

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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RYBA:

2003
MEMORANDUM FOR

formed
J L J

16 November 1953

SUBJECT: PBSUCCESS - Preliminary Analysis of
RUFUS' Intelligence Assets

1. A study of the material available in HQS relevant to the assets and production of the RUFUS positive intelligence structure in Guatemala is set forth herewith to provide a general picture of the net structure allegedly in existence and pose certain questions to be answered when the case officer arrives in the field.

2. A review by the undersigned of all the intelligence reports which have been forwarded to HQS by RUFUS seems to indicate that at present there is but one major reporting source in Guatemala. This source is an alleged Communist Party penetration who holds a job in the PGT office in Guatemala City. Although this source, field cryptonym CIRO, appears to do most of his reporting on the basis of personal observations, some of the reports give the impression that he does have several sub-sources who on occasions have furnished him with information.

3. An evaluation of ~~C~~ CIRO was made by Staff C during August 1953 in which they pointed out the lack of detail and professionalism in his reporting, and raised considerable doubt as to his identity, job and reporting ability. In view of the material which Staff C had available to make the analysis, it is felt that their conclusions are justified. However, due to the lack of operational information available in HQS at this time, no attempt should be made to reach definite conclusions until such time as a first-hand investigation of the assets can be made.

4. On the strength of the information reports which CIRO has produced over the past few months, the following basic concepts are believed to be valid:

a. CIRO is a clerk or Admin. Asst. in PGT HQS. Although he represents himself as an "Official", the caliber of reports as well as the very evident lack of first-hand reporting would seem to indicate that this agent does not perform official functions of any consequence. In reading his reports, the impression that is left is that CIRO obtains the better part of his information by virtue of the fact that he is physically in an office which is frequented by party functionaries, and in this manner picks up a considerable amount of "shop talk", which he passes on. In addition, there are several

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references in CIRO's reports to his having been asked to locate documents in the files or handle correspondence of one type or another, which seems to substantiate the theory that his duties are more clerical than executive.

b. It appears that CIRO has access to certain correspondence between members of PGT(CP) who have gone abroad on special missions. There are several copies in the files which CIRO claims to have made of letters received in Party headquarters from surveillance teams used by the Party in neighboring countries to report on the activities of anti-government groups. There is nothing in the records to indicate where or how CIRO obtained this information, but when this can be determined, there may exist the basis for an excellent CE operation.

c. CIRO appears to be handled at present by an individual identified in the reports as P.C./1. This person seems to perform the function of an area agent, in that he transmits instructions and requests from RUFUS to CIRO and forwards CIRO's reports to RUFUS. There appear to be at least one cutout between RUFUS and P.C./1 and another between P.C./1 and CIRO. None of these individuals have been identified, nor can their number be determined with any degree of certainty. A diagram is attached showing the relationships which appear to exist at present in the CIRO reporting net.

d. With the exception of P.C./1, none of the members of the net have ever been identified, nor is there any indication that they are in any way controlled by RUFUS.

5. In light of the above, then, the best that can be said for the RUFUS intelligence structure is that it is a very loose and informal reporting group composed of individuals who pass on to RUFUS by means of letters, notes and conversations, any bits of information that they feel may be of interest to him.

6. As a first step in assessing RUFUS' intelligence assets in Guatemala it will be necessary to answer the following questions:

a. How many reporting sources are presently being contacted in Guatemala. Who are they? What are their positions? What control can be, or is, exercised over them at present?

b. How often do each of these sources report? What type of information are they in a position to produce? What production have they shown in the past?

- c. Does any single individual in Guatemala control all of the sources? If so, does he edit information or merely act as a courier/cutout? Does he give instructions to reporting sources (agents), or does he receive instructions from his superior, i.e., RUFUS?
- d. Have any security checks been made on individual agents? Does RUFUS have any independent sources for continuing checks on his sources?
- e. What communication channels exist within RUFUS' intelligence structure? How is material transmitted from sub-sources to P.C./1? How does P.C./1 forward this information to RUFUS?
- f. What security measures have been taken to safeguard transmittal of information from source to RUFUS?
- g. Why does P.C./1 send copies of all reports to RUFUS, rather than originals? What happens to raw reports after copies have been made?
- h. What is the identity of P.C./1? What is his position? How much does he know of the entire net structure in Guatemala?
- i. Is P.C./1 a reporting source? If so, what type of information can he produce? (It appears from reading his reports that he normally makes copies of information that is sent to him by his sources but on occasion he seems to be in a position to provide information himself.) See Report No. 146, 19 Sept.53.
- j. Does RUFUS have any undeveloped resources, i.e., penetrations, resident agents, contacts within the Guatemala military structure? If so, will it be possible to recruit sterile couriers to contact these individuals?
7. During Phase I, then, the case officer will proceed to Honduras and endeavor to obtain the specific operational information outlined above. Only when the sources, sub-sources and channels have been identified and brought under control will it be possible to begin a proper evaluation of the intelligence production.

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HONDURAS

RUFUS

CUTOUT

PC/1 (Area agent
(Possible reporting source))

CUTOUT

GUATEMALA

CIRO (C.P. Penetration)
(Reporting source)

Alleged access to CP
correspondence with
teams in foreign
countries

Majority of reporting
on basis of office
documents and personal
observation