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*National Intelligence Estimate*

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*National Intelligence Estimate*

# Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1997 (U)

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# **Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1997 (U)**

**This Estimate was approved for publication by the  
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the  
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. (U)**

*This National Intelligence Estimate represents  
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence  
with the advice and assistance of the  
US Intelligence Community.*

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April 1997

## Scope Note

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
This Estimate focuses on *complex humanitarian emergencies*—situations in which armed conflict, government repression, and/or natural disasters cause at least 300,000 civilians to depend on international humanitarian assistance. Our definition includes those situations in which people also need protection to facilitate their access to humanitarian aid. *The Estimate does not address situations in which the need for food or other aid is the result of chronic conditions.* (U)

Complex humanitarian emergencies generated by conflict often last for years, during which large numbers of civilians flee—either within the country, as internally displaced persons, or across international borders, as refugees. Emergencies frequently are accompanied by the disruption of traditional food supply networks; fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions; population pressures; and environmental degradation. (U)

To address the resulting needs, nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies, other international institutions, and donor governments provide humanitarian assistance. Although the bulk of humanitarian aid is food, such aid may also include water and sanitation, shelter, medical care, and assistance with landmine clearing. In some emergencies, military forces provide security to ensure the delivery of aid and provide lift and transport of relief supplies. (U)



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


## Key Judgments

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### Humanitarian Aid Needs

Worldwide, the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance dropped 13 percent from roughly 41.5 million in January 1996 to an estimated 36.2 million in January 1997, according to the US Committee for Refugees (USCR).<sup>1</sup> We judge that the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance during 1997 will exceed the January 1997 level, but will remain below the January 1996 level. Conditions are expected to improve in several countries, but worsening conditions elsewhere—such as in North Korea and parts of the Horn of Africa—combined with developing emergencies, will more than offset these gains (see figure 1).



<sup>1</sup> Includes people in need because of humanitarian emergencies in all countries, not just the 20 major emergencies highlighted in this Estimate. During 1996, humanitarian conditions improved in Armenia, Cambodia, and Mozambique to the point where less than 300,000 persons were in need in each country. Thus, the number of humanitarian emergencies meeting our threshold dropped from 23 in 1995 to 20 in 1996.



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### **The International Response**


Funding for humanitarian emergencies appears to be declining, a trend that probably will continue:


- The average response to the UN 1996 appeals for all countries was 65 percent, with donors providing roughly \$1.7 billion of the \$2.6 billion requested. This is down from 71 percent, or \$1.8 billion of the \$2.5 billion requested in 1995. (UN appeals account for about half of the total funding for humanitarian emergencies.) 

Donors are likely to be more selective in choosing when to contribute and probably will fund emergencies in those countries and regions they consider important, while ignoring other humanitarian emergencies. 

The availability of food aid for ongoing and potential humanitarian emergencies in 1997 is likely to be adequate. However, worldwide grain stocks are expected to remain near current low levels. 

Global military forces available for humanitarian operations are expected to remain at 1996 levels. A key factor that will continue to affect intervention decisions is whether there is a clear, agreed-upon mandate with a set timetable for withdrawal and a firm understanding with regard to funding and other resources to be provided. Countries will be wary of any scenario that risks involvement of their forces in a local conflict:

- Among countries willing to undertake humanitarian operations, many lack the capacity to provide adequate logistic support for large, rapidly developing humanitarian emergencies and will continue to look to the United States for this type of support. In particular, the United States may be called upon to provide heavy lift and security for a developing emergency in Zaire. The United States may be called upon to provide more limited logistics support for Kenya and possibly Albania. 

Ongoing humanitarian operations during 1997 could impede the international community's ability to respond to new emergencies, particularly given the downward trend in funding. At the same time, if the international community reallocates its resources to address new crises, it could pose a threat to existing humanitarian operations. 




**Figure 1**  
**Current Humanitarian Emergencies**

Trend During 1996:	Situation	Country	Humanitarian Situation in the Country During 1996	People in Need <sup>a</sup> (in millions)		Judgment for 1997	Projected Humanitarian Conditions for 1997
				Jan 96	Current		
<p><b>Trend During 1996:</b></p> <p>↘ Worsened</p> <p>↘ ↗ Worsened, then improved</p> <p>↘ → Worsened, then leveled off</p> <p>→ Status quo</p> <p>↗ ↘ Improved, then worsened</p> <p>↗ Improved</p>							
	<b>Armed Conflicts</b>						
		Liberia	↘ →	1.5	2.0		<p>Under the revitalized peace process, the fighting has died down, the factions have partially demobilized, and all major political forces are planning to participate in elections on 30 May to establish a new national government. Despite the disarmament process, however, factions are expected to retain the core of their armed fighters, and fighting will continue in some areas. Thus, the situation will remain bleak in much of the countryside, and many refugees and IDPs will not be able to return home.</p>

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# Discussion

## Humanitarian Needs (U)

After peaking in the early 1990s, the number of humanitarian emergencies and people requiring emergency humanitarian assistance declined during 1996 (see figure 2). With improved situations in Armenia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, and the absence of major new humanitarian emergencies in 1996, the number of emergencies meeting the 300,000 person threshold dropped from 23 in 1995 to 20 in 1996. Conditions also improved during 1996 in Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Haiti, and Rwanda—although each of these emergencies still involves more than 300,000 persons in need. (U)


Worldwide, the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance dropped 13 percent from roughly 41.5 million in January 1996 to an estimated 36.2 million in January 1997, according to the US Committee for Refugees (USCR).<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, the number of people requiring emergency humanitarian assistance remains triple that of the early 1980s. Moreover, in some areas, such as North Korea and Liberia, the number of people requiring aid increased significantly during 1996. Further, we do not expect the overall downward trend to continue through 1997. (U)

## Location and Character

The majority of humanitarian emergencies in recent years often have occurred where two or more ethnic groups have competed for territory, resources, and power within a single country. Nearly half of the people requiring emergency

<sup>2</sup> Includes people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance from all countries, not just the 20 major emergencies highlighted in this Estimate. (U)

**Figure 2**  
**Estimated Number of the World's People in Need of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, 1984-97 (U)**



<sup>a</sup> People who fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees. Some are given temporary refuge or allowed to remain undocumented. Information on these groups is fragmentary and estimates of their numbers often vary widely.

<sup>b</sup> No data available.

<sup>c</sup> Figures for January each year.

Source: US Committee for Refugees, "World Refugee Survey" various issues.

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**Defining and Estimating Populations  
"In Need" (U)**

*Definitions of populations "in need" of emergency humanitarian assistance used by the international relief community often are inconsistent. The Intelligence Community's definition of persons in need of emergency humanitarian assistance includes refugees, people in refugee-like situations, internally displaced persons, and others requiring humanitarian aid in their home locations due to conflict, government repression, and/or natural or technological disasters. (U)*

*The figures used in this Estimate for the total number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance worldwide were provided by the US Committee for Refugees (USCR). Because this Estimate focuses only on those emergencies in which 300,000 or more people are in need, the totals listed for individual countries will not add up to the worldwide total cited in this paper. (U)*

*The numbers cited in this Estimate for people in need in individual countries represent the Intelligence Community's best estimate based on a review of information available from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, diplomatic reporting, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. They should be treated as approximations, not precise numbers of people affected by conflicts, government repression, and/or natural disasters. A change in the reported population "in need" does not necessarily reflect a change in circumstances, but may be due to a change in access to reliable information. (U)*

*A number of factors contribute to the problems surrounding the collection and analysis of statistics on populations "in need" and their requirements:*

- The personal level of need varies markedly among emergencies and even within countries. Some people who are "in need," for instance, live with friends or relatives and require only supplementary help; others are totally dependent on relief to survive.*
- The quality and availability of data varies markedly. Poor security, rapidly changing circumstances on the ground, and often difficult geographic and political conditions minimize access to those in need and limit the effectiveness of remote sensing techniques in determining displaced population numbers.*

*Political and economic considerations play a large role. Some governments provide inflated statistics on the numbers of people in need in order to obtain greater amounts of aid and support. Other governments underestimate the number of people in need either because a large number can symbolize the failure of the regime to properly manage a crisis or because they underreport on groups that are out of favor.*

humanitarian assistance today reside in Sub-Saharan Africa and are at greatest risk of malnutrition, starvation, and disease. With the breakup of the former Soviet Union, ethnic nationalism has fueled humanitarian emergencies in Central Asia and the Caucasus (see figure 3). (U)

As has been the case over the last decade, there were more internally displaced persons (IDPs) than refugees in 1996. This is significant because IDPs often reside in contested areas where they can be difficult for relief organizations to reach. In January 1997, there were more than 19.2 million IDPs and 14 million refugees, according to the USCR. A year earlier, in January 1996, there were roughly 22 to 24 million IDPs and 16 million refugees. (U)

### **Global Survey**


We judge that the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance during 1997 will exceed the January 1997 level of 36.2 million, but will remain below the January 1996 level of 41.5 million. Conditions are expected to improve in several countries—including Angola, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Georgia. However, worsening conditions elsewhere—such as in North Korea and parts of the Horn of Africa—combined with newly developing emergencies, will more than offset these gains. We categorize the 20 current major humanitarian emergencies as described below:

***Ongoing Armed Conflicts*** account for the largest number of people in need due to humanitarian emergencies—roughly 13 million.<sup>3</sup> Over the last year, armed conflicts prolonged humanitarian emergencies in Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.<sup>4</sup>


<sup>3</sup> We arrived at this figure by adding our estimates of the number of people in need for the individual countries listed. (U)

<sup>4</sup> Conflict in Zaire in 1996 primarily affected Rwandan refugees. We discuss the developing emergency in Zaire as it affects Zairians in the next section of this paper. (U)


- Fighting is expected to continue in Afghanistan, Liberia, and Tajikistan during 1997, and we judge that overall humanitarian conditions will remain about the same in these countries. However, conditions in northern Afghanistan may worsen due to Taliban's efforts to gain control of the country.








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
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
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


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


### **The International Response: Meeting the Need? (U)**

#### **The UN, NGOs, and Other Humanitarian Organizations**

The international humanitarian aid community consists of loosely organized networks of humanitarian organizations: UN agencies; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); other international organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM); and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). (For a more complete discussion and listing of the major humanitarian organizations, see *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996, Volume I* dated February 1996.) (U)

The UN is the major player in humanitarian emergencies. In addition to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main UN agencies providing assistance in response to humanitarian emergencies are the WFP and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). (U)



A relief worker in Mogadishu, Somalia. (U)

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

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**Successes and Failures During 1996.** Humanitarian organizations work to provide emergency aid to people in need due to conflicts, government repression, and/or natural disasters. The success or failure of an international response to complex humanitarian crises depends not only on the level of assistance provided, but also on the mitigation and mediation efforts made by humanitarian organizations in conjunction with donor governments, host countries, and neighboring states. Humanitarian organizations experienced both successes and failures in achieving these objectives during 1996. (U)

***The Humanitarian Impact of  
Economic Sanctions (U)***

*The provision of food, medicine, and other materials required for public health may be permitted under certain sanctions. However, sanctioned regimes often withhold humanitarian aid from those segments of the population that are the most vulnerable. Such regimes often exploit the link between sanctions and poor domestic economic conditions, condemning foreign powers for targeting innocent civilians. (U)*



*United Nations agencies and NGOs may assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid in a sanctioned country, but usually they are faced with the arduous task of operating in a hostile environment without much power to affect actual distribution. Under such circumstances, these agencies have a self-interest in highlighting, and sometimes overstating, the severity of humanitarian conditions—feeding into the regime's public condemnation of sanctions.*



**Early Response.** In humanitarian emergencies, a rapid, coordinated response is critical. A slow response often results in the loss of thousands of lives even though a "successful" operation is eventually mounted. During 1996, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) worked to improve the UN's standby capacity to respond to emergencies. For example, the DHA's Military Civil Defense Unit (MCDU)—designed as a focal point for UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations requesting military/defense assistance and services from governments in complex emergencies—was first tested during the 1996 crisis in Africa's Great Lakes region. The MCDU responded to and helped to coordinate a broad range of requests, including arranging airlifts of relief supplies to the region, providing civil engineers for road/bridge assessments for the WFP, and assisting in a World Health Organization (WHO) epidemiological survey. (U)


Nevertheless, cooperative humanitarian interventions by national military and civil defense units remain slow and difficult to implement because they continue to be undertaken largely on an ad hoc basis according to decisions made by the UN Security Council and regional political organizations. (U)

**Large-scale Repatriations.** A number of significant large-scale repatriations constituted some of the major humanitarian successes in 1996. For the first time this decade, there were substantially more persons returned to their homes than displaced, and a number of long-term repatriation programs were either brought to a close (Mozambicans) or were very near completion (Burmese, Vietnamese, Guatemalans, Ethiopians):



**Roadblocks.** Humanitarian organizations frequently operate in hostile environments. Continued fighting, threats to aid workers, and repressive government policies largely have prevented humanitarian organizations from adequately responding to crises in West Africa—principally Liberia—as well as in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and northern Iraq.

- In Liberia, fighting in Monrovia in April and May 1996 led to the evacuation of most relief workers; the relief infrastructure was devastated by factional looting.







In a number of cases in 1996, notably Angola and Bosnia, peace agreements have resulted in the cessation of hostilities, but a variety of obstacles—political, economic, and security—have prevented large-scale repatriation, reintegration, or reconstruction. In the aftermath of most humanitarian crises, the lack of subsequent funding for such activities also hampers returnees from reestablishing their former lives and livelihood. (U)

**Key Challenges.** Humanitarian organizations will continue to face two key challenges:

**Attacks on Relief Workers.** Hostage-taking and attacks on relief workers have increased; incidents directed against humanitarian workers resulted in the detention or deaths of relief workers in Chechnya, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan in the latter half of 1996. Humanitarian organizations are likely to find themselves increasingly in positions where they will be asked to negotiate for the release of their kidnapped workers.

**Pressure From Donor Countries.** The insistence of donors on time limitations and exit strategies for humanitarian operations places additional pressures on humanitarian organizations to muster a rapid and effective response, and to place more of their resources into mitigation (and prevention). Further, there will be increasing calls for humanitarian organizations to be more involved in human rights monitoring activities, particularly in postcrisis states pursuing policies of reintegration and reconstruction. (U)

### **Humanitarian Military Assistance**

While humanitarian organizations deliver and distribute the bulk of humanitarian aid, only the military has the rapid lift capability necessary to deliver relief in time to save a substantial number of lives in large, rapidly developing emergencies—such as natural disasters or the 1994 Rwanda crisis. Moreover, in some conflict situations, only the military can provide the security necessary to deliver aid. (U)

The capabilities of global military forces to participate in humanitarian operations have not changed since our 1996 Estimate. Major industrialized countries—particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—continue to maintain force structures capable of participating in humanitarian operations. (For a detailed discussion of the capabilities of global military forces to participate in humanitarian emergencies, see NIE 96-1/I, *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996*.) The ability of developing countries to participate in humanitarian operations continues to vary widely. Moreover, the availability of funding and the specialized logistics, transport, engineering, military police, and medical personnel needed to sustain those forces is limited.

**An African Crisis Response Force?** During 1996, the United States began to pursue the formation of a pan-African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), designed primarily to engage in peacekeeping missions. It is envisioned that international aid and training will be provided to enhance the capability of African units to operate together in regions where humanitarian assistance is required on short notice. This US initiative has met with mixed reactions: some



ECOMOG Troops in Liberia. (U)

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French IFOR checkpoint along "Sniper Alley" (west side of city), Sarajevo. (U)

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African countries have welcomed it and agreed to contribute forces, but others have adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

The two countries with the most advanced military forces, South Africa and Nigeria, are not prospective contributors to the ACRF:

- South Africa's legacy of apartheid makes it reluctant to deploy its largely white officer corps in black Africa; moreover, it does not wish to take responsibility for solving Africa's problems while its own internal structures are still fragile.
- Nigeria has marshaled the only all-African peacekeeping force—the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—that is experiencing some limited success in Liberia. However, the United States did not approach Nigeria to discuss the ACRF initiative; US-Nigerian relations are strained due to Nigeria's human rights violations and its poor counternarcotics record.


### The Availability of International Funding

We are unable to estimate with any precision total worldwide spending on humanitarian emergencies in 1996, because much of the data required to do so still are not available.<sup>5</sup> However, based on available data, funding for humanitarian emergencies appears to be declining, a trend that we expect will continue (see figure 4 and figure 5):

- The average response to the 1996 UN appeals for all countries was 65 percent, with donors providing roughly \$1.7 billion of the \$2.6 billion requested. This is down from 71 percent, or \$1.8 billion of the \$2.5 billion requested in 1995. UN appeal data constitutes about half of overall funding for humanitarian emergencies.

<sup>5</sup> The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has a one-year time lag in processing its data. (U)

**Figure 4**  
**United Nations Consolidated**  
**Interagency Humanitarian**  
**Assistance Appeals, 1992-96 (U)**



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- Although the majority of OECD governments that belong to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reported slight increases in their spending for humanitarian purposes in 1995—the last year for which data is available—the major OECD donors are indicating they will reduce such expenditures in 1997.
- Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom have announced plans to reduce their aid budgets, which could affect funding for humanitarian operations. The Swedish International

Development Agency plans to cut its budget by 11 percent between 1997 and 1999, which will strain its ability to maintain funding for humanitarian emergencies. (U)

International political support appears to be waning for the majority of the emergency aid programs that are operating in countries where humanitarian problems have continued despite an end to most fighting:


- Less than half of the amounts requested in the 1996 UN appeals for Sudan, the Caucasus, and Iraq were funded.
- Budgets for refugee repatriation—for example in the Horn of Africa—remain underfunded. Donors reportedly believe that when refugees decide to return, they usually are able to do so without international assistance. (U)

**Funding From National Government.**

National governments continue to provide roughly 70 percent of financial and in-kind contributions for emergency humanitarian relief. The OECD countries remain the principal donors (see tables 1 and 2):

- In 1995, European Union (EU) member states collectively continued to be the world's largest funder of humanitarian aid. Member governments and the EU's European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provided more than 40 percent of worldwide funding for humanitarian operations. The

**Figure 5**  
**Status of 1996 Consolidated Interagency**  
**Humanitarian Assistance Appeals<sup>a</sup> (U)**



<sup>a</sup> Requirements and contributions as of 31 December 1996, including carryover funds received in 1995.

<sup>b</sup> Includes a \$259 million request by the UN for the crisis in eastern Zaire.

<sup>c</sup> For Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.

<sup>d</sup> Donor alert for November 1996–May 1997.

Source: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

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- United States provided roughly 24 percent of the total, the largest commitment of any single government.
- Other top donors, in order of their contributions, were Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Canada, the UK, Norway, France, and Switzerland. Japan's contributions substantially increased during 1996.
- Humanitarian aid contributions from other countries including India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and South Korea remained small; these countries tend to target their aid bilaterally to a narrow set of recipients in which they have a special interest. (U)



© Sarajevo Yerevan Noviine Sources of Funding

UNHCR will finance the reconstruction of 247 private homes in Sarajevo Novi Grosi municipality. The cost will amount to 15,000 German marks. The above picture shows one of the buildings that will not be covered and will have to await new donors. (U)

**Funding From Private Sources.** Private sources provided roughly \$2 billion—nearly 30 percent—of total global emergency humanitarian aid in 1995. Most private aid is funneled through NGOs, although some is contributed to international agencies, particularly UNICEF. (U)

**Food Aid**

Total food aid deliveries—which include developmental as well as emergency food aid—during 1996 followed the downward trend that

**Table 1**  
**Estimated Funding of Global Humanitarian Assistance, 1995 (U)**

Billion US \$

Source of Funds	Funding Level
OECD Governments <sup>a</sup>	>4.2
Of which:	
United States	1.2
European Union government contributions <sup>b</sup>	2.1
All other OECD government contributions	0.9
European Community Humanitarian Office <sup>c</sup>	0.9
Private contributions <sup>d</sup>	>2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>&gt;7.1</b>

<sup>a</sup>Includes bilateral expenditures for emergency and disaster relief and contributions to multilateral organizations for emergency purposes. Excludes military expenditures for support of humanitarian operations, such as airlifts and the delivery of relief supplies. DAC report for 1996.

<sup>b</sup>Bilateral contributions for humanitarian purposes by EU members except for Greece and Ireland.

<sup>c</sup>The ECHO budget is composed of monies from the EU budget and from additional contributions by member states during 1995.

<sup>d</sup>Estimated.

This table is Unclassified.

began in 1993-94 (see figure 6). According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), total food aid shipments in 1995-96 (July-June) amounted to 7.7 million metric tons (mmt), down from 9.5 mmt in 1994-95, and barely half the peak delivery of 14.7 mmt in 1992-93. Nearly half of total food aid for 1995-96, or 3.1 mmt, was contributed by the United States, followed by the European Union with 2.9 mmt. (U)

Total food aid deliveries during 1996 were constrained by the relatively small 1995 world grain harvest—mainly caused by unfavorable

**Table 2:** *Billion US \$*  
**Annual Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
and Humanitarian Emergency Aid Provided by  
Development Assistance Committee Members  
(U)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
ODA	58.1	60.1	60.8	56.5	59.2	58.8
Humanitarian Aid (percent of ODA)	2.5 (4.3)	4.8 (8.0)	4.7 (7.7)	5.2 (9.2)	>6.0 (~10)	>4.2 (~7)

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary data from the DAC report for 1996.

This table is Unclassified.

weather—which resulted in record-high grain prices and the lowest surplus stocks in 20 years for donor countries:

- There was a nearly 36-percent drop in total US food aid deliveries between 1994-95 and 1995-96.
- Growing concern over budget deficits in the EU as well as in Canada, has caused those countries, like the United States, to reduce government-held stocks and total food aid.


**Emergency food aid** accounted for 2.4 mmt of the 1995-96 total. The share of food aid for emergencies has risen from an average of 20 percent between 1986 and 1990 to 29 percent of the total in the 1991-95 time frame. We estimate that 4.4 mmt<sup>6</sup> of emergency food aid will be required to meet emergency humanitarian needs for 1997 (see figure 7):

- Sub-Saharan Africa will require about 2 mmt of emergency food aid due to drought—in countries such as Eritrea, Kenya, and

<sup>6</sup> Includes 180,000 mmt for the emerging crisis in Kenya. (U)

**Figure 6**  
**Total Food Aid Deliveries**  
**1987-96<sup>a</sup> (U)**

*Million metric tons*



<sup>a</sup> Year begins July 1.


<sup>b</sup> Projected.


Source: Food and Agriculture Organization

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Somalia—and civil strife in the Great Lakes region and other African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola.






The availability of food aid for humanitarian emergencies in 1997 is likely to be adequate. Moreover, total food aid is expected to increase somewhat over 1996:

- FAO estimates global cereal production in 1996/97 to be almost 7 percent higher than 1995/96, and grain prices have dropped sharply from the peak reached in spring 1996. (C NF)

However, government-held grain stocks—from which most emergency aid is traditionally drawn—are expected to remain near current reduced levels because of the continuation of agricultural policies that call for reduced production subsidies.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, donors will have to depend more on open market purchases of food for humanitarian emergencies.

<sup>7</sup> The United States, Canada, and the European Community are reducing subsidies to farmers consistent with the agreement reached in the GATT Uruguay Round. (U)

**Figure 7**  
**Emergency Food Aid Requirements**  
**For Humanitarian Needs, 1997 (U)**



<sup>a</sup> Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.

<sup>b</sup> North Korea.

<sup>c</sup> Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

<sup>d</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

<sup>e</sup> Azerbaijan, Russia (Chechnya), Georgia, and Tajikistan.

<sup>f</sup> Iraq.

<sup>g</sup> Haiti.

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**Implications**

We judge that the overall demand for emergency humanitarian aid, which declined in 1996, will increase in 1997. This will occur at a time when a declining trend in donor country aid budgets is expected to continue. Thus, the question of whether—and to what extent—an international response is needed in particular situations will continue to vex the international community. In making decisions to provide funding, food, and sometimes military forces to respond to populations in need of emergency humanitarian aid, the international community will consider a number of factors on a case-by-case basis. [ ]

**Funding.** The outlook for the international response to ongoing and potential humanitarian emergencies is clouded by the growing problem of obtaining adequate international funding. Funding reductions reflect, in part, donor fatigue with long-term humanitarian emergencies and growing uncertainty about the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, particularly compared to more long-term development assistance. This trend is expected to continue through 1997:

- Donors are likely to be more selective in choosing when to provide aid and are more likely to fund emergencies in those countries and regions they consider important, while ignoring other humanitarian emergencies. [ ]

Further [ ] decline in the funding of UNDH [ ] may make DHA more cautious about launching future appeals, thereby complicating donor and relief agency efforts to maintain a comprehensive means of soliciting funds. [ ]

**1996 World Food Summit (U)**

*Representatives from 137 countries in November 1996 attended the World Food Summit in Rome. Although the Summit did not focus exclusively on emergency food needs, its Declaration on World Food Security and Plan of Action reconfirmed the world community's commitment to eradicate hunger and contained a resolution to reduce the number of undernourished people to half their present estimated level of 840 million no later than 2015. (U)*

*The signatories to the Summit Document further agreed on broad commitments aimed at fighting world hunger by fostering conditions to eradicate poverty, promoting sustainable agricultural development, promoting trade policies conducive to food security for all, and providing for emergency food requirements. (U)*

**Food.** Donor governments are expected to maintain a policy of reducing agricultural subsidies; thus grain stocks are expected to remain near current low levels. However, with increased global harvests, it is likely that donor governments will make sufficient food aid available in 1997 to meet ongoing emergency humanitarian needs as well as potential emergency needs in Zaire, Kenya, and Albania. [ ]



**Military.** Global military forces available for humanitarian operations are expected to remain roughly at 1996 levels. Most countries continue to be reluctant to commit forces for humanitarian operations in conflict situations:

- A key factor that will continue to affect intervention decisions is whether there is a clear, agreed-upon mandate with a set timetable for withdrawal and a firm understanding with regard to funding and other resources to be provided. Countries will be wary of any scenario that risks involvement of their forces in a local conflict or otherwise holds the potential for escalation.
- The members of the UN Security Council initiated multilateral humanitarian operations in such places as Somalia and Rwanda, partly in response to the media-inspired public reaction to humanitarian emergencies. This will continue to be a significant factor as the international community considers whether to become engaged in emergencies, particularly in areas of little strategic importance.
- Among countries willing to undertake humanitarian operations, many lack the capacity to provide adequate logistics support for large, rapidly developing humanitarian emergencies and will continue to look to the United States for this type of support. For example, the United States may be called upon to provide heavy lift and security for a developing humanitarian emergency in Zaire. Such involvement could also be sought in connection with developments in Kenya, and possibly Albania, although more limited logistics support would be required for these emergencies because Kenya and Albania have more developed infrastructures and are more geographically accessible.

Ongoing humanitarian operations during 1997 could impede the international community's ability to respond adequately to new emergencies, particularly given the downward trend in funding. Conversely, if the international community reallocates resources to address new crises, it could pose a threat to existing humanitarian operations.



# Annex

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## Country Estimates (U)

**Note:** The total number of persons in need for each country listed includes refugees **from** the named country, internally displaced persons, (IDPs) and others in need in their home locations due to conflict, government repression, and/or natural or technological disasters. The numbers cited in this Estimate for people in need in individual countries represent the Intelligence Community's best estimate based on a review of information available from the UNHCR, diplomatic reporting, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. They should be treated as approximations, not precise numbers of people affected by conflicts, government repression, and/or natural disasters. (U)

### Africa (U)




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
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


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The staging area for Liberian refugees in Freetown. (U) 357432 PM5 4-97

**Liberia**

The humanitarian situation in Liberia sharply deteriorated in early 1996 due to an intensification of the 7-year-old civil war. The situation has stabilized in recent months as factional violence has temporarily subsided. Relief agencies have been reluctant to resume extensive operations outside of the areas controlled by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) until factions demonstrate respect for humanitarian principals.

Roughly 2 million Liberians require humanitarian aid—500,000 more than in January 1996. Some 1.2 million Liberians are internally displaced, although the majority do not depend on regular international humanitarian relief. At least 760,000 Liberians remain refugees in neighboring states, including 410,000 in Guinea, 330,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 15,000 in Ghana, 5,000 in Sierra Leone, and 4,000 in Nigeria.

Continued fighting and harassment of relief agencies have made many areas of the countryside inaccessible to humanitarian assistance

during much of 1996, resulting in an increased incidence of disease and malnutrition:



- In September, critical food shortages were reported in at least three counties, and a partial survey revealed a malnutrition rate as high as 47 percent in some areas.
- Also in September, relief workers reported at least 10,000 severely malnourished people in Tubmanburg. Subsequent attacks on civilians there by factional fighters—in an attempt to loot food rations—forced relief workers to halt distribution of bulk rations and start providing cooked food.
- In November, the WFP reported a malnutrition rate reaching as high as 40 percent in parts of upper Margibi and Bong counties.

Nevertheless, the fighting has died down and all major political forces are planning to participate in elections on 30 May to establish a new national government. (U)


**Outlook.** The humanitarian situation is unlikely to improve during 1997. Although the disarmament process and demobilization are underway, the factions are expected to retain the core of their armed fighters, and fighting will continue in some areas. Thus, the situation will remain bleak in much of the countryside, and many refugees and IDPs will not be able to return home.

**Funding.** The primary aid donors to Liberia are the United States and the EU. The United States pledged more than \$76 million in 1996 and the EU made a \$26 million contribution. (U)

**Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal.** \$114.6 million for 1996, but in December, the UN issued a \$91.9 million appeal for Liberia to cover the period from January to June 1997.  
**Percent met:** 78.2 of the initial appeal, as of 31 December 1996; No information available for newest appeal. (U)




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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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