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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2002

6 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster

At the meeting on the morning of 3 April 1959 concerning proposed CHALICE activities, several questions were asked concerning the urgency of these requirements. I believe all concerned felt that the answers offered were not entirely satisfactory. It was my impression that the more important questions on this aspect of the matter were the following:

1. Can the sighting of one or at most two ICBM sites yield any information, positive or negative, as to the current extent of ICBM deployment? Would the failure to find sites at the expected locations prove anything?
2. Do we have any good reason for believing that the specific locations and the railroad lines which it is proposed to investigate are in fact the sites of ICBM bases?
3. If we were lucky enough to see one or even two individual operational bases, would we learn anything of real significance?

In an effort to provide as clear answers as possible to these questions, I have produced the attached notes. If you feel that they do in fact supply answers which were missing at the 3 April meeting, you might care to pass them along.



RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

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Attachment:
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4 April 1959

CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON PROPOSED CHALICE MISSIONS

Summarized below are certain facts and considerations which have a bearing on the proposal discussed on the morning of 3 April 1959. These are offered in answer to questions raised in the course of that discussion.

1. There is hard intelligence to the effect that at the locations which are the primary targets of the two proposed missions, [Redacted] construction activity has recently been in progress and that this activity is in some way connected with the Russian missile program. In addition, there is a report from a [Redacted] specifically identifying the primary target of the southern mission as an ICBM site. These are not randomly chosen or merely plausible locations. Rail lines proposed for coverage are those which by virtue of security from observation, geographic orientation and strength of road beds are most suspected of likely use in logistical support for hard sites or mobile launch.

[Large Redacted Area]

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e. What type of guidance system will be employed -- radio or inertial?

From answers to the above questions,

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[Redacted]

3. One of the targets on the southern mission is [Redacted] the location and nature of which is positively known. Up-to-date photography of this target would reveal the character of the second launch site under construction there eighteen months ago and would give at least some indication of the answer to the questions raised in the preceding paragraph. In addition, there might be clues to assist us [Redacted]

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4. The proposed southern mission in addition would provide coverage of what has been identified fairly firmly from other sources as a [Redacted] namely [Redacted] Such coverage would contribute evidence in answer to the questions raised in paragraph 2, and would in addition permit inferences to be drawn as to production rates.

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5. Positive information on these questions will, we can be sure from prior experience, provide clues to permit interpretation of information obtained from all other intelligence sources, particularly [Redacted] on areas not covered by these specific operations, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

6.


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