

CONTACT REPORT

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

DATE: 1145, 23 November 1953

PLACE: [] []

PERSONS PRESENT: []

COVER USED: None

DISCUSSION: [] introduced [] describing him as the person who would be responsible within the Communications division for the implementation of PBSUCCESS communications tasks. The discussion which followed was primarily a briefing for [] as to the background of the communications aspects of PBSUCCESS. From this discussion the following additional information developed:

A. Staff Circuit - This circuit would provide communication between

[]

assured that the R/O could be made available immediately.

B. Santa Fe. A review was made of the available information on the island and [] thought we had adequate data to project his needs which he would undertake soonest in order to negotiate further arrangements to accommodate same. It developed that the island was serviced by the [] Tampa, Florida, usually on a 3-4 weeks interval. [] said that most of his equipment would be in vans and could easily be covered as [] equipment and thus could be shipped by the same shipping company in the normal manner. In order to have a planning date [] was informed that 1 January should be established as the earliest possible date at which broadcasts can commence and he agreed to plan to meet this date for this particular broadcast. This broadcast would be short-wave and would closely parallel that of the target government in order to gain the advantage of listeners coming across it while tuning in the government broadcasts. At the right time, when so desired, this broadcast could be moved up to the government frequency. The matter of air dropping scripts/tapes was discussed and agreed upon as entirely feasible.

Ghost Voice - The manufacturers are currently engaged in preparing the necessary apparatus to carry out this operation and it was the General's opinion that the earliest date that this could be set up in the field would be on/about 1 March. He was encouraged to proceed on that date as there was strong likelihood that the plan would proceed as scheduled and that that would be adequate time to meet the requirements of the project.

The General agreed to provide a radio circuit between Santa Fe and Miami, recognizing the importance of such communications. This would be serviced directly by Washington and relayed to Miami.

C. Agent Circuits. The General informed [] that a [] had been called back to fulfill this requirement for a Spanish-speaking radio operator instructor. He was highly recommended by the General. He said, however, that he would require about 3 weeks refresher training in December before he would be ready for the field. The General was given 1 January as an approximate date for commencement of training at Pto. Cabezas. It was agreed that [] would maintain radio communications with Panama for the operations at Pto. Cabezas, thus providing a link to this location. The concept of establishing agent message centers within the target country was discussed fully. The General concurred in the entire feasibility of the plan but cautioned that it would be unrealistic to expect good R/Os to be turned out in less than 90 days unless, of course, the students demonstrated exceptional aptitude or previous radio operator experience. Accordingly, the matter of voice radios was carefully considered and the security danger fully recognized. [] pointed out that although voice could possibly be used in code, such a short range system would place the control of these nets within the hands of the local indigenous leader, thus circumventing the control that was highly desired by Project Headquarters. Various types of radio sets were discussed and the General concluded by saying that he would give the matter further study to determine whether a simpler, more rapid means of communication could be devised which would afford both security and control. Meanwhile, the General was told to go ahead on the basis that the 90-day training period would not seriously hamper or delay the program as presently envisioned.

D. Tactical Circuits - This circuit would provide for communications between the field headquarters and FM teams once the latter have been deployed within the target area. It was agreed that a simple voice type procedure could be adopted, using ANCR-9 sets. It was recognized that this tactical circuit for maximum efficiency and effectiveness should be controlled by the indigenous field commander. Training of operators for this circuit would be handled concurrently with the agent training at Pto. Cabezas.

E. Jammer. Owing to the possibility that the sabotage measures might fail at the last minute and that the government might be able to stay on the air, it was planned that a jamming set would be cached in a safehouse in Guatemala City to off-set such a contingency. The object here would be to jam all communications rather than permit the enemy to continue his broadcast which could very well have a disastrous effect. This would be continued until such time as the sabotage of the enemy's transmitters could be effective.

2. It was agreed that the above course of action would be followed pending the assessment by []

DECISIONS: As indicated above.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is apparent that a firm cover must be established with [] in order to carry out the above operational activities with maximum security. Accordingly it is recommended that careful study be given to the establishment of such a cover at an early date.

[]
24 November 1953