

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

CONTACT REPORT

2003

DATE : 1630, 9 December 1953

PLACE : []

PERSONS PRESENT: Messrs. Leddy and Tofte
[]

COVER USED : None

DISCUSSION :

1. [] gave Mr. Leddy a general briefing of the
[] Base.

2. [] explained the courier arrangements. Field stations will send their action copies to [] and information copies to Washington. The action copies pouch will have an outer envelop addressed to the [] pouch center, and an inner envelop addressed to []

[] of RI, will prepare a letter to the State Department courier service, requesting it to prepare a letter authorizing the bearer, a [] courier, to receive all pouches so addressed to the [] courier center, and to deliver pouches for forwarding. In this way the pouch center in [] will not be aware of any CIA interest in the pouches addressed to []

3. Action

It was agreed that if [] ran into any difficulties, Leddy would arrange to have the appropriate instructions issued to the [] courier center.

4. Mr. Leddy was given a brief preview of what the PBSUCCESS assessment would show. He was also informed of the manner in which Roberto Barrios y Pena and General Ydigoras Fuentes were to be handled.

5. Mr. Leddy was shown the OO contacts report (source probably []), relative to the plans of revolutionary groups in Guatemala.

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~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

6. Action

Mr. Tofte is to arrange with [] for better project liaison and servicing by the overt side of CIA.

7. Mr. Tofte reported that [] was making slow progress in convincing the Army and Air Force that their Attaches and Mission Chiefs in Guatemala should give even limited and unwitting assistance to the objectives of PBSUCCESS. Mr. Leddy reported that he had just briefed the proposed new Attaches in Guatemala. The present military personnel was to be withdrawn early in 1954 and the new men were to take up their posts by about 15 March. All participants in the discussion felt that it would be better to have the present U.S. military personnel retained on the spot. If their Washington superiors would not cooperate, Agency personnel in the field might be able to work out personal arrangements with the military men for their assistance to PBSUCCESS.

8. Action

Mr. Tofte said he would speak to [] on 10 December and take whatever other steps were appropriate to get the present Military Attaches kept on in Guatemala.

9. The limited effectiveness of the present PBSUCCESS "working group" was discussed. [] emphasized that work on the project fell into two parts; strategic and tactical. Strategic aspects, such as the arrangement of the Military Attaches ^{Assistance} pacts, State Department pronouncements, etc., would have to be handled by the "working group" in Washington. The tactical aspects would be handled in the field. Mr. Leddy agreed that the "working group" had so far done little more than exchange information. No decision was arrived at as to how the "working group" might be beefed up.

10. Mr. Leddy stated that Lampton Berry had informed Assistant Secretary Cabot that a CIA plan of action on Guatemala was in preparation and that Mr. Leddy had been called in as a consultant on it. Mr. Cabot showed no hurt feelings at having been left in the dark. He did express real concern as to the feasibility of any course of action. However, he stated that it was worth taking a chance on the matter, and if action did succeed, he was confident that the other Latin American countries would speedily approve of the change in the situation.

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-3-

11. The matter of informing CAA more fully on the plans for Santa Fe was discussed. Mr. Leddy was dubious whether General Smith would have either the "time or perspective" to discuss the matter with CAA. Leddy also expressed himself as opposed to informing CAA as to the purpose of the PBSUCCESS installation on Santa Fe.

12. Action

C I agreed that, for the time being, we should go ahead with Santa Fe planning on the basis that CAA would not be cut in.

13. Leddy reported that he had known for one week that Willauer's chances of being appointed Ambassador to Honduras were zero. Coerr, the future counselor and deputy chief of the Embassy, is slated to go down to Tegucigalpa on 1 February. Coerr is said to have done a very good job for three years in Indonesia.

14. C I status was again discussed. Leddy claimed that C I papers had not even arrived at the State Department. C I replied that State had acknowledged receipt of the papers on 24 November, that C I himself had seen the basic paper on C I and had promised quick action on integration. The fact that Ambassador Erwin would put obstacles in the way of C I work was again discussed. C I asked Leddy if General Smith would issue instructions to Ambassador Erwin requesting normal working rights for C I within the framework of the 1949 State-CIA agreement. Leddy ventured the opinion that "the chances are it could be done."

15. Action

Mr. Tofte will see DD/P on 10 December to see if, through high level CIA-State liaison, appropriate instructions can be issued to the Ambassador.

16. The military assistance pacts were discussed. The letter from the Department of Defense on the pact with Nicaragua reached State Department on 17 November and the letters on Honduras and El Salvador reached the Department on 2 December. FOA'S letter on all three is now at the White House and Presidential approval for initiating the pacts is expected by 10 December. The three Ambassadors have been informed of pact plans but have received no instructions to act. Present

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

-4-

plans call for equipping one infantry battalion each in Honduras and El Salvador. George Spencer, State Department contact man with the Department of Defense, will not let Leddy see the papers so that Leddy does not know what is contemplated for Nicaragua. Since Nicaragua requested a pact, negotiations will be initiated with them first and the other two countries will be notified that such assistance is available to them also. El Salvador has submitted a list of arms that it desires, but it wants the pact kept secret until the arms arrive. As things now stand in Honduras, it is doubtful how pact negotiations with that country will go. [] referred to a conversation on 17 November with Lampton Berry, during which [] stated that even while the negotiations were being prepared, a small working group should be set up in the Pentagon to determine what arms must be sent to the three countries and to make sure that the arms are available. Leddy replied that nothing had been done about setting up this group. He said that he thought that it was primarily the psychological effect of pact negotiations that was desired, not the actual shipment of arms. [] replied that action, in the form of arms shipments, would obviously have greater psychological impact.

17. Action

Mr. Tofte is to see DD/P, to arrange a high level CIA contact with Under Secretary Keyes. Mr. Keyes is to be asked to arrange for the availability and shipment of arms to the three Central American countries as soon as circumstances permit.

18. []

are still some difficulties with Czayal, the administrative officer of ARA, who wants to but [] through the regular [] Commission's procedure. Mr. Leddy also stated that [] would simply be detailed to [] [] There []

19. Action

[] to follow up on [] and his own status. []

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SECURITY INFORMATION

-5-

20. Mr. Leddy left copies of Toriello's November 17 remarks before the COAS, and of a report by Mr. Krieg of the U. S. Embassy in Guatemala on the opinions of Flores Avandano, a participant in the Salama uprising who has since found refuge in Nicaragua.

C J
10 December 1953

cc: Mr. Tofte

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