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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Soviet Developments

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## Gromyko's Speech at the UN

### On Terrorism

The foreign minister's speech yesterday was notable for its flat condemnation of the fedayeen actions in Munich. It was much stronger and more authoritative than any of the comments that have been made by Soviet officials and media since the incident early this month (see 8 September Soviet Developments). Gromyko's language is all the more surprising in that only last Saturday the Soviets and their allies abstained en bloc as the General Assembly voted to accept the secretariat's request that the issue of terrorism be placed on the fall agenda.

Moscow must have decided that to duck the topic in this forum would have been counter-productive in terms of its over-all objectives at this session. Soviet hopes for widespread support for another UNGA resolution condemning Israeli occupation of Arab territories could hardly come to fruition without a clear statement for the record that Moscow does not condone terrorism. In any case, Gromyko's statement that terrorist actions are not part of the "just struggle" of the Palestinian people since they "served no positive ends and caused loss of human life," echoed the line taken privately by the Soviets with fedayeen leaders well before Munich. That the whole subject remains a most sensitive one for Moscow is made clear by the fact that both the Russian and English language TASS summaries of the speech avoid even an oblique reference to Gromyko's remarks on Munich.

His statements probably also reflect the deep concern Moscow has shown for the safety of its delegation in New York this fall. Gromyko made a point of noting that the USSR opposes as a "matter of principle" all acts that disrupt the diplomatic activity of states and the normal course of international contacts and meetings.

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### On Vietnam

Gromyko's remarks yesterday on Indochina were somewhat harsher than the USSR's recent public pronouncements, but this was probably dictated by the forum and by the Soviet desire not to be outdone by the Chinese, who have not yet spoken. Gromyko condemned US bombing and the mining of North Vietnamese ports and disparaged the difference between US words and deeds on Indochina. He ended, however, with the usual plea for a negotiated settlement and reaffirmed "full" Soviet support for the "constructive" proposals put forth by the Vietnamese Communists.

The Soviets have not publicly acknowledged the promises of support reportedly given by Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny in their meetings with the North Vietnamese ambassador on Monday and Tuesday. Hanoi today published a fuller account of these meetings indicating that both men had promised to back North Vietnam "until complete victory." Podgorny reportedly added that the USSR "highly valued" recent South Vietnamese Communist victories and felt their new negotiating proposals were "very fair and reasonable." Soviet media have noted only that the two men had met with the ambassador and had a warm and friendly conversation.