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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

SOUTH KOREA: In Transition

The military and civilian leaders who have run South Korea since President Park's assassination a month ago are paving the way for an orderly transfer of power to a new interim government in December. The transition to a permanent successor government in a year or two will be more difficult as demands for liberalization are weighed against the determination of the government to maintain order. The government's plans for charge have the support of the people and the opposition New Democratic Party. Militant dissidents are not satisfied, however, and their confrontational tactics could cause a clampdown that would threaten the liberalization process.

Acting President Choe Kyu-ha and the Martial Law
Command have moved rapidly to restore a sense of normality and to ease tension. They have lifted nearly all the
restrictions on public activity imposed after the assassination, promised to revise the unpopular Yushin Constitution, and begun to release political prisoners. Moreover, the government has arranged for the election of
Choe as an interim successor and the installation of a
new cabinet in mid-December.

The New Democratic Party is likely to continue working with the government as long as it has a voice in liberalization programs and reforms move ahead at a satisfactory pace.

The progovernment Democratic Republican Party will bring a somewhat different kind of pressure to bear on the reform process. The party and Kim Chong-pil, the former Prime Minister who has just resumed the party

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, tho	se committed to the pr	rocess of liberalia	ation.

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