


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# SPECIAL REPORT

ANTI-PORTUGUESE CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA SHIFTS TO MOZAMBIQUE

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18 December 1964

ANTI-PORTUGUESE CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA SHIFTS TO MOZAMBIQUE

A long-range African nationalist offensive against Portuguese rule in Mozambique has apparently begun. Since September, there has been a series of attacks on military patrols, administrative centers, and communications facilities in northern Mozambique and in the area near the southern tip of Malawi. These attacks have been conducted by Mozambique nationalists based in Tanzania, and probably in Malawi. At present, the nationalists are ill-equipped for any serious challenge to the Portuguese, who have 21,000 troops in the country and are determined to maintain control. The nationalists' long-range potential is being enhanced, however, by greatly increased training, arms, and funds supplied by radical African and Communist sources. The growing interest in Mozambique on the part of African leaders generally may in part reflect their dissatisfaction with the lagging nationalist movement in Angola, and their anxiety to produce concrete results in the effort to liberate white-dominated southern Africa.

Nationalist Organizations

The major Mozambique nationalist organization is the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Based in Tanzania and led by Eduardo Mondlane, a US-educated moderate from southern Mozambique, FRELIMO is recognized and supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Prior to September, FRELIMO had concentrated its efforts on infiltration, recruitment efforts, and propagandizing, particularly among the Maconde tribe of northern Mozambique. It apparently has the nucleus of an organization in southern Mozambique, but it remains limited and ultraclandestine because of


public apathy and fear of the Portuguese police. An informant of the US Consulate in Lourenco Marques has characterized most FRELIMO leaders as men who are of necessity unobtrusive, who blend well into a crowd, and who have a gift for organization.

As of last March FRELIMO claimed 2,000 trained fighters in Tanzania, and the organization has camps at Bagamoyo, at Kongwa, and at a few other areas along the Mozambique border. External support for FRELIMO has increased markedly during the past year. Tanzania provides training facilities and instructors. Approximately 200 Mozambique nationalists have

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returned from training in Algeria since April 1964, and Egypt provides additional training. Algeria supplies arms, and some Chinese and Soviet weapons have probably reached the rebels via Tanzania. The OAU's African Liberation Committee allotted \$308,000 to FRELIMO for 1964, but Mondlane stated in late November that he had received only \$14,000 from the committee this year. A number of students have been sent to the Soviet Union, presumably for academic training. A FRELIMO official recently claimed that further funds, training, and equipment had been promised by Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Syria.

The Mozambique African National Union (MANU), a smaller and probably more radical organization headed by Matthew Mmole and Lawrence Malinge, split away from FRELIMO in 1963, and is probably competing with that group for members and international support. Most of MANU's support appears to come also from the Maconde tribe, but US observers believe that it has few members. These may have been responsible, however, for limited terrorist activities in Mozambique in August and September of this year. MANU claimed to have infiltrated 3,000 freedom fighters into the country at that time, but this figure is grossly exaggerated. Its leaders have reportedly been in contact with Soviet and Chinese embassy officials in Dar es Salaam.

A third group, the Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO), headed by Paul Gumane, was until recently based in Cairo. It too was in competition

with FRELIMO. It probably has few members, but was supported by Egypt, and some of its members may have received military training in Ghana. In mid-November, at the urging of the Egyptians, Gumane reportedly merged his group with FRELIMO, bringing with him \$21,000 from the Nasir regime. Gumane will probably press for a more militant effort by FRELIMO, and Cairo may be using him to extend its influence in the nationalist movement. Both UDENAMO and FRELIMO maintain offices in Lusaka, Zambia, but it is not known whether these offices have merged.

#### Nationalist Incursions

Until last August, Mozambique was largely free of nationalist agitation, although there were sporadic indications of African discontent--a dockworkers' strike in 1963, and rioting in Mocimboa da Praia in December 1962. During late August and September 1964, however, there were several organized acts of sabotage in northern Mozambique, particularly in the Cabo Delgado District. A Dutch missionary was murdered, and there were a few attacks on other civilians and some attacks on military patrols. The Portuguese credit MANU with these incidents, although their origin is not entirely clear.

In October, Mondlane stated that seven 20-man bands of FRELIMO freedom fighters had infiltrated northern Mozambique from Tanzania during late September and October and had carried out a series of attacks on military patrols, communications lines, administrative centers,

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and vehicles. He said that the attacks would continue at the rate of "at least one a month," and that he would increase the scope of the attacks and begin sabotage activities in larger cities if the Portuguese did not agree to negotiate. Most of the incidents took place in the northeastern corner of the country.

The Portuguese military captured or scattered at least five of the seven FRELIMO bands, and have been conducting mop-up operations since. Although they publicly claim that the situation is quiet, limited acts of terrorism continue to occur in the area. Apparently a decision was made by the Portuguese to create a cordon sanitaire along the Tanzanian border, and several African villages were burned. As a result, some 8,000-10,000 Africans fled into southern Tanganyika, where they are living in refugee camps. Fearing Portuguese reprisals for his government's support of the nationalists, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere sent troops to reinforce the poorly guarded border area.

Further acts of sabotage have been conducted in the Zambezia District in central Mozambique, probably from a safe haven in Malawi. These incidents occurred in October 1964, and may have been coordinated with the attacks in the Cabo Delgado District. It was reported in May 1964 that FRELIMO had established three branches in the Fort Johnston area of Malawi, and had plans to increase its activities along the Mozambique border, but it is not known if FRELIMO groups conducted the October raids. Prime Minister Kamuzu Banda of

Malawi, anxious to maintain good relations with the Portuguese, is disturbed by evidence that Mozambique rebels are increasing their efforts to use Malawi as a base of operations.

#### Disappointment in Angola

Increased external support for FRELIMO's efforts may in part reflect discouragement among radical African leaders over the lack of success in other southern African liberation movements, particularly that in Angola. Holden Roberto's Angolan Government in Exile (GRAE)--based in Congo (Leopoldville) has been increasingly hamstrung by internal squabbling, lack of materiel, and lack of military success against determined Portuguese forces in northern Angola. Roberto has been subjected to growing criticism within his own organization, largely because of his tendency to concentrate all authority in his own hands, his tribal outlook, and his inefficiency as an administrator. Morale among Roberto's military forces is very poor; they are poorly clothed, fed, and armed, and have been able only to serve as a minor harassment to overwhelmingly superior Portuguese forces.

Moreover, competition between the GRAE and one faction of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is extremely bitter. This MPLA group, based in Congo (Brazzaville) and headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto apparently conducted recent limited forays into the

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Portuguese enclave of Cabinda. Roberto reportedly has stated that he is determined to prevent the MPLA from grabbing the military initiative, even if it means fighting the MPLA's troops.

Meanwhile, another MPLA faction, headed by Viriato da Cruz and Matias Migueis, has merged with GRAE, and is apparently maneuvering to wrest control of the organization from Roberto.

The GRAE was recognized by the OAU in 1963, largely at the urging of the Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, after which 14 African states formally recognized Roberto's government. Roberto relied heavily on support from the Leopoldville government, and thus it was a severe blow to his hopes when Moise Tshombé became prime minister in July. Tshombé, apparently wishing to maintain cordial relations with the Portuguese, has been very cool toward the Angolan nationalists and has avoided any specific commitments to Roberto. He may even attempt to obstruct external support for GRAE.

In November, after unsuccessful efforts to reconcile the competing Angolan refugee groups, the OAU's Liberation Committee voted to extend aid to the Neto MPLA faction as well as to GRAE. If implemented, this decision obviously would drastically undercut Roberto's position as sole recognized leader of the Angolan liberation movement. The decision probably reflects the Liberation Committee's dissatisfaction with Roberto's progress, and may also indicate

an unwillingness to give a total commitment to a group which depends on at least the tacit approval of the hated Tshombé.

#### Prospects in Mozambique

Eduardo Mondlane had stated as recently as July that he was unprepared to commit his FRELIMO forces to a hopeless military struggle against the Portuguese in Mozambique. The FRELIMO raids into northern Mozambique in the months which followed suggest therefore that the radical African states, in addition to increasing their material support to the Mozambique nationalists, may have pressured Mondlane to step up his revolutionary timetable. Mondlane has also been under pressure from MANU, UDENAMO, and members of his own organization to adopt a more militant policy. Mondlane was touring Western and Eastern Europe this fall seeking support, and it is conceivable that the FRELIMO raids of late September and October were organized, and even initiated, without his knowledge.

Although the nationalists will be capable of continuing forays into Mozambique, it is unlikely that they will endanger the Portuguese position in the country in the foreseeable future. Internally, the nationalists appear poorly organized and divided. Mondlane may not be a radical or dynamic enough leader to control and channel the factions within his organization, and he suffers from being a southerner in a group composed largely of northern Mozambicans. Although FRELIMO

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apparently has large quantities of arms, it lacks sufficient trained guerrilla fighters, and appears incapable of any sizable military confrontation of the Portuguese. Whether through inertia or fear of Portuguese reprisals, most Mozambicans appear disinterested in the nationalist struggle. Other problems include limited communications between nationalists in Dar es Salaam and the field, the efficiency of the Portuguese police and their extensive informer network, and a lack of effective, educated leaders.

Despite their strong military position, the Portuguese face a variety of difficult problems. Their major concern appears to be the flagging morale of Portuguese settlers in the north. Continuing terrorism would worsen their situation. The Maconde tribe which inhabits the area is restive and difficult

to control, and the Portuguese have privately admitted that many of the regulos (government-appointed chiefs) on whom they had depended for support appear to sympathize with the nationalists. Portuguese morale may be further undermined by FRELIMO's threat to begin sabotage in the major southern cities if the Portuguese do not agree to negotiate. It is highly unlikely that the Portuguese will consent to any talks.

The nationalists' long-range potential is improved by increased training, arms, and funds being supplied by African and Communist countries. Their position would be still further enhanced should Prime Minister Banda be replaced by a leader more willing to assist the Mozambique nationalist incursions from Malawi. [redacted]

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