





Intelligence Information Cable



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
DIRECTORATE OF PLANS



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

DIST 12 MAY 1972



COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/JAPAN/CHINA

DOI : MARCH - MID-MAY 1972

SUBJECT :

CONCERNING NORTH VIETNAM'S PLANS TO
NULLIFY ANY U.S. BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG




1. COMMENT :



RECEIVED A CABLED MESSAGE

TO ARRANGE FOR THIPMENTS
TO BE SENT BY EITHER SOVIET OR BLOC SHIPS.

2. THE CABLE SENT



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APPROVED FOR RELE
DATE: NOV 2002

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

WHICH HAD A SHIPMENT OF GOODS AWAITING SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS. THE MESSAGE ALSO INSTRUCTED THE COMPANY TO SHIP THE CARGO TO HONG KONG FOR TRANSFER TO A NORTH VIETNAMESE SHIP.

3. IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION FURTHER, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT DURING THE MARCH - APRIL VISIT TO JAPAN OF A HIGH RANKING NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC DELEGATION, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAM ANTICIPATED A REACTION BY THE U. S. TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM OF EITHER BOMBING OR A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG. [REDACTED] THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD PLANS TO COPE WITH THIS SITUATION. [REDACTED] SAID THAT FIRST OF ALL, NORTH VIETNAM HAD TWO MINESWEEPERS WHICH WOULD BE USED TO CLEAR A CHANNEL INTO THE PORT WHEN A CONVOY OF SHIPS ACCUMULATED OUTSIDE THE PORT AREA. IF THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO AIR ATTACKS ON THE MINESWEEPERS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD REQUEST CHINESE, SOVIET AND BLOC SHIPS TO PROCEED TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, THEN ALONG THE COAST OF CHINA THROUGH THE STRAITS BETWEEN HAINAN ISLAND AND

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

THE CHINESE MAINLAND. FROM THERE THE SHIPS WOULD PROCEED WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF CHINA ALONG THE COAST TOWARDS HAIPHONG. IF ENTRY TO THE PORT COULD BE ACHIEVED BY SWEEPING OR EVADING THE MINES, THIS WOULD BE DONE. IF THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE, THE CARGO WOULD BE INLOADED AS CLOSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER AS POSSIBLE IN CHINA AND THEN TRUCKED ACROSS THE BORDER INTO NORTH VIETNAM.

[] INDICATED THAT THE STRAITS BETWEEN HAINAN AND MAINLAND CHINA MIGHT NOT ACCOMMODATE SHIPS OF VERY LARGE SIZE OR VERY DEEP DRAFT BUT THAT THIS METHOD WOULD BE FEASIBLE IN

ALMOST ALL CASES. SHIPS WOULD BE UNLOADED BY LIGHTERS, WHICH MIGHT DELAY SUPPLIES REACHING NORTH VIETNAM, BUT DELAYS COULD BE OVERCOME USING CHINESE ASSISTANCE IN OFF LOADING OPERATIONS.

ALL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF CHINA WHERE U.S. AIR ATTACKS WOULD BE AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS NORTH VIETNAM.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. AIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE CITY OF HAIPHONG AND HANOI ITSELF, []

[] OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

ECONOMIC DELEGATION HAD TOLD HIM THAT ATTACKS AGAINST THE CENTER OF HANOI ITSELF WOULD BE UNLIKELY SINCE THE U.S. KNOWS THAT ITS PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) WERE KEPT THERE IN LARGE NUMBERS: [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE HANOI PRISON AT THE INTERESECTION OF DAI LO HAI BA TRUNG AND PHO QUAN SU (WJ 884248) WAS THE LOCATION OF ONE-FOURTH TO ONE-THIRD OF THE U.S. POW'S PRESENTLY HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM.

5. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~