

HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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2003

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. ~~X~~ HGG-A-1087

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS/~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Lincoln

DATE MAY 14 1954

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala []

Info: Washington

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

K Program

SPECIFIC—

[]

1. Attached please find a written brief which will be handed to ESQUIRE by Graham L. Page on 14 May 1954 and which should serve him as a general guide in further developing this operation. The main topics of the brief were discussed with NUTTING on 11 May 1954 in WSEBURNT.
2. Reference para. 8, the list referred to contains the names of CALLIGERIS' priming targets. As soon as [] evaluations have been received, the names of individuals considered responsive to further "priming" will be checked out with SECANT to determine what previous steps had been taken to enlist their support of PBSUCCESS. If SECANT's information is deemed satisfactory, i.e., if his and [] evaluations jibe, a tailor-made approach will be decided upon.

Graham L. Page

Encl: as noted

13 May 1954

Distribution:

- 2 - Lincoln w/encl
- 2 - Washington w/encl
- 1 - Files w/encl

15 MAY 1954

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS/~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

14 May 1954

In order to derive maximum benefit from the consejo's association with [] the lines laid down in our first two meetings should be vigorously pursued.

1. [] was told that we are weak in the capital and that at this stage we have no choice left but to execute the plans of the Junta which call for a frontal assault, doubtlessly entailing prolonged bloodshed. We have hinted, as delicately as possible, that this will be tantamount to turning the capital over to Mr. Castle, placing him in a position of political ascendancy from which it won't be easy to dislodge him. You can afford to be more forthright in emphasizing this aspect than, for obvious reasons, [] could be. You should, however, leave no doubt whatsoever in [] mind that the consejo's considers the plans of the Junta, as they now stand, practicable and that only concrete assurances of support in the capital could conceivably lead to their modification. As we see it, the issue of "concrete assurances" is a pivotal one in the sense that vague promises of a last-minute attempt to turn the scales against Mr. Big, while acceptable, lack sufficient substance to affect the consejo's strategic concept one way or the other.
2. As a practical example, the consejo wishes to establish through [] what troop commanders in the capital can firmly be depended upon to side with the insurrection. We are using the term troop commander in the broadest conceivable sense, not ruling out e.g. the second in command or the executive officer. In broaching this to [] bear in mind that he probably will reiterate his question of whether our plans call for the removal by force of certain troop commanders by their subordinates. This, as you well realize, is a ticklish question, and we would suggest you play it by ear, either evade it or - if appropriate - answering it bluntly in the affirmative. Especially in the "honor" outfit, whose CO appears irrevocably committed to the cause of Mr. Big, this may become an acute issue. You are specifically instructed to

ask [] whether he can recommend any officers in subordinate positions in that particular unit who can be counted upon in an emergency.

3. As you know, there are three military units in the capital with whose basic allegiance we are concerned. We wish to obtain "concrete assurances" regarding ranking officers (not necessarily the commanding officers) in those units. In concrete terms, [] should be able to classify all troops commanders (and their staff) stationed in the capital into roughly the following categories:
 - A. Anti-communist, but for certain reasons undecided and therefore unlikely to make up their minds before D-day.
 - B. Anti-communist, but for certain reasons undecided. If properly approached and convinced their cooperation is to be enlisted in a serious, well-planned and strongly supported enterprise, could be prevailed upon to align themselves with our cause.
 - C. Anti-communist, in their own minds firmly committed to participate in any serious attempt to unseat Mr. Big. Waiting to be approached.
4. You should point out to [] that we are primarily interested in categories B and C and that the consejo is prepared at any time to delegate an emissary who will contact the individuals involved for the necessary deliberations. Possible risks involved are primarily the danger of a disclosure of our plans to the government and the physical security of the emissary. The approach would as a general rule not be made on the strength of an introduction by [] except where this is clearly called for (e.g., in P's case).
5. The payoff of this operation, as far as the consejo is concerned, are "recruitment leads," i.e., operational data enabling the consejo to map and

execute a recruitment approach to a ranking officer, preferably an officer in command of troops. Your main responsibility at this stage of the operation is to sell [] on this concept. We cannot settle for anything short of this. This should involve the disclosure of the identities of the officers who, according to [] are bound by special oath to defend the country. We are particularly interested in those identities. [] may bridle at this, because (a) such disclosure would in effect violate the oath, and (b) Mr. Castle may get hold of the information. We leave it entirely up to you how you wish to handle this matter and what assurances have to be given in order to allay [] fears. Just bear in mind that these identities would be invaluable to the consejo.

6. You are hereby instructed to query [] regarding ranking officers known to him who are stationed in the following garrison towns:

MAZATENANGO
QUEZALTENANGO
QUICHE
SAN JOSE

For your information only: We are not too strong in those garrisons and are anxious to enlist some additional support. Any recruitment lead would be most welcome. The main criteria listed above for officers in the capital would also apply here.

7. Among the officers who fall under category B, there may be some who can be presumed fully responsive to indoctrination by [] himself. In other words: no independent approach by the consejo would be needed and we could just leave it up to [] to handle those cases. We shall, of course, require detailed information on what reaction was encountered on the part of the individuals involved.
8. The attached list of names pertains to certain officers in whom the consejo is interested. You are instructed to question [] about them with a view toward determining where they stand and whether an approach is feasible. If [] thinks he himself can indoctrinate one or the other, encourage him to do so even if this involves a trip to the provinces. (Needless to stress, any travel expenses would be borne by us). Since some of the individuals listed may already have been approached in Castle's behalf, they in fact may share []'s qualms about Castle. Tell [] that for the purpose of swaying them it will be quite all right if he stresses the fact that this is essentially an

American enterprise. Of course he will have to use his judgment on how far to go. Again - the consejo is prepared to make an independent approach if [] considers this advisable and secure.

9. You are hereby requested to tell [] that, as a standing instruction, he should collect all available data regarding:
- A. Information obtained by the government regarding the plans and activities of the Junta. We are particularly anxious to know who has obtained this information and what particular agency of the government was involved in collecting it. In other words, any information that may lead to the identification of government agents in our camp, would be of immense value. [] already mentioned certain information procured by the Military Attaché in San Salvador). For your guidance: [] will be prone to exaggerate the extent of compromise reflected in some of these disclosures. Your tactics should be never to share his anxieties, but to point out that in an enterprise as vast as ours leakages simply cannot be avoided altogether.
- B. Information on government plans to cope with an internal uprising or an "invasion." No doubt the government has for some time been working on such plans, premised mainly on the anticipation of an "invasion." We do not wish to disabuse the government of that notion. By way of illustrating the type of information we have in mind, mention to [] that certain shifts of troops have been rumored, involving a strengthening of the garrisons in Puerto Barrios and in Jutiapa. We wish to be kept posted on any such moves as soon as they occur.

10. We want you to keep after **[1]** to get the information sub-paragraphs A and B on a current basis. It is of the greatest importance to us. He should be able to get most of it through P who is doubtlessly conversant with the ideas of the government. Of secondary importance, but still useful, would be political information, even if unconfirmed or merely rumored.

11. Please reaffirm [] statement that the plans of the consejo are firmly set. Any rumors, therefore, suggesting behind the scenes negotiations or approaches to Mr. Big, whether originating with sex-starved females or with unemployed Army colonels can safely be discounted. As far as the United States is concerned, Mr. Big is in the communist camp and no longer susceptible to rational argument. The United States as a matter of considered policy is firmly decided to meet the challenge of communism in G. If Mr. Big is led to believe that the United States is wavering in its resolve, we shall do nothing to convince him of the contrary. He will suffer a rude awakening.
12. Tell [] that [] has communicated his views regarding local and concerted campesino uprisings to the consejo. The Junta is confident that it can effectively cope with any communist attempts to move campesino reinforcements, especially from the Esquintla area, to the capital. Regarding local uprisings, it is patently impossible and would lead to a needless dissipation of strength, to keep them in check. Everything in the consejo's power will be done, however, to convince the campesinos that the improvement of their social and economic status will continue under the new regime.
13. You are requested to point out to [] that the consejo is disappointed at P's obvious indecision. The consejo is convinced that P will, during the next two weeks, be provided with ample evidence of large forces at work in an attempt to overthrow Mr. Big and his regime. The consejo trusts that under the impact of those events, P will formally decide to join the cause of G freedom. Until such time, the consejo wishes [] to use his own judgment in determining to what extent P is to be let in

on the plans of the consejo.

14. Advise [] that the consejo is working on a programatic declaration, to be broadcast in the very near future to the officers' corps of the G Army. The consejo is anxious to solicit [] advice on what to say and how to say it. Please debrief him in detail on what his views are. Needless to stress these views will never be attributed to him. Ask him specifically, what kind of an appeal can be directed to those officers who are bound by special oath to defend G. What we have in mind is to devise a formula of appeal which will convey to all officers belonging to that group that in case of an uprising against Mr. Big their oath will become operative. We realize that this is a very delicate matter to raise with [] and it will be up to your persuasion to have him see the light.
15. We have some reason for believing that [] knows [] and that they are on fairly close terms. In fact, he may be the Colonel X to whom [] alluded on repeated occasions. He may also be the "friend" who urged [] to go to work on P. We would advise you to start off by asking a routine question regarding [] who is a regular Army officer []. If you consider this politic, you can pursue the issue to the point of putting to [] the blunt question whether [] is a close and trusted friend of his. You might also drop, more as an aside, the question whether [] has ever tried to establish contact with the gringos. The consejo is definitely interested in []