

~~SECRET~~

*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General*

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



GUATEMALA: 1984-1995

ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
CONCERNING SELECTED U.S. PERSONS AND MYRNA MACK


(95-0152-IG)

September 15, 1995

*Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector General*

*A. R. Cinquegrana
Deputy Inspector General
for Investigations*

Investigators



Assistants



APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2001

Copy 49 of 100

All portions are
classified ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
BACKGROUND	3
The Setting	3
Guatemala City Station's Roles and Missions	5
Factual Summary	9
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES	12
QUESTIONS PRESENTED	13
Map: Alleged Human Rights Abuses Concerning Selected U.S. Persons and Myrna Mack	15
Chronology of Significant Events	17
[REDACTED]	22
FINDINGS	25
<i>WHAT INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE TO THE CIA BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1984 AND JULY 31, 1995 CONCERNING CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES? HOW WAS THAT INFORMATION HANDLED? WHAT DO CIA PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THAT REPORTING?</i>	25
♦ <i>THE DEATH OF PETER WOLFE</i>	25

- ◆ *THE DEATHS OF NICHOLAS BLAKE AND GRIFFITH DAVIS*31
- ◆ *THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION AND ABUSE OF SISTER DIANNA ORTIZ*42
- ◆ *THE STABBING OF MEREDITH LARSON*.....70
- ◆ *THE ASSAULT UPON JOSH ZINNER*71
- ◆ *THE DEATH OF MYRNA MACK*72
- ◆ *THE DEATH OF PETER TISCIONE*115
- ◆ *THE BEATING OF JUNE WEINSTOCK*.....117
- ◆ *THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION AND BEATING OF DANIEL "SKY" CALLAHAN*.....126

IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT CIA EMPLOYEES OR ASSETS WERE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DEATHS, DISAPPEARANCE, OR ABUSE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS?131

WHAT ARE THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A DRAFT CABLE FROM GUATEMALA CITY STATION ENTITLED "STATION INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN GUATEMALA," DATED OCTOBER 15,1991? WHAT INFORMATION DID IT CONTAIN THAT PERTAINED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS? WAS THE CABLE EVER TRANSMITTED TO HEADQUARTERS? WHAT DO AGENCY PERSONNEL INVOLVED RECALL ABOUT THE ISSUE?134

WHAT WERE CIA'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION CONCERNING THESE MATTERS? WAS INFORMATION REGARDING THE FATE OF THE NINE U.S.

*CITIZENS AND MACK SHARED WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES?*139

CONCLUSIONS141

RECOMMENDATIONS143

*OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF*

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

GUATEMALA: 1984-1995

**ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
CONCERNING SELECTED U.S. PERSONS AND MYRNA MACK**

(95-0152-IG)

September 15, 1995

INTRODUCTION

1. On March 30, 1995, the President directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) to conduct a government-wide review of all allegations surrounding the 1990 death of Michael DeVine and the 1992 disappearance of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez in Guatemala, as well as any related matters. As a result of the President's direction, on April 7, 1995, the IOB issued Terms of Reference outlining the scope of the review to the Inspectors General at the CIA, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice.

2. On July 15, 1995, the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed an investigation that examined what information was available to CIA concerning the killing of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine and the disappearance of Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The investigation also dealt with allegations that the CIA was concealing documents by sending them to former employees.

3. The IOB's initial Terms of Reference also asked the CIA's OIG to look into what intelligence was available to CIA regarding U.S. citizens who may have been subjected to human rights abuses in Guatemala since 1984. Specifically, the Board identified the following individuals for review: Peter Wolfe, Nicholas Blake, Griffith Davis, Dianna Ortiz, Peter Tiscione, Meredith Larson, Josh Zinner, June Weinstock, and Daniel "Sky" Callahan. Subsequently, the Board requested that the CIA/OIG inquiry include Myrna Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist who was murdered in Guatemala in 1990.

4. This Report includes the results of the CIA OIG investigation concerning the individuals designated by the IOB. It describes Agency and non-Agency reporting relating to these individuals, [REDACTED] and the dissemination of the relevant Agency Directorate of Operations (DO) and Directorate of Intelligence (DI) reports. It also addresses what key Agency personnel recall regarding CIA reporting relating to these individuals, and whether there is any evidence that CIA employees or assets were directly or indirectly involved in the death, disappearance, or abuse of these individuals.

5. This Report represents the first of three Reports that are responsive to portions of the IOB's Terms of Reference that were not covered in the investigation that was completed on July 15. The second Report will explore whether CIA activities were consistent with presidential directives and decisions [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
third Report will examine [REDACTED]
information available to the Agency concerning human rights abuses
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

The Setting

6. Central America. From the mid-1980's through the early 1990's, the CIA's activities in Central America took place within the context of wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador that spilled over into Honduras; a real, though diminishing, threat of Cuban subversion; and a long civil war in Guatemala. The Agency engaged in foreign intelligence collection [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] By the 1990s, the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador had ended and peace negotiations were underway to end the diminishing civil war in Guatemala.

7. Guatemala. Within Guatemala, politically inspired violence was common.¹ Military-civilian relations were tense.

- ◆ During this period, all factions of Guatemala's political spectrum used violence to further their political and economic interests. Far-right groups, in league with rogue elements of government security forces, were responsible for bomb attacks in Guatemala City and used assassinations to destabilize the Guatemalan Government. The leftist insurgency also engaged in economic sabotage, extortion and murder of military commissioners to bolster its political fortunes. Moreover, prior to the 1990 presidential election, political parties engaged in kidnapping, assault and robbery to raise campaign funds and settle political feuds;

¹ This violence goes back decades. For example, the insurgents are thought to have been responsible for the 1968 assassination of U.S. Ambassador Gordon Mein.

- ◆ Guatemala's emergence as a narcotics transshipment and production center contributed to the deteriorating security situation;
- ◆ Military perceptions of government paralysis in the face of escalating violence and labor strife, as well as the weak civilian response to the insurgency, triggered two abortive coups during President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo's administration (1986-1991); and
- ◆ In 1993, instability took the form of an effort by then President Serrano to expand his power by suspending the Guatemalan constitution. This effort collapsed and led to the appointment in June 1993 of Ramiro De Leon Carpio to replace Serrano.

8. **The Guatemalan Military.** Under Article 244 of the Guatemalan Constitution, the Guatemalan military is the guarantor of the nation. By long-standing practice, the officer corps serves as guarantor of its own status and position. The overwhelming majority of the roughly 2,000 officers in the Guatemalan military enter through the military academy and usually progress in rank by their class. As a corps, they support their classmates and friends and they support the military institution against external challenge. The senior officers in the Guatemalan military today were often field officers during the period of heaviest fighting and worst human rights abuses prior to 1985. Those senior officers are particularly sensitive to human rights charges against their colleagues, in part because many of the senior officers themselves engaged in questionable conduct as field officers.

9. The Directorate of Intelligence (D-2) of the Guatemalan National Defense Staff is the national intelligence organization of the Guatemalan Government. Through (a) its headquarters in Guatemala City, (b) staff officers (G-2) in regional military Commands, and (c) intelligence officers (S-2) at the base or local level, the D-2 collects and analyzes information on armed insurgency

groups, narcotics traffickers, opposition political parties, potential regional adversaries, and other issues. G-2 officers are under the command of their respective military zone or base commanders but also report directly to the D-2 in Guatemala City. D-2 collection capabilities include an informant network, interrogation of captured insurgents, as well as technical collection and investigative and surveillance teams.

10. D-2 officers are generally selected from the best military academy graduates or particularly capable field officers. The core of the D-2 is composed of officers who spend their careers in intelligence and consider themselves the elite of the Guatemalan military.

11. Another important intelligence organization with links to the military and the D-2 was the Department of Presidential Security (DSP), commonly referred to as the "Archivos," or Presidential Security Service. This organization, made up largely of military--including D-2--personnel, reported directly to the President and the Presidential General Staff. In 1993, the DSP was disbanded and replaced by a smaller Center for Analysis. This organization was to be an interim intelligence organization until a civilian-led national intelligence organization could be established. The DSP and its successor are significant because U.S. policy was to promote a democratically-oriented intelligence service [REDACTED]

Guatemala City Station's Roles and Missions

12. [REDACTED]

13.

[REDACTED]

.....
[REDACTED]

.....

[REDACTED]

14.

[REDACTED]

15.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16.

[REDACTED]

◆ [REDACTED]

◆ [REDACTED]


◆ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


17.

[REDACTED]


18.




19.




20.



21. Station Missions.





Factual Summary

22. This Report deals with ten alleged victims of human rights abuse by Guatemalan officials. Nine of these individuals were Americans—Peter Harper Wolfe, Nicholas Blake, Griffith Davis, Dianna Ortiz, Meredith Larson, Josh Zinner, Peter Tiscione, June Weinstock, and Daniel Callahan. One, Myrna Mack, was a Guatemalan citizen. Some of these individuals were reportedly attacked, abducted or tortured; others were murdered. The events in question began in Guatemala in 1984 with the murder of Peter Wolfe, a Peace Corps volunteer, and end with Daniel Callahan, a Texas filmmaker, who was attacked in July 1995.

23. On October 28, 1984, Peter Harper Wolfe, a Peace Corps volunteer, was shot to death on a Guatemala City street. Wolfe was reportedly working with citizens groups and the Guatemalan Government to establish a national park system at the time. According to Wolfe's brother, John, a Guatemalan court released the two prime suspects in the murder just days after one of them confessed to the crime.

24. Nicholas Blake, a journalist, and Griffith Davis, a photographer, were last seen alive on March 29, 1985, near the community of El Llano, in northwestern Guatemala. Blake was planning to write a story about a rebel force, the Guerrilla Army of

the Poor, that was active in the province of Huehuetenango. Davis was his photographer. Blake's family claims they were unable to determine what happened to their son for seven years due to resistance by officials of the Guatemalan Government. The Blake family reportedly undertook an investigation at its own expense, making approximately 20 trips to Guatemala. In the course of the investigation, family members spoke with numerous officials who promised assistance but never responded. The family's investigation led to the recovery of the two men's remains in June 1992. The Guatemalan Government initially claimed the two men were killed by the guerrillas. Blake's relatives, however, claim that witnesses have told them that members of the local civil patrol, an arm of the Guatemalan military, considered the men to be guerrilla sympathizers and killed them.

25. Dianna Ortiz, an Ursuline nun, was staying in Antigua, Guatemala when she was reportedly abducted, raped and tortured on November 2, 1989. She claims to have over 111 cigarette burns on her back and to have been lowered into a pit with cadavers and rats. She reports to have been rescued from a torture cell by someone she believes to be an American. The American, she says, told her he would take her to the residence of a "friend of the American Embassy." While riding in his vehicle, she says she was able to jump out and run for help. The man Ortiz claims to have rescued her has never been identified. Nor have the three Guatemalans who allegedly tortured her.

26. Meredith Larson and two other individuals were stabbed by unidentified assailants in Guatemala City. Larson and two other individuals--both Canadian citizens--were members of the Peace Brigades International (PBI) and were walking toward the Peace Brigades residence on the evening of December 20, 1989 when they were attacked. According to the Embassy, all three individuals were treated at a local hospital and released. The three victims believe that the attack was a deliberate attempt to frighten members of the PBI.

27. According to the press, in 1990, Josh Zinner, a social worker and former resident of Washington, D.C., was working with homeless children in Guatemala City when he was assaulted by gunmen and dragged toward a waiting car. The Guatemalan police intervened but released the assailants, who were said to display military identification.

28. Myrna Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist, was stabbed to death on September 11, 1990 in Guatemala City. Mack had been researching issues affecting displaced persons in the Quiche and Huehuetenango Departments. She was working for the Guatemala City based Association for the Promotion of Social Studies (AVANSCO). A former Army sergeant, who was assigned to the Presidential General Staff's Department of Presidential Security at the time of the killing, was convicted of the murder and was sentenced to 25 years on February 12, 1993 for the murder. Helen Mack Chang, the victim's sister, has been a crusader for justice in her sister's murder case. Helen Mack continues to press for identification of those she alleges ordered the surveillance and killing of her sister.

29. Peter Tiscione, also an anthropologist, initially conducted research in Guatemala in 1976 while a student at the State University of New York. He returned to Guatemala in July 1992 to study Mayan pottery. Tiscione reportedly committed suicide in his Guatemala City hotel room on August 23, 1992. He died of four wounds to his neck caused by a machete. The Guatemalan police concluded that Tiscione had committed suicide because the machete found at the scene had his fingerprints on it, his hotel room door had been locked from the inside at the time of his death, there were no apparent signs of a struggle or theft, and all blood samples found in the room matched Tiscione's. Tiscione suffered from manic depression and made calls to the Embassy just before his death indicating a need for medication.

30. On March 29, 1994, June Weinstock, a journalist and environmentalist from Fairbanks, Alaska, reportedly touched a boy's head after taking photographs of children at a market in the

northeastern Guatemalan town of San Cristobal Verapaz. When a peasant woman shouted that her son had disappeared, the crowd gathered and began to beat Weinstock. Weinstock was stripped, stoned, stabbed repeatedly, then left for dead. The crowd of Guatemalan citizens accused Weinstock of abducting a child for the purposes of extracting vital organs in support of organ trafficking in Guatemala. Army personnel arrived nearly six hours after the incident began, and police later took Weinstock to a hospital. Her skull was partially destroyed and she has suffered brain damage. More than 50 Guatemalans were reportedly arrested for the attack.

31. Daniel "Sky" Callahan, a Texas filmmaker working on a documentary detailing civil rights violations, was attacked twice in Guatemala City. The first attack occurred on July 4, 1995, when he was hit with a baton by a Guatemalan soldier while filming protesters in the main plaza in Guatemala City. The second attack occurred on July 7, 1995, when attackers abducted and beat him. He was warned to leave Guatemala or "bad things" would happen to him.

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

32. Following completion on July 15, 1995 of the first phase of the Inspector General's investigation into Agency activities in Guatemala, ten Investigators and two support personnel were assigned to undertake a second phase. Four Investigators were involved in this portion of the second phase. Approximately 30,000 pages of Agency and non-Agency documents concerning Guatemala were reviewed. This included relevant DO and DI files, as well as

[REDACTED] and Information Management Staff files and Office of Congressional Affairs files. Selected current and former CIA officials as well as a former Ambassador of Guatemala were interviewed. Nineteen current and former CIA officials, as well as a former Ambassador, were interviewed for this phase of the investigation. During the first phase, over 200 interviewees were asked about their knowledge concerning the individuals under

review, with the exception of Myrna Mack and Daniel Callahan. At the time, Mack was not included in the IOB tasking and the Callahan incident had not occurred. Attempts were made to interview Ortiz, but they were unsuccessful.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED


- ◆ What information was available to the CIA between January 1, 1984 and July 31, 1995 concerning certain human rights abuses? How was that information handled? What do CIA personnel recall regarding that reporting?
- ◆ Is there any evidence that CIA employees or assets were directly or indirectly involved in the deaths, disappearance or abuse of these individuals?
- ◆ What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the Draft Cable from Guatemala City Station entitled "Station Investigation of Human Rights Violations" in Guatemala, dated October 15, 1991? What information did it contain that pertained to human rights abuses against Ortiz and Mack? Was the cable ever transmitted to Headquarters? What do individuals involved recall about the issue?
- ◆ What were CIA's responsibilities for congressional notification concerning these matters? Was information regarding the fate of the nine U.S. citizens and Mack shared with the congressional oversight committees?

BLANK PAGE

BLANK PAGE

Guatemala: 1984-95

Alleged Human Rights Abuses Concerning Selected US Persons and Myrna Mack



~~Secret~~

Chronology of Significant Events

1984	
October 28	Peter Harper Wolfe, Peace Corps volunteer, is shot and killed on a Guatemala City street. Shortly afterward, two Guatemalan citizens are determined to be guilty of the crime. Police suspect robbery was the motive.
1985	
March 29	Nicholas Blake, a journalist, and Griffith Davis, a photographer, are last seen alive near the community of El Llano, in northwestern Guatemala.
1989	
November 2	Dianna Ortiz, an Ursuline nun, staying in Antigua, Guatemala, claims to have been abducted, raped and tortured. She reports to have been rescued the next day by someone she believed to be an American because of his accent.
November 4	Ortiz departs Guatemala for the U.S
December 20	Meredith Larson and two Canadians are stabbed by unidentified assailants in Guatemala City. Larson and the two Canadians are members of the Peace Brigades International.
1990	
March 15	Guatemalan Minister of Interior Morales and the Guatemalan police conclude that Ortiz's kidnapping was a fabrication.
Date unknown	Josh Zinner, a social worker, reportedly is assaulted by gunmen and dragged towards a waiting car. He is released when the Guatemalan police intervene.
September 11	Myrna Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist, is stabbed to death in Guatemala City.
November 7	Helen Mack Chang, Myrna Mack's sister, tells the Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission that she believes her sister was killed by someone close to, or a member of, the Guatemalan security forces.

1991

- July 5** **Guatemalan judge issues a warrant for the arrest of former Army Sergeant Noel de Jesus Beteta Alvarez for the murder of Myrna Mack.**
- October 15** **Draft Station report indicates [REDACTED] substantiated Ortiz's claim that she was kidnapped.**
- November 29** **Beteta is arrested in Los Angeles by the Los Angeles Police Department.**
- November 30** **Helen Mack Chang's uncle, Augusto Chang, is kidnapped in Guatemala.**
- December 4** **Beteta is returned to Guatemala but denies murdering Mack. Augusto Chang is freed unharmed by kidnappers.**
- December 10** **Mack family tells Ambassador Thomas Stroock of concerns for personal safety. Myrna Mack's father states he believes the kidnapping of Augusto Chang and the murder of his daughter are linked.**

1992

- June 17** **According to the Embassy, Blake family members recover the remains of Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. The Embassy comments that the two men were murdered by the civil patrol and not by guerrillas.**
- July 7** **Ambassador Stroock testifies at a Guatemalan court hearing on the alleged abduction and torture of Ortiz.**
- August 23** **Peter Tiscione dies of four wounds to the neck caused by a machete. He suffered from manic depression and had depleted his supply of medication. Guatemalan police rule the death a suicide.**

1993

- February 12** **Noel de Jesus Beteta is convicted of Mack's murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison for the crime.**

1994

March 29 June Weinstock is attacked by a mob in the northeastern Guatemalan town of San Cristobal Verapaz. She was taking photographs of children and touched a young boy's head just prior to the attack. She is critically injured and suffers brain damage.

1995

March 10 State Department cancels participation by Guatemalan military personnel in the International Military Education and Training programs in the U.S. for the remainder of 1995 due to concern over a lack of progress on various human rights cases, including the Mack case.


April 12 U.S. court finds former Defense Minister Gramajo liable for authorizing the torture of Ortiz and others in Guatemala. Monetary damages awarded to the victims total \$47.5 million.

June 12 The Embassy reports that Guatemalan Chief Prosecutor Ramses Cuestas advises of his intent to proceed with the investigation into Wolfe's murder.


July 4 & 7 Daniel "Sky" Callahan is attacked twice in Guatemala City. He is hit by a soldier with a baton. Four days later he is abducted and assaulted.

BLANK PAGE


~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~



22
~~SECRET~~



BLANK PAGE

FINDINGS

WHAT INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE TO THE CIA BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1984 AND JULY 31, 1995 CONCERNING CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES? HOW WAS THAT INFORMATION HANDLED? WHAT DO CIA PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THAT REPORTING?

THE DEATH OF PETER WOLFE

33. Peter Harper Wolfe, a Peace Corps volunteer, was shot to death on October 28, 1984, in Guatemala City. At the time, he was reportedly working to establish a national park system. Boris Rene Acosta Diaz and Julio Cesar Gramajo Castillo were accused of his killing but never brought to trial. Early on, the Embassy tried to persuade Guatemalan Officials to bring the accused individuals to trial. In an attempt to better address the case, the Embassy hired Alfredo E. Lurssen Barrios, a Guatemalan Attorney, to review the Government's handling of the matter and render legal advice. Barrios' review indicated that the police investigation was deficient, as were the legal proceedings that evaluated the evidence. Recent State reporting indicates a renewed interest in the case and that the Embassy had spoken with the Guatemalan Chief Prosecutor about locating the case records.

CIA Reporting

34. DO records included no information regarding Wolfe. A search of other Agency records revealed that the DI disseminated two items that appear to refer to Wolfe's murder.

35. **October 30, 1984 Latin America Brief.** This edition of a widely disseminated DI/Office of Current Production and Analytic Support periodic intelligence summary addressed increasing violence in Guatemala, among other topics, and suggested that the murder of a "U.S. Peace Corps volunteer" could be an attempt by leftists to embarrass the Guatemalan Government. Police suspected robbery as the motive. The perpetrators of the murder were not linked to any

political faction although previous information indicated guerrillas were planning to increase terrorism. This Latin America brief was disseminated to, among others, State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Treasury Department, and U.S. military components.

36. **December 18, 1984 Sanitized Terrorism Review.** This extracted article was based upon a DI/Office of Global Issues biweekly intelligence summary entitled Terrorism Review. A number of recent killings in Guatemala were highlighted, including the finding of a "slain U.S. Peace Corps volunteer" on October 28. Police arrested a young Guatemalan for the crime. He indicated the killing was an accident. Although inconsistencies were found in the Guatemalan's story, political overtones were not apparent. The distribution of the extract is uncertain although it appears to have been forwarded to overseas stations.

37. CIA files contain no CIA reporting relating to Wolfe's death for the period from August 1985 through June 1995.

Other Reporting

38. CIA records contain one Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) document and 17 State telegrams that were produced during the period of December 1984 through July 1995. These documents detailed State's efforts to bring Boris Rene Acosta Diaz and Julio Cesar Gramajo Castillo to trial for the Wolfe murder. Those efforts included the hiring of private counsel and seeking intervention by various Guatemalan Government officials. A July 1995 report indicated that neither Acosta or Gramajo were brought to trial and that it was believed that Acosta had been killed in a 1987 motorcycle accident and that Gramajo's ten year U.S. visa had been revoked due to an outstanding arrest warrant.

- ◆ **October 29, 1984 FBIS Report.** The FBIS report summarized Havana International Service's transmission concerning the Wolfe death in a northern sector of Guatemala City. It indicated that the incident was confirmed by the Peace

Corps but not the U.S. Embassy. Wolfe was reported to be the sixth person to die since a rightist deputy was shot to death.

- ◆ **December 4, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Acosta was released from custody as police could not produce a weapon or an eyewitness to the murder. The American Chargé made it known to Guatemalan officials that the case should be handled in accordance with the law. The autopsy and investigative reports were not received by the Embassy.
- ◆ **December 5, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy advised of a conversation with the judge who released Acosta. The judge advised that no one was present to represent Wolfe, the police were ill prepared, and there was not enough evidence to hold Acosta. The judge indicated a need for a formal accuser and stated that this could be done by the Embassy via a diplomatic note.
- ◆ **December 5, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy advised that someone must formally accuse Rene Boris Acosta, who was free under court supervision. The Embassy sought guidance on whether it could make the accusation and asked for authorization to hire a Guatemalan attorney.
- ◆ **December 5, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on the text of a diplomatic note sent to the Foreign Ministry and noted a lack of information on the matter from the Guatemalan Government.
- ◆ **December 11, 1984 State Telegram.** The State Department in Washington authorized the hiring

of an attorney to address specific concerns. Previous telegrams reported the father of Wolfe's ex-girlfriend identified Acosta as the perpetrator. Acosta's mother also may be able to corroborate Acosta's culpability. The Department raised the question whether evidence existed to contradict Acosta's self defense alibi.

- ◆ **December 11, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed a meeting with the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Thomas Batres. The Embassy expressed concern relating to the release of Acosta. Justice Batres advised that the release was inappropriate and the first judge was instructed to reissue a detention order. Separate and unconfirmed information from military sources indicated that Chief of Staff General Mejia had already ordered the rearrest of Acosta.

- ◆ **December 13, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed a meeting with General Mejia in which it was stated that Guatemala's image was improving, as was its handling of human rights. Mejia indicated a willingness to see justice served in the case but did not wish to become directly involved for fear of being accused of dictatorial actions concerning the judicial system. He suggested meeting with the President of the Supreme Court.

- ◆ **December 13, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed a meeting with Foreign Minister Andrade. He suggested continued contact with the President of the Supreme Court. Andrade was reminded of consequences for failure to take appropriate action in the Wolfe case.

- ◆ **December 13, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy documented the Ambassador's contact with the President of the Supreme Court. The Ambassador was advised that the arrest of Acosta was ordered on December 12. The State Department Regional Security Officer (RSO) confirmed that the police were searching for Acosta.

- ◆ **December 18, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy documented a meeting with Foreign Minister Andrade. Andrade assured the Embassy that the necessary steps were being taken in the case and that the arrest order had been issued.

- ◆ **December 21, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided a summary of a confidential report prepared by the Embassy's attorney. It detailed the actions of the National Police and the judicial status of the case. Findings and recommendations were summarized as follows: The Embassy can be the accuser of Boris Rene Acosta Diaz and Julio Cesar Gramajo Castillo; the Wolfe family empowered the Embassy or a lawyer to act; the prosecutor did not perform his duty at the initial hearing; the Foreign Ministry cannot be the accuser; a diplomatic note will not result in a trial; the investigation was started by the Department of Technical Investigations of the National Police but continued by Second Corps; the police interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who then provided information to identify the perpetrators; Acosta stated he committed the murder during a robbery; the police did not continue to gather evidence; and the accused denied the allegation in court.

- ◆ **December 28, 1984 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy pointed out findings by its attorney. The attorney found consistent and gross deficiencies in the police investigation and in the magistrate's handling of the case.
- ◆ **January 4, 1985 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy's attorney advised a trial could be held. Pertinent individuals were probably not interviewed as requested by the RSO. The police believed the arrest had ended the case. The Embassy lawyer found the police investigation deficient as a result of discussions with Wolfe's friends. The Embassy was doubtful Wolfe would attack anyone. Acosta and Gramajo testified that they were elsewhere when Wolfe was killed.
- ◆ **January 7, 1985 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided details of its attorney's qualifications. The date of the murder was October 28, 1984.
- ◆ **July 23, 1985 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that, in the past year, one U.S. citizen was killed in a violent act. However, the death of Wolfe was a criminal act not related to terrorism.
- ◆ **June 12, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed a meeting with Chief Prosecutor Ramses Cuestas. Cuestas advised of his intent to proceed with the investigation of Wolfe's murder, but he believed the entire case file had been burned. The Embassy suggested that a copy might be obtained from the Peace Corps.
- ◆ **July 12, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy advised that a ten-year visa for Gramajo, originally issued on March 30, 1995, was revoked. There is

still an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Acosta reportedly was killed in a 1987 motorcycle accident.

Personnel Recollections

39. CIA personnel did not recall receiving any information from [REDACTED] concerning the death of Wolfe. They also stated they did not have any direct knowledge relating to Wolfe or the circumstances that resulted in his death.

THE DEATHS OF NICHOLAS BLAKE AND GRIFFITH DAVIS

40. Nicholas Blake, a 26-year-old freelance journalist from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Griffith Davis, a 38-year-old amateur photographer from Scranton, Pennsylvania who had resided in Guatemala for three years, were last seen on March 29, 1985. At that time, they were walking in a remote mountain area of El Quiche province, which is located 150 miles northwest of Guatemala City.

41. Blake and Davis traveled to the highlands to investigate a possible story regarding the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), the Guerrilla Army of the Poor. The EGP was one of four insurgent groups in Guatemala.

42. The Blake family investigation concluded that the two were detained by a Civilian Action Patrol (PAC) in Los Llanos, a district in Huehuetenango. The PACs are paramilitary groups comprised of civilians but are organized by the Army, which supervises their counterinsurgency operations. Three PAC members killed Blake and Davis for their possessions and because they were suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers.

43. Seven years later, a military commissioner from the area came forward after being assured by Blake's family that no charges would be filed in return for the remains of Blake and Davis. He said that the bodies of the two men were moved from the site where they had been killed and were burned in order to conceal evidence of the crime. The remains of Davis and Blake were located and identified in 1992.

44. In 1993, Blake's family filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights charging the Guatemalan Government with Blake's murder and a subsequent cover-up. The family alleged that the Guatemalan Government was legally responsible for the Blake and Davis deaths because the PAC was under its command. The Blake family continues to seek financial compensation from the Guatemalan Government.

CIA Reporting

45. DO reporting regarding the Blake/Davis case ranges from May 1985 until December 1994 and consists of [redacted] Station Reports³ and [redacted] Intelligence Reports. Several Headquarters cables also appear in Agency files. [redacted] were unable to provide substantive information on the initial disappearance and deaths of Blake and Davis.

46. **May 9, 1985 Headquarters Cable.** Headquarters requested that the Station check with [redacted] for any new developments or information related to the case.

47. **May 10, 1985 Station Report.** The Station reported that, on April 30, 1985, a friend of Blake's who was the owner of a hotel in Antigua reported that he received a card from Blake through the Guatemalan postal system. The card indicated that Blake was alive and well. On May 2, 1985, a private investigator hired by the families of Blake and Davis reported that the friend burned the card for unspecified reasons.

48. According to the Station Report, Blake and Davis were last seen on March 29 or March 30, 1985 in the village of Llano, El Quiche, near the Department of Huehuetenango in the western highlands of Guatemala. Despite warnings that there were EGP units in the area, Blake and Davis decided to continue on their own and on foot using a route that was not normally patrolled by the Army.

49. On April 27, the Commander of Military Zone 20 (El Quiche) met with relatives of Blake and Davis and pointed out that the EGP units in his area consisted mostly of Indians who did not speak Spanish and who were indoctrinated to believe that all foreigners were witting collaborators of the Guatemalan Government. Furthermore, the Commander noted that these EGP units would kill for a camera or even a pair of pants.

50. On May 10, 1985, [REDACTED] visited the commander of Military Zone 20. [REDACTED] learned that, despite repeated efforts on the part of Army units to locate Blake and Davis, no additional information had been acquired concerning their whereabouts. Neither [REDACTED] the Guatemalan Army, nor the Station and Embassy were able to establish new leads that would shed light on the whereabouts of Blake and Davis.

51. **November 22, 1985 Headquarters Cable.** Headquarters informed the Station that the U.S. Vice President had made a special request for an update of information on the disappearance of Blake. It was requested that the Station query [REDACTED] [REDACTED] sources.

52. **November 25, 1985 Station Report.** The Station reported that [REDACTED] were queried several times on the status of the Blake case. None provided any information on Blake's fate.

53. According to the Station Report, members of the Blake family accused the Guatemalan Army of either having killed Blake or covering up his death. The Station uncovered no evidence of military involvement in Blake's disappearance.

54. The purpose of Blake's foray into El Quiche was to contact the EGP. Presumably, he expected similar treatment from them as he had received from the Salvadoran guerrillas. However, the guerrillas of the EGP were not the same sort of sophisticated, publicity-seeking types that he probably found among the Salvadoran insurgents. The Station reported that Blake and Davis chose their route into El Quiche deliberately to avoid the Army and they hiked into the middle of an isolated EGP-controlled area for the specific purpose of contacting the EGP. It was likely that they were killed by the EGP. The Station commented that, for some unknown reason, Blake's brothers seemed unwilling to consider that the guerrillas were responsible for his death.

55. **August 6, 1986 Station Report.** The Station referred to an August 3, 1986 New York Times article entitled, "Guatemala Rebels Accused of Slaying American," that noted that members of the Blake family concluded that he and a friend were killed by guerrillas and not the Army as they initially and repeatedly had claimed. The article depicted the EGP as the group responsible for the murders.

[REDACTED]

56.

[REDACTED]

57.

[REDACTED]

58. **December [REDACTED] 1992 Intelligence Report.** The Station indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

61. December [REDACTED] 1994 Intelligence Report. The Station reported that [REDACTED] that President De Leon and the Guatemalan Government were confused with regard to the emphasis being placed by the U.S. Government on the fate of Guatemalan insurgent Efraim Bamaca. [REDACTED] that the Guatemalan Government understood completely the importance that the U.S. Government attached to the investigation of the extrajudicial killings of U.S. citizens Michael DeVine, Blake and Davis. However, the Guatemalans were baffled by the importance being attached to Bamaca, who was a guerrilla-terrorist Guatemalan, not a U.S. citizen.

62. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

63. July 19, 1995 Station Report. Based on [REDACTED] request from Headquarters, [REDACTED] conducted a search [REDACTED] for draft cables related to human rights cases that the Station may not have forwarded to Headquarters. [REDACTED] contained no cables that were not forwarded to Headquarters.

Other Reporting

64. CIA received 18 reports relating to Blake and Davis from the Guatemala Embassy, the Department of State, FBIS, and the Defense Attaché Office (DAO).

- ◆ **April 19, 1985 State Telegram.** State reported that on April 8, a friend of Davis reported to the Embassy that Blake and Davis had not returned from a hiking trip in the Huehuetenango and El Quiche area of Guatemala. They were expected to return on April 3 or 4, according to the friend. Government military units mounted a search of the area.
- ◆ **April 21, 1985 FBIS Report.** FBIS summarized a local newspaper story that Blake and Davis disappeared on April 3 while preparing to climb the Cuchumatanes Mountains, which served as a hideout for guerrilla groups fighting the Army. The two planned a meeting with the "Poor People's Guerrilla Army" (EGP).
- ◆ **April 25, 1985 FBIS Report.** FBIS summarized media comments on the disappearance of Blake and Davis. The Guatemalan President commented that the missing Americans could have been taken hostage by the guerrillas.

- ◆ **May 24, 1985 FBIS Report.** FBIS summarized an article that reflected that the whereabouts of Blake and Davis, who disappeared in a conflict zone, were still unknown.

- ◆ **June 3, 1985 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that [REDACTED] a security consultant hired by Davis's family, visited the Embassy on May 29 to review recent developments in the case. [REDACTED] said that on May 25, he received a phone call from a female caller who stated that Blake was well. Another source of [REDACTED] said that he had sources in Managua who assured him that Blake was with the EGP and would be released circa July 1.

- ◆ **February 21, 1986 State Telegram.** State reported that Mark Clark, who was with Blake and Davis prior to their trip to the highlands, did not believe that the EGP or the Guatemalan Army would kill two Americans because both groups had enough internal organization and discipline to ensure that their members would not murder foreigners. Clark believed that the local militia killed Blake and Davis and hid the bodies.

- ◆ **February 21, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on the issues likely to arise during President Cerezo's visit to the U.S. Cerezo was reminded that Senator Edward Kennedy and President Bush had expressed an interest in the investigation of the Blake/Davis case.

- ◆ **April 4, 1990 State Telegram.** State provided a history of the case: When it was learned on April 8, 1985 that Blake and Davis were missing, the Embassy requested Guatemalan Government assistance. Army patrols were alerted and the Guatemalan Army followed up with a week-long, 450-man search of the area. Embassy officers traveled to the area and air-dropped 4,500 leaflets into the area. In December 1985, Embassy officers returned to the area and interviewed former guerrillas who defected to the Government. In September 1987, an informant alleged that Blake and Davis were killed by members of the local civil patrol. The informant provided the names of seven men who participated in burying the bodies. In March 1990, the Guatemalan Minister of Defense agreed with the Embassy that all seven men should be interviewed. Embassy officers were present when three of the men were interviewed and denied knowledge of the fate of Blake and Davis. The military zone commander planned to interview the other four witnesses by mid April 1990.

- ◆ **April 29, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** Embassy officers traveled to Huehuetenango to be present during the questioning of a civil patrol member who was allegedly involved in the disappearance of Blake and Davis. He initially denied any knowledge of the case but later admitted that he had heard of the disappearance and discussed the matter with other civil patrol commanders.

- ◆ **May 9, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** An Embassy officer accompanied Blake family members to Huehuetenango, where they met the zone commander. The Embassy officer spoke to a civil patrol member who allegedly was involved in the

murders but denied any knowledge of the disappearance of Blake and Davis.

- ◆ **June 17, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Blake family members, accompanied by forensic anthropologists and others, recovered teeth and bones from a site. The Embassy commented that there was no doubt that Blake and Davis were murdered by the civil patrol, and not the guerrillas as was originally suspected. A brother of Blake's believed that they were killed on orders from the military zone commander, although there was no evidence to support his belief. The Blake brothers stated that the family would keep its promise not to seek indictment of the guilty parties.
- ◆ **June 23, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the remains of Blake were positively identified by a Smithsonian medical anthropologist.
- ◆ **August 4, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the remains of Davis and Blake were located in March and June, respectively. Blake's brother wrote a letter to the Ambassador and included new allegations that Guatemalan military officers may have ordered the execution of Blake and Davis. The Embassy requested that the Chief of the Guatemalan Army investigate the allegations.
- ◆ **August 14, 1992 DAO Report.** The DAO reported that Blake's brother alleged that Army Lt. Col. Terraza Pinot was in the same highland village in Huehuetenango as Blake and Davis on the day that the two were murdered by a civil patrol from that area. The Blake brother alleged

that the leadership of the military zone of Huehuetenango, including Lt. Col. Terraza Pinot, may have ordered the civil patrollers to carry out the killings and then participated in the cover-up.

- ◆ **October 27, 1993 State Telegram.** State summarized a complaint filed by Blake's brothers before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The complaint sought several remedies, including a declaration that the Guatemalan Government violated the American Convention on Human Rights when members of a civil patrol killed Blake and Davis, and that it had failed to investigate the killings and prosecute those responsible. The Blake family requested that the Embassy communicate to the Guatemalan Government the family's willingness to discuss settlement directly with the Guatemalan Government.

- ◆ **April 5, 1993 DAO Report.** The DAO reported that, during a social function, a DAO officer explained to the Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff that no civil defense patrol members had been arrested for the murders of Blake and Davis, and the Army was being accused of covering up the involvement of the civil defense patrol members in the case. The Chief of Staff agreed that the Army should try to make some progress in this investigation.

- ◆ **April 7, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on a meeting that Ambassador Marilyn McAfee had with the Minister of Defense, who offered little hope of any new action or breakthrough on the Blake/Davis case. The Blake family requested an indemnification of \$800,000 from the Guatemalan Government. The family's

sworn statements to the civil defense patrol members that no criminal charges would be pursued in return for locating the remains of Blake and Davis made it very difficult to pursue judicial proceedings against the patrol members.

- ◆ **May 11, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy summarized the results of a meeting that the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) had with the Chief of the Presidential Military Staff on human rights cases. The DCM said that those involved in the murder of Blake and Davis by the El Llano civil patrol of Huehuetenango should be punished.

Personnel Recollections

65. CIA personnel indicated they had no additional knowledge relating to the deaths of Blake and Davis.



THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION AND ABUSE OF SISTER DIANNA ORTIZ

66. Dianna Ortiz resided in Guatemala for two years while teaching indigenous children in Huehuetenango. On November 1, 1989, she traveled to Antigua to attend a religious retreat at the Posada Belen. According to Ortiz, while in the back yard of the Posada Belen on November 2, 1989, two men, one brandishing a hand grenade, kidnapped and forced her to accompany them by bus to Mixco. There they were met by two men in a police car. She was forced into the police car and driven to a building where she allegedly was tortured. She was then thrown into a pit with other torture victims, some already dead. During a subsequent torture episode, an individual by the name of Alejandro appeared on the scene and ordered that Ortiz be released because she was an American. While being transported to someone Alejandro said was a "friend of the American Embassy," she escaped from the vehicle, obtained money from a female passerby, and took a public bus to a travel agency. She then contacted the Maryknoll priests who came

for her. Ortiz visited the Papal Nuncio and departed Guatemala for the U.S. on November 4, 1989.

67. The Station and Embassy reported on the Ortiz case from November 1989 until May 1995. Despite much U.S. and Guatemalan Government interest over the years, the case remains unsolved. As early as November 1989, the Embassy reported that Ortiz's statements regarding the incident were inconsistent and contradictory. She was criticized for being uncooperative with Guatemalan authorities, and this hampered the investigation of her alleged kidnapping. In 1990, the Guatemalan Government concluded that the reported kidnapping of Ortiz was fabricated. At that time, the Embassy was not optimistic about a resolution of the case and determined that the case was inconclusive.

68. In 1991, Ortiz's attorney filed suit in the U.S. against former Minister of Defense General Hector Alejandro Gramajo Morales.


 The Guatemalan Government reopened the investigation in 1991 based on pressure from the U.S., but Ortiz continued to be uncooperative and unresponsive to questioning. Her visits to Guatemala in 1991 and 1992 to re-enact the kidnapping were unsuccessful because Ortiz provided little information to assist in the investigation. Her allegations about the kidnapping, rape and torture continued to be vague.

69. In 1992, a U.S. special investigator and a U.S. special prosecutor independently reached the conclusion that inconsistencies in Ortiz's statements made it impossible to determine who may have committed the acts against her. Both also indicated doubt regarding Ortiz's version of events. Ortiz returned to Guatemala again in 1993 and identified 10 police officers who resembled her captors. The Guatemalan Government pursued the leads in an investigation but was unable to make a positive identification of the abductors.

70. Ortiz visited Guatemala twice in 1994. However, the investigation did not progress because of a lack of new information. In 1995 a federal judge in Massachusetts decided in favor of Ortiz and others in their law suit against General Gramajo. The decision was based on the grounds that, as Minister of Defense at the time of the Ortiz kidnapping, he authorized the torture. \$47.5 million was awarded to Ortiz and eight Guatemalans residing in the U.S. who alleged human rights violations by the Guatemalans. As of May 1995, no payment had actually been made to any of the plaintiffs.

CIA Reporting

71. The Ortiz matter was handled primarily by the Embassy's American Citizen Services Section. CIA reporting on the case consisted of six Station Reports and four Intelligence Reports. With one exception, information originated by CIA refutes Ortiz's claim that she was kidnapped, raped and tortured by Guatemalan Government officials. The only report that substantiates Ortiz's claim is a draft cable, dated October 15, 1991, that was found in Station files.

72. **November 7, 1989 Station Report.** The COS met with the Minister of Defense on November 4, 1989. The Minister of Defense noted that the police had requested and been denied an interview with Ortiz. Therefore, a judicial order had been obtained so that Ortiz would be forced to speak to them. The Minister of Defense said that the U.S. could not have it both ways by complaining that the Guatemalan Government does not follow legal precepts and then, when it does, ask that it not do so. The COS agreed, but noted that the religious personnel involved in the case had better access to the U.S. press than did the Guatemalan Government. To pursue the matter in Guatemala would lead to even more unfavorable publicity. The Minister of Defense recommended that the COS speak to the Chief of Police, who agreed to let the matter pass.

73. **October 15, 1991 Draft Station Cable.** According to this draft Station cable, [REDACTED] reported that Ortiz had been in contact with [REDACTED]

leftist guerrillas and this led to her arrest. He said that Ortiz was in fact kidnapped as she claimed, probably by the S-2 office of Military Zone 302, with headquarters in Chimaltenango. [REDACTED] opined that Ortiz was probably not raped or otherwise mistreated as she claimed, since women were not usually sexually molested and her captors would have killed her had she been subjected to physical mistreatment. Women were sometimes drugged and then released, leaving them disoriented and unable to recall what happened to them. This may, according to [REDACTED] have been the case with Ortiz. Although [REDACTED] was unable to provide further details about Ortiz, he was clear in stating that she, in fact, was kidnapped.


74. This draft cable contained additional information about alleged human rights violations in Guatemala. There is no indication the cable was ever forwarded to Headquarters.

75. December 20, 1991 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Guatemalan President Serrano dismissed former Minister of Defense General Luis Enrique Mendoza Garcia due to Mendoza's continued blocking of the investigations of several human rights cases, including the assault on Ortiz. Serrano hoped that Mendoza's dismissal eventually would help alleviate international pressure on Guatemala regarding the military and human rights issues.

76. The Station sent the information to Headquarters on December 20, 1991 and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on December 21, 1991 to:

U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
NSA;
State, INR;
DIA;
Treasury;
White House Situation Room; and
USCINCSO.



77. April 9, 1992 Headquarters Cable. Headquarters requested that the Station provide an assessment of the Ortiz story and any information the Station may have regarding the incident.

78. April 10, 1992 Station Report. This report noted that the Station was not involved in Ortiz's current visit to Guatemala. Plans to reconstruct the alleged abduction, torture and rape were aborted because Ortiz became ill. She was scheduled to depart Guatemala on April 10. The Embassy individual with the most knowledge of the case was the political officer who handled the initial report of the incident and the Embassy follow-up. The case was being handled primarily by the Embassy's American Citizen Services Section. The Station report contained the political officer's summary of the case, and included information provided by [redacted] who were directly involved in the Guatemalan Government's investigation of the case.

79. [redacted]

[redacted] and an extensive investigation was undertaken to attempt to identify the police officers allegedly involved in the kidnapping. [redacted]

[redacted] no evidence was found to support the story told by Ortiz. Upon completion of the investigation, the investigators were convinced that Ortiz invented the story and that senior officials of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Guatemala collaborated in turning the alleged incident into a political cause.

80. [REDACTED]

81. The Station report commented that neither the Station nor the Embassy found Ortiz's story credible. There were too many contradictions of fact, refusals to cooperate with law enforcement investigators, and convenient fainting spells when direct questions were asked about events.

82. This Station report contained no reference to the information confirming Ortiz's story contained in the October 15, 1991 draft Station cable prepared by Station [REDACTED]

83. April [REDACTED] 1992 Station Report. [REDACTED]

claimed that, two days before Ortiz left her post in Huehuetenango in late October 1989, two guerrillas were captured near San Miguel Acatan. The two guerrillas had only one carbine and one round of ammunition between them. They were transported to the military zone in Huehuetenango and interrogated. They told military authorities that they had not eaten in three days and that they were waiting for Ortiz to bring them food and ammunition. No other information was provided in the Station report.

84. February 16, 1994 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] cast further doubt on Ortiz's story. [REDACTED] said the former site of the Guatemalan Military Academy could not possibly have been the location, as alleged by Ortiz, where she was

detained and physically and sexually assaulted by members of an unidentified Guatemalan Government security force.

85. [REDACTED] explained that the Guatemalan Military Academy was the location of the D-2 of the Guatemalan Armed Forces General Staff from 1982 until early 1985 when the D-2 moved out of the building and the site was turned over to the D-5 (Civil-Military Affairs) of the General Staff. [REDACTED] said that the D-2 had detention cells located in a converted laundry at the Academy, but that these detention cells were dismantled in early 1985 when the D-2 moved out of the building. Furthermore, [REDACTED] said that there had not been either an intelligence service or any facility for holding persons at the Academy since then.

86. [REDACTED] speculated that Ortiz may have been shown the site by persons interested in assisting her in fortifying her case against the Guatemalan Government and who would have known the site was formerly associated with government security forces. The Station sent this information to Headquarters on February 16 and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on February 17, 1994 to:

U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;

[REDACTED]

NSA

State, INR

DIA

Intelligence units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force;

Treasury Department;

White House Situation Room;

DOE; and

USCINCSO.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

87. November 8, 1994 Station Report. [REDACTED] opined [REDACTED] that Ortiz fabricated her story as part of a Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG)-directed effort to force an end to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] commented that a foreign journalist met [REDACTED] during one of Ortiz's post-1989 visits to Guatemala. [REDACTED] explained that the foreign journalist advised [REDACTED] that he learned from URNG sources that the Ortiz story had been fabricated by the URNG and that it was intended to force an end to [REDACTED] funding of Guatemalan security services. [REDACTED] said that he could not recall the name or nationality of the foreign journalist, or recall when or where the meeting between the journalist and [REDACTED] took place.


88. A Station comment noted that three separate events surrounding the Ortiz case made her story appear questionable. First, Ortiz claimed that the site where she was held and tortured in 1989 was the old Military Academy that the D-2 moved out of in 1985, reportedly completely dismantling the holding facility. Second, Ortiz submitted to the Guatemalan courts an affidavit from a U.S. medical doctor attesting that the doctor had seen the alleged scars from cigarette burns on Ortiz's back. However, Ortiz refused to permit a Guatemalan court-appointed doctor to verify the scars. Third, Ortiz claimed, that during her torture, a Caucasian North American male identified as "Alejandro" by her kidnappers visited the site and spoke with her. Ortiz claimed that this same male took custody of her and told her that he would drive her to see a "friend of the North American Embassy." According to the Station, this portion of Ortiz's statement appeared to be an attempt to force the conclusion that Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured by a Guatemalan security service with which [REDACTED] had a liaison [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] liaison officer must have been aware of her kidnapping and torture.

89. November 11, 1994 Intelligence Report. According to [REDACTED] in early November 1994, the Guatemalan military has never operated "clandestine prisons" to hold political prisoners as claimed by the URNG and its supporters. [REDACTED] said that captured guerrillas were held at military zone headquarters and at D-2 facilities, but that calling these "clandestine prisons" appeared to be an intentional exaggeration and misrepresentation on the part of the URNG. The holding cells located in the old Military Academy, where the D-2 was formerly housed, were used to hold persons while the D-2 debriefed them. The D-2 completely dismantled the cells when the D-2 relocated from that site.

90. A Station comment included in the Report stated that Ortiz's claim that she was held and tortured at the site of the old Military Academy was viewed as proof by the Guatemalans that Ortiz fabricated her claim to have been kidnapped and tortured. The Guatemalans believed she must have been told what to say by the URNG or its supporters.

91. This information was sent to Headquarters on November 11, 1994 and was disseminated [REDACTED] on November 11, 1994 to:

NSA;
State, INR;
DIA;
Intelligence units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force;
Treasury Department;
White House Situation Room; and
USCINCSO.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

92. December [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. Ambassador McAfee contacted COS [REDACTED] and said that she had received a call from a State Guatemalan desk officer who had been contacted by Ortiz. Ortiz inquired about an alleged "Media Management Course" sponsored [REDACTED] in Guatemala as reported in the "Central America Report." [REDACTED] told McAfee that this was probably the "Relations With The Media" course given [REDACTED] on November 14 and 15, 1994 as an extension of the Incident Management Seminar [REDACTED] was providing this special follow-up course at the request of Guatemalan [REDACTED]. The course provided training to a broad segment of Guatemalan officials within the context of Incident Management.

93. May [REDACTED] 1995 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

94. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Although there was no suggestion that Gramajo personally tortured Ortiz or the others, he was sued on the grounds that, as Minister of

Defense at the time, he had authorized the torture. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

95. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

96. **July 19, 1995 Station Report.** Based on a telephonic request from Headquarters, [REDACTED] conducted a search of Station files for draft cable traffic related to human rights cases that the Station may not have forwarded to Headquarters. According to [REDACTED] contained no cables that had not been forwarded to Headquarters.

Other Reporting

97. CIA records contained 83 reports dealing with Ortiz. These included FBIS reporting, Embassy telegrams and Defense Attaché Reports. They are summarized as follows:

- ◆ **November 3, 1989 FBIS Report.** According to the press, Guatemalan Archbishop Prospero Penados del Barrio reported the kidnapping of Dianna Ortiz, a 20 year old nun from Colorado. Ortiz was reported kidnapped on November 2, 1989 in Antigua, Guatemala, where she was attending a seminar with other nuns.
- ◆ **November 4, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** Ambassador Stroock reported Ortiz was taken to the home of the Papal Nuncio. Stroock visited the home and noted Ortiz had large bruises/scrapes on her left cheek. According to the Nuncio, she also had burns on her back. Stroock noted that Ortiz looked traumatized.
- ◆ **November 4, 1989 DIA Report.** A Defense Intelligence Summary reported that Archbishop Prospero Penados del Barrio announced the kidnapping of Dianna Ortiz on November 3, 1989.
- ◆ **November 6, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** Stroock reported he made another attempt to visit Ortiz on November 4 but was not allowed to see her.
- ◆ **November 6, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy suggested press guidance for the State Department based on available details regarding what happened to Ortiz. The guidance stated that Ortiz appeared to have been physically mistreated. However, she declined to provide details. Embassy officers attempted to meet with her on

four occasions to learn what had happened, but were unsuccessful.

- ◆ **November 7, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** Because of interest in a separate kidnapping in Mexico, the Guatemala City Embassy provided details to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico regarding Ortiz's kidnapping, release and departure from Guatemala.
- ◆ **November 8, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the story released by the Archbishop surrounding the alleged disappearance and subsequent reappearance of Ortiz contradicted in important ways the story initially told to the Ambassador and Embassy officers. The Embassy noted that Ortiz's refusal to speak to U.S. representatives, either in Guatemala or the U.S., and the insistence on maximum publicity by those around her, led the Embassy to question the motives and timing behind the story. Stroock urged a full investigation by appropriate U.S. law enforcement agencies.
- ◆ **November 8, 1989 FBIS Report.** According to the Guatemalan press, the Guatemalan Government denied the existence of the "secret jails" denounced by Ortiz. The press reported that Ortiz was kidnapped, raped, tortured, and held by three men for 24 hours.
- ◆ **November 16, 1989 FBIS Report.** According to the Guatemalan press, former Guatemalan Interior Minister Valle described Ortiz's account of her kidnapping as "surprising and incredible." Valle noted that, if state security forces were responsible for the crime, they would never have used a public bus to transport the nun from Antigua to Mixco, as

she claimed. He also criticized Ortiz's failure to provide Guatemalan authorities with information so that they could investigate the incident.

- ◆ **November 16, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on continued Guatemalan Government, church and local press reaction to Ortiz's kidnapping and torture story. On November 9, Guatemalan President Cerezo said he doubted Ortiz's story. On the same day, an Army captain in the Presidential Guard charged with investigating Ortiz's case said he was at a dead end. The Papal Nuncio told Stroock for the first time that Ortiz was visited and treated by a doctor before she left Guatemala.

- ◆ **November 20, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Mutual Support Group had linked the United States with the kidnapping of Ortiz. The link was based on Ortiz's testimony that one of her alleged kidnappers mentioned "a friend in the U.S. Embassy."

- ◆ **November 27, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy received a copy of the police investigation report of the alleged torture and kidnapping of Ortiz. The report, according to the Embassy, stated that all the bus drivers who drove on the Antigua-Mixco route were interviewed but none of them remembered any woman matching Ortiz's description boarding the bus.

- ◆ **December 1, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** Stroock met with two American Maryknoll priests to attempt to overcome religious community suspicion and antipathy toward the U.S. Embassy. Both priests recounted numerous past atrocities

against villagers and priests that they attributed to the Guatemalan Army. Neither priest accepted the general proposition that the human rights situation had improved under a civilian government.

- ◆ **December 19, 1989 State Telegram.** State Department issued its Central American update for November and noted that the Ortiz case had created a furor among religious and human rights groups in the U.S. It noted that the case may lead to renewed attempts in Congress to restrict assistance to Guatemala.
- ◆ **January 12, 1990 FBI Report.** The FBI reported to CIA, DoJ, State, Panama City, and two FBI field offices on the kidnapping of Ortiz. The FBI report provided no new information.
- ◆ **January 26, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the investigation of the alleged kidnapping of Ortiz was stalled in an Antigua court. The presiding judge had prepared letters requesting that the appropriate U.S. authorities take a sworn statement from Ortiz and require that she undergo a physical examination.
- ◆ **February 1, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that a Guatemalan dermatologist told Embassy officers that he had examined Ortiz on November 3, 1989 and treated her for minor facial lacerations and burns on her back. The dermatologist stated that there could have been as many as 100 lesions or burns on her back. He explained that there were no follow-up visits because Ortiz left Guatemala for the U.S. the next day.

- ◆ **February 3, 1990 State Telegram.** The State Department issued its final version of the 1989 Human Rights Report for Guatemala. The report mentioned that the alleged torture case of Dianna Ortiz was under investigation. It also noted that the Guatemalan Government opened an investigation into the case and requested additional information from Ortiz. However, Ortiz did not accede to the request and the perpetrators remained unidentified.

- ◆ **March 12, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Guatemalan Minister of Interior Carlos Morales Villatoro told reporters at a press conference that he believed the Ortiz incident was a "self-kidnapping." Morales criticized Ortiz and another recent kidnap victim for fleeing Guatemala without presenting their cases before the appropriate authorities. The Embassy commented that Morales expressed the conception held by many Guatemalans that Ortiz fabricated the entire incident.

- ◆ **March 15, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Guatemalan National Police provided a booklet to the Embassy entitled " Report on Investigations of Human Rights Related Cases in Guatemala: January 1989-February 1990." The Embassy commented that the booklet's discussion of the Ortiz case provided information already known, with the exception of the claim that a psychiatrist had asked Ortiz to go to the retreat in Antigua. This claim, according to the Embassy, was consistent with public statements by Morales that there were "certain aspects of Ortiz's life that he does not wish to make public."

- ◆ **March 15, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Minister of Interior Morales and the police concluded that the reported kidnapping of Ortiz was a fake. It also stated that one of the local newspapers carried a paid advertisement from the conference of religious persons of Guatemala that disputed Morales's statement that Ortiz did not tell the truth.

- ◆ **April 3, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Ortiz's attorney, Paul Soreff, told Stroock that he would write a letter to the public stating that neither he nor Ortiz accuses any employee of the U.S. Embassy of participating in her abduction and torture. The Embassy commented that it was not optimistic about a definitive resolution of Ortiz's case. Ortiz's physical and emotional states were said to be too fragile to allow her to be interviewed by anyone other than her closest colleagues.

- ◆ **April 6, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Ortiz's attorney Soreff told Minister Morales that he was outraged by statements that Ortiz was involved in a "self-kidnapping." Morales told Soreff that as far as he was concerned the investigation was over and that it was a "self-kidnapping." Morales stated that the burden was now on Ortiz to make her case.

- ◆ **April 30, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** According to the Embassy, Soreff told Stroock that Guatemalan President Cerezo agreed to appoint a Special Commission to examine the Ortiz case. Soreff and other members of a delegation visiting Guatemala to discuss the Ortiz case accused the Embassy of bias and of spreading misinformation about Ortiz.

- ◆ **May 31, 1990 State Telegram.** The State Department reported that Soreff met with State officials in Washington and requested that they press for the establishment of a Guatemalan Special Commission to investigate the Ortiz case. Soreff requested a letter be sent to President Cerezo indicating the U.S. considered resolution of the Ortiz case to be important.
- ◆ **June 14, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that President Cerezo told Stroock that he believed the Special Commission should investigate and resolve the Ortiz case.
- ◆ **September 27, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy's 1990 Country Human Rights Report stated that no progress was made in the Ortiz case. It reported that a police investigation and official statements cast doubt on Ortiz's claim that she was abducted and tortured by security forces. The Report noted that, despite many requests, Ortiz had not provided further information to Guatemalan or U.S. officials, and the case remained open with a lack of information hampering a serious investigation.
- ◆ **November 23, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that it opposed a representative of the State Department in Washington meeting with Ortiz. It stressed that such a meeting was a "lawyer's stunt" meant to blunt criticism of Ortiz's year long refusal to talk to FBI investigators.
- ◆ **December 6, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** Soreff told Stroock that he wanted the commission to look into the Ortiz case to be formed and operating as President Cerezo had promised. Soreff told Stroock that Cerezo refused to meet with him.

According to Ursuline head Sister, Francis Wilhem, Ortiz began to remember more details about her alleged kidnapping and torture. Ortiz, according to Wilhem, said that she now remembers that she was repeatedly raped, that rats were dropped on her, and that wine was poured on the cigarette burns on her back and dogs were brought in to lick the wine off. The Embassy commented that the Ortiz case is inconclusive and will remain so until she is willing to come forward and answer questions.

- ◆ **December 12, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** According to the Embassy, Sister Wilhelm issued a press release that stated that the Guatemalan military and police were responsible for the kidnapping and torture of Dianna Ortiz. As a result, they chose not to do a thorough investigation of this case, instead calling her disappearance a "self-kidnapping."
- ◆ **December 17, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the Ortiz case was being given extensive local publicity and was a subject in local electoral politics.
- ◆ **December 20, 1990 Press Report.** The local Guatemalan press reported that President Cerezo made a formal commitment to a group of U.S. legislators to allow Ortiz to take part in the investigation to ascertain who kidnapped and raped her.
- ◆ **February 13, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** A delegation representing Ortiz concluded its visit to Guatemala. The group issued a statement asking that a Guatemalan Presidential Commission meet before the end of February, or the Ortiz case would

be referred to international public opinion and the world press.

- ◆ **May 7, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy's April 1991 Human Rights Summary for Guatemala noted that Guatemalan President Serrano, despite earlier promises, announced he would not form a commission to investigate Ortiz's allegations.
- ◆ **June 21, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that it polled every U.S. and foreign service national employee at the mission and did not find anyone who matched the description of "Alejandro" that had been provided by Ortiz.
- ◆ **July 5, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued a standard reply letter to be used regarding the Ortiz case. The letter provided details on Ortiz and the Embassy's involvement in the case.
- ◆ **July 20, 1991 State Telegram.** State Department transmitted guidance on responding to Special Investigator [REDACTED] request to discuss the Ortiz case with Embassy officers. The Department requested that the Embassy contact Ortiz's attorney and ask [REDACTED] to submit his request in writing.
- ◆ **August 1, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that a religious legal delegation told Stroock that the Guatemalan Government was now serious about investigating Ortiz's case. Members of the delegation noted that Ortiz's suit against former Defense Minister General Gramajo was the result of Gramajo's continuing allegation that Ortiz's ordeal was the result of a lesbian affair gone bad.

- ◆ **August 6, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued its Human Rights Report for July 1991 stating that a recent delegation led by Soreff was pleased with President Serrano's decision to name a special investigator and prosecutor to examine Ortiz's case.
- ◆ **August 13, 1991 FBIS Report.** On July 21, the Guatemalan press reported that former Guatemalan President Cerezo said that he was aware of security forces involvement in the abduction and torture of Ortiz. However, the Embassy reported that when the Deputy Chief of Mission spoke with Cerezo, he denied that he ever said such a thing.
- ◆ **October 17, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Ortiz refused to meet with Special Investigator [REDACTED]-who was investigating Ortiz's case on behalf of the Guatemalan Government.
- ◆ **October 21, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported in its FY 1991 Human Rights Report that the Guatemalan Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor and an investigator to examine the Ortiz case.
- ◆ **November 22, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that retired General Gramajo called the suit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights a political maneuver and stated that "nobody believes the Ortiz story."
- ◆ **December 6, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Guatemalan Special Prosecutor Linares explained to Stroock that he would not travel to Kentucky to interview Ortiz because he felt uneasy about the

terms of the interview. He noted that he urged Deputy Ombudsman Morales de Sierra to go instead.

- ◆ **December 6, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy forwarded a copy of a memorandum from Deputy Ombudsman Morales de Sierra to Ombudsman De Leon describing Morales's attempt to interview Ortiz in Kentucky. Ortiz, according to the memorandum, was not cooperative and would not respond to questions.
- ◆ **December 31, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Unknown assailants fired several shots at the home of the Deputy Human Rights Ombudsman who was working on the Ortiz case.
- ◆ **January 3, 1992 State Telegram.** State's final version of the FY 1991 Human Rights Report for Guatemala mentioned the Ortiz case as one of a number of human rights cases that remained unsolved.
- ◆ **January 7, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon saw some improvement in Guatemala's overall human rights situation. De Leon stated he believed the Archbishop had gone beyond the evidence in his statements about Ortiz.
- ◆ **February 7, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** Stroock reported on plans for an Ortiz visit to Guatemala.
- ◆ **February 21, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on Ortiz's upcoming visit to Guatemala and her availability for an investigative interview. Special Prosecutor Linares called for a complete investigation into Ortiz's case and stated

that her judicial statements were essential to clarify inconsistencies in the facts.

- ◆ **March 24, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on Stroock's meeting with Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon. Stroock told De Leon that Ortiz planned to visit Guatemala April 5-9 and would stay at his residence.
- ◆ **April 10, 1992 FBIS Report.** FBIS relayed a transcript of Presidential Secretary General Orellana's statement on Ortiz's return to Guatemala.
- ◆ **April 15, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Ortiz's visit to Guatemala provided little, if any, new information to enable the Guatemalan Government to investigate her case and bring the perpetrators to justice. The Embassy indicated that Ortiz's advisor carefully controlled her time and she was not exposed to any risk of contradicting herself or providing additional testimony that might have cast doubt on her version of events concerning the kidnapping.
- ◆ **April 24, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** A Guatemalan official told Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Sullivan that Ortiz's allegations about the rape, torture, and kidnap were vague. He stated his belief that the case was being manipulated politically and would be very difficult to resolve.
- ◆ **April 30, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided a summary of Ortiz's visit to Guatemala and ██████████ investigation. ██████████ according to the Embassy, stated that inconsistencies in Ortiz's statements made it impossible to determine who may have committed acts against her. Both the

Special Prosecutor and Judge Secaira doubted Ortiz's version of events.

- ◆ **May 6, 1992 State Telegram.** The State Department authorized a limited waiver of diplomatic immunity to permit Stroock to provide answers to questions concerning the Ortiz case at a Guatemalan court hearing.
- ◆ **May 12, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided a list of questions from Judge Secaira that Stroock was to answer at the court hearing on the Ortiz case.
- ◆ **May 19, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission report described naming a special prosecutor in Ortiz case.
- ◆ **June 1, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported Stroock's responses to Judge Secairo's questions at the Ortiz hearing.
- ◆ **July 6, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Monsignor Flores told Stroock that he doubted Ortiz's story.
- ◆ **July 7, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** Stroock reported on a meeting with Ortiz's attorneys where he requested they provide a listing of actions they would like the Guatemalan Government to take in the case. Stroock stated he would continue to press for resolution of the case.
- ◆ **July 7, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on Stroock's testimony to the Guatemalan court on the alleged abduction and torture of Ortiz.

- ◆ **August 14, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Judge Secaira had been unexpectedly transferred.
- ◆ **September 23, 1992, Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy stated that Stroock requested that President Serrano respond to a July 31, 1992 letter from Attorney Shawn Roberts who was now representing Ortiz.
- ◆ **September 28, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon Carpio told the Deputy Chief of Mission that Ortiz's story was very confused and she was not cooperative in efforts to resolve the case.
- ◆ **November 18, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy transmitted its Human Rights Summary for September-October 1992. The summary stated that Judge Secaira resigned from the Ortiz case as a result of her transfer outside of the capital.
- ◆ **December 10, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported Ortiz's psychological health was improving and she planned to return to Guatemala.
- ◆ **March 9, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on Ortiz's plan to return to Guatemala to complete judicial procedures, and of the Embassy's plan to assist in the visit.
- ◆ **March 31, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported Ortiz's return to Guatemala on March 21 to complete judicial procedures. It also reported that she identified ten policemen who resembled her captors.

- ◆ **April 5, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** A Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) note to the Embassy requests names of U.S. personnel collaborating with Guatemalan Security Forces in October and November 1989.
- ◆ **April 28, 1993 State Telegram.** The State Department disagreed with the Embassy response to the MFA inquiry and stated that it was unclear what the MFA means by the word "collaborating."
- ◆ **May 6, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy proposed a different response to MFA and it was approved by the State Department.
- ◆ **October 27, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** Ambassador McAfee met with the Guatemalan Foreign Minister and provided him with a letter from the Senate Appropriations Committee that requested information and authorization to access military installations in connection with the Ortiz case.
- ◆ **October 28, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported McAfee met with Bishop Gerardi who stated that, because of intransigence by the armed forces, his office considered closing the Ortiz case. Gerardi believed Ortiz was being excessively manipulated by her advisers.
- ◆ **January 21, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** McAfee met with Bamaca's American spouse, Jennifer Harbury, Ortiz and members of the Blake family.
- ◆ **July 25, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that former National Police Director Cifuentes stated he surmised Ortiz was abused by soldiers. Cifuentes promised to review the Ortiz

case file and develop a strategy for continuing the investigation.

- ◆ **November 5, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported McAfee met with Ortiz and two other members of "Coalition Missing" to discuss the Harbury/Bamaca case.
- ◆ **November 8, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported Ortiz met with McAfee and expressed concern that officials in the Guatemalan Government had a vindictive attitude toward Harbury.
- ◆ **November 18, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Assistant Secretary John Shattuck and McAfee met with Prosecutor Ramses Cuestas. Cuestas stated the Ortiz case was stalled due to an inability to identify a suspect in the abduction. Cuestas said he hoped for a resolution of the case in four to five months.
- ◆ **December 29, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued its Human Rights Report for 1994. The report mentions that Ortiz returned to Guatemala in January and November to press authorities to take action on her case.
- ◆ **April 20, 1995 FBIS Cable.** An FBIS cable from Panama City provided a transcript of Gramajo's interview after the \$45.7 million judgment against him by a U.S. judge.
- ◆ **April 27, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported MINUGUA (the UN Human Rights Verification Commission) Director Leonardo Franco stated former Minister Gramajo requested intercession to obtain a public statement from the

Embassy that Ortiz was permitted to leave Guatemala as a result of former Ambassador Stroock's intervention.

- ◆ **May 6, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Gramajo stated he expected to run for President and expressed concern over the Ortiz lawsuit.

Personnel Recollections

98. Agency personnel who were knowledgeable of the Ortiz case recall the inconsistencies and contradictions in Ortiz's various testimonies about the incident. [REDACTED]

99. Former Station officers also doubted Ortiz's versions of the kidnapping. [REDACTED]

100. According to former Ambassador Stroock, Ortiz suffered some form of trauma. However, her story and the alleged connection to the Embassy did not withstand scrutiny.

THE STABBING OF MEREDITH LARSON

101. Meredith Larson is a Northern Virginia native who was stabbed by two men in Guatemala City on December 20, 1989 while walking to her residence. At the time of the attack, she was a member of the Peace Brigades International (PBI) and was accompanied by two other PBI members. All three individuals suffered non-lethal wounds and received medical attention.

CIA Reporting

102. Agency records do not contain any CIA-generated information relating to Larson or the stabbing incident.

Other Reporting

103. CIA records contained two reports dealing with Larson. These included two Embassy telegrams. They are summarized as follows:

- ◆ **December 21, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy indicated that the local PBI and Canadian Embassy reported the stabbing. Larson and two Canadian citizens were attacked by two knife wielding men in downtown Guatemala City. Larson was reported to have been hospitalized overnight and the Consul was to meet with her.
- ◆ **December 22, 1989 Embassy Telegram.** An Embassy telegram documented contact with Larson on December 21. Larson indicated she and two other PBI members were walking within one block of the group's residence when they were stabbed. The attackers did not speak nor attempt to rob the three. Larson fled to the PBI's residence and subsequently received medical attention for wounds to her left arm, breast and chest. The victims believed the attack was a deliberate

attempt to frighten PBI members. This incident was reported to have followed May 1989 death threats and an August 1989 grenade attack directed at their residence. The Embassy contacted the Director of the National Police to urge an immediate and thorough investigation.

Personnel Recollections

104. No CIA personnel had direct knowledge relating to Larson or the circumstances surrounding her stabbing.

THE ASSAULT UPON JOSH ZINNER

105. According to the press, Josh Zinner, a social worker and former resident of Washington, D.C., was working with homeless children in Guatemala City in 1990. He was assaulted by gunmen and dragged toward a waiting car. The Guatemalan police intervened, but released the assailants who were said to display military identification.

CIA Reporting

106. Agency records contain no information pertaining to Zinner.

Other Reporting

107. CIA records contained two reports dealing with Zinner. These included two Embassy telegrams. They are summarized as follows:

- ◆ **November 7, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** Guatemala Embassy summarized Ambassador McAfee's meeting with members of "Coalition Missing," an organization of U.S. citizens who identify themselves as affected by official and right-wing

violence in Guatemala. Zinner was present at the meeting. The visitors argued in favor of imposing trade sanctions against Guatemala in order to induce the Guatemalan Government to cooperate in the Bamaca investigation.

- ◆ **November 8, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** Guatemala Embassy summarized Ambassador McAfee's meeting with supporters, including Zinner, of Harbury's hunger strike. Zinner stated that the Government of Guatemala harassed Harbury by providing little advance notice of Bamaca's pending exhumation.

Personnel Recollections

108. No Agency personnel had direct knowledge of the Zinner case.

THE DEATH OF MYRNA MACK

109. Myrna Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist, was stabbed to death in Guatemala City on September, 11, 1990. At the time, she was working for a social and anthropological research institution researching issues that concerned displaced persons. Initial speculation was that her death resulted from a robbery. Myrna's sister, Helen Mack Chang, has alleged persistently that the murder was perpetrated by members of the Guatemalan Security Services. Helen Mack has regularly sought U.S. assistance in pursuing the perpetrators of the crime and also senior Guatemalan Security Officials whom she alleges were involved in the murder.

110. Noel De Jesus Beteta Alvarez, a former Army Sergeant assigned to the Presidential General Staff, was accused of carrying out the murder. Through the efforts of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, he was returned from California to stand trial. The subsequent legal proceedings relating to Beteta and numerous efforts

to hold other individuals accountable have been riddled with conflicting factual, political and personal divisions.

111. Beteta was initially believed to have had a hand injury so serious that he could not have stabbed Mack. Subsequently, the police officer involved in the Mack investigation was murdered and it was speculated that his death resulted from association with the Mack investigation. It was further rumored by political opponents that Chief of the Presidential Staff Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo was in some way involved in the police officer's murder. [REDACTED]

112. The U.S. Embassy has consistently applied pressure to the Guatemalan Government to ensure that justice is served and human rights respected. This diplomatic stance resulted in strained relations, especially between the Guatemalan military and the U.S. A number of military officials believe they were unfairly implicated in human rights abuses before investigations were initiated. Additionally, there were divisions within the military. For example, some D-2 officers believe they were being blamed for human rights violations committed by the Presidential Security Service. The Guatemalan Government, in attempts to improve its international reputation, responded by creating a Security Cabinet. The military even hired a Washington, D.C. consulting firm to help with its image problems.

113. Beteta was convicted of the Mack murder on February 12, 1993. The Guatemalan courts ruled that the investigation of the alleged involvement of others could continue. Although others have not been criminally tried, Helen Mack has filed civil actions against them.

CIA Reporting

114. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

115. July [REDACTED] 1991 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that there was a lack of solid evidence in the Mack murder case. [REDACTED] political pressure applied to the National Police to solve the murder resulted in an order to arrest a man who probably could not have committed the crime. The accused, Noel De Jesus Beteta Alvarez, was a member of the Guatemalan Army, Presidential Security Staff who was on medical leave for a serious hand injury when Mack was murdered. [REDACTED] indicated that Beteta was in no physical condition to commit the murder with a knife. Beteta had been discharged from the Army on October 2, 1990, and his whereabouts were unknown.

116. The Station sent this information to Headquarters on July [REDACTED] 1991, and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on the same day to:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

117. [REDACTED] the Station obtained information [REDACTED] that senior Police Officials believed the assassination of Jose Miguel Merida Escobar, a member of the Guatemalan National Police, resulted from his involvement with corrupt police officers and not his role in the Mack murder investigation. According to [REDACTED] Director of the D-2 Colonel Marco Antonio Gonzalez Taracena, Minister of Government Fernando Hurtado Prem, and Director of the National Police Colonel Mario Paiz Bolanos (Retired), spread a rumor that the Security Department of the Presidential Staff, controlled by Colonel Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo, was in some way involved in the Merida killing. [REDACTED] despite a fairly clear trail leading to the murderers of Merida, Ortega was the subject of the rumor in hopes of reducing his influence.

118. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

119. August [REDACTED] 1991 Station Report. [REDACTED] Station obtained information from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that there appeared to be a concerted effort to misdirect the Merida murder investigation. [REDACTED] talk within military circles indicated Merida was getting too close to identifying the Mack killers and his assassination appeared to have been officially sanctioned. [REDACTED]

120. August [REDACTED] 1991 Station Report. The Station reported information contained in an August 23, 1991 newspaper article. The article detailed a communiqué from an anonymous right wing military group accusing Colonel Gonzalez Taracena and the D-2 of participating in the Mack murder. The Station provided this information as a possible symptom of continued discontent within the military.

121. October 15, 1991 Draft Station Cable. This draft cable [REDACTED] reported that members of the D-2 assassinated the police officer who had been assigned to investigate a number of human rights cases, including the Mack case. According to the draft cable, [REDACTED] did not say that D-2 members killed Mack, but [REDACTED] said he believed from the nature of the killing and the attempts to shift the blame to the

Presidential Security Staff that D-2 members may well have killed her.

122. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

123. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

124. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

125.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

126.

[REDACTED]

127.

[REDACTED]

128.

[REDACTED]

129.



130.



131.



132.



[REDACTED]

133. October [REDACTED] 1992 Station Report. The Station forwarded to Headquarters information contained in the October 14, 1992 edition of the Guatemala daily newspaper Siglo Veintiuno. The newspaper reported that Helen Mack accused several Guatemalan Army officers of being involved in her sister's murder, giving false testimony, and covering-up after the fact. The Station indicated that Helen Mack accused all of the officers who were in the Presidential Security Staff's chain of command at the time of the murder.

[REDACTED]

134. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported information concerning the deteriorating state of relations between Guatemala and the U.S. [REDACTED] attributed the worsening of relations to the U.S. Government's active interest in cases of alleged human rights abuse on the part of the Guatemalan Army and security services. According to [REDACTED], some senior Army officers believed the U.S. was supporting efforts by Helen Mack to implicate Army officers in the Mack killing.

135. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also stated that senior Army officers were frequently angered by the perceived attitude of U.S. officials that Guatemalan officials were always guilty of alleged human rights abuses even before investigations had begun.

136. The Station forwarded the information to Headquarters [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It was disseminated [REDACTED]
October [REDACTED] 1992, to: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


137. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

138. November [REDACTED] 1992 Intelligence Report. The Station provided Headquarters with an appraisal of the situation in Guatemala and growing discontent within the Armed Forces. The

report reiterated earlier reporting concerning the belief by some senior Guatemalan military officers that the U.S. was supporting Helen Mack's efforts to implicate or identify Army officers in the Mack killing. These officers were frequently angered by the perceived attitude of U.S. officials that the Guatemalan forces were guilty of human rights abuses even before investigations had begun.

139. The Station provided this information to Headquarters [REDACTED] and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on November [REDACTED] 1992, [REDACTED]



140. December [REDACTED] 1992 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Guatemalan Government viewed the accusations by the Human Rights Ombudsman regarding the Mack case and involvement of the U.S. in another case, as a sign of things to come [REDACTED]

141. The Station sent the information to Headquarters [redacted] [redacted] and it was disseminated [redacted] on December [redacted] 1992, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

142. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the person responsible for the Mack murder was not connected to the [redacted] as was believed by the local press and Helen Mack. [redacted] that the responsible individual was extremely well protected by the Guatemalan Government. [redacted] expressed hesitation to engage in further discussions concerning this issue for fear of endangering himself.

143. [redacted]

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

144.

[REDACTED]

145.

[REDACTED]

146. February [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report. The Station sent information to Headquarters that indicated that a verdict on Beteta's guilt or innocence was expected soon.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] order to provide Mack trial witnesses with protection but none had been requested.

[REDACTED] was aware of a threatening letter that had been sent to witnesses and derided the credibility of the witnesses against Beteta, stating he was innocent. [REDACTED] speculated that the press play surrounding the threats against the witnesses only served to enhance their credibility in the Mack legal proceedings.

147. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] internal Army investigation Board looking into Helen Mack's accusations.

[REDACTED] suspected that Otto Barrios Longo was the probable source for Helen Mack's belief [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Barrios was reported to have an ax to grind with the security services due to his involvement with narcotics traffickers and commerce in stolen cars. Barrios was noted to be a principal government contact of Helen Mack's.

148. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

149. February [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Army intelligence officers believed the conviction of Beteta and his sentence of 30 years in prison was political in nature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] these officers remained hopeful that the conviction will be overturned. The officers also believed that the court was forced to convict Beteta because President Serrano was pressured by human rights organizations who were tools of the

URNG. The officers also believed that the URNG was behind Helen Mack's attempt to prosecute the individuals in Beteta's chain of command as well. The officers viewed this as an URNG tactic to attack the Army as an institution in the name of human rights.

150. [REDACTED]

151. [REDACTED]

152. April [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] accused by Helen Mack were confident the Guatemalan Supreme Court would deny any motion to reopen the investigation [REDACTED] in the murder of Mack. [REDACTED] expected Helen Mack to take the case outside Guatemala to the Organization of American States.

153. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

154. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] denied [REDACTED] any knowledge of or participation in any case of human rights violations, including the Mack and Urrutia cases. However, [REDACTED] fully expected that a Commission of the Past or a Truth Commission would investigate [REDACTED] military officers. [REDACTED] could not rule out [REDACTED] might be accused of being involved in various crimes that the URNG might try to attribute to [REDACTED] intelligence organizations.

155. **May 3, 1993 Station Report.** The Station advised Headquarters that Beteta's conviction was upheld by the Guatemalan Appeals Court on April 29, 1993. The Appeals Court denied a motion by the Mack family attorney to expand the case in order to investigate others who were allegedly involved. The Mack attorney planned to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court. The source of the information was the April 30, 1993 edition of the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico.

156. **May [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report.** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] noted there was a considerable amount of disinformation in Guatemala concerning human rights violations. According to [REDACTED] at the first sign of a potential human rights problem, [REDACTED] or the military are immediately held to blame. Therefore, the Station advised it would investigate all accusations involving [REDACTED] contacts to determine the veracity of the accusations prior to reporting details. If a good possibility existed that [REDACTED] contact was involved, the Station intended to seek guidance from Headquarters.

157. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

158. May [REDACTED] 1993 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] officers involved in the peace process cited the Mack murder as one of the more violent and politically costly actions undertaken by the Presidential Security Services and for which the D-2 had been blamed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

159. The Station sent the information to Headquarters [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] May [REDACTED] 1993, and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on the same date [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

160. July [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the daily Siglo Veintiuno, Editorialist Marta Altolaguirre referenced the Mack murder and she noted that, in criminal cases involving the military, the commanders as well as the soldiers had responsibility.

161. September [REDACTED] 1993 Station Report. In this report to Headquarters, the Station provided [REDACTED] information indicating that Beteta, the convicted killer of Mack, escaped from Pavoncito Prison on September 23, 1993. The escape occurred during a small uprising and he subsequently was recaptured along with 38 other prisoners.

162. February [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. A Station report to Headquarters noted that the Supreme Court resolved to leave open the legal proceeding against others allegedly involved in the Mack murder. This decision allowed prosecutors to investigate and try retired General Godoy, and Lieutenant Colonels (Lt. Col.) Juan Valencia Osorio and Juan Guillermo Oliva for their alleged connection to the killing. Valencia was the Commander of the First Battalion of the Military Ambulatory Police. Oliva was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Division of the D-2.

163. February [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station advised Headquarters of open source information published on February 11, indicating that the investigation of the Mack murder should continue. News articles reported that the Supreme Court took under consideration claims made by Helen Mack and convicted murderer Beteta that the Mack murder was ordered by officials of the Presidential General Staff. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

164. March [REDACTED] 1994 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
information was obtained that related to the divisions within the
Guatemalan Armed Forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

165. The information was forwarded to Headquarters [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and disseminated [REDACTED] on
March [REDACTED] 1994, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

166. April [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station advised Headquarters that Jorge Lemus, a Guatemalan journalist and convicted criminal who was in prison with Beteta, offered the Embassy information concerning the Mack case. Specifically, Lemus claimed that he had conducted and taped interviews with Beteta. He provided copies to the Embassy's Human Rights Officer, although

the legitimacy of the taped interviews was in question as they reflected Beteta claiming he received an order from Valencia to murder Mack. The Embassy doubted that Beteta would make such a claim on tape or trust Lemus.

167. Beteta also reportedly stated that [REDACTED] who was the Deputy Chief of the Department of Presidential Security at the time of Mack's murder and one of Beteta's supervisors, was not involved in the planning or carrying out of the murder. [REDACTED] depending on the legitimacy of the tapes, this could vindicate [REDACTED]. As Helen Mack did not appear to doubt the validity of the interviews, [REDACTED] hoped that she would drop [REDACTED] name from the list of others who were allegedly involved in her sister's death.

168. [REDACTED]

169. [REDACTED]

170. [REDACTED]

171. June [REDACTED] 1994 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Jorge Lemus, alias "El Buky," had in his possession a recent videotape of Beteta. In the videotape, Beteta purportedly stated that the murder of Mack was conducted on the orders of former National Defense Staff Chief Godoy and Colonel Valencia. [REDACTED] could not understand how Lemus could have such a videotape since [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Beteta advised [REDACTED] he wanted to deny publicly the allegations raised by Lemus.

172. [REDACTED] if the videotape really existed and Beteta would not deny Lemus's allegations, [REDACTED] would conclude that the U.S. Embassy paid Beteta to gain his cooperation. [REDACTED] Army attempts to locate Beteta's relatives had met with negative results [REDACTED] believed that they were taken to the U.S. under U.S. Embassy auspices. [REDACTED] the Embassy was using this refuge to persuade Beteta to turn against the military and provide false testimony.

173. [REDACTED] commented that Beteta had publicly denied Lemus's allegations that implicated military officers in the murder. [REDACTED] noted the growing military distrust of the U.S.

174. The Station sent the information to Headquarters on [REDACTED] and it was disseminated [REDACTED] on June [REDACTED] 1994, to:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

175. June [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station indicated that Beteta was transferred to a police hospital after a second suicide attempt. Following the first attempt, Beteta denied having tried to take his own life. In this second instance, police reportedly found Beteta trying to hang himself in his cell. He was returned to the Zone 18 Central Penitentiary the next day.

176. July [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station reported that Lemus played an audio tape for journalists in which Beteta admitted that he surveilled and later killed Mack. Beteta stated that he did this on orders from the former Presidential Security Service Commander, Valencia.

177. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


178. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]



179.



180.



[REDACTED]

181. December [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station reported that the Constitutional Court [REDACTED] ruled that General Godoy, Lt. Cols. Oliva and Juan Valencia and Specialists Juan Jose Larios, and Jose Del Cid Morales must stand trial for their alleged involvement in the Mack murder. All worked in military intelligence at the time of the murder.

182. December [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station advised that Chang had stated her intent to press charges against five more military officers whom she accused of being involved in her sister's death.

183. [REDACTED]

184. [REDACTED]

185. December [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. [REDACTED] provided information on recent developments in the Mack case. Specifically, the Supreme Court had confirmed the sentence given to Beteta and left open the legal proceeding against senior military officers. The Station noted that the thrust of current U.S. efforts in Guatemala was to pressure both the Army and Government officials to pursue pending human rights cases. Guatemalan officials were noted to have taken deliberate steps to effect reform in the human rights arena and end irregular practices

sanctioned in the past. The Station also indicated that human rights violations continued and the Army would, in all probability, never allow full disclosure for fear that this would be its demise. Headquarters was sent an information copy of the report.

186. [REDACTED]

187. [REDACTED]

188. February [REDACTED] 1995 Station Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] issues concerning

[REDACTED] the Mack murder. [REDACTED]

189. [REDACTED]

190. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

191.

[REDACTED]

192.

[REDACTED]

193.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

194.

[REDACTED]

195. July [REDACTED] 1995 Station Report. This report documented the results of the search by Station officer [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The search was prompted by a [REDACTED] Headquarters' request on the previous day. The search did not produce any new documents relating to the Mack case.

Other Reporting

196. Reports from the Department of State, FBIS and [REDACTED] in Agency files detail U.S. efforts to locate Beteta and return him to Guatemala for trial. They also address the legal proceedings relating to Beteta, the murder of Police Officer Merida, and the pursuit of other officers alleged to have been involved in the Mack murder. The most significant of the over 100 of these reports are summarized below:

- ◆ **September 19, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** Guatemalan Deputy Human Rights Ombudsman Alvarez told the Embassy that he believed the killing of Myrna Mack was almost certainly the result of a robbery and not political. He based his conclusion on the fact that the murderer stole credit cards and knifed his victim to death.
- ◆ **October 1, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy Human Rights Summary report mentioned that Myrna Mack was stabbed as a result of a robbery attempt.
- ◆ **November 9, 1990 Embassy Telegram.** Helen Mack told the Deputy Chief of Mission that her sister's investigations into displaced persons in the highlands brought her to the attention of local security forces. Helen Mack believed that it was likely that her sister was killed by someone close to or in the security forces because her sister's killers inflicted more than 30 stab wounds in vital places, indicating that the killers knew what they were doing. Helen Mack requested U.S. assistance in conveying her concerns about the murder to the President of Guatemala.
- ◆ **January 25, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that an Americas Watch letter

requested termination of a DoJ police training program due to the murders of Mack and the others. The Embassy noted police behavior in the Mack case indicated a need for more trained policemen, not fewer. It further stated that, although there was no evidence, there was a stated assumption, that a Guatemalan Government Agency had Mack under surveillance and committed her murder.

- ◆ **July 5, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** A Guatemalan judge issued a warrant--based on an investigation by Attorney General Valladares--for the arrest of Beteta. On July 4, Valladares declared that the investigation concluded Beteta was part of a conspiracy and his arrest and interrogation were essential to unravel the plot.
- ◆ **July 12, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy noted attempts to locate Beteta had been unsuccessful. However, Embassy files indicated he applied for a tourist visa on November 6--seven weeks after the murder. The visa application was refused under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The Embassy commented that, even though the visa was denied, Beteta could be in the U.S. It further commented that the information regarding the visa application would be passed to Valladares.
- ◆ **August 11, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Guatemalan Armed Forces issued a press communiqué indicating Beteta "is no longer enrolled in the Army." Local press reports indicated that Merida was murdered on August 5 because he had discovered that Beteta was one of Mack's murderers.

- ◆ **August 12, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon stated that he believed Army officers were acting "extra officially" and were behind some of the recent murders in the city, including the murder of Merida. De Leon, Valladares, and the Archbishop's office linked the Merida murder to Mack's murder. However, according to the Embassy, there was no evidence to support the linkage.

- ◆ **August 27, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The National police arrested Gonzalo Cifuentes Estrada, aka Antonio Guzman, and charged him with the August 9 murder of Merida. The National Police continued to search for the other men implicated in the murder. The Archbishop's office continued to argue that Merida was killed because of his work on the Mack case. The Embassy commented that the evidence indicated that Merida was not killed because of his role in the Mack murder.

- ◆ **September 5, 1991 [REDACTED] Report.** According to [REDACTED] the assassination of Merida was the responsibility of an individual who was seeking personal revenge against Merida. The Guatemalan Army was instrumental in helping resolve the case, according to [REDACTED]

- ◆ **October 11, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Key members of the Guatemalan Government's peace talks team asked the U.S. to reduce its criticism of Guatemala's human rights record. Team members explained that the murder of Merida was definitely not linked to Mack's case. The Embassy noted that team members could not provide evidence that any progress had been made in the

case other than the issuance of an arrest warrant for a suspect who could not yet be found.

- ◆ **October 16, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Ambassador Stroock met with Presidential Aide Neumann to discuss the President's Human Rights Advisory Commission. Neumann stated his hope that the Commission would start with the more notorious human rights violations cases--Mack, DeVine and the Santiago Atitlan massacre.
- ◆ **October 18, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy noted that not much had been done to find Beteta, and requested that the State Department in Washington contact INS and the Los Angeles Police Department to check on whether Beteta was in Los Angeles.
- ◆ **December 3, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Guatemalan press announced the arrest of Beteta on November 29, and the kidnapping of Helen Mack's uncle, Augusto Chang, the next day. The Mack family reportedly was concerned that the arrest and the kidnapping were linked. Mack family members told Embassy officers that the kidnapers contacted them and stated they would make a ransom demand. The Mack family attorney stated he believed that Beteta killed Myrna Mack. The attorney noted that there were two witnesses who were afraid to come forward.
- ◆ **December 4, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Ambassador Stroock expressed concern to President Serrano about the safety of the Mack family due to the arrest of Beteta and the kidnapping of Augusto Chang. According to the Embassy, the kidnapping of Chang was most likely not linked to Beteta's arrest because the

kidnappers could not have been aware of the arrest at the time of the kidnapping. On behalf of the Mack family, Stroock asked Serrano to do everything he could to bring about Chang's release and to ensure the safety of other family members.

- ◆ **December 5, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** INS returned Beteta from Los Angeles to Guatemala. Beteta was taken into custody but denied murdering Mack. Press reports indicated Chang was freed unharmed the same day. Helen Mack, however, reported that her uncle was still in the hands of kidnappers.
- ◆ **December 12, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Mack family members told Stroock that they believed they were under surveillance by unknown individuals and that they feared for their personal security. Although the Mack family stated publicly that common criminals were responsible for the kidnapping of Chang, Myrna Mack's father told Stroock that he feared the incident might be related to his daughter's murder investigation.
- ◆ **December 16, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** Representatives from human rights and labor groups met with Stroock. Daniel Saxon of the Archbishop's office stated that he believed the murder of Merida was politically motivated.
- ◆ **December 16, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Presidential Advisor Neumann planned to visit the State Department in Washington on January 13. The Embassy noted that, because he was the head of the Presidential Coordinating Committee for Human Rights, he should be met by officials at the appropriate level.

- ◆ **December 20, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** American Attorney Daniel Saxon, who represented the Mack family, believed that Mack's accused murderer would probably be tried and a verdict obtained in less than a year. He noted that there was very little evidence against Beteta and doubted he would be convicted.
- ◆ **December 31, 1991 Embassy Telegram.** A Guatemalan judge found sufficient evidence to continue criminal proceedings against Beteta for the murder of Mack. Also, the Guatemalan Interior Minister fired the head of the country's penal system, ostensibly for his failure to produce Beteta for a line-up in accordance with court orders.
- ◆ **February 26, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** A civilian judge transferred criminal proceedings against Beteta from a civilian to a military court. The Guatemalan Attorney General appealed the transfer order. The Embassy noted that the transfer could provide legal and political advantages to the Mack family.
- ◆ **March 20, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued a Guatemala Human Rights Summary for January and February that mentioned transfer of Beteta's case to a military court. It also mentioned the murder of Merida as occurring for personal and not political reasons.
- ◆ **May 14, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Mack murder case was transferred from military to civilian court. A new judge was assigned, the twelfth judge to preside over the case. The case was scheduled to go to trial in the near future.

- ◆ **June 24, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** According to the Director of the Guatemalan Archbishop's Human Rights office, proceedings against Mack's accused murderer were bogged down in discovery motions over the release of government documents.
- ◆ **September 25, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** Supreme Court President Rodil told the DCM that he believed there was evidence implicating Beteta in the death of Mack. Rodil stated that the current judge in Mack's case wanted to withdraw from the case because he considered his life in danger.
- ◆ **October 6, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Mack murder trial was underway. Two eyewitnesses identified Beteta as one of several persons surveilling Mack just prior to her death.
- ◆ **October 22, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** A letter from Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson to the Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington encouraged the Government of Guatemala to follow up on a recent court ruling on evidentiary issues in the Mack trial. Guatemalan President Serrano agreed to ensure that evidentiary issues were addressed.
- ◆ **October 23, 1992 [REDACTED] Report.** A [REDACTED] reported that the mid-level Guatemalan officer corps was disgruntled about the handling of the Mack case.
- ◆ **October 31, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** A new judge--Carmen Ellguter--was assigned to the Mack case. She was said to be making good faith efforts to obtain all relevant evidence. An eyewitness to the murder testified that he saw two men grab

Mack and throw her to the ground. Both assailants, he said, had knives. Mack, according to the eyewitness, was dead when the assailants departed the scene. The Embassy commented that the trial of Beteta should conclude in November with a verdict expected in late November.

- ◆ **November 18, 1992 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued a Human Rights Summary for September and October. It reported on the assignment of a new judge and the testimony of two witnesses who saw Beteta at the murder scene just prior to Mack's killing. Mack's attorneys hoped for an initial verdict in November.
- ◆ **December 7, 1992 State Telegram.** Bernardo Neumann told Aronson that he was personally committed to resolving the Mack murder case, adding that he had evidence against two active duty military officers. He said that he believed the Army had Mack killed because she was writing on the displaced in Guatemala.
- ◆ **January 20, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** As the trial court proceedings resumed, the judge agreed to investigate further Beteta's claim that he could not have murdered Mack because his hand was injured at the time. A doctor had testified in the case that the hand injury was not serious enough to prevent Beteta's stabbing Mack. The Judge expected a verdict on February 16 or 17.
- ◆ **January 29, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Guatemalan Congress approved the transfer of Judge Ellguter to a higher court, which meant that her role in the Mack case would probably end the first week of February. Helen Mack stated that the transfer was a favor by Rodil to President Cerezo.

Meanwhile, a doctor changed his testimony and stated that Beteta could not have killed Mack because he was unable to hold the knife used to stab her to death because of a hand injury.

- ◆ **February 4, 1993 FBIS Report.** The defense attorney filed a motion requesting the annulment of a deposition made by a key witness in the trial against Beteta.
- ◆ **February 9, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** Two eyewitnesses in the Mack case departed Guatemala for Canada. Within three days of their departure, the Canadian Consul in Guatemala was threatened and the Canadian Embassy was broken into. The two witnesses told the Canadian Consul that they had witnessed the murder of Mack by two men. They stated that they saw one man hold her down while the other one stabbed her.
- ◆ **February 13, 1993 FBIS Report.** The Guatemalan media reported on February 12 that Beteta had been found guilty of murdering Mack. He was also found guilty of critically injuring another individual.
- ◆ **February 16, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Mack murder trial closed with the conviction and sentencing of Beteta to 30 years in prison. The Embassy commented that the Beteta conviction was an extremely positive development.
- ◆ **March 8, 1993 State Telegram.** Assistant Secretary Aronson met with Helen Mack, discussed the status of her sister's murder case, and assured her that the U.S. would continue to push the Guatemalan Government to provide security to

her and others involved in seeking prosecution of human rights violations.

- ◆ **March 9, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** Former Rebel Armed Forces leader Danilo Rodriguez told an Embassy political officer that he believed Myrna Mack was killed because she was working with Padre Falla. Rodriguez explained that Falla was a priest who was affiliated with the Guerrilla Army of the Poor. He stated that at the time of Mack's death, both Mack and Falla were engaged in work involving displaced persons. He added that, at the time of Mack's death, the EGP controlled Mack's employer—Avansco.

- ◆ **March 10, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy Human Rights report for January and February mentioned the Mack trial and the conviction of Beteta. It also mentioned that unknown persons threatened key trial witnesses and the Director of Avansco.

- ◆ **March 23, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that a Guatemalan appellate court held a March 22 public hearing to review the trial verdict in the Myrna Mack murder and to consider whether further proceedings were appropriate against the superiors of the convicted murderers. Helen Mack called for confirmation of the February 12 murder conviction of Beteta and prosecution of his superiors for involvement in the crime. The Guatemalan Attorney General's office supported the trial verdict and further investigation of others.

- ◆ **May 1, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy recommended that the U.S. Government issue no statement regarding the prison sentence for Beteta

being upheld because it might imply support for the decision to dismiss charges against his superiors. The Embassy believed that a statement alone welcoming the Beteta conviction would imply U.S. support for the decision to dismiss charges against Beteta's supervisors.

- ◆ **October 14, 1993 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued its 1993 Country Human Rights Report for Guatemala mentioning that Beteta was sentenced to 30 years for the murder of Mack and the unrelated beating of a minor. The report noted that the conviction was being appealed and that Helen Mack was seeking prosecution of other military personnel. The report also stated that Helen Mack received death threats, and that Beteta escaped from jail but was recaptured shortly afterwards.
- ◆ **April 12, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** Helen Mack asked the U.S. to consider granting Beteta's family humanitarian parole as an inducement for Beteta to name his coconspirators in the death of Myrna Mack. Beteta revealed to Embassy officers that he was ordered to murder Mack by Colonel Juan Valencia.
- ◆ **July 19, 1994 [REDACTED] Report.** The [REDACTED] that Lt. Col. Oliva was reassigned from Chief of the Counterintelligence Division (D-2) to Chief of the Academic Department of the Escuela Politecnica. [REDACTED] commented that Oliva was linked to Mack's murder and was a career intelligence officer. However, [REDACTED] reported that it could not be determined if Oliva "fell from grace" or if the transfer was meant to be career enhancing.

- ◆ **July 20, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued a Human Rights Summary covering January-March 1994. The summary reported that little progress had been made in the investigation and prosecution of human rights cases except for the confirmation of the Supreme Court's sentence of Beteta. The report stated that former prisoner Lemus had made overtures to the Embassy that Beteta would reveal Mack's killer in exchange for U.S. assistance. Lemus provided tapes of conversations with Beteta. However, there was not enough evidence on which to base further convictions. The Embassy reported its disassociation from Lemus, and noted that Beteta attempted suicide on June 16 and 17.

- ◆ **October 25, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued a Human Rights Summary covering April-August and noted that there were two lawsuits concerning Mack before the Constitutional Court. The first lawsuit was an appeal of a Supreme Court decision that held there was sufficient evidence to keep open the investigation against others who were alleged to have been involved in the Mack killing. The second was an appeal by Helen Mack of a decision not to release government documents concerning her sister's murder.

- ◆ **December 9, 1994 [REDACTED] Report.** [REDACTED] reported that the Guatemalan Army nominated Lt. Col. Valencia as a representative to "Fuersas Unidas," then withdrew his name because of his alleged involvement in the murder of Mack. Two other officers said to be involved in the Mack murder were Godoy and Oliva who were in Beteta's chain of command.

- ◆ **December 29, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy issued its annual Human Rights Report noting some progress on the Mack case in February and December. In February, according to the Report, the Supreme Court confirmed the 25-year sentence given Beteta and left open legal proceedings against others alleged to have been involved in the crime. In December, the Report stated that the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Helen Mack that the case against the others could proceed, but had denied release of Government documents regarding Mack's death.

- ◆ **January 4, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Constitutional Court declined to review the Supreme Court's decision that allowed for a continuation of the case against others alleged to have been involved in the Mack murder. However, it reaffirmed the Supreme Court's ruling that Government documents regarding Mack's murder did not have to be turned over to Helen Mack. Mack stated that she planned to file another motion requesting file access and noted she was considering asking the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus to obtain U.S. Government files for her.

- ◆ **March 11, 1995 State Telegram.** State Department Press Guidance indicated that participation by Guatemalan military personnel in International Military Education and Training programs in the U.S. had been canceled for the remainder of 1995 due to concern over a lack of progress on various human rights cases, including the Mack case.

- ◆ **May 9, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** Peace Commission member Peter Lamport told Ambassador McAfee that he thought the

Guatemalan system was in a state of overload in regard to human rights issues. Lamport suggested the U.S. focus on areas where progress was possible by shifting from the Executive Branch and the Army to the judicial system.

- ◆ **June 14, 1995 [REDACTED] Report.** A [REDACTED] reported that it was general knowledge in the Army that Defense Minister Enriquez is financially supporting Colonel Garcia, Colonel Alpirez and former General Godoy. Reportedly, the Army was paying several hundred thousand quetzales in lawyer fees for Godoy and one hundred thousand quetzales a month for each of the lawyers representing the two colonels. [REDACTED] revealed that Godoy was implicated in the Mack case.
- ◆ **July 24, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The UN Human Rights Verification Commission report indicated that Helen Mack filed suit against others she alleged were responsible for her sister's murder due to a lack of progress by the Guatemalan Government.
- ◆ **July 26, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** Helen Mack told McAfee that there appeared to be no political will to solve her sister's murder. Mack noted that Ramses Cuestas had said that no special prosecutor would be named. She asked when U.S. documents relating to the case would be declassified. The Embassy commented that the Guatemalan Government decided to reopen Mack's case to examine the involvement of Oliva and Godoy.

Personnel Recollections

197. CIA personnel generally recall Station reporting regarding the Guatemalan who was accused and convicted of Myrna Mack's murder. They also recall Station reporting regarding Helen Mack's active pursuit of allegations that the military hierarchy was also involved in the murder.

198. 


199. 


[REDACTED]

200.

[REDACTED]

201.

[REDACTED]

202.

[REDACTED]

203.

[REDACTED]

204. [REDACTED]

THE DEATH OF PETER TISCIONE

205. A May 15, 1995, New York Times article indicated that Peter Tiscione was an archeologist from New York who was in Guatemala in August 1992 conducting research on Mayan pottery. He was found dead in a hotel room on August 23, 1992. The Guatemalan police investigation determined that Tiscione stabbed himself to death with a machete. Tiscione had a history of manic depression and was taking medication to control the illness. The article quoted Representative Robert G. Torricelli as questioning the police findings. A search of CIA records identified one related DO document.

CIA Reporting

206. July [REDACTED] 1995 Station Report. This report documented the results of a search by [REDACTED] of Guatemala City Station's [REDACTED] files [REDACTED]. The search was prompted by a [REDACTED] Headquarters' request on the previous day. The search did not produce any [REDACTED] documents relating to Tiscione.

Other Reporting

207. One FBIS media translation, one State telegram, and one Embassy telegram were located.

- ◆ **August 26, 1992 FBIS Report.** This FBIS document reflected Guatemala City Siglo Veintinuo's article on the death of Tiscione in the Panamerican Hotel. Tiscione was found in a bathtub on August 22 with four neck wounds inflicted with a machete. The discovery of his body was prompted by a telephone call to a hotel receptionist who checked his room, discovered the body and notified police. The police report indicated that the killers left the machete on Tiscione's chest and did not steal his jewelry.
- ◆ **May 15, 1995 State Telegram.** State sent a widely disseminated telegram to its embassies and consulates providing detailed press guidance relating to the Tiscione death as follows: Tiscione died on August 23, 1992. A Guatemalan autopsy report reflected death by a penetrating wound to the neck. Local police and Embassy personnel were notified of the death. Tiscione had spoken with an Embassy Duty Officer to request assistance in obtaining medications. He declined the Duty Officer's offer to help. The police investigation found no evidence that Tiscione was murdered. All windows in his hotel room were closed from the inside, the room's door was locked and chained from the inside, and the only fingerprints on the machete were his own. The Embassy reviewed the police report and had no reason to disagree with its conclusion.
- ◆ **May 16, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** An Embassy telegram to Washington and the U. S. Information

Agency reported on Guatemalan media reaction. The morning dailies La Republica and Prensa Libre reported that Congressman Torricelli was calling for an investigation into the death of Tiscione. In the business oriented daily Siglo Veintiuno, a columnist wrote that the Tiscione suicide was suspicious in light of the reported use of a machete to commit the act.

Personnel Recollections

208. CIA personnel had no direct knowledge relating to Tiscione or the circumstances surrounding his death. Ambassador Stroock, who served in Guatemala at the time of Tiscione's death, indicates a strong belief that this death was a suicide.

THE BEATING OF JUNE WEINSTOCK

209. June Weinstock was a 51-year-old environmental consultant from Fairbanks, Alaska who visited Guatemala in March 1994. While watching an Easter parade in San Cristobal, Weinstock touched the head of a child and was falsely accused of an attempted kidnapping. A mob of at least 1,000 surrounded the building where she took refuge and eventually broke into the building. Weinstock was stripped, stoned, stabbed repeatedly, and beaten unconscious by her assailants. She suffered permanent brain damage as a result of the beating. As of June 1994, she resided at a nursing home in Fairbanks and was unable to walk or talk.

CIA Reporting

210. A 1987 Station Report first explained the anti-American views of the URNG and described the long-standing belief that U. S. citizens kidnapped Guatemalan children to sell body parts for use in transplant operations in the U. S. This belief set the scene for the attack on Weinstock. Four Station Reports and one Intelligence Report, based on information obtained through the Embassy or

provided by [REDACTED] referred to the Weinstock beating. The reports described the events leading up to the attack and the implications of a U. S. travel advisory issued by State.

211. June [REDACTED] 1987 [REDACTED] Portions of a June 12 broadcast of the clandestine radio of the URNG [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The broadcast adopted an anti-American and anti-D-2 tone. The Ambassador was criticized for strengthening physical security in and around the Embassy. The broadcast accused U. S. citizens of kidnapping Guatemalan children for sale in the U. S., mutilating them and then using their organs for transplant operations to save the lives of critically ill children in the U. S. The broadcast attempted to legitimize the allegations by noting that an official protest was filed with Guatemalan police authorities regarding the kidnap, sale and mutilation of Guatemalan children by U.S. persons.

212. March [REDACTED] 1994 [REDACTED] that there was an ongoing and long-standing hysteria in Guatemala as a result of allegations that U. S. citizens were kidnapping Guatemalan babies in order to sell them or their organs in the U. S. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed that the attack on Weinstock was not the result of a Guatemalan police or military campaign directed against U. S. citizens. In the Weinstock incident, a crowd of Guatemalans accused her of attempting to kidnap a child. The local police force was unable to provide Weinstock protection from the crowd, and the military forces from Coban arrived too late to prevent the violence.

213. April [REDACTED] 1994 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] investigation of the Weinstock beating. The chain of events started when Weinstock touched the head of a child and was accused by the child's mother of an attempted kidnapping. A crowd gathered and began to strike Weinstock. She fled and sought help from uniformed members of the national police, who led her to the local magistrate's office. Various striking employees of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, Highways Department, who were armed with machetes and clubs, incited the

crowd that had gathered at the magistrate's office. The crowd eventually entered the office and beat Weinstock severely. Simultaneously, three individuals set fire to the building. Military reinforcements assisted national police in arresting 20 Guatemalans identified as mob leaders and participants in the riots and assault.

[REDACTED]

214. April [REDACTED] 1994 Intelligence Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], Guatemalan President DeLeon [REDACTED] expressed his disappointment with the handling of issues that had led the U. S. Government to issue a travel warning for Guatemala. He specifically referred to the Weinstock beating, press accounts of rumors indicating that foreigners were involved in kidnapping Guatemalan children, and the actual comportment of Guatemalan citizens.

[REDACTED]

215. This information was sent to Headquarters on April [REDACTED] 1994 and disseminated [REDACTED] on April [REDACTED] 1994 to:

- NSA;
- State, INR;
- DIA;
- Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps; and Air Force;
- Treasury Department;
- Department of Commerce;
- White House Situation Room;
- DOE; and USCINCSO.

[REDACTED]

216. April [REDACTED] 1994 Station Report. The Station provided an update on the Weinstock investigation. Guatemalan authorities arrested 40 people who participated in either the beating of Weinstock or in setting fire to the magistrate's office. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a Guatemalan news crew filmed the beating and authorities used the film to identify those who were arrested. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ambassador McAfee was concerned because Army troops did not arrive on the scene until 30 minutes after the attack on Weinstock. However, the Army troops were delayed while the military zone commander sought permission from civilian authorities to enter the zone as required by Guatemalan law.

217. [REDACTED] commented that the Ambassador and some members of the Country Team were suspicious that the Government's arrest of the 40 persons was a sham intended to frighten striking workers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

218. June [REDACTED] 1994 Headquarters Cable. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a segment of the June 3, 1994 television program 20/20 contained information about the Weinstock incident and the mass hysteria in Guatemala about U. S. citizens kidnapping Guatemalan children for body parts. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Reporting

219. Between March 30, 1994 and June 12, 1995, the CIA received reports from FBIS, the Guatemala Embassy, and the Guatemala DAO relating to the Weinstock incident.

- ◆ **March 30, 1994 FBIS Report.** FBIS summarized a local reporter's chronology of events leading to the beating. The reporter was the first on the scene to cover the events. Voluntary firefighters, the Departmental Red Cross, and the assistant human rights official tried to intervene, to no avail. A can of tear gas thrown by police infuriated the mob. Fire forced all of the occupants, except Weinstock, out of the building. The crowd broke into the room where Weinstock took refuge and beat her severely.
- ◆ **March 31, 1994 FBIS Report.** FBIS reported that the Guatemalan Government recognized the innocence of Weinstock and condemned the violent act. The Government appealed to the public, urging people not to be deceived by the propagation of groundless rumors aimed at creating an atmosphere of social unrest.
- ◆ **April 5, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Embassy officers traveled to Coban, Alta Verapaz, to investigate the assault on Weinstock. The Justice of the Peace who initially took Weinstock into custody was interviewed and said that Weinstock was secure in his office until strikers from Coban joined the mob outside of his office. The mob broke into his private quarters and beat Weinstock severely. The final attack was perpetrated by 15 to 30 persons.

- ◆ April 8, 1994 Embassy Telegram. The Embassy summarized the results of a meeting that Ambassador McAfee had with the new Minister of Government. The Minister stated that mob actions against Americans and anti-American graffiti that appeared on buildings in Guatemala City were instigated by leftist groups sympathetic to the URNG. He also said that he intended to implement a psychological campaign to educate the Guatemalan populace against false rumors of Americans kidnapping Guatemalan children and selling organs for transplant operations.
- ◆ April 11, 1994 [REDACTED] Report. [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The report indicated that the police attempted to calm an angry crowd of 700 people surrounding the building where Weinstock sought refuge. The police requested assistance and were joined by the Governor, a local human rights ombudsman, the Archbishop, and additional police officers. These individuals tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis with five leaders of the mob. A group of striking highway workers, armed with machetes, arrived on the scene and distributed rocks to the crowd. Michael Anthony Lewis, a U. S. citizen who was acting as an interpreter for Weinstock, attempted to escape from the building. Police officers rushed to offer assistance to Lewis, leaving Weinstock unguarded from the mob. The Army was called in for assistance but arrived after the assault. Under Guatemalan law, the Army cannot enter a civilian community to restore order until permission is received from the proper civilian authorities, and this delayed the arrival of the troops.

- ◆ **April 22, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that it continued to apply pressure to the Guatemalan Government to improve security for Americans and others in Guatemala. The Embassy requested that the Government extend its public information campaign to dispel the lingering rumors of child kidnapping by U.S. citizens. Ambassador McAfee met with Guatemalan officials and expressed the need for a full investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the Weinstock beating.

- ◆ **April 28, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy summarized an editorial in a Guatemalan news report that Weinstock and her translator, Michael Anthony Lewis, were victims because of a psychosis that resulted from the frequent disappearance of children in Guatemala.


- ◆ **April 28, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on the increased threat of violence and crime against Americans in Guatemala. The notion that foreigners kidnapped children to extract and sell their vital organs had circulated in Central America since at least the mid 1980's. The resurgence of the issue could be traced in part to Guillermo Carranza, who became the Deputy Attorney General for Children's Affairs in the Public Ministry in November 1993. He viewed the "baby parts" theme as a means to obtain publicity.

- ◆ **May 2, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided an update on the arrests and trials of Guatemalans charged in the Weinstock case. Fifty-seven Guatemalans were arrested and 23 more were being sought in connection with the Weinstock incident. The suspects were charged with attempted murder, infliction of grievous

bodily harm, aggravated assault, and contempt of authority.

- ◆ **May 3, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy summarized an editorial in a local newspaper. The editorial stated that the reason for the kidnappings might be that, in the U. S. , transplants were performed by murderers who call themselves doctors and who were involved in the trade of the organs of poor children destined for the children of the rich.

- ◆ **May 7, 1994 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported on progress of the Guatemalan Government criminal investigation and on an investigation by Embassy officers. Embassy officers concluded that there was no evidence of political manipulation of the crowd. The mob appeared to have been motivated by labor grievances, a belief of the "baby parts" story, the demand for vigilante justice, and drunkenness. Civil and military security authorities did not take adequate steps to control the situation. Embassy officers noted that a month after the incident, despite promises to take action, the Guatemalan Government and private groups had not undertaken any campaign to refute the "baby parts" rumor, and a repeat occurrence of such an incident could not be discounted.



February 6, 1995 Embassy Telegram. The Embassy reported on media reaction to the court decision on the Weinstock case. The court acquitted the individuals accused of the attack because of a lack of evidence.

- ◆ June 12, 1995 Embassy Telegram. The Embassy reported that a special prosecutor reviewed evidence in the case and had already identified some assailants from videotapes.

Personnel Recollections

220. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

221. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

222. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION AND BEATING OF DANIEL "SKY" CALLAHAN

223. Media reports indicate that Daniel Robert "Sky" Callahan was a Texas filmmaker who was working in Guatemala City on a documentary detailing civil rights violations. On July 7, 1995, he was forced into a car, beaten, and threatened with additional harm if he stayed in the country. Embassy reporting indicates he also had been hit with a baton by a soldier a few days earlier.

CIA Reporting

224. A search of Agency records produced [REDACTED] DO documents.

225. July [REDACTED] 1995 Headquarters Cable. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] Chief of Station was instructed to determine [REDACTED] regarding the Callahan case and the identities of the perpetrators. The Station was further instructed to raise these issues [REDACTED] and report information in intelligence format. Headquarters noted that the State Department and the Embassy were actively involved in this matter.

226. July [REDACTED] 1995 Station Report. The Station reported that the Ambassador had been unavailable for consultations [REDACTED]

[redacted] but that [redacted]
[redacted] had no information on the Callahan case.

[redacted]

[redacted]

227. [redacted]

[redacted]

228. [redacted]

[redacted]

229. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] received a telephone call from the RSO who stated that Callahan had reported he was robbed and beaten on July 7 but refused the RSO's offer to provide an escorted ride to the Embassy. He also refused refuge in the Embassy. [redacted]

[redacted]

230. [redacted]

[redacted]

231. 


Other Reporting

232. CIA records include reporting from FBIS, State and the Defense Attaché.

- ◆ **July 11, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy reported that Callahan called the Embassy Duty Officer on July 4 and reported he had been hit with a baton by a soldier on July 3. He declined assistance but wanted the incident to be recorded. On July 7, Callahan was attacked by two men who were driving in an unmarked car. He reported the incident to the Embassy on the following day as a robbery. Callahan subsequently stated the incident was not a robbery and advised of his intent to report it to the UN Human Rights Verification Commission. Callahan advised that the perpetrators told him to return to the U. S. On July 9, Callahan provided a sworn statement and referenced a connection between the incidents on July 3 and July 7. The Embassy contacted the D-2 and Presidential Human Rights Commission concerning this matter.

- ◆ **July 11, 1995 State Telegram.** State provided press guidance to various Embassies indicating the July 7th attack on Callahan was the result of his work as a filmmaker.
- ◆ **July 12, 1995 State Telegram.** State advised the Embassy of a protest that had been filed with the Guatemalan Ambassador to the U. S. on July 11. State expected a full investigation and the Guatemalan Ambassador agreed. Callahan was also contacted and advised of State's actions.
- ◆ **July 13, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy provided a summary of its contact with various Guatemalan officials. The Chief of the Presidential Military Staff indicated the possibility that Mobile Military Police may have been involved in the Callahan incident.
- ◆ **July 13, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy advised that the first incident involving Callahan was on July 4 and not July 3 as initially reported.
- ◆ **July 13, 1995 FBIS Report.** The FBIS text of a July 10 Guatemala television newscast indicated that the Human Rights Commission of Guatemala condemned the Callahan kidnapping and called it a physical and psychological attack. Callahan was identified as a member of a goodwill mission from Texas. He was warned by his kidnappers that his actions in Guatemala fostered an unstable political climate. The Commission demanded a thorough investigation by the authorities.
- ◆ **July 14, 1995 FBIS Report.** The FBIS text of a July 12 Guatemalan City Prensa Libre article detailed a communiqué by the Guatemalan Mutual

Support Group. The group condemned the Callahan attack in front of the National Palace, noting that it was the second incident against him. According to the Guatemalan Mutual Support Group, two individuals in a blue, four-door vehicle kidnapped Callahan on July 7. He was held for two hours and encouraged to leave the country. The communiqué emphasized that human rights violations could cause the suspension of peace talks.

- ◆ **July 18, 1995 State Telegram.** State provided press guidance to various Embassies detailing the assistance provided to Callahan in obtaining medical care and filing a complaint with the Public Prosecutor.
- ◆ **July 20, 1995 [REDACTED] Report.** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] denied that the incidents resulted from Army policy. Callahan was hit by a soldier while filming anti-Guatemalan Government protesters on July 4. On July 7, he was picked up, beaten, and warned by unknown assailants. [REDACTED] indicated the possibility that off duty Army elements, who operate outside of senior leadership, could have been involved.
- ◆ **July 20, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed Ambassador McAfee's meeting with Defense Minister General Mario Rene Enriquez. Enriquez indicated that great effort was being expended on this inquiry. The Ambassador and Defense Attaché advised they were impressed with the D-2 efforts.
- ◆ **July 27, 1995 Embassy Telegram.** The Embassy detailed developments. On July 7 and 13,

Callahan was interviewed by State investigators in Dallas. A sketch of the English speaking assailant was obtained and forwarded to the Embassy. The sketch and State report were provided to the Public Ministry, Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, Estado Mayor, and D-2. On July 7, the Embassy provided the name of the restaurant where Callahan ate before being abducted. The D-2 asked for additional information and Callahan was reinterviewed.

Personnel Recollections

233. 


IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT CIA EMPLOYEES OR ASSETS WERE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DEATHS, DISAPPEARANCE, OR ABUSE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS?

CIA Employees

234. No CIA employees have been alleged to have been involved as participants in the deaths, disappearance, or abuse of any of these individuals. No information was developed during the

course of this investigation that remotely suggested that any CIA employee was involved in the death, disappearance, or abuse of any of these individuals.

235. In Ortiz's case, her claim that the individual who rescued her from her torturers had an American accent remotely suggests a possible connection between her abduction and abuse and the Embassy or the Station. No information has been identified that would tend to substantiate Ortiz's speculation about the individual with a North American accent. Further, the suggestion that this unknown individual may have been affiliated with CIA is even more speculative and is not supported by any information that has been identified in CIA records.

[REDACTED]

236. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

237. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

238.



239.



240.



241.



[REDACTED]

WHAT ARE THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A DRAFT CABLE FROM GUATEMALA CITY STATION ENTITLED "STATION INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN GUATEMALA," DATED OCTOBER 15, 1991? WHAT INFORMATION DID IT CONTAIN THAT PERTAINED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS? WAS THE CABLE EVER TRANSMITTED TO HEADQUARTERS? WHAT DO AGENCY PERSONNEL INVOLVED RECALL ABOUT THE ISSUE?

242. An October 15, 1991 draft cable obtained from Guatemala City Station [REDACTED] contains information that tends to substantiate Dianna Ortiz's claim that she had been kidnapped. The cable consists of seven double-spaced typed pages. The document is addressed as an EYES ONLY immediate precedence cable to Chief, Latin America Division and is entitled "Station Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Guatemala." There are no references indicated in the space marked "REF." The last page of the document indicates that it was drafted by Station Officer [REDACTED] and is dated October 15, 1991. There was no indication it, or some of the specific information it contains regarding the Ortiz and Mack cases, was ever shared with Headquarters by the Station.

243. The stated purpose of the 1991 cable was to provide Headquarters with the content of certain recent revelations. The first paragraph of the cable indicates that, over the past year, the Station had been receiving increasingly disturbing reports of alleged human rights abuses involving the D-2, the Guatemalan Army and other components of the Guatemalan Security Services. The text indicates that the Station took each report seriously and that each report was generally insufficient from an evidentiary standpoint to merit intelligence dissemination, but the Station concluded that certain of the accusations may in fact be true. The text also states that many of the cases cited required further investigation and that such investigation was considered a top priority of the Station.

244 The draft cable contains a paragraph pertaining to Dianna Ortiz. That paragraph states:

Kidnapping of Dianna [Ortiz]: Dianna [Ortiz] is a U. S. citizen and Roman Catholic nun who claims to have been kidnapped and released more than a year ago by Guatemalan ... a story with suspicion because of the tactics commonly used by leftist propagandists in Guatemala (False kidnappings, etc. and the unconvincing content of her story. [redacted] told Station, however, that she was in fact kidnapped as she claimed, probably by the S-2 Office of Military Zone 302, with Headquarters in Chimaltenango, Chimaltenango Department (She was kidnapped in Antigua, Guatemala which is in MZ 302). Station must stress that [redacted] has simply said that he knows she was kidnapped, but has not provided any specific information surrounding the kidnapping. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this case, this is a crucial point. As Headquarters may be aware, the case has received extensive news coverage in the U. S., including a story on the 20/20 news show. In the opinion of [redacted] she was probably not raped or otherwise mistreated as she claimed, however. [redacted] said that women are not normally sexually molested and if there had been any physical mistreatment by her captors she would have been killed rather than released. [redacted] said that, according to what he knows of such affairs, women who are not released are usually stabbed and left at a public bus terminal so they will be found and the death reported as an ordinary criminal incident. Those released unharmed are sometimes drugged and then released. When they come to they are disoriented and often unable to give an account of what happened to them. This may well have been the case with Ortiz. [redacted] added that Ortiz was in contact with leftist guerrillas, which led to her arrest. We repeat, [redacted] was unable to give further details, but was clear in stating that Ortiz had been kidnapped.

245. The draft cable also contains a paragraph pertaining to Myrna Mack. That paragraph states:

Myrna (Mack) Chang: [redacted] reports that the [redacted] Service assassinated the police officer assigned to investigate a number of human rights cases, including the murder of Myrna (Mack) Chang, a member of the Guatemalan guerrilla political structure. Although [redacted] did not say that the [redacted] Service killed Mack, [redacted] said that he believes from the nature of the killing and the attempts to shift the blame to the [redacted] Service

(the prime "suspect", who cannot be located, is a former [REDACTED] member) that the [REDACTED] Service may well have killed her. To balance this, [REDACTED] reported that a criminal killed the police officer because of a corruption case the slain policeman was involved in. The [REDACTED] Service produced a tape which has a confession of the alleged killer, a petty criminal. [REDACTED] reports that the [REDACTED] Service induced a criminal to take the fall for the killing, with a promise of later release. This is possible, and it is possible that the accused criminal or others were asked to carry out the killings by the [REDACTED] Service. It is also possible that the [REDACTED] were not involved.

246. The draft cable also contains information [REDACTED] concerning Lt. Col. Julio Roberto Alpirez. [REDACTED] that information was subsequently included [REDACTED] in a October [REDACTED] 1991 sensitive Memorandum Dissemination [REDACTED] (The information concerning Alpirez is discussed in greater detail in Volume II of the CIA Inspector General's Report of Investigation regarding Agency activities in Guatemala.) The draft cable also contains information obtained [REDACTED] on the death of a Sandinista Military Intelligence Officer in Guatemala City, and the alleged killing of 15 criminals [REDACTED] in October 1991.

247. Extensive searches of the CIA records system failed to locate a copy of the draft cable at CIA Headquarters. [REDACTED] the Latin America Division Desk Officer [REDACTED] in 1991, has no recollection of the draft cable or its contents.

248. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

249. [REDACTED] remembers preparing the October 1991 draft cable, and vaguely recalls the information being sent to Washington in some form, albeit slightly different from the original draft. [REDACTED] says he prepared the draft cable in response to a request by COS [REDACTED] does not recognize the information pertaining to Ortiz or Mack, and cannot recall how he obtained that information to include in the draft cable. He is confident that he would recall if [REDACTED] had provided him with the information contained in the draft cable. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

250. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

251. [REDACTED] the Deputy Chief of Station in Guatemala City [REDACTED] has no recollection of the draft cable. He says that, after he read it, some of the information seemed familiar.

252. Former COS [REDACTED] says he did not instruct [REDACTED] to prepare the draft cable. He has no memory of seeing it before being shown the document recently, but refers to it as "vintage" [REDACTED]. He points out that the information regarding Ortiz was speculation on the part of [REDACTED] and as COS he would have been reluctant to add to the rumors that were flying around about Ortiz. He points out that CIA did not publish sensational unsubstantiated information such as most of the information contained in the draft cable.

253. The Headquarters file concerning [REDACTED] includes no information concerning Ortiz or Mack resembling that in the October 15, 1991 draft cable. Information concerning Mack, [REDACTED] in the October 1991 draft cable, is very similar to that [REDACTED] in an August [REDACTED] 1991 Station Report that is described in paragraph 119 of this Report.

254. Although [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] state that [REDACTED] information on Ortiz was not suitable for reporting because it was unsubstantiated or speculation, other reporting concerning Ortiz from [REDACTED] was shared with Headquarters that was equally unsubstantiated. For example, an April [REDACTED] 1992 Station Report indicates that [REDACTED] two captured guerrillas said that they had been waiting for Ortiz to bring them food and ammunition. This information appears to be wholly unsubstantiated, yet was sent to Headquarters and was not corroborated through other means.

255. [REDACTED] who authored the October 1991 draft cable, later contributed to an April 10, 1992 Station Report that was in response to a Headquarters request for an assessment of the Ortiz case and "any information that Station may have on the incident." Yet the [REDACTED] information that was included in the October 1991 draft cable supporting Ortiz's claim that she was kidnapped was not included in the April 10, 1992 Station Report. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it cannot be determined whether the [REDACTED] information that tended to support Ortiz was omitted from the April 1992 Station assessment of

her claims because it was forgotten or because it contradicted the prevailing Embassy and Station assessment of the case. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] it cannot even be determined which Station officer, if any, actually collected the information [REDACTED]

256. The October 1991 draft cable also contained information on the Mack murder that was not sent to Headquarters. Again, it cannot be determined who, if anyone, collected the information and why it was not acted upon. It is clear that Station officers did not follow up on the new Ortiz and Mack information.

WHAT WERE CIA'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION CONCERNING THESE MATTERS? WAS INFORMATION REGARDING THE FATE OF THE NINE U.S. CITIZENS AND MACK SHARED WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES?

257. While CIA is subject to general statutory obligations to provide information to the congressional intelligence oversight committees⁴, there is no specific statutory or policy requirement that the CIA provide intelligence information to Congress concerning human rights abuses involving American citizens or non-U. S. citizens such as Mack. However, as a matter of practice, the Agency does provide information to Congress if the circumstances appear to warrant notification or in response to specific inquiries. [REDACTED]

⁴ The scope and nature of those statutory obligations are discussed in detail in Volume I of the July 15, 1995 OIG Report concerning Agency activities in Guatemala.

258. There was no significant CIA reporting concerning Wolfe, Blake and Davis, Larson, Zinner, Tiscione, Weinstock, and Callahan. Therefore, CIA had no information on those cases to share with the oversight committees.

259. CIA reporting concerning the Ortiz kidnapping was sketchy or not generally relevant to the circumstances of her abduction, except for the October 15, 1991 draft cable that was not shared with Headquarters by the Station. Even if the contents had been forwarded to Headquarters, it is not clear that it would have been shared with the oversight committees without further corroboration. [REDACTED]

260. CIA reporting on Mack was not generally relevant to the circumstances of her death, [REDACTED]

CONCLUSIONS

261. No evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employees were involved, either directly or indirectly, in the deaths, disappearance, or abuse in Guatemala of the nine U.S. citizens discussed in this Report or Myrna Mack.

262. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] according to Guatemalan press reports, [REDACTED] was allegedly one of those responsible for Mack's death. In addition, [REDACTED] has been found liable by a U.S. District Court judge for human rights abuses in Guatemala by virtue of his position as Defense Minister in an uncontested civil suit brought by Ortiz and others.

263. Agency intelligence reporting on the cases in question appears to have been too sketchy to warrant reporting to Congress, although further inquiry could have added to its significance. The Agency acquired no direct evidence of CIA asset involvement in human rights abuses against the nine U.S. citizens that would have been reportable. [REDACTED]

264. Guatemala City Station's reporting on human rights issues was in fulfillment of its [REDACTED] requirements, but there appears to have been a lack of analysis and sustained effort to obtain further information concerning alleged human rights abuses [REDACTED]

265. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

266. There are indications that some positive steps were taken beginning in May 1993 to deal with human rights issues regarding Guatemala Station [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Also, at Headquarters' direction, and in light of attention focused on the Agency's handling of human rights issues, the Station was active in seeking information [REDACTED] and offering assistance to the Ambassador in the Daniel Callahan case in 1995 and the attack upon June Weinstock in 1994.

267. The October 15, 1991 draft cable that was not sent to Headquarters contains information that corroborated Ortiz's claim that she was kidnapped. This is significant in that it is the only information obtained [REDACTED] that supports Ortiz and contradicts previous and subsequent Station and Embassy assessments of Ortiz's claims. None of the Station personnel who were involved can explain where the information came from. The information should have been followed-up and also reported to Headquarters, as was other unsubstantiated information relating to the Ortiz case. The basis for the failure to follow-up and report this information to Headquarters cannot be determined because of the lack of personal recollection and documentary record.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] A. R. ~~Zin~~ ~~quegrana~~
[REDACTED]


RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Deputy Director for Operations should ensure that all allegations of human rights violations against [REDACTED] are thoroughly investigated and documented.

2. Although it is difficult to determine accountability with regard to the October 1991 draft cable, the information contained in it regarding the Myrna Mack and Dianna Ortiz cases should have been reported to Headquarters. The fact that it was not represents poor judgment on the part of Station management and personnel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was the Chief of Station (COS) and as such bears ultimate responsibility for everything that occurred at the Station during his tenure there. Agency management should consider whether COS [REDACTED] performance in this regard was consistent with the level of performance expected of a COS.

CONCUR:



Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector General

9/15/95

Date