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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



30 November 1982

MEMORANDUM

PAKISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON [redacted]

We believe that President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq will attempt to assess the strength of the US commitment to Pakistan when he visits Washington beginning on 6 December. We judge that Zia will be more concerned about indications of the seriousness of the commitment, especially President Reagan's attitude, than about specific issues. [redacted]

Zia will be coming to Washington with serious doubts about the reliability of US promises of economic and military support. Judging by his decisions--beginning with his rejection of President Carter's aid package in 1980--he sees economic and military aid as the prime test of Washington's commitment. In the past few weeks, Islamabad's fears about the funding of the US economic aid package and a belief that Washington was renegeing on the July 1981 agreement to supply F-16s developed into a serious problem in US-Pakistan relations. [redacted]

[redacted] the Pakistanis are also concerned that they will not be able to meet obligations they have already assumed--and might even be forced into default--if the aid package is delayed or not fully funded. [redacted]

Zia values Pakistan's relationship with the US as a counter to Soviet pressures from Afghanistan, but public statements [redacted] indicate that [redacted]

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he, his senior generals, and many other Pakistanis doubt the durability of the US commitment. [redacted] that Islamabad is concerned that the US will not provide protection against India, which Pakistan continues to regard as its primary foe. [redacted]

We believe that Zia will imply--and may state openly--that because Pakistan is threatened by India and the USSR, it must have strong US backing in order to continue following policies that support US interests. If he takes this line it will be partly to encourage US support. [redacted]

[redacted] advisers believe that at some point Pakistan will have no alternative but to make a deal with Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Pakistani View of the US

We believe Zia shares the widespread concern in Pakistan that the US commitment to that country will evaporate at a critical moment. Pakistanis frequently cite US "abandonment" of Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Zia will be seeking a strong personal commitment to Pakistan from President Reagan. He is probably less concerned about the sincerity of the present US administration than he is about its ability to prevent Congress from blocking help for Pakistan and about a possible future US tilt toward India. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Almost every discussion with Pakistanis about India reveals that they believe the US fails to understand the seriousness of the threat to Pakistan posed by India. Pakistanis claim that the Indo-Soviet relationship is far closer and India's intentions toward Pakistan far more aggressive than we believe. Even if the Soviets consolidated their position in Afghanistan, we believe most Pakistanis would still see India as the greater threat, and many--despite their distrust of the Soviets--would put more faith in an agreement with Moscow than in one with New Delhi. [redacted]

[redacted]

Although the Zia government remains strongly opposed to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan are becoming a serious burden. We believe major concessions, such as recognition of the Babrak government and acceptance of a continued Soviet troop presence, are unlikely during at least the next year, even if the US relationship should falter, because of concern over the reaction of the conservative religious parties and armed Afghan insurgents in Pakistan and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia and China. [redacted]

[redacted]

Military Supply

US arms are the centerpiece of Pakistan's ambitious plans for military modernization and the key determinant in Islamabad's relations with the United States. [redacted]

[redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Economic Aid


Islamabad also believes that Washington's performance on economic issues raises doubts about the seriousness of the US commitment to Pakistan.

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
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
Human Rights

Zia's political opponents [redacted] hope to focus US attention on his "military dictatorship" during his visit to Washington by staging demonstrations that will force him to jail political leaders and thousands of other Pakistanis. They hope to force Washington to increase pressure on Zia to hold elections. Zia is likely to respond to criticism of military rule by saying that he is trying to restore civilian government, but in present circumstances elections would probably bring an unstable--and likely leftist--government not in the best interest of either Pakistan or the US. [redacted]

Zia faces growing problems but no immediate threat to his rule. His largely benign authoritarian regime has given Pakistan political stability and economic growth. Zia lacks an organized constituency outside the Army, however, and we believe he could find his hold on power challenged should he blunder, the economy stagnate, or a popular leader emerge to unite the opposition.



Pakistanis--including



senior military officers--want military rule to end. We believe that Zia and his military government survive because the divided opposition is unable to present an alternative acceptable to most Pakistanis and because Zia has shown considerable skill in dealing with the opposition. He has kept the opposition off balance by exploiting their differences and by rounding up potential demonstration leaders when necessary. At the same time, he has kept repressive measures to a minimum, thereby avoiding a strong popular reaction to military rule. He has also been helped by public distaste for the terrorist acts of a small minority within the opposition and by the tendency of Pakistanis to support their government when faced with a foreign threat.

[REDACTED]

Narcotics

[REDACTED]

heroin reaching the US is produced from opium harvested in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. The increase in Southwest Asian heroin is due primarily to the drying up of other sources--such as Mexico--chaotic conditions in Iran, and the introduction of heroin manufacturing into Pakistan. Opium production has declined since Zia came to power, but this may be due mainly to poor weather and to lower prices brought about by overproduction in previous years.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Zia should make a greater effort to ensure that Pakistan enforces antinarcotics laws, especially eliminating heroin laboratories.

[REDACTED]


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
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: President Zia's Visit to Washington



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
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