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The Attack That Failed: Iraq's Attempt To Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait, April 1993

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The Attack That Failed: Iraq's Attempt To Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait, April 1993 (U)

Key Findings

On 15 April 1993, a team of terrorists was arrested by Kuwaiti authorities for plotting to assassinate former President George Bush during an official visit to Kuwait City on the previous day. The two leaders of the team confessed to Kuwaiti authorities and later to US investigators that they had been recruited; trained; and equipped with arms, explosives, and false passports by Iraqi intelligence agents based in Basra. Forensic tests conducted by US experts proved conclusively that the explosive devices were identical to others recovered before and after the Kuwait event and were known to have been manufactured by Iraq. The Iraqis had sufficient foreknowledge of President Bush's visit to prepare for the operation. In addition, Saddam Husayn had several motives

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for wanting to assassinate the former President, including revenge for the devastation caused by Coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Iraqi press articles and editorials had made explicit threats before the assassination attempt.



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The Attack That Failed: Iraqi's Attempt To Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait, April 1993

Scope Note

This report details the Iraqi regime's attempt to assassinate former President George Bush on 14 April 1993. The investigation of the attempt to kill President Bush was exhaustive. It drew on the investigative and forensic resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a variety of Central Intelligence Agency sources, and the concerted efforts of the Kuwaiti Government.

Evidence surrounding the assassination plot consists of four mutually reinforcing segments:

- o Public threats by senior Iraqi officials.
- o Statements made by the suspects.
- o Forensic evidence.
- o Intelligence reporting.

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On 4 June 1994, the Kuwait State Security Court convicted 13 of the 14 defendants who were tried for involvement in the assassination plot. Five Iraqis--including the major defendants al Asadi and al Ghazali--and one Kuwaiti were sentenced to death. Seven other defendants, including five Iraqis and two Kuwaitis, were convicted of possessing explosives and entering Kuwait illegally. The seven were given jail sentences ranging from six months to twelve years. One Kuwaiti defendant was acquitted.

On 20 March 1995, following all of the defendants' appeals, Kuwait's highest appellate court--the Court of Cassation--confirmed the death sentence for two of the Iraqis and commuted the sentence of the other four defendants who had faced execution, including one Kuwaiti. The Amir must order the executions and has not done so as of August 1995.

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The Attack That Failed: Iraq's Attempt To Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait on 14 April 1993

Background: Baghdad's Use of Terrorism

The Ba'th Party in Iraq has a history of sponsoring or encouraging terrorism. At various times it has played host to, and maintains ties to, such terrorist groups as the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) led by Sabri al Banna and the Palestine Liberation Front led by Abu Abbas.

Iraqi use of terrorism as a means of governing and repressing increased significantly when Saddam Husayn assumed office. In addition to supporting radical Palestinian terrorist groups, he has ruthlessly pursued and murdered his opponents at home and abroad. He ordered the assassinations of numerous domestic adversaries and former colleagues, including dissidents in the United Kingdom, Sudan, Jordan, and the Kurdish area of northern Iraq. His grasp on power, the fear he instills in his subordinates,

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and the highly centralized nature of his dictatorship would indicate that he authorizes all major Iraqi terrorist operations.

Numerous instances of Saddam's brutality in killing real or imagined enemies to protect himself and his regime have been recorded over the years. Examples include:


- o Shortly after coming to power, Saddam convoked a congress of senior Ba'th Party and government officials. During the sessions, he accused various individuals of treachery. The accused were taken from the hall and summarily executed. A film of the proceedings shows Saddam alternately weeping and smoking his cigar during the roll call.

- o In 1988, Saddam ordered the murder of a prominent Shia clerical dissident, Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim, in Khartoum. Al-Hakim, whose brother heads the largest Iranian-backed Shia opposition group, was shot by an Iraqi operative. The killer drove away from the scene in a car with Iraqi diplomatic license plates.

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Damage to Iraq's overseas terrorist infrastructure did not quell its tendency toward violence. In December 1992, two Iraqi agents murdered an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Amman as he was preparing to defect. However, Saddam has been mainly

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targeting his Kurdish adversaries and UN humanitarian units and nongovernmental organizations working with Kurds in northern Iraq. During 1993, Iraqi agents caused numerous casualties in attacks that included placing magnetic bombs beneath UN relief trucks and bombing, shooting, and arson incidents aimed at the houses, offices, and vehicles of UN and other relief workers. At one point, Defense Minister Ali Hassan al-Majid offered a bounty for the killing of dissident Kurdish leaders.

A flagrant terrorist attack in 1992 directed against a leading Western personality demonstrated Saddam's willingness to disregard international opinion and possible military retaliation. On 6 July, terrorists who were probably Iraqi agents mounted a car-bomb attack against a convoy traveling near the town of Sulaimaniya in northern Iraq. The convoy was escorting the wife of French President Mitterrand, a fact that was known to the Iraqi regime because the government-controlled press criticized her visit. An Iraqi newspaper, *Al-Qadisiyah*, wrote on 6 July that her visit to the Kurds in northern Iraq was "foolish," and a "rude violation of Iraq's national sovereignty." The

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newspaper then claimed that Madame Mitterrand "has close links with Zionism and the secessionist gangs in northern Iraq [and] cannot justify her foolish behavior by giving it a humanitarian cover" Madame Mitterrand escaped injury, but four people were killed and 19 others were injured.

Saddam's domestic terrorism campaign persists. Iraq was responsible for 41 terrorist incidents between 1 January 1993, and 28 February 1994, all in northern Iraq with the exception of the attempted assassination of President Bush in Kuwait. The incidents included armed attacks and bombings, which killed seven persons, including four international and three local staff members of nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. More than 30 others were wounded.

Public Iraqi Threats Against President Bush

Following Iraq's surrender in January 1991, Baghdad publicly singled out President Bush, as well as other senior US Government officials, as being responsible for the devastation of its military and physical infrastructure.

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Thereafter, Iraqi officials were open about exacting retribution.

On 27 November 1991, an editorial in the Iraqi Ba'thist newspaper *Al-Thawrah* claimed that "The Iraqi people will...never forget that Bush's barbaric aggression targeted their lives and their existence.... Bush and his aggressor allies are responsible, first and foremost, for the suffering of the Iraqi people." On 28 July 1992, Saddam's press secretary said in the same newspaper that "Bush and no one else wants to apply a new law, which goes beyond the law of the jungle This [President Bush] is the spiteful, the brutal, and the savage one. This is the one who will be cursed, along with his ancestors, until the day of judgment " The article continued: "Who is the savage one who has embodied all savagery, who is the villain who epitomizes all lowliness". . . Can it be anyone other than George Bush?"

Numerous Iraqi public statements called for revenge against President Bush. Immediately after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi press issued frequent threats, of which the following are representative examples. One editorial in January 1991 claimed that a "fedayeen (one

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who sacrifices himself) combat force" would be formed to seek revenge through "suicide operations." (The assassination attempt may have involved a suicide attack.) Another Iraqi press item in February 1991 held President Bush personally responsible for each drop of blood spilled on Iraqi soil and warned that he and others would be hunted down and punished. "The curse," the writer threatened, "will haunt them and their families until doomsday." On 28 December 1992, after the downing of an Iraqi military aircraft, the Defense Ministry newspaper Al-Qadisiyah was quoted by the Iraqi News Agency as claiming that "Iraq reserves the right to respond in the manner and at the time its leadership deems appropriate, at which time Iraq will wreak double retaliation on Bush and on all the evil ones." On the same day, the proregime newspaper Al-'Iraq boasted that "If the criminal Bush imagines that this crime will go unpunished, then he is deluded and deceives only his sick, evil person. This is because forgetting the acts of scoundrels and murderers like him is not an Iraqi characteristic."

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Saddam's Motive for the Attack

The motive suggested by the Iraqi media's rhetoric--revenge for Iraq's defeat in Desert Storm--was probably the principal reason for Saddam's decision to attack President Bush. Saddam has a deserved reputation for bloody vindictiveness. The presence of the former President in neighboring Kuwait would have appeared to be a prime opportunity to strike, hopefully with deniability. Saddam probably calculated that the Kuwait-Iraq border, which was porous and crisscrossed with smugglers' routes, would be an ideal area to infiltrate an assassination team.

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Foreknowledge of President Bush's Visit

The Iraqi regime had ample time before President Bush's visit to Kuwait to prepare an attack. The possibility of a visit by the President had circulated in the Kuwaiti media as early as 10 November 1992. On that date, Kuwait's Embassy in Washington delivered a public message to President Bush, via the Department of State, in which the

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
Crown Prince thanked the President for defeating Iraq and invited him to visit Kuwait "at a date of [his] choice." The Kuwaiti media published the text of the Crown Prince's letter on 12 November. Additional indicators of an impending visit came from media speculation in January 1993 that President Bush would go to Kuwait after visiting US forces in Somalia. Later in January there were press reports that President Bush would visit Kuwait in 1993 to receive a medal from the Kuwaiti Government.

On 1 April 1993, President Bush's spokesman in Houston announced that the former President "planned to spend two days in Kuwait sometime between 12 and 16 April." By 1 April, the Iraqis were able to focus their planning for the terrorist attack--planning that could have begun as early as the previous November--on specific dates. According to one of the principal accused persons, al-Ghazali, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) recruited him for the operation on 8 and 9 April.

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Information Supplied by the Suspects

The fullest account of the assassination plot and how it failed was provided by the two key suspects, Wali al-Ghazali and Ra'ad al-Asadi, who confessed to Kuwaiti authorities within a week of their capture. By their account, they had been recruited by Iraqi intelligence officers in Basra, Iraq, to infiltrate Kuwait and carry out a series of bombings. Both later repeated their admissions to FBI agents and during court proceedings.¹

Both al-Ghazali and al-Asadi² insist that they agreed to carry out the mission out of fear of Iraqi retribution against them, and probably their families, if they refused to cooperate. Al-Ghazali claims that he had intended to

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surrender to Kuwaiti authorities as soon as he could escape from the other members of the assassination team. Al-Asadi asserts that al-Ghazali was determined to complete the mission and was only prevented from doing so by Kuwaiti interdiction.³

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Synopsis of the Plot and the Arrests

The following narrative, drawn from the suspects' statements, describes the unraveling of the plot. The chronology in appendix A includes key events regarding President Bush's trip, the assassination plot, and the ensuing investigation.

The earliest reported contact between the IIS and any of the suspects was in February 1992, when Salim al-Shamri took al-Asadi to Safwan. They met with an Iraqi intelligence officer called Abu Ahmad, a.k.a. Captain Jum'aa. Abu Ahmad tried to recruit al-Asadi to provide information on Kuwait derived from his activities as a smuggler. Al-Asadi told Abu Ahmad, however, that he did not cross into Kuwait frequently enough to be useful.

On 8 April 1993, the other key suspect, al-Ghazali, was contacted by an Iraqi named Abd al-Husayn, whom al-Ghazali believed to be an officer of the IIS. This officer took al-Ghazali to the Hamdan Hotel in Basra, where he was ordered

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to wait to meet another reported Iraqi intelligence officer named Abu Rafed.

The next day Abu Rafed met with al-Ghazali at the hotel. He told al-Ghazali he was required to participate in an operation in Kuwait to assassinate President Bush. Al-Ghazali claims that he tried hard to refuse the mission but that Abu Rafed rebuffed his objections. Abu Rafed then accompanied al-Ghazali to have his passport photograph taken.

On 10 April, a reputed Iraqi intelligence officer named Muhammad Jawad approached al-Asadi in the Marbed Cafe in al-Ashaar, a district of Basra. Over a three-year period, Al-Asadi had noticed Jawad patronizing the cafe but had only known him personally for one year. Jawad inquired when al-Asadi's next smuggling trip to Kuwait was scheduled and what goods he would be taking. Al-Asadi replied that he would be crossing the border in the near future with a load of contraband whisky.

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The same day, Abu Rafed escorted al-Ghazali a short distance from the Hamdan Hotel to a military-guarded government building (identified later by intelligence reporting as the Basra municipal office). Inside the facility, Abu Rafed, showed al-Ghazali a Toyota Landcruiser, which he explained was loaded with explosives to be detonated on the Bush motorcade route. Abu Rafed instructed al-Ghazali on how to detonate the Landcruiser and told him that a guide would be provided to take him to the target location, but that he himself would have to scan the media carefully for details of President Bush's itinerary. Abu Rafed then gave al-Ghazali 5,000 Iraqi dinars. Abu Rafed's personal driver, Walid, drove al-Ghazali to his home so that he could hand the money over to his wife. Walid then took al-Ghazali back to the Hamdan Hotel.

On 11 April, Iraqi intelligence officers arranged al-Asadi's role in the mission. Jawad met al-Asadi at the Marbed Cafe and requested that he smuggle a car and a driver into Kuwait. Jawad offered to pay al-Asadi 5,000 Iraqi dinars

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and five cases of whisky. Al-Asadi responded that he was already committed to smuggling three cases of whisky and some illegal immigrants into Kuwait and therefore would first have to consult with his partners. After obtaining his partners' agreement, al-Asadi contacted Jawad and was informed that he would be transporting explosives into Kuwait. Jawad asked for a photograph of al-Asadi, and al-Asadi provided one.

In Iraq, preparations to initiate the operation were completed on 12 April. Abu Rafed and Abdel Yamma met al-Ghazali at the Hamdan Hotel. Abu Rafed gave al-Ghazali a Browning pistol with a silencer, two battery-powered landmines, and US \$1,100 for expenses. Al-Ghazali was also provided with the Landcruiser. Next, the group went to the Marbed Cafe in al-Ashaar, followed by al-Asadi driving a Chevrolet Suburban. They all then went to Zubayr, where Abu Rafed introduced al-Ghazali to al-Asadi.

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At the Zubayr rendezvous, the Iraqi intelligence officers provided final instructions, explained how to use the explosive devices, and issued additional equipment:

- o Jawad gave al-Asadi a Kuwait license plate. Jawad then instructed al-Asadi to find out from Bandar al-Shamri how to get to Kuwait University and what the best locations would be for the placement of the packaged explosive devices. Al-Asadi himself would pick from those locations and place the explosives.
- o Jawad told al-Asadi that the Landcruiser contained explosives and instructed him to be responsible for guiding al-Ghazali to Kuwait University so that al-Ghazali could complete the mission.
- o Jawad gave al-Asadi 10 blocks or "cubes" of explosives in two bags, showed him how to detonate the devices, and explained that the devices were to be placed in various locations in Kuwait.

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- o Jawad also gave al-Asadi an AK-47 rifle, a pistol, handgrenades, mines and a United Arab Emirates (UAE) passport bearing a false identity.
- o At the same time, the other Iraqi intelligence officer, Abu Rafed, briefed al-Ghazali. He gave al-Ghazali an explosive belt and told him that, if the car bomb failed to work, al-Ghazali was to don the belt, make his way close to President Bush, and detonate the device strapped to his body.
- o Finally, Abu Rafed gave al-Ghazali a false UAE passport.

The briefings concluded, the Iraqi intelligence officers left Zubayr. Shortly thereafter, nine additional members of the group were assembled and embarked in the Suburban and the Landcruiser. Two new members were familiar with the topography and guided the team across the Kuwait border the evening of 12 April to al-Sheeb. Before crossing the border, the group removed the Iraqi license plates from their vehicles and replaced them with Kuwaiti plates. Al-Asadi also gave al-Ghazali two grenades at this time. Once

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across the border, the group unloaded and hid their illegal cargo.

Al-Ghazali, al-Asadi, Jabbar Muhammad, Salim al-Shamri, and Bandar al-Shamri left the remaining members with the Suburban and its contents at al-Sheeb. They then drove off in the Landcruiser to the house of Badr al-Shamri, another of the accused. They persuaded Badr to agree to buy the whisky and give them a place to sleep. Al-Asadi and two of the team drove back to al-Sheeb to collect the whisky. They found that the Suburban had left, with the other people in it but without the whisky, for an unknown destination. They loaded the whisky into the Landcruiser, and, at al-Ghazali's request, al-Asadi also loaded a bag containing weapons, grenades, and mines. Al-Asadi buried another bag containing four explosive devices, after which the group left for Kuwait City to rejoin the others. On the way, they met up with the Suburban, which was coming from the direction of Kuwait City. They all proceeded to a warehouse in Jahra near Kuwait City owned by Badr and hid the Landcruiser and the Suburban.⁵ Al-Ghazali and al-Asadi stayed overnight in Badr's home. Al-Asadi told al-Ghazali that Bandar al-Shamri

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would show them the route to Kuwait University the following day.

On 14 April, the mission started to unravel. Al-Asadi, Bandar al-Shamri, Salim al-Shamri, and Badr al-Shamri left Kuwait City to retrieve the Landcruiser and the Suburban from the warehouse in Jahra. On arrival, however, they found the warehouse surrounded by police, and they fled without the two vehicles. They collected al-Ghazali and decided to go back to Jahra to seek sanctuary. En route to Jahra, al-Ghazali--evidently rejecting the idea of a suicide attack--decided to get rid of the explosive belt and arranged to do so, probably by leaving it in the desert. Next, al-Asadi and the three other accused dropped off al-Ghazali at the home of Jabbar Muhammad (another of the accused) and then returned to the warehouse, which was still surrounded by police officers. They returned to pick up al-Ghazali, and about this time Badr al-Shamri turned himself in to the Kuwaiti authorities. Subsequently, al-Ghazali and his associates went to the house of a friend in Jahra, who permitted them to stay the night but insisted they leave by 0500 hours the next morning.

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The terrorist mission collapsed abruptly on 15 April. Al-Asadi and al-Ghazali decided to give up the attempt and return to Iraq. Al-Asadi stole a vehicle and, with al-Ghazali and two other members of the group, drove toward Iraq. The vehicle soon overheated, so the group abandoned it by the side of the road and started to walk. After being reported by local Kuwaiti hunters, they were arrested by Kuwaiti police around noon near Markaz al-Matla (also referred to as Mutlaa), about 10 kilometers north of Jahra.

Forensic Evidence

The following descriptions are based on combined forensic reports performed at different times by the CIA and FBI.

The Explosive Devices and Materials

Examination of the explosive devices--the car bomb and 10 so-called cube bombs--that were smuggled into Kuwait and recovered by Kuwaiti authorities clearly identifies Iraq as

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their source. All of the bombs were improvised explosive devices--they were not mass-produced in a regular ordnance factory--and as such they bore the peculiar signature or imprint of the bomb-maker. A recognizable signature was easily discerned in independent examinations by FBI bomb technicians and forensic specialists when the bombs found in Kuwait were compared with others recovered elsewhere and known to be of Iraqi origin. The combined findings of the examinations, which, although independent arrived at the same conclusion, are as follows:


- o The FBI lab report noted that the remote-controlled firing device that was part of the car bomb found in Kuwait closely resembles the corresponding components of Iraqi-made bombs that were recovered in February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. According to a variety of sources, these latter bombs include a car bomb in Turkey (the ownership of this car was traced to an identified Iraqi intelligence operative) and similar devices recovered from a hiding place in the Iraqi Embassy

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
in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, which Iraq had vacated shortly before the Persian Gulf war.





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- o Chemical and physical analyses at the FBI lab indicate that the main charge in the Kuwait car bomb is an explosive known as PE-4A.



- o Chemical and physical analyses of samples from two of the 10 cube bombs found in Kuwait indicate the same kind of explosive material as was taken from the car bomb recovered in Turkey in February 1991.

Other Components and Techniques

Examination of other components used in the explosive devices recovered in Kuwait, together with a comparison of the techniques used to assemble them, once again provide ample proof of direct Iraqi responsibility:

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- o The same basic components and techniques were used in the improvised explosive devices found in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Turkey, and northern Iraq. The radio-controlled part of each fuzing system was constructed from a manufactured radio control unit with an anodized metal housing. The numbers shown on each circuit board are the same, indicating the same manufacturer.

- o The electronic timing mechanisms in these devices used the same type of circuit board and basic electronic components, and the placement of components and soldering techniques also are similar. The same resistor on each timing mechanism, for example, was positioned and uniquely installed in the same manner on each circuit board. Furthermore, the face plates of the three radio-controlled receiving devices were altered by drilling two holes immediately under the off position of the on-off switch of each unit. Black and red insulated multistrand copper wires were

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inserted into the left and right holes respectively. The wires ran under the on-off switch and were soldered to the circuit boards in a uniquely expert way, proving that the same person was responsible for the alterations on the three circuit boards. In sum, all of these identical construction techniques are part of the bombmaker's signature.



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
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
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BOX 1

List of Accused Submitted by the State of Kuwait Ministry of Justice Public Prosecutor's Office to the State Security Court

1. Ra'd 'Abd Al-Amir 'Abbud Al-Asadi (al-Asadi)

Age 33, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, resident of Iraq.

2. Wali 'Abd Al-Hadi 'Abd Al-Hasan Al-Ghazali (al-Ghazali)

Age 36, Iraqi citizen, employed as nurse at Al-Najaf hospital in Iraq, resident of Iraq.

3. Salim Nasir Subayh Rumi Al-Shamri (Salim)

Age 34, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, resident of Iraq.

4. Bandar 'Ujayl Jabir Al-Shamri (Bandar)

Age 24, Iraqi citizen, lives in Zubayr, Iraq.

5. 'Adil Ismail 'Isa

Age 44, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, resident of Iraq.

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6. Hadi 'Uda Harjan Al-Shamri

Age 42, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, lives in Zubayr, Iraq.

7. 'Ali Khudayr Baday 'Abd

Age 65, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, lives in Zubayr, Iraq.

8. Jabbar Nasir Zayir

Age 43, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, lives in Zubayr, Iraq.

9. Didan 'Atiyah Al-Khalidi

Age 38, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, lives in Zubayr, Iraq.

10. Jabbar Habib Muhammad

Age 56, Iraqi citizen, unemployed, lives in Basra, Iraq.

11. Badr Jayyad Thamir Mutlaq Al-Shamri (Badr)

Age 30, Kuwaiti citizen, driver at the Ministry of Electricity and Water, lives in Khaytan [district of Kuwait City], Section 4, 147th Street.

12. Jabbar Habib Muhammad (Jubbar or Jabbar)

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Age 21, Iraqi citizen, employed by Al-Shaharan Trading Company [in Kuwait], lives in al-'Aridiyah [district of Kuwait], Section 5, 3rd Street.

13. Nasir 'Abd Al-Rida Husayn Al-Mil

Age 43, Kuwaiti citizen, employed as security office director of the juvenile prison of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, lives in Al-'Aridiyah, Section 3, 3rd Street.

14. Salim Jayyad Thamir Mutlaq Al-Shamri

Age 22, Kuwaiti citizen, employed as corporal in the industrial security section of the Ministry of the Interior, lives in Al-Raqqah [district of Kuwait City], Section 3, 7th Street.

15. Muhammad Khalifah 'Uqla

Age 56, Kuwaiti citizen, retired police captain of Kuwaiti Police Department, lives in Al-Jahra, Parcel 4, House 68, Said Bin Jubair Street

16. Nahar Rumi Al-Khalidi

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Age 56, born in Kuwait, retired from Kuwaiti Army, resides around Kuwait City.

17. Muhammad (LNU)

(left smugglers' party soon after arrival in Kuwait)

Unclassified

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Box 2

Items Recovered From Suspects

From two hiding places in the desert near al-Sheeb:

- o Olive-green metal suitcase containing six cubes of explosives (four orange, two brown) and 10 new Duracell nine-volt batteries.
- o Four orange cubes of explosives. (U)

From Badr al-Shamri's warehouse:

- o A white three-door Toyota Landcruiser with explosives embedded in three separate locations in the vehicle. The original ownership of the vehicle was traced to a Kuwaiti company and had been leased to the Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water. The Landcruiser had been stolen and removed by Iraqi forces during the occupation of Kuwait.
- o A brown/beige Chevrolet Suburban, which originally belonged to a Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior official. This vehicle also had been confiscated by the Iraqi military during the occupation.

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- o Thirteen cartons of liquor. (U)

Weapons recovered from the accused:

- o One AK-47 assault rifle, 90 rounds of ammunition, and three magazines.
- o Two Belgian-made Browning pistols.
- o Four antipersonnel handgrenades. (U)

Recovered from al-Ghazali:

- o United Arab Emirates passport #984888, in the name of Saqr Khalifa bin Ahmad Al-Shamsi. UAE officials later confirmed that the passport was false. (U)

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Appendix A
Chronology of the Attempted Iraqi Assassination Plot Against
President Bush

1992

10 November. The Kuwaiti Embassy in Washington, on behalf of the Crown Prince, publicly thanks President Bush via the State Department for defeating Iraq and invites him to Kuwait. On the same day, the Kuwaiti press speculates when the visit is most likely to occur, with February 1993 considered the most likely time frame. (U)

12 November. The Kuwaiti press publishes the text of the Crown Prince's 10 November invitation to President Bush.
(U)

1993

1 April. President Bush's spokesman in Houston announces that the former President "planned to spend two days in Kuwait between 12 and 16 April." (U)

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9 April. An Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) officer recruits al-Ghazali in Basra, Iraq, to kill President Bush during the latter's visit to Kuwait.

10 April. The same officer shows al-Ghazali the car bomb and demonstrates its use.

11 April. Another IIS officer recruits al-Asadi in Basra to help smuggle the explosives into Kuwait.

12-13 April. Al-Ghazali and al-Asadi rendezvous and cross the border into Kuwait during the night of 12-13 April. They arrive in Kuwait City during the day of 13 April.

14 April. President Bush arrives in Kuwait City one day later than originally scheduled because of mechanical problems with his aircraft.

14 April. Kuwaiti authorities seize the car bomb and another vehicle brought by al-Ghazali and al-Asadi into Kuwait.

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15 April. Having avoided arrest, al-Asadi steals a car and he, al-Ghazali, Salim al-Shamri, and Bandar al-Shamri try to escape to Iraq. The vehicle breaks down and the suspects hire a car for a short distance and then try to continue on foot. They are then arrested by Kuwaiti authorities.

16 April. President Bush departs Kuwait.

25 April. A report in the London-based newspaper *Ash Sharq Al Aswat* describes an Iraqi-sponsored attempt to assassinate President Bush with a car bomb. Wire services pick up the report the following day.

26 April. US Embassy officials query Kuwaiti security officers on the newspaper report and are told that the suspects were arrested on 14 April.

27 April. The chief of Kuwaiti security confirms to US Embassy officials that 17 Iraqi agents--four Iraqis, 12 stateless Bedouin, and a Kuwaiti-born Iraqi--had been arrested and two vehicles in which they were traveling were seized. The Kuwaiti officials provide additional

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information taken from statements made by the four non-Bedouin suspects.

28 April. The Kuwaiti Defense Minister tells the US Ambassador that details of the plot were not supplied at the time to the US Government because President Bush was on his way home and the plot had been thwarted. Kuwaiti security officials give permission for US Government officers to examine the physical evidence. (S NF)

29 April. US Embassy officers examined and photographed the car bomb and other explosives. United States investigative and forensic specialists arrive in Kuwait. The newspaper *Ash Sharq Al Aswat* publishes the names of the 17 suspects in Kuwaiti custody.

30 April. Kuwaiti security officials provide the US Embassy with additional details of the plot, including names, photographs, and initial statements made by the suspects.

1 May. US Government bomb specialists re-examine the car bomb and other explosives recovered by Kuwaiti authorities.

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3 May. The Kuwaiti Attorney General authorizes US law enforcement officials to interview the suspects.

6 May. The forensic evidence is legally sealed pending trial of the accused. Kuwaiti officials promise full access to the evidence once the prosecutor releases it.

11 May. The Kuwaiti Attorney General announces that the court case will begin on 16 May.

12 May. FBI agents begin interviewing the suspects.

17 May. The Kuwaiti Attorney General postpones the trial until 5 June.

22 May. FBI agents complete their interviews of the suspects, while forensic examinations continue.

5 June. The trial begins.

19 July. The trial is recessed until 4 September.

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5 September. The trial is concluded and judgments reserved.

(U)

30 October. The judgments are further postponed until 25 December.

25 December. The judges delay the verdict indefinitely and announce that they will recall Kuwaiti security officials for additional testimony.

1994

5 February. The judges reexamine a Kuwaiti security official who was one of the prosecution's major witnesses.

5 March. The Court hears additional arguments from the defense lawyers.

2 April. The Court hears the defense lawyers' final arguments and announces that it will deliver verdicts on 4 June.

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4 June. The Court convicts 13 of the 14 defendants. Five Iraqis--including al-Asadi and al-Ghazali--and one Kuwaiti are sentenced to death. Death sentences automatically will be appealed to another court. If upheld there, the sentences will be referred to the Emir of Kuwait for final approval.

17 October. Kuwaiti appeals court delays until 24 November its review of the death sentence convictions in the Bush case.

1995

20 March. Kuwaiti Court of Cassation, the country's highest appellate court, confirms death sentence for two Iraqis, commutes sentence to life for four defendants--three Iraqis and one Kuwaiti.

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Appendix B

Statements Made by the Four Chiefs Accused to the FBI and to the Kuwait State Prosecutor's Office

The following statements were taken from the two key suspects--the intended assassin and his guide--plus the two other suspects most directly implicated in the assassination plot. Extraneous detail has been omitted from the statements:

Federal Bureau of Investigation Interviews

Wali 'Abd al-Hadi 'Abd al-Hasan al-Ghazali, Referred to as al-Ghazali (Main statement recorded on 9 June.)

Al-Ghazali joined the Ba'th Party of Iraq in 1981 when he first enlisted in the military. In 1990 he became a member of the National Guard and was trained to use various weapons and explosives.

8-9 April. Al-Ghazali was taken to the Hamdan Hotel by an Iraqi intelligence officer, and he met with Abu Rafed, who appealed to his patriotism and said he was being sent on a

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mission he could not refuse, that is, to kill President Bush in Kuwait. Al-Ghazali protested and said he did not know Kuwait, but Abu Rafed responded that a guide would be provided. After the meeting, Abu Rafed took al-Ghazali to have a passport photograph taken. Al-Ghazali was told to stay in the hotel room until the next day.

10 April. Abu Rafed and his driver took al-Ghazali a short distance to a military-guarded building. They drove into the parking lot, where Abu Rafed showed al-Ghazali a Toyota Landcruiser, and told al-Ghazali to take the vehicle to Kuwait, work out the Bush itinerary there, and park on the street where the Bush motorcade would pass. Abu Rafed said the Landcruiser was loaded with explosives as a car bomb.

He then told al-Ghazali to insert the two batteries-- mentioning that a green light would come on when the batteries were inserted--and instructed him on how to raise the antenna for remote-controlled firing. He also told al-Ghazali how to detonate the car bomb using the hand-held remote-controlled device. Rafed also showed al-Ghazali how to use a backup device that used a timer that would detonate the bomb in four and a half hours. Al-Ghazali expressed

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concern regarding his family, so Rafed gave him 5,000 Iraqi dinars; a driver then took al-Ghazali home, where the money was given to al-Ghazali's wife.

12 April. Abu Rafed returned to the Hamdan Hotel, accompanied by Abdel Yamma. All three then left--al-Ghazali in the Landcruiser and Yamma and Abu Rafed in another vehicle--and Abu Rafed told al-Ghazali that his guide awaited him at al-Ashaar, a suburb of Basra. Abu Rafed gave al-Ghazali a Browning pistol with a silencer, two battery-powered landmines, and US \$1,100 for expenses. Al-Ghazali saw cases of whisky in the Landcruiser. Shortly afterward, a Chevrolet Suburban drove up; the Suburban and the Landcruiser then left together for Zubayr and stopped on a hidden side road. Al-Asadi was introduced to al-Ghazali as his guide to Kuwait. Al-Ghazali saw five cases of whisky transferred from the Landcruiser to the Suburban. Abu Rafed told al-Ghazali that, if it proved impossible to place the car bomb close to President Bush, he should park it on "Bush Street" in Kuwait City and detonate it there. He also gave al-Ghazali an explosive belt. He told al-Ghazali that, if the car bomb failed, al-Ghazali should get close to President Bush and detonate the belt bomb. Al-Ghazali and

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al-Asadi drove to Zubayr and stopped. Al-Asadi left and came back with several other persons. They left together in the two vehicles and picked up some additional people; the final group, including al-Ghazali and al-Asadi, numbered 11. They drove to the border area at al-Sheeb and waited until dark before exchanging Iraqi for Kuwaiti license plates. Before crossing the border, al-Asadi gave al-Ghazali two handgrenades, which he put in a bag with the other weapons and explosives. They crossed into Kuwait with Salim al-Shamri driving the Suburban, al-Asadi driving the Landcruiser, and a man called Adil 'Isa leading on foot.

13 April. At dawn, the party stopped in the desert and unloaded the whisky. Al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim al-Shamri, Bandar al-Shamri, and Jabbar Muhammad drove off in the Landcruiser to Jahra, leaving the others behind with the Suburban. Jabbar Muhammad was dropped off to see a relative, and the others went to the house of Badr al-Shamri, a cousin of Bandar al-Shamri, who accepted the offer to sell the contraband whisky. Al-Asadi, Salim al-Shamri, and Badr al-Shamri returned to the desert rendezvous to retrieve the whisky, leaving behind al-Ghazali and Bandar al-Shamri. That evening, al-Asadi and his companions

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returned with some of the whisky and al-Ghazali's bag of weapons and explosives. Having stored the two vehicles in a warehouse owned by Badr al-Shamri, they discussed future plans and spent the night at Badr al-Shamri's residence.

14 April. Early the next morning, al-Asadi, Salim al-Shamri, Bandar al-Shamri, and Badr al-Shamri went to retrieve the two vehicles. They returned saying that the warehouse was surrounded by police. They all fled in Badr al-Shamri's car to his apartment. Al-Ghazali told al-Asadi to throw the explosive belt out of the car, but al-Asadi refused. Later, however, while passing through a desert area, al-Ghazali gave the belt to al-Asadi, who threw the belt from the car. The group then went to Jabbar Muhammad's house. Al-Ghazali stayed there while the others rechecked the warehouse. They returned and confirmed that the warehouse was still surrounded. In this confused situation, most of the group went to Muhammad Uqla's house, inadvertently leaving al-Ghazali's bag in a car. Al-Asadi asked the person to bring the bag to the house. The person refused,⁶ and Muhammad Uqla made them leave. They persuaded

⁶With minor discrepancies, which can be expected in a complex investigation and trial, the key suspects' stories remained consistent throughout the Kuwaiti and FBI

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Salim al-Shamri's uncle, Nahar al-Khalidi, to let them stay the night.

15 April. In the morning, al-Asadi stole a car parked in the front of the building. The group fled toward Iraq, but the car overheated close to Jahra. They then started off on foot, but were soon captured by a Kuwaiti police patrol.⁷

interviews and the various stages of the trial. The results of the interviews of al-Ghazali and al-Asadi are presented for comparison in appendix B. Appendix B also includes the statements of two other suspects, Salim al-Shamri and Bandar al-Shamri. Both were implicated by al-Asadi but denied being aware of, or involved in, the plot. The remaining individuals who were arrested probably had some awareness of the presence of explosives and weapons, but there is no evidence that they knew of the plot to kill President Bush.² The accused were kept in separate cells during the interviews to prevent them from communicating with each other.

³International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officials were permitted to examine the suspects and told US Embassy officers in Kuwait on 20 May that no evidence was found that the statements and confessions had been coerced. The key suspects told the presiding judge that they had not been abused while in custody. US Government officials who saw the accused at an earlier date also reported that the accused showed no signs and gave no indication that they had been ill treated.

⁴Kuwaiti authorities have never confirmed to the United States whether they subsequently recovered this explosive belt.

⁵The warehouse has also been described as a sheep-pen, a goat-pen, and a barn.

⁶According to al-Ghazali's statement, the person concerned threw the bag into a garbage dumpster; it was never recovered.

⁷Al-Ghazali was asked whether he had told the others in his party that their mission was to kill President Bush. The

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responded "No." He was also asked whether he had intended to carry out the mission from the outset, and he responded that he had meant to surrender to Kuwaiti police as soon as he was able to separate himself from the others. He also said that Abu Rafed had promised him an unspecified reward upon his return from the operation.

⁸Al-Asadi claimed that al-Ghazali worked for the Mukhabarat and thus did not press him for details of the mission. The previous year, Salim al-Shamri took al-Asadi to Safwan Center in Iraq, which he claimed was a government complex containing a Mukhabarat office. At Safwan he met Abu Ahmad, a.k.a. Captain Jum'aa, a Mukhabarat official. This official tried to recruit him, but he refused, saying he was not a frequent visitor to Kuwait.

⁹Salim denied seeing any explosives carried on the trip to Kuwait City apart from those in al-Asadi's bag. He said he knew nothing of the plot to kill President Bush. He denied any affiliation with Iraqi intelligence or ever having been to Safwan Center. When confronted with admissions he had made to Kuwait police, Salim said they were untrue, including a statement that he knew about the 10 blocks of explosives and where in Kuwait City they were intended to be detonated.

¹⁰Badr denied knowledge of the explosives and of the plot to kill President Bush. He also denied knowing any Iraqi intelligence officers. He said his warehouse was normally used for keeping livestock, but he let the Landcruiser and the Suburban park there as an exception.

¹¹In his statement to Kuwait State Prosecutors, Salim recanted several major admissions he had initially made to Kuwaiti police. Specifically, he defined having said that:

- o He had learned from al-Asad that the Landcruiser was bobby-trapped for a mission in Kuwait City.

- o He had a relationship with and had worked for Iraqi intelligence.

- o He had seen the explosives belt while traveling with a group into Kuwait.

- o He knew about the 10 explosives charges and had tried to place one of them. (U)

¹²Badr said that he had not surrendered earlier because he was afraid of the group. Both al-Asadi and Salim appeared to have handguns, which were kept in a bag in al-Asadi's possession. Badr denied knowing anything about the assassination plot or that he had agreed to act as a guide for the mission. (U)

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Ra'd Abd al-Amir Abbud Mohammed al-Asadi, Referred to as al-Asadi (Main statement recorded on 12 May.)

Al-Asadi served as a driver in the Iraqi Army from 1978 through 1990. He was a prisoner of war in Iran from 1987 through 1990. He claimed to live in Basra, where he worked in the Marbed Cafe, owned by his uncle, and smuggled sheep and liquor into Kuwait. He denied membership in any Iraqi political party or affiliation with Iraqi intelligence.

10 April. A regular Marbed Cafe patron named Muhammad Jawad--a known Iraqi Mukhabarat intelligence officer--asked al-Asadi if he intended to cross the Kuwaiti border in the immediate future and, if so, what goods he would be carrying. Al-Asadi replied he would soon be smuggling some whisky. This was al-Asadi's first official contact with Jawad.

11 April. Jawad offered al-Asadi 5,000 Iraqi dinars and five cases of whisky if he would smuggle a car and a driver

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into Kuwait. Al-Asadi replied that he already had arranged to smuggle some illegal immigrants plus three cases of whisky into Kuwait and would have to check with his partners. Al-Asadi subsequently got their agreement. Later that day, Jawad told al-Asadi that he also would be transporting explosives. Despite al-Asadi's disbelief at this statement, he gave Jawad a passport photograph.

12 April. Jawad provided al-Asadi with a United Arab Emirates passport with al-Asadi's photograph in the name of Fah'd Ahmed Salem al-Mazro'ee. At 1130 hours, Jawad returned to the cafe driving a white Toyota Supra accompanied by al-Ghazali driving a white Toyota Landcruiser. Al-Asadi owned a Chevrolet Suburban. Al-Asadi had never met al-Ghazali before. With al-Asadi in the rear, all three drove off to a place outside Zubayr, where five cases of contraband whisky were transferred from the Landcruiser to the Suburban. At this point, Jawad told al-Asadi that the Landcruiser contained explosives and that al-Asadi had to guide al-Ghazali to Kuwait University. Jawad gave al-Asadi a bag containing four explosive devices and told him to place and detonate them near Kuwait City stores, car dealerships, and markets in order to spread confusion.

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Al-Asadi was shown how to place a battery timer in the explosive devices; the timer would detonate the devices six hours later. Jawad gave him an AK-47 rifle, four magazines, a pistol, two grenades and two landmines. Al-Ghazali put the weapons in the Landcruiser; the explosive devices were in the Suburban. Jawad gave both al-Asadi and al-Ghazali Kuwait license plates for their vehicles. Jawad told al-Asadi that Bandar al-Shamri would show him the locations in Kuwait City where the explosives could be placed, but that he, al-Asadi, would pick the specific sites from among those locations for setting the explosives. Jawad also told al-Asadi that Bandar al-Shamri would show him the location of Kuwait University. Al-Asadi was not shown how to detonate the car bomb, because this was al-Ghazali's job. Al-Asadi said he never knew that the target of the operation was President Bush; he was simply told that he was to act as guide to the team. Jawad then left.

In Zubayr, al-Asadi and al-Ghazali met the nine other team members and drove them in the two vehicles to al-Sheeb, on the Kuwait-Iraq border. Kuwait license plates were installed. After dark, the party crossed into Kuwait and unloaded the cargo.

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13 April. Early that morning, al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim al-Shamri, Bandar al-Shamri, and Jabbar Muhammad drove off in the Landcruiser to Kuwait City to meet with Badr al-Shamri. On the way, Jabbar stopped in Jahra to visit relatives. The others asked Badr to buy the whisky and provide a place to sleep. Badr agreed to buy the whisky, so he, al-Asadi, and Salim al-Shamri returned in Badr's car to get the whisky. They left the Landcruiser near Badr's house. Before leaving, al-Ghazali asked al-Asadi to get his bag with the weapons and explosives. On arrival at al-Sheeb, they found that the Suburban had left but were able to retrieve the whisky and al-Ghazali's bag. Al-Asadi dug a hole and buried his own bag containing the four explosive devices.

On the way to Kuwait City, the group met the Suburban with the others in it. The three vehicles (including Badr's car) went to a warehouse owned by Badr. The Landcruiser and the Suburban were stored there, while Badr left in his car accompanied by his companions. Al-Asadi and Salim al-Shamri then went to Badr's residence, where al-Asadi handed over al-Ghazali's bag. After some discussion, it was reaffirmed

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that Bandar al-Shamri would show them the location of Kuwait University.

14 April. The bag containing the explosives was inadvertently left in Ahmad Muhammed's car. Al-Asadi telephoned Muhammed and asked him to bring the bag to Uqla's residence. Muhammed refused and al-Asadi never saw the bag again. Al-Asadi, Salim al-Shamri, Bandar al-Shamri, and Badr al-Shamri then left to collect the Landcruiser from the warehouse so one of the party could lead al-Ghazali in the car to Kuwait University. The warehouse was surrounded by police, so they returned to the residence, collected al-Ghazali, and drove to Jahra. Badr and Bandar went to a relative's house in Jahra, while al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, and Salim al-Shamri stayed in the vehicle. Al-Ghazali wanted to throw the explosive belt, wrapped in newspaper, into the street, but al-Asadi told him to wait. Badr and Bandar returned, and they all left for Jabbar's house. While passing through the desert, al-Ghazali gave the belt to al-Asadi, who threw it from the car.

The group rechecked the warehouse, but it was still surrounded by police. They then tried to find shelter in

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three different residences but were turned away from all but the last, where they spent the night.

15 April. Early in the morning, al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim al-Shamri, and Bandar al-Shamri stole a Mercedes car someone had left running in front of their building. They fled toward Iraq, but the car overheated near Jahra, and they abandoned it. They starting walking, but suspicious Kuwaitis nearby notified the police. They were soon arrested near Mut'laa.⁸

Salim Nasir Subayh Rumi al-Shamri, referred to as Salim
(main statement recorded on 14 May)

Salim served in the Kuwait Army between 1973 and 1974 and as a private in the Iraq Army during the Iraq-Iran war. He was later arrested in Kuwait for smuggling alcohol from Iraq in 1986, 1988, and 1990.

Early April. Salim may have known Asadi since 1989, but their most intense contact began when Salim met al-Asadi in the Marbed Cafe in Basra around December 1992 and began

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discussing smuggling alcohol. Salim had no car but claimed that, in early April, al-Asadi said he would buy one. He returned to Basra with a Chevrolet Suburban and said they would leave for Kuwait in five days. Salim also arranged to smuggle several Iraqis into Kuwait at the same time. These people were to wait at the house of Adil 'Isa (one of the accused).

11 April. Al-Asadi showed Salim the alcohol they were to smuggle into Kuwait.

12 April. At around 1300 hours, al-Asadi arrived in his Suburban at Salim's home in Zubayr. He was accompanied by al-Ghazali, whom Salim had never met, driving a Landcruiser.

Bandar al-Shamri arrived next and agreed to provide housing for the group in Kuwait. Al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, and Bandar left in the Landcruiser. Salim drove the Suburban to Adil 'Isa's house, where he picked up seven other people. He then drove about 15 kilometers and met up with the Landcruiser. They drove together to al-Sheeb, on the Kuwait-Iraq border, and crossed over into Kuwait after dark.

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13 April. During the morning, Salim, al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Bandar al-Shamri, and Jabbar Muhammad drove in the Landcruiser to Kuwait City to meet with Badr al-Shamri, a cousin of Bandar, to sell the whisky and find a place to sleep. (Jabbar stopped off in Jahra to visit relatives.) Badr agreed to sell the whisky; he, Salim, and al-Asadi returned to the al-Sheeb area in Badr's car to collect the alcohol, leaving the Landcruiser parked on the street. The group with the Suburban was not at al-Sheeb, so they loaded the alcohol and drove back toward Kuwait City. They met the Suburban en route. They drove all three vehicles to Badr's warehouse. The alcohol was unloaded, and al-Asadi and Salim stayed at Badr's house.

14 April. Salim, al-Asadi, Bandar, and Badr went to the warehouse to get the two vehicles, but it was surrounded by police. They drove to Badr's house and collected al-Ghazali. Next they went to Jabbar's home. Here Salim saw al-Asadi with a bag containing grenades and pistols. Jabbar soon received a telephone call from a relative saying the police were looking for him; Jabbar announced that they would all have to leave, which they did. They hired a car

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and went to the house of Nahar al-Khalidi who reluctantly let them stay until 0500 hours the next morning.

15 April. The group left for Iraq in a stolen Mercedes, but it broke down in Jahra. They were able to hire a car for a short distance only, after which they had to walk. Soon they were spotted by local hunters, who notified the police. They were arrested shortly thereafter.'

Badr Jiyad Thamir Mutlaq al-Shamri, Referred to as Badr
(Main statement recorded on 16 May.)

Badr lives in Kuwait City, is employed as a driver for the Ministry of Electricity, and has no party or political affiliation. He has a criminal record for smuggling.

13 April. He went to the hospital for treatment of a minor wound received during the Iraqi invasion. When he returned home, he found al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar waiting. He did not know they were coming to Kuwait. He knew Salim in prison in Kuwait in 1986; both served time for theft.

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Al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, and Salim offered Badr the smuggled whisky for sale, and he agreed. He, al-Asadi, and Salim drove in his car to the desert where the whisky had been hidden, leaving the Landcruiser parked on the street. They loaded the whisky. Al-Asadi told Badr that a Suburban with several passengers had left the area. Driving through Jahra en route to Kuwait City, they saw and flagged down the Suburban. Both vehicles then went to the parked Landcruiser, collected it, and all three vehicles went to Badr's warehouse. They agreed on a price for the whisky and offloaded it. The Landcruiser and the Suburban were left in the warehouse. Badr then drove five of the men to points in Kuwait City and returned to the warehouse, which was deserted except for the merchandise and vehicles. Badr went home and found al-Asadi and Salim waiting; they had received a ride there from Badr al-Shamri's brother, Salim Mutlag al-Shamri. They drank some whisky and spent the night.

14 April. In the morning, al-Asadi, Salim, Bandar, and Badr drove to the warehouse--apparently in two different cars-- but found it surrounded by police. They fled to Badr's home, picked up al-Ghazali, and went to Jabbar's house,

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where they discussed the situation. Al-Asadi asked Jabbar's son to retrieve a bag from Badr's car, which was done. Al-Asadi took a pistol and two magazines from the bag and put them in his pocket. Badr, al-Asadi, and several others then drove back to the warehouse and found it still surrounded. They returned to Jabbar's home. Al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar said they had to keep moving. Badr called his mother, who told him to surrender to police. This he did, and his cooperation led to four arrests.¹⁰

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Interviews by Kuwaiti State Prosecutors

Wali 'Abd al-Hadi 'Abd al-Hasan al-Ghazali, Referred to as al-Ghazali (Statement recorded on 25 April.)

Al-Ghazali entered the Iraqi army in 1981, joined the Ba'th Party as a "supporter," and was promoted to "partisan" in 1989. That year, he left the Army and worked as a hospital nurse. He became short of money and went to Basra because it was a profitable smuggling center. A friend told him about a cafe frequented by a man called al-Asadi who smuggled whisky into Kuwait and brought back cars.

Later, al-Ghazali was introduced to a man named Abu Rafed, who talked about going to Kuwait and described al-Asadi as a "courageous man." He told al-Ghazali that he wanted him to accept an assignment to go to Kuwait and kill President Bush. Abu Rafed added that he would supply a vehicle equipped with an explosive device and timer. Al-Asadi would guide al-Ghazali in the vehicle to Kuwait City. Here al-Ghazali would need to find out President Bush's time of arrival at the university, park the vehicle close by, and detonate it by remote control. At this time, Abu Rafed also

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took al-Ghazali to a photo store where al-Ghazali's photograph was taken.

Abu Rafed told al-Asad that, in case Bush did not go to the university, al-Asadi should select another location for the detonation. Abu Rafed said he would give 5,000 dinars to al-Ghazali's family. He gave al-Ghazali US \$1,100 and 500 Iraqi dinars for expenses. He also gave him a UAE passport.

The following day, Abu Rafed returned, and they went to a place behind the post office in Al-Ashaar. Al-Asadi arrived in a Suburban accompanied by another man. Al-Ghazali was given a car [a Landcruiser]. The party drove in the two vehicles to Zubayr. On the way, the person who came with al-Asadi gave al-Ghazali an explosive belt and showed him how to use it.

The two vehicles drove to a "sand barrier" and loaded several cases of whisky. Several other men had joined the party by this time. They then went to the border, with al-Ghazali driving the Landcruiser accompanied by al-Asadi and Bandar. They stayed near the border until sunset and then changed the license plates of both vehicles. Al-Ghazali and

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al-Asadi were each given a handgun and "mines." Two mines were placed in each of the two cars, after which they crossed the border.

They experienced some difficulty driving in the desert but eventually stopped and unloaded the whisky from the Suburban and hid it in a deserted shelter. Al-Ghazali, al-Asadi, Salim, Bandar, and another man, Jabbar, left in the Landcruiser. Somewhere en route Jabbar got off, and the others continued to Badr's house. Badr's wife fed them breakfast, and then Badr came home. He was asked for help with the whisky and the other people, who he thought were illegal immigrants. Later, Badr, Salim, and al-Asadi left. When they returned, they said they had put the cars and the liquor in Badr's warehouse. Al-Asadi told al-Ghazali he had some explosives and a rifle hidden in a bag. The group spent the night at Badr's house.

The next morning, Badr and some others went in Badr's car to the warehouse but returned, saying it was surrounded by police. Al-Ghazali took the bag containing the handguns, handgrenades, mines, and the explosive belt, and the group drove around to several locations. While traveling, al-

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Asadi threw the belt out the car window. They arrived at Jabbar's house and were told the cars had been seized. They decided to go back and check. At that time, the bag was left in Badr's car. On return, Jabbar asked al-Ghazali if he had any friends in the area, but al-Ghazali had not. The bag was hidden in Jabbar's house. Al-Ghazali, al-Asadi, Salim, Bandar, and another person went to a house in Jahra belonging to Jabbar's relative.

Jabbar telephoned to say his house was being searched and his family had been taken away. He had had to leave the bag there. Jabbar then told the group to leave the house. They did so and went to another, where they were reluctantly given shelter until dawn the next day.

At that time, al-Ghazali left with al-Asadi, Salim, and Bandar in a car stolen by al-Asadi. En route to Jahra, the car broke down. They hired a car for a short distance but soon had to get out and walk. Some persons reported them to the police and they were arrested and taken to al-Jamra police station.

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Ra'd 'Abd al-Amir Abbud Mohammed al-Asadi, Referred to as al-Asadi (Statement recorded on 20 April.)

Al-Asadi is an unemployed Iraqi citizen living in Basra. He joined the Iraqi Army in 1978 and was trained to use assault rifles and handgrenades. He was a prisoner of war in Iran from 1987 to 1990.

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10 April. At the Marbed Cafe in Al-Ashaar (a district in Basra), an Iraqi intelligence officer named Muhammad Jawad and two other men came to see al-Asadi. Jawad asked al-Asadi to drive a man in a jeep to Kuwait University in Kuwait City. Jawad promised to pay al-Asadi 5,000 Iraqi dinars and five cases of alcohol beforehand and another 5,000 dinars on his return. The man in the jeep would be Wali 'Abd al-Hadi 'Abd al Hasan al-Ghazali [al-Ghazali]. Al-Asadi did not know at this time that the jeep would be a car bomb. He told Jawad that he wanted his partners' agreement. These men were Salim and Bandar, and they agreed to help al-Asadi get to Kuwait City and find lodging there. Al-Asadi then told Jawad of the decision.

Before leaving Basra, Jawad gave al-Asadi the following: several boxes of Grant's whisky, two 9-mm pistols, detonators, several antipersonnel mines, 10 explosive charges, one AK-47 assault rifle, ammunition, and some hashish. Jawad told al-Asadi that the explosive charges were to be detonated at various places in Kuwait City to spread fear and confuse security officials. Jawad showed al-Asadi how to use the charges. Jawad also gave him a UAE

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passport (al-Asadi had already given him a photograph) in the name of Fah'd Ahmed Salem al-Mazro'ee.

Jawad brought al-Ghazali in the jeep [Landcruiser] and the party met together at Zubayr. Al-Asadi was driving his Suburban. Both vehicles had Iraq license plates. Jawad told al-Asadi that the Landcruiser was rigged with explosives and gave him 5,000 dinars. Al-Ghazali was driving the Landcruiser, and al-Asadi drove the Suburban. Nine other men made up the group [excluding the Iraqi intelligence officers].

11-12 April. The two vehicles left Zubayr around 1330 hours on 11 April. They crossed the border and stopped at a deserted Iraqi military site [left over from the occupation]. There they left the Suburban and several members of the group. They hid several boxes of the whisky, the explosive charges, and al-Ghazali's bag containing the handguns, handgrenades, detonators, and ammunition. Al-Asadi drove off in the Landcruiser accompanied by al-Ghazali, Salim, Bandar, and Jabbar. The group dropped Jabbar off in Jahra to visit his relatives. They went to the house of Badr al-Shamri, who is Bandar's cousin. Badr's

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wife hosted them until Badr turned up at around 1230 hours on 12 April. Al-Asadi and Badr drove off in the Landcruiser and Badr's car respectively, leaving al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar at Badr's house. They drove to the desert area where they had hidden the alcohol and the explosives. The Suburban and its passengers had gone, but al-Asadi collected the alcohol and al-Ghazali's bag. In addition to the other equipment, the bag contained an explosive belt that al-Ghazali had taken from Jawad. (Al-Asadi had learned about this belt from al-Ghazali as they traveled into Kuwait; some time later, al-Asadi threw the belt out of the car window at al-Ghazali's request.) Al-Asadi could not find the hashish and left the explosive charges in the desert.

On their way back to Badr's house, Al-Asadi's group met with the Suburban and its occupants. All three vehicles went to Badr's warehouse. They left the Landcruiser, the Suburban, and the alcohol in the warehouse. The group then returned to Badr's home [in Badr's car]. Al-Ghazali told al-Asadi, Salim, and Bandar that he was going to plant a bomb at the Kuwait University when President Bush showed up there. He asked al-Asadi to act as guide. (Al-Ghazali had earlier informed al-Asadi of the plan to kill President Bush before

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they left Iraq.) Al-Ghazali told al-Asadi that this duty had been assigned to him by Jawad in Basra.

13 April. In the morning, al-Asadi, Badr, Salim, and Bandar drove to the warehouse to pick up the two vehicles. On arrival, they found it surrounded by security men and returned to Badr's house. They collected al-Ghazali and his bag of equipment and headed for Jahra to find a place to stay. They spent a short time at Jabbar's house and drove to the warehouse again but found it still surrounded. After being refused overnight accommodation at a couple of places, the group eventually stayed the night at the home of a relative of Salim. Al-Asadi left al-Ghazali's bag of equipment at the house of Muhammad Khalifa Uqla (one of the people who had refused to let them stay the night).

Very early the next morning, al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar left the house and stole a Mercedes car that had been left with its engine running. It broke down on the Jahra road. The group started walking, but were arrested by police security patrols. After making his confession to the authorities, al-Asadi went with security officials to the

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Landcruiser and told them that it was booby-trapped. He also told them about the explosives hidden in the desert.

Salim Nasir Subayh Rumi al-Shamri, Referred to as Salim
(Statement recorded on 28 April.)

Salim is an Iraqi citizen, but served in the Kuwait Army from 1972 to 1974. he went to Iraq in 1975 and served in the military (artillery) there until wounded in the Iran-Iraq war. He returned to Kuwait in 1984 and earned money smuggling but was imprisoned for it. He was in a Kuwaiti jail until the second day of the Iraqi invasion, when he was released. Salim returned to Iraq, from where he has smuggled liquor into Kuwait on numerous occasions.

When approached by al-Asadi in the Marbed Cafe in Basra to help him smuggle liquor into Kuwait, Salim agreed. His task was to drive al-Asadi's Suburban, which al-Asadi brought to the cafe loaded with boxes of liquor. They went to Zubayr and met with al-Ghazali, who was in a jeep [Landcruiser].

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Al-Asadi told Salim both vehicles were going to Kuwait. They stopped by a house to pick up the other accused persons and then left Zubayr for the border area. They crossed into Kuwait early on 13 April. At a sand barrier, they unloaded the liquor and hid it in a trench. Salim saw al-Ghazali bury a beige bag in the sand and then cover it with a sheet of corrugated iron. Adil 'Isa buried a Kalashnikov assault rifle belonging to al-Asadi. Al-Asadi drove off in the Landcruiser with al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar, leaving the Suburban and the other persons at the cache.

Salim and the others in the Landcruiser were guided to Badr's house by Bandar. They spent the night there, having received Badr's agreement to buy the alcohol.

The next morning, the group in the Landcruiser, driven by al-Asadi, and Badr, driving his own car and accompanied by Salim, returned to the cache where they had hidden the liquor and the bag. Bandar and al-Ghazali stayed behind in Badr's house. On arrival at the cache, they were surprised to find that the Suburban and the persons with it were gone. They found the liquor and loaded it into Badr's car. The two cars then left for Badr's warehouse and, by chance, met

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the Suburban on the way. All three vehicles then drove to Badr's barn [warehouse], where they parked and offloaded the liquor. Badr went off in his car and dropped off several of the accused at their relatives. He came back for Salim, al-Asadi, and Bandar and took them to his home. Al-Asadi wanted to remove the Landcruiser and the Suburban from the warehouse, but Badr said they would be safe there because it was after dark.

The next morning, Salim, Badr, al-Asadi, and al-Ghazali drove to the warehouse, only to find it surrounded by police. Badr then drove the group to Jabbar's house, where al-Asadi gave Jabbar's son two handguns and two handgrenades for safekeeping. Later, they returned to the warehouse and found it still surrounded, so they returned to Jabbar's house again. Salim, al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, and Bandar left shortly afterward and drove to Muhammad Uqla's house in Jahra. They had dinner there but had to leave. They went to Salim's uncle's house and spent the night.

They left the next morning, and al-Asadi stole a Mercedes car that was parked outside the building with its engine running. The group left in the car to try to escape to

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Iraq, but it broke down. Eventually they started walking but were soon stopped and arrested by a Kuwaiti police border patrol. This was on 15 April at about 1400 hours. The police had been alerted by suspicious Kuwaitis out bird hunting.¹¹

Badr Jiyad Thamir Mutlaq al-Shamri, Referred to as Badr
(Statement taken on 1 May.)

Badr works as a driver for the Ministry of Electricity and Water and lives in Kuwait City. He has been imprisoned in Kuwait for smuggling liquor and met the accused Salim in prison. Badr has kinship ties to the accused Bandar, who has stayed at Badr's house on previous occasions.

13 April. Bandar arrived at Badr's apartment with al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, and Salim. Badr's wife admitted them, and Badr himself soon returned home. Badr had never met al-Asadi and al-Ghazali before, but he gave them food and let them stay. They told Badr they had smuggled liquor in from Iraq and had hidden it in an earthen berm outside town. They also said that other men were at the hiding place with a Suburban

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vehicle. They offered to sell the liquor to Badr, and he agreed. Some hashish was also involved in the sale. Badr, al-Asadi, and Salim then left in Badr's car and the Landcruiser, leaving al-Ghazali and Bandar behind. On arrival at Jahra, Salim and al-Asadi got out of the Landcruiser and joined Badr's car. They drove to the earthen berm but found that the Suburban and the other men had gone. They found the liquor--13 cases of Grant's whisky--and loaded it into Badr's car.

At Jahra, al-Asadi got into the Landcruiser. Just then the Suburban drove up and they flagged it down. Salim got into the Suburban and drove it. All three vehicles went to Badr's warehouse, where the whisky was offloaded and the Suburban and Landcruiser were parked. Sometime during the stay in the warehouse, Badr overheard al-Asadi and Salim talk about some Kalashnikov rifles. Another man said that he had buried the rifles outside town. Badr then drove several of the men to various houses. He returned alone to the warehouse and from there went home. Salim and al-Asadi had already returned. Bandar and al-Ghazali were still there. They drank some liquor and then spent the night.

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14 April. In the morning, Badr was asked to pay for the liquor, so, with the exception of al-Ghazali, they all drove to the warehouse to complete the deal. As they drew near, they found it surrounded by police. They drove back to Badr's apartment to pick up al-Ghazali, after which they tried unsuccessfully to find the other members of the group.

Al-Asadi then guided the group of al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Bandar, Salim, and Badr to Jabbar's house. They had lunch there and decided to recheck the warehouse. Finding it still surrounded by police, they returned to Jabbar's home. Al-Asadi, al-Ghazali, Salim, and Bandar said they wanted to try to escape to Iraq, but Badr decided to go home. After that, he went to the warehouse and surrendered himself to the police at around 1800 hours.¹²

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Captions for Figures

Fig. 1: Locator Map

Fig. 2: Map: Alleged Assassination Plot Against President Bush

Figure 3. (keep figs. 3 and 4 together) Toyota Landcruiser seized by Kuwaiti authorities. It had been turned into a car bomb by concealing approximately 80 kilograms of explosives in the vehicle's body panels.

Figure 4. Some of the wiring that was part of the bomb is shown in the area below the right front door.

Figures 5 and 6. This comparison of the Turkish (right or top) and Kuwaiti (left or bottom) improvised explosive devices shows the inside of the two firing devices. The selection of components and construction techniques, including the soldering and the use of connectors in the two devices, are similar.

Figure 7. The cube bombs recovered in Kuwait.

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Figure 8. The Motorola chips found in an Iraqi device recovered in Jakarta were identical to those found in the integrated circuits used in the Kuwaiti cube bombs.

Figures 9 and 10. Another comparison of the improvised explosive devices found in Turkey and Kuwait shows obvious similarities in the undersides of the two firing systems.

Figures 11 and 12. Two remote-controlled firing systems found in known Iraqi devices recovered in Abu Dhabi (right or top, depending on placement) and in the Kuwaiti device (left or bottom). Both are essentially identical. The face plates of both devices had holes drilled in the same places to permit connection of the red and black wires.

Figure 13. Sketch of Abu Rafed

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