

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

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


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THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600
12 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
12 November 1962

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION

Preliminary analysis of 11 November photography discloses that assembly of IL-28-type aircraft continues at San Julian. Eleven aircraft were observed: eight BEAGLES, seven of them trainers, are completely assembled except for engine cowlings; one BEAGLE bomber is complete except for engines; and another two BEAGLES are being assembled. One BEAGLE fuselage was also noted.

Twenty-two BEAGLE fuselage crates were scattered along the taxiway system and in the assembly area.

Nine BEAGLE fuselage crates are located at Holguin airfield. There is no evidence that these crates are being unpacked.

A fifth possible coastal defense cruise-missile site was detected west of Mariel.

[REDACTED]

Yesterday, Cuban news media continued their complete silence on the Mikoyan mission to Cuba for the second day running. The French AFP news agency representative in Havana quoted "informed sources" as saying that Mikoyan was expected to leave Havana for New York today. He reported that most observers believed he would return "practically empty-handed."

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Fidel Castro had reacted violently to advice from Mikoyan that he either give up the government or take a long vacation. During a meeting of students which the Cuban premier attended on 6 November instead of going to ceremonies on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Castro is reported to have said that it would be necessary to kill him before he would follow Mikoyan's advice and that, as far as he was concerned, the Soviet leader could get out of Cuba immediately. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SOVIET SHIPPING TO AND FROM CUBA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A review of photographic coverage of Mariel City Dock, covering the period during which the BRATSK was being loaded, does not reveal any special containers or security measures indicative of the presence of nuclear weapons.


Eleven Soviet ships, carrying missiles and missile-related equipment, are not en route from Cuba to the USSR. Eight of the nine ships listed by Kuznetsov are carrying a total of 42 canvas-covered missiles and missile transporters as deck cargo. Two of these eight Soviet ships have given an ETA at Odessa of 23 November. The ninth ship, listed by Kuznetsov, ALAPAEVSK, and two other freighters, ALMETEVSK and ALEKSANDROVSK, are carrying missile-related equipment.

The Soviet dry cargo ships CHERNYAKHOVSK and MICHURINSK, and the Soviet tanker LISICHANSK arrived in Cuban ports within the last three days. The LISICHANSK has apparently discharged her cargo and departed already. Ten other Soviet dry cargo ships, four Soviet tankers, two Soviet passenger ships, and one East German dry cargo ship are presently en route from the Bloc to Cuba. The passenger ships, GRUZIYA and POBEDA have normal passenger capacities of more than 1,000, are carrying a total of only 104 passengers to Cuba, and it can be assumed that they are scheduled to return a larger number of Soviet personnel to the USSR.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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BLOC MILITARY FORCES



SOVIET POSITION

Moscow continues to maintain silence on Mikoyan's talks with the Cuban leaders, except for noting that his recent tour with Castro--which included a visit to the Bay of Pigs--was marked by "an exceptionally friendly atmosphere."

With the departure of the last ship carrying missiles and related equipment, Moscow radio is stressing that the USSR has carried out its obligations. It states that the time has come for the US to lift the quarantine and to make a public statement on nonaggression and respect for Cuba's territorial integrity.

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ANNEX I

The MIG-21 fighter aircraft in Cuba armed with AA-2 infrared homing air-to-air missiles have only a limited capability against either very high or very low US surveillance flights.

The main threat to U-2 flights over Cuba continue to be the 24 SAM sites, which cover almost the whole island and its approaches.

The MIG-21Cs have a top speed of Mach 1.7 at 36,000 feet and a combat ceiling of about 55,000 feet. They are capable of climbing to 70,000 feet but can maintain that altitude for only 2 or 3 minutes. The AA-2 missile has a range of about 6 nautical miles.

MIG-21Cs with AA-2 missiles are not designed to attack an aircraft such as the U-2 flying at altitudes above 70,000 feet. To intercept a U-2, a MIG-21C pilot would be dependent on precise guidance by ground control, since his plane is equipped with "range only" radar and does not, to our knowledge, have airborne intercept radar. In the time available to him at or near maximum altitude, the MIG-21 pilot, even with the best GCI control, would have little chance of locating the target and maneuvering into firing position.

The capability of MIG-21Cs to hit low-flying F-101s and F-8Us is also poor, but would be somewhat improved by AA-2 missiles. At very low levels, ground heat sources would tend to confuse the missile's homing system. Before or after the low-level runs of US aircraft, however, when they are at higher altitudes, the MIG-21Cs would have better prospects of scoring a hit.

Our only evidence to date indicates that MIG-21C aircraft in Cuba have been operated solely by Soviet pilots. We have seen no evidence that Cuban pilots have been at the controls of these aircraft over Cuba, although some may be training in MIG-21s in the Soviet Union.

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ANNEX II

B-26 AIRCRAFT IN LATIN AMERICA

The B-26 was developed during World War II as a low-level attack bomber. It compares favorably in terms of bomb load and combat radius with the IL-28. The B-26 is a piston-engine aircraft, however, and it cannot operate at either the altitude or speed of the twin-jet Soviet bomber.

Comparative statistics on the two aircraft follow:

	<u>IL-28</u>	<u>B-26</u>
Bomb load	4,400 lbs.	4,000 lbs.
Combat radius	700 n.m.	800 n.m.
Maximum speed at optimum altitude	460 kts/ 15,000 ft.	300 kts/ 10,000 ft.

A total of 116 B-26 aircraft are in the air forces of Latin American countries, including Cuba:

Cuba	17	Dominican Republic	5
Brazil	27	Guatemala	8
Chile	29	Nicaragua	4
Colombia	9	Peru	17