

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Comments submitted by
[] after reading
PB Success plan.*

2003

20 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. J. C. King
SUBJECT: PBSUCCESS

Here are a few of my spontaneous impressions which may be of interest.

1. I am very much concerned about the international consequences of visible signs of U.S. official support, especially in case the violent steps planned for the final stages must be carried out to achieve the objectives of PBSUCCESS.
2. It seems that it is now time to re-examine the extent to which U.S. Government intentions have already been compromised.
3. If the U.S. Government is going to be obliged to show its hand to achieve success, we would be better off attempting to do the entire job economically (economic warfare), which we probably could do; we would stigmatize our international reputation less through economic intervention than through military intervention.
4. We should bear in mind that the closer RUFUS gets to the target, the less will be (and the less should be) our control. It would therefore be unwise now to make the U.S. hand conspicuous as a necessary sacrifice to maintain control.
5. I am not sold on overt U.S. pressure in most cases. The U.S. declaration about the upcoming Caracas Conference is a case in point. Some other Latin American country should have been induced to speak first. We should be careful about this in all phases of PBSUCCESS; otherwise the effect will be to consolidate the target people in support of their president. This is apparently what we did in Argentina during the forties.
6. The "Memo for the Record" of 12 November 1953, gives as the first objective of PBSUCCESS, "To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible....." This implies intensive PP action before the paramilitary force is employed. According to the record, RUFUS fears that advance PP action will cause a premature, abortive and hence a delaying, coup. But RUFUS must also fear a change of regime without his being on hand to carry the banner. Therefore, his views about advance PP action are probably not entirely objective.
7. My first impression is that the greatest weakness in the KUGOWN aspects of this operation is, and will continue to be, lack of control. This is a necessary evil born of security, the numbers of people and distances involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

100-2-20

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

In order to take up the slack, I believe some of our PP developments, from now on out, should be in the form of activities conducted only by U.S. citizens; example -

- (a) Print coffee advertising similar to that disseminated by the target country's Department of Agriculture. Use as a slogan - "Only Guatemalan Coffee is Free of the Injurious Tarbinaldehyde". Send these folders to coffee buyers throughout Europe and the U.S.A. This would help to discredit the target with other coffee-producing countries.
- (b) Using our own aircraft, make high altitude drops of black materials over the target, in case it is not otherwise operationally feasible.
- (c) Use a small naval craft, 2000 tons or less, to usurp the target's radio long-wave bands. The ship would broadcast bona fide programs recorded earlier by our station in target country. The programs would be interspersed with statements by target labor leaders defiling the fat, rich and lazy army of the target country.

We could also fake some broadcasts from Moscow praising the target leader for his paternalistic guidance of the five countries in his area, his ability to give the lion's share of the fruits to labor without incurring the ill-will of the Army, etc.
- (d) We should try to start a distasteful black campaign, mailing to other countries of the area pamphlets eulogizing in nauseating terms "JACOBO y MARIA" as the guardian angels of the area. (Similar to the "JUAN y EVITA" approach). We would have to get target stamps and postmarks.
- (e) Covert economic pressures could be initiated now, but the U.S. hand (and certainly the U.S. official hand) would have to remain hidden. The ideal way would be to hang the blame for diminishing supplies of oil, newsprint, etc. on target labor. But even engine trouble aboard a U.S. tanker at sea would probably be very difficult, operationally, to arrange. Preclusive buying of the usual target imports would be effective, but difficult operationally. Any internal monetary maneuvering would probably cause enduring difficulty for the consolidation team after D-day. There are a few import items critical to target industry on which we could work; - dyes is one such item.

8. My remaining miscellaneous thoughts are: -

~~TOP SECRET~~

02 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

(a) We must choose and use a liberation slogan which will appeal to both army and labor.

(b) We should promote ARANA as the martyr.

(c) 15 September is National Independence Day; the armed forces will be off-balance because of the usual parades; most of the people will be half-unconscious from overeating and over-drinking; - D-Day?

(d) RUFUS will have an easier time getting recruits from neighboring countries under the banner - "UNION CENTROAMERICANA CONTRA COMUNISM". At least fourteen Central American armies have been organized since 1821.

(e) Certain parts of the PBSUCCESS project require considerable physiographic and logistical research. It is suggested that G-2, ONI, and A-2 already have most of these data in their monographs. (e.g. - power stations, telephone centrals, water conduits, fortifications, mountain passes, level-covered ground for staging areas).

9. I feel that a lot of excellent thinking has gone into the project and will undoubtedly alter some of my first-hand impressions after a few days at Lincoln.

[]

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - CWH

cc: []

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 2