



1948

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CIAC/CPAS... NID 89-265JX...




Director of Central Intelligence

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Wednesday, 15 November 1989




CPAS NID 89-265JX

15 November 1989

1950

~~TOP SECRET~~
[Redacted]



El Salvador: Implications of the Rebel Offensive

15

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~
[Redacted]

15 November 1989

1975

~~Top Secret~~
[Redacted]

Implications of El Salvador's State of Siege

The state of siege decreed by President Cristiani Sunday is permitted under Article 29 of the Salvadoran Constitution "in the event of serious disturbances in the public order" and must be renewed every 30 days to remain in effect. Former President Duarte had instituted a state of siege that he ultimately allowed to lapse in 1987 under pressure from civil rights groups and some foreign governments. Civil liberties that could be affected include:

- Freedom of travel to, from, and within El Salvador.
- Freedom of expression.
- Freedom of peaceful assembly.

In addition, intercepted correspondence—including captured insurgent documents—can now be used as legal evidence.

Finally, the state of siege permits government authorities to detain suspected terrorists for 15 days, rather than the limit of 72 hours under Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution.

[Redacted]

~~Top Secret~~
[Redacted]

15 November 1989

1976

[REDACTED]

Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR: Implications of the Rebel Offensive

The FMLN offensive, although anticipated by the Salvadoran military, has involved broader operations and greater numbers than expected. Still, the insurgents have not been able to destroy military targets, and they evidently misjudged their ability to marshal popular support. The government controls most of the capital and has thus far thwarted rebel attacks elsewhere; it faces the difficult task of dislodging guerrillas from fortified sites in densely populated urban areas. [REDACTED]

The rebel attacks that began Saturday have been conducted throughout the country, although San Salvador has been the primary target. Insurgent leaders calculated that urban attacks would generate significant domestic and international publicity for the FMLN. [REDACTED] the guerrillas have also occupied sections of Santa Ana and San Miguel and have attacked military bases in northern and eastern El Salvador. The magnitude and number of guerrillas involved in this week's attacks suggest this probably was the FMLN's long-planned, all-out "final" offensive to unseat the government. As recently as yesterday, senior guerrilla commander Joaquin Villalobos publicly implored all Salvadorans to rise in rebellion. [REDACTED]

Although pockets of resistance remain in San Salvador's northern and eastern suburbs, the Army appears to control most of the city; there has been no attack on a military target in the capital since Sunday. [REDACTED] rebels have entrenched themselves in some of the capital's poorer neighborhoods, including areas near the military airfield, forcing civilians to dig trenches and abandon their homes. There are unconfirmed reports, however, that some insurgents have changed into civilian clothes, abandoned their weapons, and fled from the city. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] morale in the military is high because of the large number of insurgent casualties and the quantity of captured materiel. [REDACTED] the National Police cleared one neighborhood of rebels Monday afternoon, and press reports indicate the Army conducted a probing operation into a second rebel stronghold yesterday. [REDACTED]

Implications for the Government and the Military

Although the armed forces expected a guerrilla offensive last weekend, it appears to have been caught offguard by its magnitude. Some 2,000 guerrillas—about one-third of the FMLN's total

continued

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[REDACTED]
15 November 1989

1977

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[REDACTED]

strength—may have been involved in the attacks in San Salvador. Although no military base has been overrun, the Army may be criticized for its inability to prevent such a large offensive. [REDACTED]

The situation appears to be under control, but events over the next few days might create problems for the Cristiani government. Eliminating the remaining rebel strongholds, for example, might take days and expose the military to charges of excessive force. El Salvador's armed forces are neither trained nor equipped for house-to-house combat, and the Air Force is of limited use in densely populated areas. [REDACTED]

Implications for the Rebels

The rebels succeeded in launching a well-planned, coordinated offensive on a large scale but probably lost more than they gained. Some 300 guerrillas were killed and 136 wounded in the attacks, and the FMLN is expending and losing large quantities of munitions. As they did after their failed election-day offensive in March, the insurgents probably will spend the next several months regrouping. [REDACTED]

The failure of the offensive to spark a popular uprising is also a blow to the FMLN. The insurgents' image had already been tarnished by recent attacks against nonmilitary targets, particularly the assassinations of government officials and their families. [REDACTED]

The guerrillas probably had hoped their offensive would force concessions from the government in future negotiations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
15 November 1989