1) Offices (headquarters) (national, regional, municipal, etc.) of the CP, the CGTG, the peasant federation, all communist fronts;
- 2) Government offices dominated or strongly influenced by communists;
- 3) The homes and offices of all leading CP members, and of all their relatives and friends where they may have cached documents ,

in order to be sure that the Junta has in its possession all important documents and records which will

- 1) Clearly evidence the foreign direction of the communist movement;
- 2) Specifically identify not only all leading foreign and local communists involved but all CP members and collaborators, so that they can be rendered ineffectual and can be prevented from making a renewed bid for power.

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APPENDIX B

I. Arbenz Material (obtained by Station from Arbenz' L

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A. Documents: Communist books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets; Foreign Ministry documents concerning the "June Days;" questionnaires put to Arbenz by Army and press; an offer of sale of planes and arms by a Genoa firm; a brochure on Agrarian Reform; a study of the 1936 U.S.-Guatemala Commercial Treaty; documents concerning the formation of civilian militias. (See brochure of documents prepared for Director's use before NSC).

B. General Character of the Documents

1. The above cited Communist books, etc. constitute a substantial Marxist-Leninist Library. Included are works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-Tung, Malenkov; copies of Cominform journal; Soviet and satellite magazines and books. (Photographs of this material were taken). Items of special interest:

a) A copy of the Report of the Secretary General of CP Guatemala, Jose Manuel Fortuny, to the Central Committee of that Party (16-17 February 1952) bearing the handwritten inscription:

"To the young and exemplary President of Guatemala, Jacabo Arbenz, with the deep affection of his friend —

Jose Manuel Fortuny"

b) Two copies of Fortuny's Report on the Activities of the Central Committee of CP Guatemala (11 December 1952); one copy of the Statutes of CP Guatemala (PGT); and a list of books available at the local Communist bookstore, Libreria Futuro. Also, two envelopes marked in pencil, "For Jose M.F." (probably Jose Manuel Fortuny).

c) Three copies of the short biography of Stalin published in Moscow. One bears a handwritten dedication to Arbenz' wife:

"To Maria Cristina:

The lofty example of the great should inspire us with optimism.

Matilde Elena Lopez

December 24, 1951"

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- d) A specially-bound edition of two of Mao's theoretical works, "On Practice," and "On Contradiction." Name of "ARBENZ" is stamped in gold on cover. It bears a handwritten inscription:

"To Colonel Arbenz, the two basic contributions
of Mao Tse Tung to universal Marxism,

Matilde Elena Lopez
24 December 1953"

It was also accompanied by a calling card of Matilde Elena Lopez bearing a handwritten inscription:

"Colonel Arbenz:

I am placing in your hands the two basic contributions of Mao-Tse-Tung-To Universal Marxism, and other important materials concerning Agrarian Reform in China. -- I want to talk to you to explain my plan for a Monograph on Agrarian Reform in Guatemala which will gather together, in clear and simple form, all that has been accomplished. I am awaiting your invitation since you said some time back that 'we should have a visit' Your health! (illegible notation: probably Lopez' initials). December, 1953."

The "other important materials concerning Agrarian Reform... in China" to which Lopez referred were apparently a typed copy of the Spanish-language "The Law on Agrarian Reform of the People's Republic of China" (Peking: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), which contains, in addition to said Law, a report by Liu Chao-Chi on Problems of Agrarian Reform, and the Statutes of Organization of the Peasant Federation.

2. The questions put to Arbenz, 5 June 1954, by the Army General Staff concerning Communist influence in the Government, and:
- a) a typed list of answers to Army questions.
 - b) four and one-fourth legal pages of advice on how to answer the questions. (The author is clearly a CP member -- very probably, Jose Manuel Fortuny).

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3. A brochure on Agrarian Reform containing a decision and "related documents":
 - a) Report by Isador Lubin, U.S. representative before the Economic and Social Council of the UN.
 - b) Statements by Secretary Acheson
 - c) Speeches by Willard L. Thorp and Henry G. Bennett
 - d) Resolution of the Economic and Social Council of the UN.
4. The page bearing the Table of Contents is annotated:

"Publications of the Department of State of Washington, D.C. -- United States of America.

Translation by the Office of Foreign Information of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Guatemala."
5. A discussion of the U.S.-Guatemala Commercial Treaty of 1936. Cites need for changes; possible action U.S. might take if treaty were denounced by Guatemala; and action that Guatemala could take to counteract the effects of the U.S. action.
6. A letter "to the Government of Guatemala, Guatemala City," from "Industrial and Technical Advisory Service," Genoa, Italy, dated 28 May 1954, referring to "previous correspondence" and offering for sale airplanes, submachine guns, and rifles. The planes were DC-6s, Consolidated Vultees, and DC-4s. The arms were from an Italian arms factory for which the writers were "sales delegates;" the arms would be supplied from a Swedish port.
7. Foreign Ministry Material
 - a) Documents: Cables (open and decoded) to and from Foreign Ministry, letters and memoranda of the Foreign Minister and Guatemalan Ambassadors; related materials.

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b) General Character of the Documents:

- 1) Telegrams and memoranda dated May-June 1954 from Guatemalan Ambassadors in Central America concerning movements of elements of the Army of Liberation and attitudes of the various governments.
- 2) A letter from the Honduran Foreign Ministry, 7 June 1954, declining to sign the additional friendship and non-aggression pact requested by Guatemala.
- 3) A copy of a letter 14 June 1954 from Foreign Minister Toriello to Minister of Government Augusto Charnaud and MacDonald, protesting against police outrages in Guatemala against a group of "honest and respectable" people.
- 4) A copy of General Lazaro Cardenas' Expression of Support of Guatemala (29 May 1954) and of Toriello's Expression of Thanks (31 May 1954).
- 5) Memorandum of the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations, 24 May 1954, rejecting a claim for \$15,854.89 against the Government of Guatemala, made by the U. S. State Department in the name of the United Fruit Company. Rejection is based on the Agrarian Reform Law.
- 6) A Guatemalan Foreign Ministry memorandum, undated, (apparently from G. Toriello to President Osorio of El Salvador, sent by Toriello via his friend Salvadoran Ambassador to Guatemala, Col. Jose Alberto Funes) praising El Salvador's fine attitude toward Guatemala in its hour of need, and asking that El Salvador employ its good offices to create a similar attitude on the part of Honduras; specifically, to put an end to the provocative acts of Guatemalan exiles which are being performed with the knowledge and "patience" of Honduras.

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7) A file of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry containing a resume, for the President, of (open and decoded) cables sent by the Foreign Minister to the Guatemalan Ambassadors to El Salvador, Cuba, Washington, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia, alleging the falsity of the U. S. State Department declaration that the Guatemalan Government had received a shipment of arms from Poland. Messages also cited U. S. efforts to call consultative conference of American States to "intervene" in Guatemalan affairs, and urged Ambassadors to win support Guatemala.

8) A blind memorandum containing notes "For a Conversation with Willy Toriello" (Guillermo Toriello, Guatemalan Foreign Minister). Notes urge practical steps to strengthen Guatemala's position in world public opinion in the face of U.S. criticism. The notes were clearly written by a person with special knowledge of high-level Mexican diplomatic/governmental affairs. Numerous steps are urged to win Mexican support of Guatemala. The notes recommend activity on the part of Arevalo and others. The aim is to win the support of the countries to which special emissaries are assigned--or at least to "neutralize them somewhat."

8. Communications directed to President Arbenz

a) Decoded telegram from Arevalo in Santiago, 31 May 1954, recounting pro-Guatemalan sentiment and Congressional action in Chile.

b) Telegram from a Departmental Governor, 18 June 1954, stating:

"Revolutionary (i.e. pro-Arbenz) political parties need arms. Enemy troops advanced via Shupa, Caparja, and Iela. We await orders. Urgent."

c) Memorandum 28 May 1954 from Jaime Rosenberg, Chief, Guardia Judicial, advising the President of the presidential aspirations and anti-Communist activities of a Deputy for the Department of Izabal.

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- d) Memorandum, 31 May 1954, from Rogelio Cruz Wer, Chief, Guardia Civil, urging cancellation of the visas of Guatemalan delegation to the anti-Communist Congress held in Mexico during May, 1954.
- e) A letter dated 3 April 1954 at the Hague by (quite apparently) a top Guatemalan diplomatic representative at Bern. It treats of the author's delay in obtaining data desired by the President; the printing of a 200-page brief (subject matter not stated); praise of Guatemala's firm stand at the Caracas Conference; and the author's desire to return home.
- f) Letter dated 23 June 1954 to President from Jaime Rosenberg, Chief of the Guardia Civil, transmitting a copy of the statements given by captured crew members of the ship, "Siesta", which arrived at Puerto Barrios loaded with arms and military supplies. Also included is the statement of a Guatemalan who was awaiting the shipment in Puerto Barrios and who signaled the ship upon its arrival. A memorandum note is attached to the top of the letter; the note points out that "all the persons mentioned in instant report were executed," except for a few who were hospitalized with serious wounds.

(The foregoing does not constitute a complete, itemized list. The Arbenz documents are being photographed and the originals and one set of prints will be returned to the Station).

II. Communist Party (PGT) Headquarters, 7 Calle #2-22, Guatemala City.

- A. Premises: Old dirty one-story building with seven offices.
- B. Documents: Numerous papers scattered about on floor, on desks, and protruding in disorder from desk and cabinet drawers and shelves. Stacks of propaganda material.
- C. General Character of Documents:
 - 1. Lists of CP departmental, section, and cell officials, organizational chart, membership books.
 - 2. Cases of expelled (or disciplined) CP members.

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3. Internal CP correspondence and Party-organ subscription lists.
4. Propaganda material -- handbills, newspapers, books.

(Note: The foregoing constitutes but a general appraisal, based on a very brief survey. A minute, lengthy examination of the copious material, paper by paper, may produce documents of a higher order than those cited. This observation applies equally to other premises and documents described herein.)

III. CGTG Headquarters, 9 Calle #10-71, Guatemala City.

- A. Premises: Old, dirty, two-story building. About 50 rooms occupied by the CGTG proper and affiliated trade union federations and unions.
- B. Documents: Thousands of papers scattered about in great disorder, in addition to some CGTG correspondence notebooks still bound in good order.
- C. General Character of Documents:
 1. CGTG correspondence-notebooks, in good order, on relations with WFTU, CTAL and some affiliated trade unions, especially peasant unions.
 2. Thousands of scattered letters, handbills, etc., of a routine trade union correspondence nature.
 3. CGTG propaganda material (and equipment) -- handbills, newspapers, booklets, pamphlets, wall-posters.

IV. Frente Universitario Democratico Headquarters, Avenida Simeon Canas #5-38, Guatemala City.

- A. Premises: Old, dirty, one-story building with c. 6 rooms.
- B. Documents: Hundreds of letters, handbills, pamphlets, etc. scattered about on the floor of two rooms.

A pile of half-burned letters, etc. (as above) in a patio; fire apparently put out by rain falling into patio.

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C. General Character of the Documents:

1. Circular letters from the WFDY.
2. Local letters re student-political affairs and personalities
3. Propaganda materials -- publications of WFDY, local "youth" handbills, pamphlets, newspapers, booklets.
4. A small pile of miscellaneous, routine peasant-federation records (left-over from previous tenancy).

V. Files and Documents Maintained in Room at Headquarters of the Guardia Civil, Guatemala City (Seized by the Guatemalan Army).

A. Documents: Six 4-drawer file cabinets, several drawers (removed from desks), three small cabinets containing addressograph plates, and small stacks of Communist propaganda material.

B. General Character of Documents:

1. The six file cabinets contain correspondence and records of the SAMF (R.R. workers union affiliated with the CGTG) and the Sociedad de Seguro Social del Gremio Ferrocarril (SSSGF).
 - a) Five of the cabinets are of little interest; they contain files which deal with industrial accidents and insurance-policy dossiers.
 - b) One cabinet is of moderate interest; it contains folder on the SAMF's relations with the CGTG, CTAL, WFTU, and some unions in Mexico and Central America.
2. Loose file and desk drawers contain miscellaneous SAMF and SSSGF correspondence, stamps, and pamphlets.
3. Two small cabinets containing addressograph plates appeared to pertain to the SAMF or the SSSGF; other small boxes of addressograph plates belonged to the peasant confederation (CNCG).
4. One box contained photographs of what appeared to be trade-union meetings, personalities, and Soviet-worker scenes (propaganda).
5. The Communist propaganda material consisted of Soviet and Guatemalan magazines, pamphlets, and handbills. (A stack of copies of the Moscow magazine, "Union Sovietica," bore wrappers addressed to The Libreria Futuro in Guatemala City.)

VI. Material Made Available to Station by Col. Ruben Gonzalez Sigui, Director of Guardia Civil (Retained in Station).

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A. Documents: Two sacks of books, magazines, pamphlets, and notes.

B. General Character of Documents:

1. The material consists, in very great part, of routine Communist books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, and handbills.
2. The most interesting and useful material consists of 3-ring notebook sheets listing CP Guatemala (PGT) officials, outstanding figures, key addresses, trade union leaders, names of anti-Communists, Communists who have traveled to Soviet orbit and Red China, leaders of other pro-Arbenz Parties. (Note: This material may be the notes of a non-Communist).
3. Mimeographed documents of the CP Guatemala relative to the statutes and program of the Party. (Note: Col. Gonzalez Sigui also made available a list of over 1900 arrested Communists).

VII. Additional Material from Col. Ruben Gonzalez Sigui
Received 7 July 1954 (Seized by Guatemalan Army).

A. Documents:

1. Telegrams (and typed abstracts of telegrams) apparently from the files of Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, Minister of Government.
2. Telegrams from peasant federation (CNCG) affiliates to CNCG headquarters. (Possibly passed on to Minister of Government).
3. Abstracts of telegrams sent from Departments (State, Provinces) to President and apparently passed on to Minister of Government.
4. Copies of censored cables of New York Times correspondent (Kennedy).

B. General Character of the Documents:

They reflect:

- a) Expressions of support of the Arbenz regime, during the hectic, critical June days, on the part of departmental governors and peasant affiliates of the CNCG.

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- b) Statements by peasant unions (affiliated with CNCG) re readiness to defend the regime with arms against the "imperialist invaders".
- c) Expressions of alarm, confusion and disbelief regarding Arbenz resignation.
- d) The determination of censors to keep the outside world from knowing about the fears of the government and the populace.
- e) Brief notices re planes sighted.
- f) Accusations of disloyalty (to Arbenz) on the part of certain provincial officials.
- g) Notices of various peasant uprisings.
- h) Pledges of support of the Arbenz regime on the part of the PRG.

VIII. Material Located in Office of Miguel Angel Mendizabal, Chief of the Guardia Judicial and Retained in the Office of the Director of the Guardia Civil (as of 10 July 1954).

A. Documents:

- 1. A small cardboard box filled with CP Guatemala documents and membership books (obtained by Mendizabal at CP headquarters in early July 1954).
- 2. A list of foreign "Marxists" who have been in Guatemala (with local addresses).
- 3. An alphabetical list of Guatemalan Communists (over 400) with local addresses.
(Note: Copies of items 2 and 3 were obtained for Station files).

B. General Character of the Documents:

- 1. The CP documents were mainly concerned with the Department of Guatemala; they list departmental officials; they are useful.

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2. The membership books did not belong to prominent Communists but they are useful for indexing and possible operational use on short-term basis.
 3. The lists of foreign "Marxists" and Guatemalan Communists are of use; the latter is of use as an arrest/search list.
- IX. Documents pertaining to former Chief of Guardia Civil, Rogelio CRUZ Wer (Obtained through Station channels).
- A. Documents: Four police-type reports to CRUZ, dated in 1952-53 re "subversive" activities.
 - B. General Character of Documents:
 1. One report, dated 11 December 1952, cites the activities of Guatemalan emigres (along the Honduran border) who were making contact in Guatemala with "Reactionaries." Unconfirmed information indicated that Col. Carlos CASTILLO Armas was among the emigres. Surveillance of the emigres was recommended.
 2. Another report, dated 27 June 1953, cited activities indicating an invasion of Guatemala backed by the United Fruit Company.
- X. Documents Obtained from the Palacio Nacional through Col. Jose Luis CRUZ Salazar (Then a member of the Junta).
- A. Documents:
 1. A study dated in January 1952, of the manner in which banana production and marketing could be handled in the event the United Fruit Company should withdraw from Guatemala.
 2. A list of the personal expenditures of President Arbenz' wife, from February through July 1952. (Total: \$15,323.19).
 3. Memoranda and correspondence directed to President Arbenz' wife, as President of the Instituto de Comedores y Guarderias Infantiles (ICGI), concerning trade union activities relative to same and concerning the withdrawal of a Communist woman from her post in the pertinent trade union. Also, a memorandum from the Communist woman to Jose Manuel FORTUNY, Secretary General of the CP Guatemala, concerning the same subject matter.

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XI. Documents Pertaining to Alfonso Martinez (Chief of the DAN, as of Arbenz fall). Obtained through Station sources.

A. Documents: Miscellaneous letters, receipts, certificates, memoranda, etc.

B. General Character of Documents (A few items of possible interest)

1. Martinez' Army papers reflecting his military training and activities.
2. Certification by Jose Manuel Fortuny, as Secretary General of the P.A.R. (December 1947) that Alfonso Martinez was an active member of the P.A.R.
3. Letters certifying (1948) that Martinez was engaged in carrying out a confidential mission abroad for the Guatemalan Government and instructing Guatemalan diplomatic representatives to provide necessary facilities. Also, receipts, bearing various names, for money received from Army for confidential missions. (Of interest in connection with reports of Alfonso Martinez' participation in the purchase of the notorious arms shipment, i.e., papers indicate a background for "confidential missions" for the Government.

(Note: As previously indicated, certain of the documents mentioned in the foregoing general notes, were brought back for briefing purposes; they are being photographed and returned to the Station).

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