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GROUP 1
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2 February 1966

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE
BRIEFING

THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

Introduction

I. We have recently reviewed and updated our national intelligence estimates concerning Soviet military power.

A. We continue to have a high confidence in the accuracy of these estimates for the next few years.

1. They are broadly based on a wide spectrum of intelligence collection and analytic techniques--ranging from classical clandestine methods, through a wide variety of electronic systems, to our successful and highly sensitive satellite photography.

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2. I want to remind you that many of our methods, and particularly satellite photography, must be closely guarded. The existence of such programs is special, privileged information even within the intelligence community.

II. The estimates I am about to describe present a picture in which Soviet military power today clearly lacks the punch and weight of US power, in terms of strategic capabilities.

A. We have estimated that it is highly unlikely that the Soviets in this decade can achieve offensive and defensive forces strong enough to persuade the leadership it could risk launching an attack upon the West.

B. At the same time, our estimates show the Soviets to be pursuing military programs which, we believe, will result in a considerable strengthening

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of their military posture over the next ten years.

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2 February 1966

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE
BRIEFING

SOVIET STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES (S)

I. The Soviet Union's principal threat, the Strategic Rocket Force, has more than 200,000 men manning intercontinental, intermediate-range, and medium-range ballistic missile units.

(MAP, ICBM DEPLOYMENT)

A. Operational ICBMs are deployed at the 18 complexes shown in red on this map. Seven more complexes, shown in black, are under construction for new systems.

B. For the past year or so, the number of operational launchers has remained at about 220. Most of these are soft pads, deployed in pairs. The rest are in hardened silos, clustered in threes. (By way of comparison, the US has 830 operational Minutemen and Titans--all in silos.)

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(GRAPH, ICBM DEPLOYMENT RATE)

1. During the next few months, however, the number of operational Soviet ICBM launchers will begin rising sharply, when the Soviets complete the first of some ~~200~~ 220 dispersed single silos. ~~These~~ are being built at the seven new complexes and at four of the older ones which are marked with green circles. By mid-1967, the total will be doubled.

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2. Since the new silos are widely spaced, the number of separate aiming points which must be targeted for any Western counterforce strike will triple.

C. Two types of single silos are being built. One is about 30 feet in diameter, and the other 15 to 17 feet across.

1. The larger silos will probably house the new SS-9 ICBM, which has been tested for two years, and may already

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be operational. It is a large missile, capable of carrying an 18-megaton warhead.

2. A smaller ICBM still under development is probably intended for the small silos. This missile, the SS-11, can carry a 1.2-megaton warhead. We expect it to be operational by the middle of this year.

II. Soviet ICBM testing in 1965 culminated in an unprecedented flurry of firings around Christmas.

(MAP, ICBM RANGES, TYURATAM AND PLESETSK TO KAMCHATKA)

A. In a six-day period, the Soviets fired at least one of each of the deployed and developmental missiles in their inventory.

B. One important test was what we call a "ripple firing" of the SS-9. The Soviets apparently attempted to fire three SS-9s in a six-minute period. Only the first and third launches were successful.

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1. This type of firing is a systems test. The missiles are launched from silos using nearly the same sort of launch sequence that would be used in a war-time strike.

C. The other new ICBM--the SS-11--is also well along in its test program, but its failure rate has been high--about 50 percent. Since early 1965, it has been successfully fired 12 times, including four shots to the Pacific.

D. Further testing of the SS-7 and SS-8, which are already deployed, continued at a relatively high rate during the year.

1. Eighteen SS-7s and six SS-8s were successfully fired from Tyuratam during 1965. The SS-7, incidentally, is the mainstay of the operational Soviet ICBM force and is deployed at nearly 200 launchers.

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III. Until recently, we had detected only two missile launchings from operational sites--one in 1963, and the other in 1964.

A. In December, however, the Soviets fired five ICBMs from an operational complex at Plesetsk in the northwestern USSR.

1. Two of these were the SS-6 type, the first operational Soviet ICBM.

2. The other three were probably SS-7s.

3. The Soviets are probably checking on the effectiveness of older missiles which have been standing by for several years.

B. These Plesetsk firings provide an example of the resources required to monitor the Soviet missile effort.

1. As you know, a great deal of our electronic monitoring is carried out by facilities in Turkey, Iran,

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2. 

3. We have radars on Shemya Island in the Aleutians which detect the impact of the missiles on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

IV. We believe that the Soviets are developing a small ICBM which will use solid fuels.

(PHOTO, SAVAGE)

A. We have detected no flight tests for a solid-fuel ICBM. As far as we know, the Soviets until now have used solid fuels only in their shorter-range, tactical missiles.

B. Recent Moscow parades have featured this missile, similar to a MINUTEMAN, which

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we call the SAVAGE. The Soviets say it is a solid-fueled ICBM. We think it may be a mock-up or an R&D prototype.

1. If testing of a solid-fuel ICBM begins soon, it could become operational by early 1967.

C. The Soviets are continuing to develop large liquid-fueled missiles. The launch vehicle which was used to place the Proton 1 and 2 satellites into orbit could be used as an ICBM. However, it has not yet been tested in this role.

(PHOTO, SCROOGE)

D. The Soviets have shown keen awareness of the advantages of a mobile ballistic missile. They may be developing a mobile ICBM.

1. They displayed this vehicle, which we call the SCROOGE, in a Moscow parade last November. They called it a mobile launcher for a solid-propellant ICBM. We think that special problems with this type of system. probably would prevent it from becoming operational before 1970.

V. So far, we have not confirmed Soviet testing of ICBM penetration aids, but we expect them to add such devices, including multiple warheads.

(MAP, DEPLOYMENT OF MRBM/IRBM LAUNCHERS)

MRBM-IRBM Force

VI. The Soviets also have more than 700 fixed launchers for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Less than 20 percent of these are in silos. (The United States no longer has any fixed-site MRBMs or IRBMs in operational use.)

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A. On this map, the black dots indicate the silos for either type. The red-dots are soft pads for MRBMs, and the green dots are IRBM pads.

B. About 90 percent of these missiles are in the western USSR. They could deliver a devastating attack--as much as 2,000 megatons--against targets in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

C. You can see a few which are in position to attack South Asia, Japan, and Alaska --and, for that matter, Communist China.

(PHOTO,SCAMP)

D. The Soviets are apparently trying to build the advantages of mobile launchers and solid fuel into their MRBM/IRBM force. They showed this vehicle, which we call the SCAMP, in a May, 1965, parade. They describe it as the transporter-launcher for a solid-propellant IRBM.

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1. Our analysis indicates that the missile could probably achieve MRBM/IRBM ranges with a light warhead. It almost certainly has not been flight-tested to full range. It may yet prove to be a tactical rather than strategic missile.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

VII. Long Range Aviation remains an important element of Soviet strategic strike forces, although the USSR is placing chief reliance on ballistic missiles.

(TABLE, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

A. We estimate that the Long Range Air Force has more than 1,000 combat aircraft currently assigned. About 200 of these are heavy bombers with an intercontinental range. The remaining 800 are medium bombers. (The present US inventory shows 580 heavy bombers, and 200 mediums.)

B. Training patterns and range capabilities of Soviet bombers indicate that an attack

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against the continental US would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively. Medium bombers would probably be used on European and Asian targets.

C. The Soviets could put about 100 heavy bombers over the US on two-way missions. A major part of this force would probably consist of the turboprop BEAR. About 70 to 80 of the BEARs have been equipped with the AS-3 air-to-surface missile. This is a weapon which can be launched against targets as much as 350 nautical miles away, at twice the speed of sound.

1. The BEARs, incidentally, are the aircraft which have been used on long-range practice missions to locate and overfly our naval task forces, on the ocean approaches to both Europe and the Asian mainland.

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(PHOTO, BLINDER)

D. This picture shows an aircraft we call the BLINDER, a medium bomber with supersonic dash, which is now entering the Soviet Air Force inventory. About 130 BLINDERS are operational.

1. The Soviets are developing an air-to-surface missile which is probably intended for the BLINDER, the AS-4. This missile will have a range of about 260 nautical miles, and comes in at MACH 4--in other words, four times the speed of sound.

2. I want to emphasize the nature of the threat which these air-to-surface missiles can pose, not only to land targets, but to our naval units, troop transports, and surface convoys at sea. They come with a variety of guidance systems. Some of them have active radar for homing. ~~Others can be homed in with terminal~~

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~~guidance~~ from enemy submarines or surface units near the target. Defense against such missiles, coming in at supersonic speeds, is a real problem.

E. The Soviets may develop an improved medium bomber to replace the BLINDER. We do not believe it likely, however, that they are working on a follow-on heavy bomber. Current Soviet research and development on heavy aircraft appears to be directed toward new transports.

(PHOTOS, FOUR SUBMARINE TYPES)

STRATEGIC SUBMARINES

VIII. The Soviet strategic submarine force consists of about 85 missile-equipped units. (Our 29 Polaris submarines, with 16 missiles apiece, have a much greater total firepower than the entire Soviet sub missile force. Polaris missiles also have a much longer range--up to 2,500 n.m. in the A-3 version.)

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A. Most of the Soviet ballistic missile submarines--the G and H classes--are equipped with three 350-mile missiles. A few can fire 700-mile missiles while submerged. About 10 are nuclear-powered.

B. Their cruise missile submarines are equipped to fire missiles against surface ships and probably shore installations, at ranges up to 450 miles. About 17 of these units are nuclear-powered--the E-class--and carry six to eight missiles.

C. In addition to the missile submarines, there are about 290 first-line torpedo-attack units--15 of them nuclear powered.

1. Soviet submarines, including missile-equipped units, now are conducting longer range clandestine patrols with greater frequency.

2. They are already patrolling the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and the Mediterranean on a routine basis. We expect

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them to begin regular patrols off the US coastline by the end of the decade.

C. In addition, the Soviets have kept intelligence trawlers or submarines on virtually continuous patrol near US Polaris submarine bases at Holy Loch, Rota, and Guam.

1. Their intelligence trawlers also maintain surveillance of US and allied forces in the Vietnam area.

2. As part of the increased tempo of their naval operations, the Soviets are maintaining a continuous naval presence in the Mediterranean. They also have sent small task forces into the Philippine Sea ~~five~~ several times ~~in~~ during the past year.

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FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE
BRIEFING

SOVIET DEFENSES

I. The Soviets give defense against strategic attack a high priority in their military planning. They allocate a much larger share of the total military budget to this purpose than we do.

II. This investment has provided the Soviets with a good defense against manned bombers penetrating the Soviet Union at medium and high altitudes.

A. Soviet antiaircraft defenses are still susceptible, however, to penetration by the sophisticated attack techniques which we have developed in recent years.

III. The current Soviet air defense system is equipped with an impressive quantity of weapons deployed in depth. It includes more than 1,000 surface-to-air missile sites, 3,800 jet interceptors, and an extensive radar and control network.

SMIL-19

(MAP SOVIET SA-2 AND SA-3 DEPLOYMENT)

A. The SA-2 has been the mainstay of Soviet surface-to-air missile defenses for several years. An early version of this system is currently in action in North Vietnam.

(PHOTO SA-2 SITE)

1. This is a photo of an SA-2 site in North Vietnam, taken by a low-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.

2. The SA-2 system in North Vietnam has not been effective against our aircraft there. It is older equipment, it suffers from being moved frequently, and the Vietnamese operators are not yet sufficiently trained or experienced. In addition, we have developed some effective countermeasures, including evasive maneuvers by our pilots.

B. The SA-2 has a basic weakness against aircraft at low altitudes. In the USSR, some additional protection against low-flying aircraft is provided by about 100 batteries equipped with the SA-3 system. Deployment of the SA-3 has virtually stopped, however.

This suggests the Soviets are not satisfied with the SA-3.

(TABLE, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

C. The Soviet air defense interceptor force is very large--about 3,800 aircraft. Only half of these are equipped for all-weather operations, and less than half can carry air-to-air missiles. In a crisis situation, the Soviet air defense can augment its interceptor force by incorporating fighter regiments from the Tactical Air Force.

Advanced Defense Systems

(MAP, NEW DEFENSIVE MISSILE AND ELECTRONICS INSTALLATIONS)

IV. For the past decade, we have been watching a vigorous Soviet effort to develop defenses against ballistic missiles.

A. The Soviets have experienced many frustrations and failures. An early start was made on a system at Leningrad, which seemed to be intended for both antimissile and antiaircraft defense. This was halted in 1962 before construction was completed.

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B. New approaches apparently fared better, and we believe that the Soviets are now deploying an ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Our understanding of this system is still incomplete, but we believe we have identified key elements.

(PHOTO, OLENEGORSK)

1. This is one of two large radar installations in the northwestern USSR which probably provide initial warning and tracking of incoming missiles.

(PHOTO, "DOGHOUSE")

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2. At Moscow, [redacted] another large radar which also probably acquires and tracks targets. There are ~~eight~~ nine other electronics installations, at five locations around the city, which probably provide final target tracking, and guide the defensive missiles.

3. At Sary Shagan, the Soviet center for defensive missile research and development, there is a complex which we believe to be a prototype of the ABM system being built at Moscow. We believe

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antimissile missiles have been fired from launchers at this location.

4. The Soviets at Sary Shagan have probably conducted intercept tests within the atmosphere, but we have yet to detect full system tests involving intercepts outside the atmosphere.

5. They almost certainly have not tested antimissile missiles with nuclear warheads. Their underground test program could be giving them information on the effects of such warheads.

C. The Moscow antimissile system could be operating as early as 1967, but we think 1968 is a more likely date.

D. We cannot predict the future deployment pace with any confidence. In the next decade, the Soviets could expand ballistic missile defenses to 20 or 30 other urban areas, containing a total of about one fourth of the Soviet population and more than half of its industry.

(PHOTO, TALLINN)

V. Another new defensive missile system is being

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deployed in barrier fashion in the northwestern USSR.

A. We estimate that this system is intended for long-range defense against bombers and cruise missiles, but cannot discount the possibility that it is ballistic missile defense.

B. Large launch complexes like this one are being built at three locations in the northwestern USSR--Tallinn, Cherepovets, and Liepaya. The launch facilities at Leningrad, on which work stopped in 1962, are apparently being converted for the newer system. We have recently discovered three more of these complexes under construction in the Sverdlovsk area of the Urals industrial region.

VI. The Soviets may be working on antisatellite systems in addition to their ABM program.

A. We estimate that the Soviets could now have a limited antisatellite capability based on an existing missile--such as the SS-4 MRBM--armed with a nuclear warhead and using existing Soviet tracking facilities. We have no direct evidence, however, that such a system has been tested.

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(PHOTO, ANGARSK)

C. The placement and estimated capabilities of a huge radar complex under construction at Angarsk, shown here, and another at Sary Shagan, suggest that they are components of an advanced antisatellite system.

1. They are very expensive and more complex than is necessary merely to track space vehicles. They are not properly placed for ICBM early warning.

2. These radars will be largely complete in the next year or two, and a compatible antisatellite missile could be ready at the same time.

D. The Soviets' traditional concern for military secrecy gives them an incentive to develop defenses against US reconnaissance satellites. They are probably also concerned that the US may develop space weapons systems.

1. We believe that the USSR would attack a US satellite in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire for secrecy, they are willing for other reasons to accept a major disruption of East-West relations.

3 February 1966

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

I. The Soviet general purpose forces comprise the ground, naval, tactical air, and military transport forces. These elements still make up the largest and most expensive component of the Soviet military establishment.

(TABLE, SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER)

A. We estimate the strength of Soviet general purpose forces at 1.8 to 1.9 million men. (The total armed forces amount to 2.8 to 2.9 million.) There were some slight reductions in the 1960-64 period.

B. The Soviets continue to retain a large number of line divisions--we estimate between 132 and 147. More than 60 of these divisions are between 75 and 90 percent of full strength. The rest are at reduced or cadre strength.

(MAP, DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ARMY DIVISIONS)

II. Deployment is concentrated mainly in the Western USSR and Eastern European area, confronting NATO.

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A. The observations of [redacted] confirm

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that there are still 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany.

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1. [redacted] we have acquired classified Soviet articles on military doctrine. These indicate that the heavy Soviet deployment in East Germany presupposes a general war against NATO.

2. The doctrinal articles indicate that the war is expected to begin with a massive nuclear exchange, after which the Soviet theater forces are to advance rapidly and seize critical objectives before the NATO forces can recover.

B. In keeping with this concept, Soviet ground forces now feature a large number of heavily armored tank and motorized rifle divisions.

1. Even at full strength, these divisions are substantially smaller than US divisions.

2. They also have less organic and non-divisional combat and service support, even in proportion to the lower manpower.

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[redacted]

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C. That means that there is little point in trying to compare Soviet ground units to US ground units for relative combat capability.

1. The Soviet units are organized primarily for speed, shock effect, and tactical firepower.

2. If a Soviet advance is stalled after a nuclear exchange, or if the conflict should be non-nuclear, then the Soviet units are going to be handicapped because they lack adequate capability for sustained action.

(PHOTOS, SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY)

III. The Soviets are gradually improving the quality of equipment in the hands of the troops.

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III.
A. For example, this month [redacted] the new T-62 medium tank -- the most modern tank in the hands of Soviet troops -- for the first time in a Soviet rifle division in East Germany. [redacted] enough of these tanks in Germany to re-equip one regiment in each tank division. New armored personnel carriers are also replacing older types in Germany.

B. Conventional artillery is being improved.

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[redacted] artillery units are getting the new 1963-model 122-millimeter gun-howitzer. This has an increased range and a 360-degree traverse.

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(PHOTOS, FROG, SCUD, SHADDOCK)

C. Conventional artillery is also being supplemented by tactical missiles and rockets similar to our Honest John. Here are some of these weapons, [redacted] in Moscow parades. They can use nuclear or chemical warheads.

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D. Within the past year, the Soviets have developed a ballistic missile, the SS-12, which has a maximum range of 600 miles. We have not yet seen this weapon in the field, but troop training has begun.

(CHART, COMMUNIST SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION)

E. The Soviets have not neglected small arms development. Our study of weapons acquired since World War II reveals that they have standardized on a few light infantry weapons. Almost all of these can fire the same short, lightweight rifle cartridge of medium caliber, at high rates of automatic fire.

1. The AK-47 assault rifle is the standard individual weapon in Soviet and East European ground forces. It is also being copied by the Chinese Communists, and is used by

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Communist forces in South Vietnam. The rifle has a 30-round magazine. Its practical rate of fire--80 to 100 rounds per minute--can be matched in rate of fire only by our M-16 rifle.

2. Our tests show that the RPD and RPK light machine guns are also very effective small unit weapons, with practical rates of fire of 100 to 150 rounds per minute.

(CHART, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

IV. The Soviet Union currently has about 3,200 combat aircraft assigned to its 13 tactical air armies. All of these are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, although only one-third are bombers or fighter-bombers.

A. New supersonic fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers are steadily being added to tactical air units, with first priority going to Soviet air regiments in East Germany.

V. Modernization of the general purpose forces will continue. By 1974, the USSR will probably reduce the number of divisions slightly, but may keep a greater proportion in combat-ready status.

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(PHOTO, AN-22)

A. The Soviets are beginning to acquire a limited capability for long-distance military actions. Air and sea lift is being improved, and there is greater emphasis on airborne operations.

1. This AN-22, the world's largest transport aircraft, is supposed to have surprised the world at the Paris Air Show last June.

2. Actually, we had been looking for it since 1962, when we found the first reference to it in [redacted] we identified the aircraft plant in Tashkent responsible for the development.

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3. Shortly after the prototype was completed--~~two~~ one years before it showed up in Paris--[redacted] our experts managed to postulate dimensions and performance characteristics which were within about five percent of the actual figures obtained in Paris.

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B. As for sea lift, [redacted] that the USSR is working on the development of large amphibious landing craft.

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1. A marine corps was established in 1964 and is being built up rapidly.

VI. We have detected significant changes in the military forces of the East European satellites in the past several years.

A. They can now contribute about a million men, and they have about 40 divisions ready for early commitment to Warsaw Pact forces.

B. The Soviets have been giving the satellite forces more modern weapons at an increasing pace over the past two years. This includes such items as tactical missiles and rockets, and newer types of fighter aircraft.

1. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would do this if they had doubts of the effectiveness ~~or the loyalties~~ of the satellite forces.

(MAP, DISPOSITIONS ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER)

VII. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, we have been especially watchful for signs that the Soviets or

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the Chinese might be beefing up the forces along the 4,000 miles of their common border.

A. At present the frontier appears to be quiet, but both countries have taken some steps already to strengthen border security.

B. The Chinese, for instance, have carried on a certain amount of resettlement in an attempt to remove population elements of questionable loyalty from some sensitive points along the frontier.

C. The Soviets have strengthened both the security troops and regular military forces at some border locations.

1. In the fall of 1964 the Soviets moved a motorized rifle division from the Moscow area to the Manchurian border. Last fall a corps headquarters moved from the Afghan to the Sinkiang (SIN-DJUNG) border.

2. In the past three months the Soviets have built a new airfield near the only rail line running to the Sinkiang border. This suggests they want to be prepared to air-lift troops into the area.

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FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

SOVIET NUCLEAR PROGRAM

I. During 1965 the Soviets stepped up the pace of their nuclear test program. They conducted 12 underground nuclear explosions, compared with seven tests in 1964. (The US conducted 39 underground tests in 1965 and 47 in 1964.)

A. As you know, the United States maintains a worldwide network of seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, and other stations with very sensitive scientific instruments designed to detect foreign nuclear tests.

1. This system monitors foreign nuclear tests and provides the principal means for detecting violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

2. The detection network is effective against Soviet underground tests with yields of more than a few kilotons, [redacted]

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II. The Soviet nuclear test program continues to be concentrated largely on weapons testing.

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(PHOTOS, SEMIPALATINSK TEST CIRCLE BEFORE AND AFTER)

A. Last year, the Soviets built a new instrumentation circle at the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test center,

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B. On October 14, 1965, the Soviets first used this test site to conduct a low-yield nuclear test.

C. The Soviets could be using underground tests in an effort to get information applicable to understanding the destructive effects of exo-atmospheric nuclear bursts, but we are unable to identify this kind of testing from available evidence.

III. Two of the nuclear tests during 1965 appeared to have been experiments like our PLOWSHARE program, designed to explore the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

A. One of these was the 250-kiloton explosion which vented into the atmosphere on January 15, 1965. This explosion threw a dam across the Shagan River, forming a 1,400-acre lake near Semipalatinsk.

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B. The second probable PLOWSHARE-type experiment took place on June 10, 1965, in east central USSR. This appears to have been a small underground explosion designed to evaluate the use of nuclear explosives to increase gas or oil production.

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2 February 1966

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY

I. The Soviets continued an active and varied space program during the past year. Besides the manned flight with the first "walk in space," considerable progress was made in unmanned space operations and the landing of Luna 9 on the moon was an outstanding space achievement.

A. Luna 9 was launched from Tyuratam on 31 January and landed on the lunar surface on 3 February. Besides sending pictures of the terrain, such as this, Luna 9 transmitted data on the environment that will be of considerable value to the Soviet lunar program.

1. Luna 9 was the 12th Soviet soft-landing attempt, but the first complete success. It may well mark inauguration of a vigorous Soviet program of instrumented lunar exploration as a prelude to manned lunar landings.

B. We do not yet know how successful two Soviet probes en route to Venus will be. They both apparently are on course and will reach the vicinity of Venus in early March.

C. Two communications satellites, both designated Molniya or "Lightning" by the Soviets, were successfully orbited in 1965. They have been used to transmit color TV between Moscow and Paris, as well as for relaying communications within the USSR. We have detected Soviet interest in using communications relay satellites to beam programs into other areas of the world.

D. Another important achievement was the launching of two large scientific satellites--designated Proton 1 and 2. Although significant from a scientific point of view, the primary purpose of these launchings probably was to test a very powerful new launch vehicle. It has put payloads of 27,000 pounds into orbit and could launch payloads of 50,000 pounds or more with a third stage.

1. The launch vehicle--a two-stage rocket--is larger than Saturn I, and has on the order of 2.5 to 3 million pounds of thrust. It probably is intended for use in more complex space operations, such as manned space stations and manned circumlunar flights.

(PHOTO, "J" COMPLEX AT TYURATAM)

2. Here is an indication that the Soviets plan an even larger space booster. This is a new and very large launch facility still under construction. It is designed for vehicles in the multi-million-pound thrust category.

E. The new space launch facilities are indications of things to come, but most Soviet heavy space launches are still made with SS-6, the first Soviet ICBM. That ICBM is still the standard booster for Soviet space shots, including manned missions and photoreconnaissance satellites.

1. A total of 18 reconnaissance satellites were launched from Tyuratam in 1965, compared with 12 in 1964.

2. In addition to satellite photography of Western military installations, the USSR has undertaken photoreconnaissance of China, concentrating on Chinese advanced weapons test and development facilities.