

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**SECRET**

[REDACTED] 16 [REDACTED] JAN 86

CIA [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] CIA [REDACTED]  
TO: NPIC, DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,  
DEPT OF COMMERCE,  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF,  
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS,  
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COMSEVENTHFLT,  
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EZ1:

EZ2:  
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DIST: 16 JANUARY 1986  
COUNTRY: VIETNAM/CHINA/CAMBODIA/USSR  
SUBJ: VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND GOALS REGARDING  
FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
DOI: NOVEMBER 1985

TEXT: 1. IN NOVEMBER 1985 IN VIETNAM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TOLD A [REDACTED] COMMUNIST PARTY  
MEMBER ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY AND GOALS  
REGARDING VARIOUS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE  
COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. [REDACTED] ONE OF THE PRIMARY  
OBJECTIVES OF VIETNAMESE FOREIGN POLICY IS TO INTEREST AMERICAN  
BUSINESSMEN AND POLITICIANS IN STATE AND PRIVATE ECONOMIC  
INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN THE COUNTRY. [REDACTED] HOWEVER,  
THE ONLY ISSUE CAPABLE OF ATTRACTING AMERICAN INTEREST IN VIETNAM  
IS THE QUESTION OF THE REMAINS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS STILL  
LISTED AS MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) DURING THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE POLITICAL  
IMPORTANCE OF THE MIA ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.), AND  
WILL ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE INCREASING FLEXIBILITY ON THE MIA  
ISSUE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE AN ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S.  
[REDACTED] VIETNAM WILL EXTEND MORE OFFICIAL INVITATIONS  
TO REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, POLITICAL AND CIVIC GROUPS  
TO TOUR VIETNAM AND DISCUSS WAYS TO LOCATE THE REMAINS OF MIAS.  
[REDACTED] PRESENCE OF U.S. DELEGATIONS IN VIETNAM WILL  
PERMIT AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE TO BECOME BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH

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[REDACTED]  
ONE ANOTHER, THEREBY CREATING OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS OTHER SUBJECTS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, NOTABLY FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND THE FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM.

2. [REDACTED] A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEPENDS ON IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., BUT [REDACTED] THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS AWARE THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROMOTE A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, AND ALSO BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA. [REDACTED] ONE WAY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT COULD ENCOURAGE A DECREASE IN TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE TO OFFER THE POSSIBILITY, OVER TIME, OF PRIVATE ECONOMIC INVESTMENT PROJECTS. [REDACTED] COMMENT:

[REDACTED]  
THAT THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN VIETNAM HAS DETERIORATED SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, AS HAS THE LEVEL OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. [REDACTED] THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION HAS ALSO GROWN CONSIDERABLY, DOUBLING SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, DESPITE LOSSES INCURRED DURING ITS WAR WITH THE U.S.)

3. [REDACTED] THAT CHINA REMAINS THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENT IN REALIZING VIETNAM'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY, EXPLAINING THAT CHINA VIEWS VIETNAMESE AMBITIONS FOR INDOCHINA AS COMPETITIVE WITH THEIR OWN GOALS OF DOMINATING THE REGION'S DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION. [REDACTED] THE CURRENT WAR IN CAMBODIA AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PRO-CHINESE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) RESISTANCE FORCE, LED BY ((KHIE)) SAMPHAN AND ((POL)) POT, AS BASICALLY A CHINESE-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. [REDACTED] CHINA'S SUPPORT OF THE DK IS AN ACT OF "SABOTAGE" AGAINST VIETNAM'S OVERALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS FOR INDOCHINA. [REDACTED] THE WAR DOES INDEED REPRESENT AN EFFECTIVE AND CONSTANT DRAIN ON VIETNAMESE RESOURCES, PREVENTING VIETNAM FROM EFFECTIVELY PURSUING ITS GOALS FOR THE INDOCHINESE REGION. [REDACTED] COMMENT: VIETNAM IS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT LED BY ((SON)) SANN, AND THE SIHANOUK NATIONAL ARMY, WHICH IS [REDACTED] LOYAL TO PRINCE NORODOM ((SIHANOUK)). [REDACTED] THESE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS AS OPPORTUNISTS BASICALLY UNCONTROLLED BY THE CHINESE. [REDACTED] VIETNAM COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GROUPS TO STOP THE WAR IMMEDIATELY, IF THEY WERE NOT ALLIED WITH THE DK.)

4. [REDACTED] THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOAL REMAINS THE CREATION OF AN INDOCHINESE FEDERATION OF STATES, INITIALLY INCLUDING LAOS AND CAMBODIA ALL UNDER VIETNAMESE CONTROL. [REDACTED] THIS FEDERATION WOULD DEVISE A REGIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACH TO BUILDING AN ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPING AGRICULTURE. EVENTUALLY, [REDACTED] THIS INDOCHINESE FEDERATION WOULD ASPIRE TO BUILD UP ITS LIGHT INDUSTRIAL EXPORTING CAPACITY TO COMPETE WITH SOUTH KOREA. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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