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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EYES ONLY

17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Haitian Exile Activity Against Duvalier Government

1. This memorandum summarizes the meeting which took place in the office of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, on 15 April, from 1745 to 1820. Others in attendance: for the Department of State: Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin and Deputy Director for Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Mr. Kennedy Crockett; for the Central Intelligence Agency: Mr. Richard Helms, Colonel J. C. King, and Raymond G. Rocca.

2. At Mr. Bundy's invitation, Mr. Helms outlined the progress that had been achieved in recent contacts with various Haitian exiles in the United States with respect to their organization and plans for action against the Duvalier Government. He described the Fusion Group's formation, the linking up of the Parti Nationale, the UDN and various independents. He also noted that a separate source of [redacted]

[redacted] had produced evidence of a developing relationship between these two and various American private (racketeering) interests for an anti-Duvalier coup. There were also various independents not associated with either of these two efforts outside of the country, such as Father Bissainthe's "Young Turk" group in New York. Mr. Helms concluded by noting that the Chief of Operations

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of the Fusion Group, General Cantave, had departed Sunday, 14 April, for the Dominican Republic to survey conditions on-the-spot.

3. CIA was now in the position of requiring a decision or guidance with respect to the continuation of the exploratory and elicitation activity which had been accomplished.

4. Mr. Martin commented that he recognized that considerable progress had been made by the Rigaud group in organizing Haitian exile activity, but he was inclined to place greater significance on assets in being within Haiti rather than outside and on demonstrable contacts by the outside elements with those in the country, which could be activated in accordance with the previously known plan. He was not convinced that the Rigaud group really had these contacts in an effective sense, nor was he convinced that the Rigaud group had a detailed plan which could be judged on its merits in terms of success or failure. Mr. Martin was doubtful of the wisdom, ultimately, of basing Haitian exile activity on the assurance of support from Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic. This would be intervention and the net effect, he felt, would go against the United States. Mr. Martin also raised the question of whether it would be possible to stage an effective move against Duvalier in the near future because of the decimation that had taken place among the high-ranking military as a consequence of the abortive 10 April Army leader coup. He also raised the question

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regarding the bona fides of various participants, in particular, he mentioned [ ] as a possible double agent and asked whether the repeated trips of Pierre Rigaud's former wife between Port-au-Prince and Puerto Rico had been explained satisfactorily.

5. Mr. Martin also indicated his doubts with regard to General Magloire's role in the Fusion activity as financier and wire-puller. He placed significant emphasis upon the participation in the anti-Duvalier activity of Francois La Tortue.

6. Colonel King sustained the feasibility of a military move into Haiti from the Dominican Republic overland by a force of between one hundred and five hundred individuals.

7. Mr. Martin expressed his agreement with the low opinion held by Mr. Helms of Dejoie's capability to act as a unifier in Haitian politics. However, he stated, that it was his understanding that Bosch preferred Dejoie to any other Haitian exile candidate. Rocca pointed out that Pierre Rigaud himself had indicated doubt that Dejoie had had any assurance of support or, for that matter, had had a direct meeting with Bosch. It was agreed that Dejoie was attempting to make use of discussions he had had with the Dominican President during the period he was in exile.

8. It appeared that there was agreement among all the participants

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that if assistance were to be given to the anti-Duvalier effort outside the country, the group with greatest promise of success was the Fusion Group now led operationally by Cantave in which the Rigauds and Rodriguez (with respect to whom Mr. Martin also expressed his personal doubts) played a leading part.

9. Five action steps were agreed upon for immediate implementation:

a. In response to Mr. Martin's request, a country team evaluation of the remaining anti-Duvalier capabilities of Army leaders identified in February 1963. [redacted]

[redacted]  
b. Secure an evaluation from oppositionists inside the country of their preference and relations with exile leaders and movements outside Haiti. Madhere was singled out as one to be queried in this respect. [redacted]

[redacted]  
c. Do a careful debriefing of General Cantave and get his estimate of the possibilities of a successful anti-Duvalier effort upon his return from his current inspection.

[redacted]  
d. Check specific Latin American leaders with respect to their attitudes and support for Pierre Rigaud and the UDN. (This is a reference to a statement contained in the


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briefing paper tabled by CIA which indicated that Pierre Rigaud claimed to have the support of Pepe Figueres, Munoz Marin and Romulo Betancourt.) This will be carried out as a blind request for information by the Department of State.

e. Check with Sacha Volman regarding the results of his personal inspection on behalf of Juan Bosch of the situation in Haiti.



*RGR*  
*ut*  
Raymond G. Rocca

Distribution:

Mr. Bundy ✓  
Mr. Martin  
Mr. McCone  
Mr. Helms  
Col. King  
Mr. Rocca

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