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COUNTRY	ITALY	REPORT NO. TE	OCS - 3/958679
SUBJECT	RICCARDO LOMBARDI'S COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION WITHIN	DATE DISTR.	19 WHYEL963 _KILDUFF
	THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY /PSI/	PRECEDENCE	ROMER
DATE OF NFO.	16 JULY 1963	REFERENCES	-PARROTT
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1. RICCARDO LOMBARDI CONFIRMED THAT GREAT PROGRESS HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACHIEVED IN PROMOTING A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF SOCIALIST AUTONOMISTS WHICH SPLIT A MONTH AGO OVER THE ISSUE OF SOCIALIST SUPPORT TO THE PROPOSED CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT OF ALDO

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MORO, SECRETARY OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC /DC/ PARTY. LOMBARDI WAS CONFIDENT THAT SUCH A RECONCILIATION WOULD BE FORMALLY ANNOUNCED AFTER A MEETING OF AUTONOMISTS SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY, 19 JULY 1963. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE RECONCILIATION WOULD ALSO INCLUDE THOSE ELEMENTS - ITALIAN GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR /CGIL/ SECRETARY FERNANDO SANTI AND PSI DEPUTY TRISTANO CODIGNOLA - WHO WERE THE MOST OUTSPOKEN CRITICS OF THE AGREE-MENT REACHED BY PSI SECRETARY PIETRO NENNI WITH LEADERS OF THE DC, THE ITALIAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY /PSDI/ AND THE ITALIAN REPUB-LICAN PARTY /PRI/. LOMBARDI HAS BEEN WORKING TO PERSUADE SANTI AND CODIGNOLA TO ACCEPT THE RECONCILIATION, "BECAUSE EVEN THE ISOLATED REFUSAL OF A FEW AUTONOMISTS TO DO SO WOULD HAVE VERY UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN SOME OF OUR PROVINCIAL FEDERATIONS AND MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE VICTORY OF THE AUTONOMISTS AT THE FORTHCOMING PARTY CONGRESS.'' LOMBARDI ADDED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF A COMPLETE RECON-一点。如此是是 CILIATION AMONG THE AUTONOMISTS, THEY SHOULD NOT ONLY BE ASSURED OF WINNING THE CONGRESS BUT SHOULD HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF STRENGTHENING ''SOMEWHAT'' THEIR MAJORITY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LEFT WING. " AS LONG AS OUR MARGIN OF MAJORITY IS SO SMALL, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE EVEN SMALL DEFECTIONS AND MINOR SPLITS IN OUR RANKS. !!

2. ACCORDING TO LOMBARDI, THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THE RECONCILIA-

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TION WAS TAKEN WHEN IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES THAT THE EVENTS OF A MONTH AGO DID NOT STEM FROM A SUDDEN DECISION BASED ON ''PERSONAL'' AIMS AND MANEUVERS BUT THAT IT REFLECTED HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OR OF INTERPRETATION ON POLITICAL MATTERS. AS FOR HIMSELF, LOMBARDI CONTINUED, HE HAD MADE IT REPEATEDLY CLEAR DURING THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE APRIL 28 ELECTION THAT IN HIS OPINION THE CIRCUMSTANCES MADE IT INADVISABLE FOR THE PS! TO LEND ITS SUPPORT TO "THE KIND OF CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT AND PROGRAM WHICH WAS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DC. ' LOMBARDI EXPLAINED THAT WHEN THE FIRST CENTER-LEFT GOVERN-MENT WAS FORMED BY FANFANI IN FEBRUARY 1962, "THE NATURE OF THAT GOVERNMENT AND THE SITUATION AT THE TIME WITHIN THE DC AND IN THE COUNTRY IN GENERAL, MADE IT POSSIBLE AND ADVISABLE FOR US SOCIALISTS TO GIVE OUR OUTSIDE SUPPORT. THIS WAS POSSIBLE EVEN THOUGH NO SPECIFIC GUARANTEES WERE GIVEN ABOUT THE SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PLANKS OF THE PROGRAM AND EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM ITSELF WERE NOT FULLY SPELLED OUT. ..

3. CONDITIONS HAD CHANGED, SAID LOMBARDI, WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS GOT UNDER WAY FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT TO BE HEADED BY MORO. ''FIRST OF ALL, WE SOCIALISTS WERE ASKED TO GIVE SUPPORT TO /AND EVENTUALLY TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN/ A GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO REMAIN IN OFFICE FOR SEVERAL YEARS, RATHER THAN TO A

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GOVERNMENT LIKE THAT OF AMINTORE FANFANI WHICH HAD STILL AN
'EXPERIMENTAL' NATURE AND WHICH WAS BASED ON A PROGRAM WHICH WAS
SUPPOSED TO COVER ONLY ONE YEAR UNTIL THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE
SPRING OF 1963. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE ECONOMIC CHANGES THAT HAD
TAKEN PLACE IN THE MEANTIME MADE IT EVEN MORE EVIDENT THAT THE
PROGRAM OF THE PROJECTED MORO GOVERNMENT COULD AND WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THE
GROWING INFLUENCE GAINED IN THE MEANTIME BY THE 'MODERATE' GROUPS
WITHIN THE DC MADE IT EVEN MORE NECESSARY FOR THE PSI TO SECURE
DEFINITE GUARANTEES ABOUT THE PROGRAM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AS
WELL AS ABOUT THE SCHEDULE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS VARIOUS
PLANKS.''

4. LOMBARDI STRESSED THAT ''WE SOCIALISTS DO NOT AIM AT SPLITTING THE DC. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT WE CANNOT ELIMINATE THE PRESENCE OF A STRONG 'MODERATE' GROUP WITHIN THAT PARTY. WE'RE CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT A LASTING AND FRUITFUL COLLABORATION BETWEEN US AND THE DC REQUIRES THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE DC 'MODERATES' BE CONTAINED AND NEUTRALIZED BY THE PRESSURE AND INITIATIVE OF THE PROGRESSIVE-MINDED FORCES WITHIN THAT PARTY. THIS WAS THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS WHICH EXISTED DURING THE FIRST SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS OF THE FANFANI GOVERNMENT BUT WHICH BEGAN TO CHANGE IN THE FALL OF LAST YEAR. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE MORO GOVERNMENT IT

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APPEARED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER SUCH A COUNTERVAILING POWER TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE 'MODERATES' OR AT LEAST THAT IT WAS NO LONGER EFFECTIVE AND THAT THE PREMIER-DESIGNATE HIMSELF WAS IN EFFECT FOLLOWING AN APPROACH CONTROLLED BY THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE 'MODERATES'.'' THEREFORE, LOMBARDI CONTINUED. ''WE COULD UNDERTAKE TO GIVE OUR SUPPORT TO MORO ONLY IF THE AGREEMENT ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM SPELLED OUT IN PRECISE TERMS ITS VARIOUS PLANKS AND ABOVE ALL. IF IT CONTAINED SPECIFIC GUARANTEES ABOUT THE SCHEDULE FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. THIS POINT IS EXACTLY WHAT WAS LACKING IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS CONCLUDED BY NENNI WITH MORO. GIUSEPPE SARAGAT AND ORONZO REALE. INSTEAD, THE AGREEMENT LEFT VAGUE MOST OF THOSE TERMS AND SCHEDULES. ACCORDINGLY IF WE SOCIALISTS HAD ACCEPTED THAT AGREEMENT. WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE READY IN EFFECT TO UNDERWRITE THE PRESERVA-TION OF THE PRESENT CONDITION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN ITALY. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT WE DO NOT WANT TO DO AND WHAT WE MUST NOT DO. OTHERWISE WE WOULD GIVE UP OUR FUNCTION AND LOSE OUR USEFULNESS, A FACT WHICH SHOULD ALSO BE REALIZED BY THOSE WHO LOOK UPON THE CENTER-LEFT AS A MEANS OF ISOLATING THE COMMUNISTS AND OF REDUCING THEIR INFLUENCE AND ELECTORAL FOLLOWING IN ITALY. IF WE HAD ACCEPT-ED THAT KIND OF AGREEMENT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES CURRENTLY PRE-VAILING WE WOULD HAVE ACTUALLY CEASED TO BE OURSELVES -I.E., A

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SOCIALIST PARTY WHICH HAS PLEDGED TO PURSUE A CHANGE IN THE EXISTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ONLY THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS BUT WHICH IS STILL COMMITTED TO PURSUING SUCH A CHANGE. WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN A FURTHER, TREMENDOUS IMPETUS TO THE TURMOIL ALREADY EXISTING AMONG OUR RANK-AND-FILE AND WE WOULD HAVE ALSO GIVEN UP ALL CHANCES OF APPEALING TO SOME SECTORS OF THE COMMUNIST ELECTORATE.

- AGREEMENT AMONG THE DC, THE PSDI AND THE PRI AND THE FAILURE OF THE SOCIALIST MAJORITY TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF DID NOT STEM FROM THOSE PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO FOREIGN POLICY OR TO THE PROPOSED 'DELIMITATION OF THE MAJORITY' INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE PROJECTED MORO GOVERNMENT -I.E., THE EXCLUSION OF THE COMMUNISTS FROM THAT MAJORITY. HE SAID THAT THOSE WHO MAINTAINED THAT SUCH HAD BEEN THE REASONS FOR HIS OPPOSITION 'ARE IN BAD FAITH OR WERE NOT LISTENING WHEN I AND THE OTHER 'EXPERTS' REPORTED TO THE FOUR PARTY SECRETARIES ON THE POINTS ON WHICH AN AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED.'' AMONG THOSE WHO 'DID NOT LISTEN OR DID NOT DEIGN TO THISTEN' LOMBARD! SINGLED OUT PSDI LEADER GIUSEPPE SARAGAT.
- 6. ON THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS, LOMBARDI RECALLED THAT HE WAS THE FORERUNNER OF THE POSITION, WHICH WAS LATER ACCEPTED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE SOCIALISTS, THAT "THE PSI CAN NO LONGER ALLY

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POWER IN ITALY.'' HE ADDED BITTERLY THAT HE HAD PUBLICLY TAKEN
THAT POSITION AT A TIME ''WHEN IT WAS NOT YET SHARED BY MOST OF
MY FELLOW SOCIALISTS WHO ARE NOW BLAMING ME FOR REFUSING TO GO
ALONG WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY NENNI WITH THE DC, PSDI AND PRI
LEADERS,''

ON THE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTION, LOMBARDI SAID THAT HE HAD RAISED 7. NO OBJECTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION BY THE PROJECTED MORO GOVERNMENT THAT ''ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATLANTIC PACT. LOMBARDI SAID THAT THE SOCIALISTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SHARE 'THE ATLANTIC IDEOLOGY, ' SOMETHING WHICH MAY BE 'OBVIOUS' FOR THE DC BUT WHICH ''IS NOT OBVIOUS AT ALL FOR US SOCIALISTS.'' SUCH AN ''INDISCRIMINATE' ENDORSEMENT OF THE ATLANTIC IDEOLOGY, MOREOVER, APPEARS ABSURD AT A TIME WHEN ''SO MANY DIFFERENT WAYS OF PRACTICING THAT IDEOLOGY HAVE EMERGED WITHIN THE WESTERN CAMP ITSELF. THERE WAS JOHN FOSTER DULLES' WAY OF PRACTICING IT, WHICH WAS AND STILL IS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE FOR US, AND THERE IS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WAY, WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE, AT LEAST AS IT IS EXPRESSED IN HIS SPEECH OF LAST JUNE LOMBARDI ADDED THAT ''ANOTHER THING THAT WE ARE NOT READY TO 10.11 DO IS TO ADMIT THAT WE WERE WRONG IN OPPOSING ITALY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ATLANTIC PACT IN 1949. FIRST OF ALL, WE DO NOT THINK THAT

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WE WERE WRONG. MOREOVER, TO ASK US TO ADMIT IT IS TANTAMOUNT TO ASKING US TO SPIT IN OUR OWN FACES.' FOR ALL THOSE REASONS, LOM-BARDI CONTINUED, ''I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THE PROPOSED FOREIGN POLICY DECLARATION OF THE PROJECTED MORO GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN CONTAINING A GENERIC AND DOGMATIC REAFFIRMATION OF LOYALTY TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, SHOULD HAVE SAID THAT ITALY WOULD REMAIN FAITH-FUL TO HER INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND ALLIANCES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ATLANTIC PACT WOULD EVIDENCE MORE AND MORE CLEARLY A DEFENSIVE NATURE AND AIMS. IN OTHER WORDS, MY IDEA IS THAT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ITALY SHOULD HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY THAT OTHER PARTNERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE ENJOYED OR HAVE INDICATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ENJOY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ITSELF, THE KIND OF AUTONOMY WHICH PAST ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE FAILED TO PRACTICE OR EVEN TO ASSERT ITALY'S RIGHT TO PRACTICE. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS NOT IN THIS FIELD, EITHER, THAT I RAISED MY REAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT BECAUSE, AS I SAID BEFORE, I'M NOT OPPOSED TO ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY OPERATING ON THE BASIS OF THE ATLANTIC PACT."

8. LOMBARDI CONCLUDED ON THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT HE HAD PUBLISHED HIS WHITE BOOK IN ORDER ''TO DOCUMENT THE FACT THAT MY OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT DID NOT REST ON ITS ASPECTS RELATING TO FOREIGN POLICY OR TO THE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS, BUT RATHER ON THE /HEADQUARTERS COMMENT- PORTION GARBLED WHEN RECEIVED AND

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A CORRECTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT AFFECTS THE SENSE OF GUARANTEES FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO A DEFINITE THE REPORT SCHEDULE - SPECIFICATIONS AND GUARANTEES WHICH WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE COUNTRY AND WITHIN THE DC . ' '

9. LOMBARDI EXPLICITLY STATED THAT HE AND THE MAJORITY OF THE SOCIAL-ISTS IN GENERAL REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE CENTER-LEFT APPROACH MUST BE RESUMED AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT ON THE BASIS OF A LONG RANGE PROGRAM WHICH LOOKS FORWARD TO A DIRECT SOCIALIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE STRESSED. HOWEVER. THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING THAT APPROACH DOES NOT DEPEND ONLY UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE SOCIALIST CONGRESS, A QUESTION ON WHICH HE REPEATED HE IS RATHER OPTIMISTIC. IT DEPENDS UPON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DC. LOMBARDI ADMITTED THAT THE FANFANIANI ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH BY THEMSELVES TO INSURE THAT THE SITUATION WITHIN THE DC WILL DEVELOP IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PROVIDE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH SOCIALISTS ALONG THE LINES WHICH HE /LOMBARDI/ ENVISAGES. HE FURTHER ADMITTED THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CANNOT BE INSURED, EITHER, BY AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE FANFANIANI AND THE OTHER CENTER-LEFT DC GROUPS SUCH AS LA BASE AND THE LABOR REPRESENTATIVES EVEN IF THE LATTER GROUPS SHOULD AGREE TO SUCH AN ALLIANCE. WHICH APPEARS MORE THAN DOUBTFUL. INGLY, LOMBARDI CONCLUDED, ''MUCH IF NOT ALL WILL DEPEND ON MORO.''

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- THE WORD ''MODERATE'' IN REFERENCE TO THE DOROTE FACTION OF THE DC.
- SOURCE COMMENT- LOMBARDI'S WHITE BOOK, /PARAGRAPH 8/ WHICH WAS CALLED FATTI E DOCUMENTI, '' EXPLAINED THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE GROUP OF SOCIALIST AUTONOMISTS WHO REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH NENNI ON THE ISSUE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMATION OF MORO'S PROPOSED CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT.
- 12. FIELD DISSEM- STATE.

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