

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

2003

22 March 1954

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, Project

FROM: Paul D. LANGEVIN

SUBJECT: SHERWOOD
Comments on Memorandum from Chief/Project dated 8 March

(Note: It is requested that LANGEVIN's memorandum on project for distribution of commercial type sets in target city be read before the following, to clarify comments on memorandum concerning distribution of sets among Indian and/or Ladrino population of isolated areas).

1. It is the opinion of SHERWOOD that Indian and Ladrino classes will never be effectively reached by short wave. Thus SHERWOOD does not anticipate successful operation in this field. It is doubtful, for instance, that an inquilino family would listen to short wave broadcasts even if they were so fortunate as to own an expensive and high caliber short wave set. They would listen to local music.

2. SHERWOOD does intend to reach inquilinos indirectly. In the regular course of clandestine build-up programs finca owners -- who usually own short wave sets and might easily be sympathetic to our arguments -- will be subtly informed that they can, through their servants, spread rumors beneficial to us. Through farm house servants, the word will be spread through the countryside: "Maria says that the patron is hearing such and such on his wonderful machine and that things are going bad for the commies -- and anyone who helps them." Such indecisive information, in the opinion of SHERWOOD, might be even more effective than direct contact among superstitious Indians.

3. Another point to consider: Are Indian and Ladrino types more likely to spring to the aid of the government, against us, if they hear only "that there's a big fight going on in the city"? If the latter is true the suggested distribution of 1,000 sets would work to our detriment.

4. SHERWOOD considers its plan to distribute 50 sets in the capital area to be a vital part of D-Day broadcast plans, and naturally is concerned with any other radio distribution plan which might jeopardize this operation. The distribution of such a large number of military sets, through commercial channels in nine isolated target areas presents a tremendous security. An effort of such magnitude would of necessity be carried out by the Rufus group, where the danger of penetration is always to be considered. If this project were blown authorities would naturally tighten up on all unusual radio set movement, thus frustrating SHERWOOD's city distribution scheme. (Which requires the action of only one witting agent -- and he would have

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to know only that the sets were to be placed by a certain time, and could be left ignorant that a panic broadcast is planned.)

5. In brief, SHERWOOD is leary of any project intended to increase a general listening audience to the possible detriment of the separate operation to insure city audience for panic broadcast.

6. The above, of course, reflects only the viewpoint of SHERWOOD without considering needs of FM and other operations. If the project were amended to have the 1,000 military style sets distributed on D-Day SHERWOOD would definitely welcome such action.

7. LANGEVIN is presently in target area. Before departure he made request that action on above be delayed until his return, when he will have a clear picture of the Indian/ Ladrino set up.

Paul D. LANGEVIN

PDL/ sgw
22 March 1954
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