ČIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

24 November 1953



ATTENTION:

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SUBJECT: SS

Conference with DD/P re PBSUCCESS

TIME:

1130 hours, 24 November 1953

PLACE:

DD/P's office

PRESENT:

DD/P; CWH; C-PPC; C-PP/Ops; and

Chief of Station, Guatemala

1. Use of Military Missions: DD/P had called the meeting with the main intent to discuss the military missions currently stationed in Guatemala City and possible exploitation of same in connection with PBSUCCESS.

He asked [](Chief of Station) about said missions. [] stated that the army mission consisted of four officers headed by Col. Tom Hanford; the Air Force mission consisted of three officers headed by Col. Hutchinson. Both these senior officers were, ir [] estimation, excellent men; Hanford was more of an extrovert than Hutchinson who never talked much, especially not about political matters or international relations. [] did think, however, that both men could be used as indicated in DD/P's memos to DDCI and DCI, dated 19 and 20 November 153 respectively. (DD/P wants [] to see these memos.)

[](PPC) had discussed the missions and the possible use of same as indicated in the above with Col. Brad Smith of Gen. Erskine's staff, mainly to prepare for the recall of Hanford and Hutchinson for briefing. [] volunteered that Hutchinson was supposed to be in the United States at Kelly Field where an airplane belonging to the Embassy was supposed to be overhauled. It was suggested that Hutchinson might be called to Washington for his briefing in connection with this visit.

DD/P immediately telephoned Col. Brad Smith suggesting that he endeavor to verify Hutchinson's presence in the U.S. and call him to Washington for a briefing if feasible. At the same time, DD/P stated that Col. Hanford of the Army mission could be briefed abroad, if someone (e.g., Col. Smith himself) went to Guatemala with proper credentials from a top-flight Defense representative to do the job.

It is ascertained that the two mission Cols. came under the jurisdiction of G-3 of the Army and the Air Force respectively. Col. Brad Smith

would take care

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would take care of the issue concerning the use of said missions. He would verify the status of the officers as to normal termination of duty tours, etc.

(FOLLOW -UP ACTION:

3. OAS Meeting in Caracas, March 1958: DD/P inquired what could be done to alert field stations to watch for possible Communist tricks and maneuvers in respect to the planned OAS meeting in Caracas. DD/P was anxious to avoid any kind of embarrassment that might be caused by customary Communist activities in connection with meetings of that nature. J. C. King (CWH) indicated that certain preparations were already completed in Venezuela where ten leading Communists were scheduled for jailing or other neutralization prior to the meeting. DD/P requested a complete report from J. C. King concerning alerting of field stations relative to the Caracas meeting.

(ACTION: J. C. King)

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indicated that

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indicated that this would be all right, but DD/P suggested that the working group take up this question forthwith for further deliberation before a final reply was given to Col. Brad Smith.

(ACTION: PBSUCCESS working group.)

HANS V. TOFTE Chief, PP/Ops

C-PP/Ops/HVT:mgd
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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#2. Have written memo & Tofte #4. Because of possible gentomes between the three countries, 3 US musican would be preferable. To convey the effect of concerted action, Lowever, a single US group in Washington should head them up of their should be publicly stated. Fro - 1 7

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