

18a

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

DATE 1225Z 13 SEP 63

~~TOP SECRET~~

1	A
2	B
3	G

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION:



INFO:



~~IMMEDIATE~~

IMMEDIATE

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs (C)

TOR 1718Z 13 SEP 63

IN 91103

IMMEDIATE ADIC

SAIG 0890



*McCone*

*Sheldon*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: OCT 2001

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EYES ONLY FROM [REDACTED]

IN REPLY TO DIR 67656

1. IN DETAILED REVIEW OF KEY PROBLEMS TODAY WITH JOSEPH BRENT, DIRECTOR USOM, HE CONCURRED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONCLUSIONS A, B, C, D, AND SET FORTH TO YOU IN SAIG 0793 AND READILY AGREED THAT I INFORM YOU THAT HIS VIEWS COINCIDE WITH MINE. HE IS AWARE THAT CERTAIN MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF, INCLUDING PHILLIPS, EXPRESSING QUITE CONTRARY OPINIONS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. MILITARY WITH WHOM HE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES GENERALLY SHARED THESE SAME VIEWS. HE PARTICULARLY REFERRED TO GEN. STILWELL, J-3, MACV, IN WHOSE JUDGEMENT HE EXPRESSED HIGH CONFIDENCE. I HAD EARLIER IN A SESSION WITH STILWELL FELT THAT WE WERE PRETTY MUCH ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH.


2. JOSEPH BRENT ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL HIS VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLE MANIPULATION OF AID AS A SANCTION OR LEVER AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. IN AMPLIFICATION OF SAIGON EMBASSY CABLE 483, 11 SEPT, DRAFTED BY BRENT AND APPROVED BY LODGE WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A PLEA TO STOP LOOK AND

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MANDATORY REVIEW

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LISTEN, BRENT SAID HE COULD THINK OF NO ACTION OPEN TO THE U. S. IN THIS FIELD (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MOTION PICTURE CENTER) WHICH WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THIS COUNTRY'S CLOSELY BALANCED ECONOMY OR THE WAR EFFORT (CUTTING OFF AID TO COL. TUNG UNILATERALLY WOULD ALSO HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON U. S. SPECIAL FORCES PROGRAM). BRENT SAID THAT 70 PERCENT OF THE PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF THE ARVN WERE COVERED BY PIASTERS GENERATED BY THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, SALES OF PL 480 ITEMS WERE ALSO A SOURCE OF PIASTERS (ABOUT 25 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR), 90 PERCENT OF WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY. HE ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 200 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF IMPORTS WERE NEEDED ANNUALLY TO KEEP THIS COUNTRY'S ECONOMY GOING OF WHICH THE U. S. PROVIDED ABOUT 95 MILLION AND HE STRESSED THAT WERE THE CIP TO BE CUT DOWN IT WOULD REDUCE BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND OF COURSE REDUCE THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR PROSECUTING WAR. FURTHER AID DATA IS IN PARA. 5.

3. IN CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH GEN. TIMMES, CHIEF MAAG, WHO HAS LONG EXPERIENCE HERE, IS CONSTANTLY VISITING FIELD INSTALLATIONS, AND IN INTIMATE CONTACT WITH HIS FIELD ADVISORS, HE EXPRESSED FIRM OPINION THAT FROM ARVN DIVISION LEVEL DOWN WHERE MILITARY ACTION IS CARRIED OUT, THERE IS AS YET NO DISCERNIBLE LESSENING OF TROOP DISCIPLINE OR MORALE OR THE WILL TO PROSECUTE THE WAR EFFORT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS EVIDENT TO HIM THAT THE SENIOR OFFICERS AT CORPS LEVEL AND ABOVE, PARTICULARLY THE GENERAL OFFICERS, HAVE LATELY BEEN ABSORBED IN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RESULTING IN LESS ATTENTION TO OVERALL PLANNING AND COORDINATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF A PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR SOME TIME LOOKING TOWARD BEEFING UP THE KEY IV CORPS AREA AT THE EXPENSE OF UP TO A DIVISION FROM THE II CORPS AREA HAS BEEN HANGING FIRE. THE MOVEMENT OF THIS NUMBER OF TROOPS WITHIN THE COUNTRY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD, OF COURSE, REQUIRE CAREFUL CALCULATIONS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INSURE THAT NO ONE TROOP COMMANDER ACQUIRED AN OVERWHELMING FORCE.

4. [REDACTED]

IN RE-

SPONSE TO THE FINAL PORTION OF YOUR PARA TWO, DIR 67656, SUBSTANCE OF PORTION OF TODAY'S DISCUSSION WITH DCM TRUEHEART FOLLOWS:

A. HE IS UNALTERABLY CONVINCED THAT WAR CANNOT BE WON UNDER PRESENT GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP; TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND ACTION TO OUST THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT LONG BE DELAYED; HE NOW REALIZES THAT CUTTING OFF AID GENERALLY WOULD PROVOKE UNPREDICTABLE AND PROBABLY UNCONTROLLED SITUATION HERE WHICH MIGHT ALSO NOT PRODUCE THE MILITARY TYPE COUP D'ETAT WHICH HE FIRMLY BELIEVES IS STILL NECESSARY.

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B. HE SAID THE AMBASSADOR IS CONSIDERING CHARGING MACV WITH MAKING APPROACH TO SVN MILITARY, HE MENTIONED GEN. DON, TO ATTEMPT STIMULATE EARLY COUP ACTION WITH APPROPRIATE U.S. ASSURANCES. I INQUIRED HAD AMBASSADOR MADE SUCH PROPOSAL TO WASHINGTON AND WAS TOLD THIS WAS WITHIN LODGE'S AUTHORITY.

C. I THEN ASKED WHETHER APPRAISAL HAD BEEN MADE OF CONSEQUENCES SUCH APPROACH TO SVN MILITARY INCLUDING POSSIBILITY THAT IT WOULD SIMPLY BE REFERRED TO DIEM/NHU OR ALTERNATIVELY HASTILY MOUNTED WITH RESULTING FAILURE. I GOT THE REPLY THAT IN THAT EVENT U. S. MIGHT BE FACED WITH BEING INVITED OUT OF SVN.

5. FOLLOWING IS IN FURTHER SUPPORT OUR POSITION; PARAGRAPHING KEYED TO THAT OF SAIG 0793.

A. AS RESULT OF FAILURE OF EFFORT BY US TO STIMULATE COUP IN EARLY AFTERMATH OF IMPOSITION MARTIAL LAW, WE ARE AT PRESENT IN NO POSITION TO PROCEED IN CONSCIOUS AND ORGANIZED MANNER TO FOSTER OVERTHROW OF DIEM REGIME BY COUP D'ETAT. IN RETROSPECT IT IS PROBABLE THAT GENERALS' APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO MOUNT COUP WHEN FIRST APPROACHED WAS BASED ON HOPE RATHER THAN REALITY AND THAT EVEN HAD ABSOLUTE SECURITY BEEN MAINTAINED GENERALS WOULD NOT HAVE MADE ATTEMPT AGAINST REGIME SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY LACKED CAPABILITY TO DO SO. IN ANY EVENT, COLLAPSE OF EFFORT, WITH ATTENDANT REVELATION OF AT LEAST SOME OF ITS ASPECTS TO NHU, HAS LEFT US IN MUCH WEAKER POSITION THAN BEFORE TO ATTEMPT NEW EFFORT. IN INTERIM, NHU, ALERTED TO WHAT HE MAY SUSPECT IS OUR CONTINUING INTENTION TO SEEK EARLY OVERTHROW OF REGIME, HAS HAD FURTHER TIME TO

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CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION, TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS IN DISPOSAL AND BALANCE OF FORCES IN SAIGON, AND TO WEAKEN FURTHER SUCH RESOLVE AS GENERALS MAY HAVE HAD FOR ACTION. BASIC PROBLEM OF GENERALS HAS BEEN LACK OF DIRECT COMMAND OF TROOPS; ONLY GENERAL PARTICIPATING IN MARTIAL LAW EXERCISE WHO DISPOSES OF TROOPS WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO BEAR IS GEN. GON THAT DINH, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SAIGON. HOWEVER, DINH HAS FROM BEGINNING APPEARED TO SUPPORT NHU, AND EVEN IF OTHER GENERALS THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY ON DINH'S WELL-KNOWN OPPORTUNISM, THEY WOULD BE FEARFUL OF APPROACHING HIM BECAUSE OF STRONG POSSIBILITY HIS HQS PENETRATED BY NHU'S AGENTS. LOYALTY TO DINH OF FIFTH DIVISION, BASED AT BIEN HOA, ADMITTEDLY OPEN TO SOME QUESTION,

BUT

[REDACTED] WE ARE IN POOR POSITION TO PROBE DIVISION COMMANDER'S INTENTIONS. SAME ALSO APPLIES TO COMMANDERS OF SPECIALIZED UNITS SUCH AS AIRBORNE BRIGADE, MARINES AND ARMORED BRIGADE. SOME OF THESE COMMANDS, OR POSSIBLY CONSTITUENT UNITS THEREOF, MAY WELL BE DISPOSED TO PULL A COUP, BUT AT THIS TIME WE KNOW TOO LITTLE ABOUT WHERE THEY WOULD LINE UP AT MOMENT OF DECISION TO BASE NEW COUP PLANS ON THEM WITH ANY GREAT CONFIDENCE. CERTAINLY THE GENERALS' SEEMING INABILITY TO LINE UP THEIR SUPPORT IN LAST WEEK OF AUGUST INDICATES THAT THESE UNITS WERE NOT WILLING TO LEND THEMSELVES TO GENERALS PURPOSES WHATEVER PLANS SPECIALIZED UNIT COMMANDERS MAY HAVE FOR THEIR OWN POWER ENHANCEMENT. IN SUM, BELIEVE THE U.S. NOW LACKS THE MEANS TO STAGE ANOTHER COUP ATTEMPT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES OF

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CONTROL SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE SUCCESS OR TO ASSURE THAT THE OUTCOME OF ANY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE TO OUR BENEFIT.

PROponents OF COMPLETE CESSATION OF AID TO DIEM REGIME APPARENTLY BASE PROPOSAL ON PREMISE THAT THIS CLEAR-CUT EXPRESSION OF U.S. INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES WOULD PROVIDE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CATALYST FOR EARLY OVERTHROW OF GOVT. WHILE THIS SOLUTION, BECAUSE OF ITS SIMPLICITY, HAS ITS ATTRACTIONS, BELIEVE WE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH AT THIS POINT TO HAZARD COMPLETE BREAK WITH DIEM/NHU, WITH ALL THE ATTENDANT RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A STEP, ON BASIS UNCERTAIN EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD TRIGGER EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THAT THE MILITARY MIGHT SO REACT, BUT IT IS EQUALLY OR PERHAPS MORE LIKELY THAT THE CONTROLS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES WHICH NHU HAS BUILT INTO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND WHICH EFFECTIVELY IMPEDED GENERALS FROM TAKING ACTION, WOULD ALSO SERVE HIM SUFFICIENTLY WELL UNDER CONDITIONS OF CESSATION OF AMERICAN AID TO PERMIT REGIME TO CONTINUE IN POWER, AT LEAST FOR A FEW MONTHS.

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B. LACK OF ANY REALISTIC OPTION OF OVERTHROWING REGIME AT THIS TIME NARROWS OUR AREA OF CHOICE TO EXERTION OF PRESSURES INTENDED ACHIEVE REFORMS WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF DIEM/NHU REGIME. EVEN IN THIS MORE LIMITED ENDEAVOR OUR SOURCES OF LEVERAGE ARE UNFORTUNATELY RATHER LIMITED. DIEM AND NHU APPEAR WILLING TO RESIST PRESSURES OF WORLD OPINION, AS IS EVIDENCED BY THEIR DECISION TO CRACK DOWN ON BUDDHISTS EVEN THROUGH THEY KNEW THE INTERNATIONAL FURORE THIS ACTION WOULD GENERATE. THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF CUT-OFF OF U.S. AID WAS CONSIDERED IN THEIR CALCULATIONS PRIOR TO 20 AUGUST IS SUGGESTED BY NHU'S NUMEROUS ADMONITIONS TO LESSER GVN OFFICIALS THAT SVN MUST LEARN TO DO WITHOUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND BY FACT THAT MAJOR ITEM ON AGENDA FOR SUMMER SESSION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL WAS ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENTS OF U.S.-FINANCED COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM IN EFFORT DETERMINE WHICH ITEMS COULD BE DISPENSED WITH, WHICH WERE ESSENTIAL, ETC. TACTIC OF SELECTIVE AID CUTS, WHILE PERHAPS OFFERING SOME POSSIBILITIES, POSES EXTREMELY COMPLEX PROBLEMS AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY AND EXHAUSTIVELY STUDIED PRIOR TO ITS UTILIZATION. TO CITE A FEW OF THE PITFALLS, ACCORDING TO USOM DIRECTOR JOSEPH BRENT, IF WE ATTEMPT TO CUT BACK ON THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM, WE WOULD REDUCE PIASTER AVAILABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF OVERALL GVN BUDGET ENCOMPASSING AMONG OTHER THINGS VITAL COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS. PHYSICAL LACK OF GOODS AFFECTED BY CUT WOULD ALSO CREATE MATERIAL SHORTAGES IMPORTANT TO SVN ECONOMY WHICH WOULD LEAD TO INFLATIONARY SPIRAL, CAUSING PERHAPS SERIOUS LOCAL SOCIO/ECON DISLOCATIONS, AND

MAKE OUR REENTRY INTO POSTURE OF FULL SUPPORT FOR DIEM OR SUCCESSOR REGIME MUCH MORE COSTLY IN YEAR WHEN WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH CONGRESSIONAL CUT IN FOREIGN AID FUNDS. REDUCTION IN MAP SUPPORT WOULD OF COURSE HAVE DIRECT EFFECT ON ABILITY OF SVN TO PURSUE MILITARY ASPECTS OF STRUGGLE AGAINST VIET CONG. ONE TARGET BEING MENTIONED FOR AN AID CUT IS COL. TUNG'S SPECIAL FORCES. THIS WOULD HAVE ADMITTEDLY SALUTARY IMPACT ON BOTH LOCAL AND FOREIGN OPINION, BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NO EFFECT ON THOSE PORTIONS OF TUNG'S OPERATION RELATED TO HIS ROLE AS DEFENDER OF REGIME AGAINST ITS POLITICAL ENEMIES. NHU WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FUND THIS ASPECT OF TUNG'S WORK FROM OTHER SOURCES. WHAT WOULD BE AFFECTED WOULD BE SUCH IMPORTANT FACETS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM AS CIDG, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CROSSING PROGRAMS. ANOTHER PRICE WE MIGHT HAVE TO PAY IS POSSIBLE EXPULSION OF U. S. SPECIAL FORCES A, B, AND C DETACHMENTS FROM COUNTRY AT TIME WHEN ENTIRE EFFORT BEGINNING MAKE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON WAR AGAINST VC. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE INDUCE NHU TO OFFER UP CHANNEL OTHER THAN TUNG FOR FINANCING THESE IMPORTANT PROGRAMS, BUT SHORT OF PLACING PROGRAMS UNDER CONTROL OF REGULAR VIETNAMESE MILITARY, WHICH IS PROBABLY NOT ATTAINABLE AND MAY NOT BE INTRINSICALLY DESIRABLE, WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT, WHATEVER MANAGEMENT SPECIAL FORCE CAME UNDER, THEY WOULD NOT BE USED IN SAME MANNER AS PROP FOR REGIME AGAINST OPPONENTS. THERE ARE PROBABLY CERTAIN FRILLS IN OUR AID PROGRAM WHICH COULD BE CUT, BUT THESE FALL MAINLY IN DIRECT AID CATEGORY WHICH COMPRISES SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PROGRAM AND WHICH ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECTIVES NOT VITAL TO REGIME. REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS IN THIS CATEGORY WOULD MERELY BE OF NUISANCE VALUE AND VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES



WOULD BE ULTIMATE LOSERS.

WE SHOULD ALSO BE REALISTIC AS TO WHAT WE CAN ATTAIN IN TERMS OF REFORM WITH LEVERAGE AVAILABLE TO US. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE IN PAST BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING DIEM/NHU ACCEPTANCE OF WIDE VARIETY OF JOINT COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES, WE HAVE BEEN CONSPICUOUSLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN A LONG SERIES OF ATTEMPTS TO GET DIEM TO LIBERALIZE HIS REGIME, MODERATE HIS METHODS OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL, AND IMPROVE FACE REGIME PRESENTS TO WORLD. DIEM'S IMMOVABILITY ON INTERNAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS PRODUCT OF PERSONALITY WHICH EXTREMELY STUBBORN, WHICH VIEWS PROBLEMS IN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TERMS THAN THOSE PRESSING REFORMS ON HIM, WHICH MORE OR LESS CLOSED TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCES AND WHICH CONSIDERS ANY CONCESSIONS AS SIGN OF WEAKNESS WHOSE ONLY RESULT WILL BE TO ENCOURAGE DEMANDS FOR FURTHER YIELDING ON HIS PART. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IN EFFORT TO RESTORE U.S. CONFIDENCE IN HIM, DIEM WILL AGREE TO MINOR PALLIATIVES, BUT THEY WILL DO LITTLE TO IMPROVE STATUS OF REGIME WITH VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF POPULATION. ABOVE ALL, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT DIEM WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAWAL OF NHU FROM SCENE; HE IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT NHU IS INDISPENSABLE TO HIM, BOTH AS DRIVING FORCE BEHIND STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM AND AS POLITICAL MANIPULATOR WHO KEEPS HIS REGIME TOGETHER, HOWEVER DISTASTEFUL TO US AND DELETERIOUS TO FUNCTIONARY MORALE NHU'S TACTICS MAY BE.

C. LIMITS OF TOLERANCE BETWEEN WHICH WE CAN SAFELY OPERATE IN COMING WEEKS OR MONTHS ARE PROBABLY NARROW. FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, BOTH TO CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES AND TO OFFER THOSE SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE POPULATION MOST STRONGLY AFFECTED BY RECENT OPPRESSIVE MEASURES SOME GROUND FOR HOPE, U.S. MUST MAKE SOME EFFORT TO EXERT PRESSURE ON REGIME; HOWEVER, UNTIL WE ARE CONFIDENT WE HAVE VIABLE

ALTERNATIVE WAITING IN WINGS, WE MUST KEEP THOSE PRESSURES BELOW THRESHOLD OF INTENSITY WHICH WOULD CAUSE OPPOSITION TO REACH PREMATURE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE READY TO INVITE A CHANGE IN REGIMES. SITUATION MAY ERUPT SPONTANEOUSLY IRRESPECTIVE OF OUR ACTIONS AND FORCE U.S. HAND BEFORE IT IN POSITION TO CHANNEL DEVELOPMENTS IN DESIRABLE DIRECTION. WE SHOULD AVOID, HOWEVER, ENCOURAGING SUCH AN EXPLOSION OURSELVES AND SHOULD PRESS ON DIEM REGIME, TO EXTENT OF OUR LEVERAGE, MEASURES CALCULATED TO DAMPEN DOWN THESE TENSIONS.

D. OVERALL COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT, AS DISTINCT FROM JUST ITS PURELY MILITARY ASPECTS, HAS ALMOST CERTAINLY SUFFERED FROM RECENT CRISIS, BUT WITH LUCK IT MAY REGAIN SOME OF ITS MOMENTUM EVEN UNDER PRESENT REGIME. TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, IT ESSENTIAL TO KEEP DIALOGUE WITH DIEM REGIME ON QUESTION OF REFORMS BELOW LEVEL OF POLITICAL EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD PARALYZE GVN/U.S. WORKING PARTNERSHIP IN PROVINCES. AS [REDACTED] NOTED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES TO HQS, WE MAY BE IN BETTER POSITION TO MEASURE NET IMPACT OF RECENT EVENTS ON VIABILITY OF REGIME IN TERMS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM IN WEEKS TO COME.

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ONE DANGER IN "BUSINESS AS USUAL" APPROACH WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IS THAT IN MAKING DECISION TO TAKE NO DRASTIC ACTION TO RETRIEVE SITUATION AT THIS TIME, THERE MAY BE TENDENCY TO LET WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE ESSENTIAL THINKING, PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME TO FALL BY WAYSIDE. IF WE ARE TO PAY SUCH A HEAVY PRICE IN TERMS SWALLOWING OUR PRIDE AND EXPOSING OURSELVES TO CRITICAL COMMENT AT HOME, IN SVN AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES, WE SHOULD USE THAT TIME TO OUR ADVANTAGE. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH SELECT WORKING GROUP WHICH WOULD FUNCTION UNDER MAXIMUM SECURITY TO MAKE

~~(PORTION GARBLED - WILL FORWARD)~~

EXHAUSTIVE STUDIES OF POTENTIAL AVAILABLE ASSETS  
AND TO DEVELOP DETAILED INTERIM ACTION PLANS.

6. MY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED THOUGH I SENSE THE  
TIDE IS RUNNING STRONGLY ANOTHER DIRECTION. SEMPER FIDELIS. FIRM  
ETA WASHINGTON MONDAY EVENING 16 SEPT. THIS PROBABLY CONCLUDES  
REPORTING ON NON-BALL PORTION OF MISSION.

7.



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