

EYES ONLY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

30 December 1953

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : PBSUCCESS

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to pass on to you and the others directly concerned with this operation certain points requiring the application of immediate consideration as well as certain material and information relevant to the above-mentioned program. I appreciate that you are already familiar with certain of the points and information set forth in this memorandum but I am including them nevertheless for the purpose of emphasis and in order to be certain that appropriate action is being taken by all concerned. Incidentally, I propose to call a meeting early next week for the purpose of following up on some of these points and also to discuss ways and means of keeping all of the staff currently informed of the most recent developments which have a bearing upon their respective responsibilities.

2. In a conversation which took place in the Director's office on 28 December 1953 with Mr. Cabot, the latter repeated to the Director and myself his full acceptance of the necessity for this operation and his understanding that all actions be appropriately coordinated. He expressed himself as being most eager to perform any of the responsibilities which State should undertake and appeared to be fully aware of the importance of proper timing and follow-through. We discussed to some extent the Ambassador's telegram of 23 December and Mr. Cabot agreed with my point that some of the more sensitive aspects of this message might better have been sent via our channels. He indicated that he might drop a personal note to the Ambassador along these lines, but I think this is a matter which we should check with him again early next week to see what he has done. More important, we undertook to consider all of the various proposals put forward by the Ambassador in his telegram, and having gotten up our own position as to the desirability and feasibility of each of these proposals, to sit down with him, Ray Leddy and Dick Berry early next week to exchange ideas and assign responsibility for action. We said to Mr. Cabot that we considered that the withdrawal of the military mission would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

be premature at the present time and he appeared to agree. There was some discussion of the proposal that there should be a suspension of POL shipments and it was agreed that this should be further studied. (Just where do we stand on this item and who, if anyone, has undertaken to carry the ball -- i.e. just what is the status of this matter at the present time.) If anything has been done with the shippers and suppliers of POL, who should approach them as between ourselves and State and what should be the nature of the proposal and approach. Concerning the proposed campaign through columnists and radio commentators for volunteer refusal of American coffee importers to buy coffee, Mr. Cabot expressed some concern on the grounds that it might be dangerous to stir up US public opinion prematurely. His thought was that if public opinion should become too aroused and excited, there might be embarrassing demands for action upon the Government from Congressional and other quarters which would be premature, or in some cases altogether infeasible. In other words, he thought that the domestic pot should not be brought to a boil too soon. The real target for this aspect of the "war of nerves" would be the people of the target area, including in particular those who would be the most directly injured by a boycott. Action is required at the present time in this connection: we should see to it that word is spread about in the target area to the effect that there have been meetings of the principal coffee importers of this country and that they are currently considering the reduction and even the suspension of their coffee importations, and that because of their hatred of Communism, it appears likely that at least some of them would be willing to accept the damage to their private business which would be entailed.

3. Mr. Cabot emphasized the importance of a quick culmination of the "operational" aspects of the program once they have actually begun. If the matter sputters and drags out, there will be "the most awful mess" and other nations will probably become involved disadvantageously.

4. Attached hereto is a dispatch which reached my desk yesterday afternoon from our Chief of Station enclosing the full text of the Ambassador's memorandum of conversation which formed the basis of a portion of his telegram of 23 December. This should be carefully studied by all concerned since there are items of information and other points and suggestions apparent in this material which we can work on and make use of as PP themes and otherwise.

DD/P:FGW/vmh 30 December 1953
Orig & 1 cc: Addressee
cc: C/OPS/PP ✓
DD/P "Eyes Only" file

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

~~SECRET~~