

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

AIR POUCH

HUL-A- 129

~~SECRET/RIBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

MAR 2 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

INFO: Wash

Operational

[] - Objectives and Development

REF: HUL-A-90(23 February 1954)

1. Our current review of independent operational assets, which can be developed through the facilities of your Station, has led us to considering certain potential uses to which Subject could be put in support of PBSUCCESS' objectives. This speculative discussion of matters relating to the post-recruitment phase of the operation may strike you as premature. We feel, however, that the success of this operation would be ample recompense for painstaking planning.

2. Although this may be begging the question, it is our feeling that Subject's potential use as a source of political intelligence is probably limited, whereas he may loom large as an important factor in our political action program. While for the present most of our eggs are in CALLIGERIS' basket, we are casting about for alternate solutions in case he should fail us and some of the questions put to you should be viewed against the background of that contingency.

3. []'s Official Position

It is our understanding that Subject is []

a. What was the political background of this appointment? b. How close is Subject's relationship with AREVALO and ARBENZ? c. What are his specific administrative and political functions? d. How close is he to the center of power? e. Does he attend cabinet meetings? f. Does he have direct and private access to ARBENZ?

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4. Political Dissent

- a. What are the roots of his political philosophy?
- b. What are the reasons for his disgruntlement with the ARBENZ regime?
- c. Is his opposition of recent vintage?
- d. Is his oppositional stand widely known?
- e. Is he opposed to the reforms of the ARBENZ regime per se, or does he merely resent the increasing influence of Communism?
- f. Is he known to be close to any of the coalition parties?
- g. Who are his closest political friends?
- h. Does he "have the goods" on ARBENZ? Does his retention in the cabinet serve to effectively neutralize a potentially important segment of the resistance?
- i. Is he on record as favoring or deprecating U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of Guatemala?
- j. Does he feel that the social gains of the ARBENZ regime should be retained, or does he favor political retrenchment?

5. Army Relations

- a. Does Subject have a following among the officers' corps of the Guatemalan army?
- b. Is his holding a cabinet post liable to alienate the officers' corps' confidence in him?
- c. Does Subject actively mend his fences among Guatemalan officers?
- d. Has Subject's name ever been mentioned as possible candidate for the Defense Ministry?

6. Political Future

- a. Does Subject have any political ambitions?
- b. Would he covet a leading position in a resistance movement aimed at overthrowing the ARBENZ regime?

c. Does he aspire to the Presidency?

7. Political Independence

a. Would Subject be prepared, for the sake of the cause, to subordinate his political views and aspirations to the program of one Guatemalan resistance movement?

b. Would Subject be prepared to associate himself with private American interests dedicated to toppling ARBENZ?

c. Would Subject resent becoming associated with American interests in the public mind?

8. Intelligence Potential

a. Does Subject have the capability to build up and develop from outside the country a system of controlled political and military sources?

b. Could he be induced to lay the necessary groundwork prior to leaving the country?

9. Personal Affairs

a. What personal considerations would determine Subject to go into political exile?

b. What personal considerations would weigh with him in a decision not to go?

c. What specific commitments would Subject desire as regards his and his family's personal and economic security while in exile?

d. What, in terms of financial losses, would his flight from Guatemala entail?

10. Political Action Program

a. Would Subject be prepared to actively participate in a political action program conducted under unofficial American auspices?

b. Specifically, would Subject accept an overt position in a resistance movement, composed of prominent exiles?

c. Would Subject be willing to actively participate in a psychological warfare program, involving black and white propaganda, including radio broadcasts? What would be his capabilities in this field?

d. Would Subject be willing to take a leading position in the planning and conduct of paramilitary operations? What would be his capabilities in that field?

11. Defection - Immediate Effects

a. Would Subject's defection have a major impact upon the political stability of the ARBENZ regime?

b. Would this impact be augmented by a propaganda campaign, following on the heels of his defection, setting forth and elaborating upon the reasons for his exile, viz. the increasing influence of Moscow-controlled Communism?

c. Could Subject's defection conceivably precipitate a Communist move to take over the Guatemalan government?

d. What would be the effect upon ARBENZ personally? Would it affect his position?

e. What would be the reaction of other Central American countries?

12. We are aware that few if any of the above-listed questions can be answered by you at this stage. As a matter of fact, presumably only Subject himself can answer the majority of them. Given the hypothetical case of a face-to-face meeting between Subject and an American representative, these are some of the sample questions (excepting para 7b, c) which we would like to have asked of him.

13. In referenced dispatch, which was predicated on the assumption that Subject's potential is primarily of a RUFINE nature, we set forth certain operational factors which will have to be cleared up as an indispensable prerequisite to developing this lead. Inasmuch as we consider this operation still in the "thinking out loud" phase, we see no virtue in consistency and prefer an exploratory exchange of views bearing on all aspects of the operation and its ultimate objectives. To emphasize this once more, LINCOLN attaches great importance to this lead and expects that you devote to it all the effort you feel you can spare.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

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