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Rwanda: Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past [REDACTED]

Rwanda's 1994 genocide, in which roughly 800,000 people were killed, was the product of a convergence of political, economic, and social factors, most of which continue to drive instability in Rwanda. The genocide was not a spontaneous release of centuries-old ethnic hatreds, as is sometimes claimed, but a calculated strategy initiated by Rwanda's ruling elite to counter rising challenges to their hold on power.

- *President Habyarimana's ruling clique was challenged from within by newly formed opposition parties, and without by Tutsi rebels.*
- *Rwanda's economy took a turn for the worse in the late 1980s, making resources even more scarce and intensifying the competition for access to those resources through political control.*
- *Underlying these changes was an extremist ideology that cast Tutsi as foreign invaders determined to enslave the Hutu populace. [REDACTED]*

The civil war and genocide placed a devastated Rwanda in the hands of an ill-prepared coalition government led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The government's struggle to rebuild the country and promote ethnic reconciliation has been continuously undermined by reminders of the genocide.

- *For two years following the genocide, international assistance went toward supporting more than two million Rwandan Hutu refugees in neighboring Zaire and Tanzania rather than rebuilding Rwandan society. Moreover, the former regime's army conducted a low-level insurgency against Rwanda from within the refugee camps.*
- *With the return of the refugees in late 1996, the insurgency gained momentum, further distracting the government from its program of reconciliation and reform. [REDACTED]*

Although the Hutu insurgency does not threaten the regime in Kigali and a repeat of the genocide is unlikely, terrorist-style guerrilla attacks are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. [REDACTED]

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Many of the same forces that drove the genocide in Rwanda in 1994—roughly 800,000¹ Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in less than 100 days from April to July—remain relevant today. Several key differences exist, however, which contribute to our judgment that systematic ethnic massacres of the scale witnessed in 1994 are unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future. [REDACTED]

Prelude to Genocide [REDACTED]

The Rwandan genocide was a product of several political, social, and economic factors. [REDACTED]

Rwandan Patriotic Front Challenges Hutu Regime. On 1 October 1990, a force of several thousand Rwandan exiles invaded northern Rwanda from Uganda. The force, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), revolved around a core of Rwandan Tutsi that had served in Ugandan President Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM), the rebel force that became a national army upon sweeping Museveni to power in 1986. Despite having lived most of their lives in Uganda and having played a vital role in Museveni's victory, the Rwandans were regarded as outsiders by most Ugandans and found themselves becoming increasingly marginalized. In 1987, they formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, dedicated to securing the right of Rwandan refugees to return home. The rebels decided it was time to act in early 1990, when two influential Rwandans—one of them current President Pasteur Bizimungu—approached the leadership of the RPA's political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), saying that the Hutu-dominated regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana in Kigali was on the verge of collapse. [REDACTED]

¹The lack of reliable, up-to-date demographic statistics for Rwanda, and political manipulation by the former regime of the statistics available prior to the genocide precludes a definitive count of genocide victims, but most estimates range from 500,000 to just over 1 million. [REDACTED]

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Battle-hardened RPA fighters expected to quickly overpower the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), seize a portion of northern Rwanda, and negotiate a power-sharing agreement with Habyarimana from a position of power. Despite dramatic initial gains, the RPA offensive quickly bogged down. By month's end, government forces—supported by French and Zairian troops—had forced the RPA back into Uganda, killing hundreds, including several rebel leaders, and causing hundreds more to desert. ■

After Paul Kagame took over leadership of the RPA in late October, the force spent several months regrouping in the volcano region of southwestern Uganda, and resumed operations in January 1991 with a one-day occupation of Ruhengeri town, where RPA fighters released several hundred political prisoners, some of whom joined their movement. The RPA spent the next three years waging a guerrilla war in Byumba Prefecture and gradually captured enough territory to bargain for a power-sharing agreement. ■

Domestic Opposition Challenges Habyarimana Regime from Within. Under intense pressure from foreign donors and the international community, Habyarimana agreed in June 1991 to open Rwandan politics to multipartism. Within a year, nearly a dozen opposition parties had formed, the two most significant being the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) and the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR).

- The MDR presented the greatest challenge to Habyarimana's National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND).² The MDR was a more moderate Hutu party that exploited the regional divisions within the Hutu political scene and included many former Habyarimana allies who had fallen out of favor. The MDR led the effort to pressure Habyarimana for greater political inclusiveness.
- The CDR was a radical offshoot of the MRND that criticized the government for not being aggressive enough in fighting the RPF. The Hutu extremists of the CDR extended their violent opposition of the RPF to include the Tutsi populace in general and the moderate Hutu opposition, whose calls for greater democratization were seen as distracting the government and, consequently, aiding the rebels. ■

Economic Decline. In 1986 world prices for coffee—Rwanda's principal source of foreign currency—declined sharply. In previous years, tin exports had been able to cover the gap left by decreases in coffee earnings, but the collapse of tin prices between 1984 and 1986 had resulted in the demise of Rwanda's tin mining industry.

² The MRND changed its name in July 1991 to the National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy, to reflect its newfound political liberalism. ■

The cost of the war further depleted Rwanda's scarce hard currency, and a scramble ensued for control of scarce resources.

- Habyarimana's clique became more determined to maintain control of the government and their access to the country's limited resources.
- Once the genocide began, many Hutu peasants willingly killed Tutsi neighbors with the expectation—encouraged by the extremist leaders—that they would inherit their victims' property and belongings. ■■■

Laying the Foundation of Ethnic Divisions. After the 1959 Hutu "revolution"—in which the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown—Hutu political leaders used the fear of a return to Tutsi domination to control the Hutu population. The precise evolution of the Hutu and Tutsi groups, and the manner by which the Tutsi came to dominate, is unclear. Many scholars believe, however, that some 500 years ago Tutsi cattleherders migrated in successive waves from the horn of Africa to the Great Lakes region, where they formed a largely symbiotic relationship with the Hutu, who were primarily farmers. There was significant intermarriage and social mobility between the two groups, and they shared a common language and culture. Nevertheless, in a society in which cattle—in the absence of money—represented wealth, Tutsi generally were more wealthy and over time came to dominate the political scene. European colonizers sharpened and exploited ethnic distinctions by enacting preferential policies in education and employment.

- The preexisting structure and efficiency of the Tutsi kingdoms fit well with German, and later Belgian, policies of indirect rule.
- Tutsi rule also conformed to racist colonial theories. Tutsi, with their lighter skin and more angular facial features were seen as superior to Hutu. ■■■

Final Solution Implemented ■■■

The starting gun for the genocide sounded on 6 April 1994, when President Habyarimana's jet was shot down on approach to Kigali's Kanombe airport. Although never proven, the shutdown is widely believed to have been the work of Hutu extremists—most likely within Habyarimana's own Presidential Guard—opposed to negotiations with the RPF.

- Many extremists believed Habyarimana had given the rebels and the Hutu opposition too much in peace talks, and they feared their time in power was drawing to a close.

- Although details are sketchy, eyewitness accounts suggest that the President's plane was hit by one or more shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, launched from just outside the airport perimeter or from near Habyarimana's palace, both areas controlled by government forces.
- Within hours, the Presidential Guard constructed roadblocks throughout Kigali and began assassinating opposition politicians, journalists, and influential or outspoken critics of the regime. [REDACTED]

Several additional factors suggest that the genocide was a calculated strategy, carefully planned by key members of the Habyarimana government.

- Much of the killing was carried out by MRND-trained militia, the Interahamwe, supported by the Army.
- Rwandan media, particularly the extremist radio station Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, preached ethnic hatred and encouraged mass participation in the killings but was unhindered by the government. Hutu extremists dehumanized the Tutsi, calling them cockroaches and convincing many among the uneducated masses that the RPA fighters were demons with glowing eyes and pointed tails who would slaughter all Hutu if they weren't killed first. [REDACTED]
- Numerous unconfirmed reports claim that lists of initial victims were circulated among extremists. The rapid, efficient, and systematic nature of the political assassinations in Kigali during the first days of the genocide supports the existence of such lists.
- Local government officials who worked to contain the violence were quickly replaced by extremists. Numerous survivors and unwilling participants have testified that government officials often gave speeches encouraging the population to kill and occasionally took part themselves in the killings. In areas where the Hutu population was reluctant to take part in the killing, Interahamwe from other areas were bused in to spur on the locals.
- In January 1994 the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda informed UN headquarters that one of his sources had provided detailed information on government training and equipping of the militias to conduct large-scale massacres of Tutsi and opposition Hutu politicians. The source corroborated claims of "death lists". The report was disregarded at the time, but its credibility is bolstered by subsequent events. [REDACTED]

In the weeks following Habyarimana's death, violence spread throughout Rwanda. Although the scale of the killing varied from prefecture to prefecture, no area was free of massacres.

- Byumba witnessed the least amount of killing because the RPA already controlled a portion of the prefecture at the start of the genocide and overran most of the rest soon after resuming its offensive. Ironically, in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi—the heartland of Hutu extremism—few massacres took place during the genocide; most of the region's Tutsi had been killed or driven out prior to 1994.
- Cyangugu and Kibuye saw the most thorough killing; roughly 85-90 percent of the Tutsi population in Cyangugu was killed and as much as 97 percent in Kibuye, according to a human rights organization.
- At the start of the genocide, Butare—run by the only Tutsi Prefet in Rwanda—remained free of large-scale killing and attracted Tutsi refugees from the rest of the country. On 18 April, however, the Prefet was replaced—and subsequently killed—and the large gatherings of Tutsi refugees soon became the victims of some of the largest massacres of the genocide. ■■■

Soldiers and Interahamwe militiamen did most of the killing, but ordinary Rwandan peasants also took part in the genocide. Many killed to settle old grudges, to gain neighbors' possessions, or because they embraced anti-Tutsi sentiment. The government once again resurrected fears of a return to Tutsi domination. Moreover, intimidation and Rwandan respect for authority—additional factors that played a large role in the later refugee crisis—contributed to mass participation.

- Many Rwandans took part in the genocide because they feared—quite accurately—that if they did not take part, they would be seen as Tutsi sympathizers and would be targeted themselves.
- Rwandan society, much like Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, was highly structured and held obedience to authority in high regard, even to the extent of following orders to kill neighbors. ■■■

The Face of Genocide [REDACTED]

The scope, speed, and brutality of the genocide all contributed to its horror and to the difficulty of rebuilding Rwandan society in its wake.

- Using the figure of 800,000 killed from April to mid-July—more than 10 percent of Rwanda's pre-genocide population, estimated at 7.7 million people—the rate of murders was more than 8,000 per day.
- A very large percentage of the dead were killed with “traditional” weapons like machetes, hoes, axes, and nail-studded clubs. Many were drowned in rivers or burned alive.
- Most Rwandan Tutsi lost family members in the violence and many witnessed the brutal murder of their families, sometimes by neighbors. Survivors, often wounded, were hunted like animals and forced to seek refuge in horrific places such as swamps, pit latrines, and among piles of corpses.
- Rape, including gang-rape, sexual slavery, and sexual torture was widespread.
- Parents were forced to kill their children, husbands their wives. Victims paid for the “privilege” of being killed by gunshot rather than machete. [REDACTED]

The killing took many forms. The murder of individuals at road blocks or entire families within their homes was not uncommon. The majority of casualties in the genocide, however, resulted from large-scale massacres, according to human rights organizations. The massacres followed similar patterns.

- Tutsi and targeted Hutu seeking safety in numbers gathered in churches, schools, stadiums, or other large compounds, often at the urging of local authorities.
- The Interahamwe militias, sometimes supported by civilians, attacked the refugees with “traditional” weapons and grenades. If the refugees resisted, more heavily armed soldiers or gendarmes were brought in to soften them up. Once resistance was overcome, the Interahamwe would resume their “work.”
- The killing of large groups often took several days, with the Interahamwe stopping at night only to return the next morning to kill any survivors of the previous day's massacre. Survivors who escaped the massacre site were killed at roadblocks or pursued into the forests, swamps, or hills. [REDACTED]

Resumption of War and RPA Victory [REDACTED]

Two days after the killings began, the RPA resumed its offensive. RPA forces crossed the demilitarized zone in the north—established as part of the Arusha Peace Accord, signed in its final version in August 1993—and rapidly advanced on Kigali. The RPA battalion in the capital—stationed there in accordance with the Accord—began its attempt to break the FAR encirclement of its barracks. By late April, the RPA had captured all of Byumba, most of Kibungo, and portions of Ruhengeri prefectures. By the end of May, it had captured Kigali airport and the adjoining Kanombe military base and was closing in on the new seat of the Hutu government, Gitarama, which it captured in mid-June. As the RPA pushed across Rwanda, hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees—some fearing Tutsi retribution, others believing government propaganda demonizing the RPA—fled before the advance.

- Over 250,000 refugees flooded into Tanzania in early May, and more than double that number fled to government-controlled areas in western Rwanda. [REDACTED]

In late June, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of French troops to establish a “secure humanitarian zone” in southwest Rwanda. Operation Turquoise, as it was named, was extremely controversial, particularly among RPA leaders, who questioned French motives. Many suspected France, which had been a close ally of Habyarimana’s regime and had played a critical role in stopping the RPA offensive in October 1990, was trying to save the vestiges of the Hutu government and Army.

- Although the French presence probably prevented some massacres, it did not stop the killings, even within Zone Turquoise.
- Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees and the remainder of the FAR passed through the French zone safe from pursuit by the RPA, which further heightened suspicions about French motivation. [REDACTED]

After nearly three months of heavy fighting, the RPA captured the capital on 4 July and quickly consolidated its control of Kigali, Butare, Gitarama, and Ruhengeri prefectures. In late July, the RPF established a new government, announced a unilateral cease-fire, and declared the war over. [REDACTED]

The Refugee Crisis and Attempts to Rebuild [REDACTED]

When the civil war and genocide ended, the RPA rebels—who had been fighting to force a power sharing arrangement on Habyarimana’s regime—found themselves in charge and faced the daunting task of rebuilding Rwanda’s devastated society. Much of Rwanda’s population had fled to neighboring countries and many of those that

remained looked upon the RPA as an occupation force and upon the Tutsi-dominated RPF government as foreigners. [REDACTED]

A Society in Shambles. In the course of four months, Rwanda's population was nearly halved. In addition to the roughly 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu killed, more than 2 million Hutu fled Rwanda and gathered in refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire during and immediately after the genocide. The traumatized remains of Rwandan society were soon augmented by the return of approximately 800,000 Tutsi exiles from Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi, many of whom had spent most—if not all—of their lives outside Rwanda. [REDACTED]

Already one of the world's most impoverished nations, Rwanda's economy ground to a halt. Most of the country's educated elite and professionals were killed or took part in the killings. There remained few doctors to care for the hundreds of thousands of physically and psychologically wounded survivors, teachers to educate the more than 2 million Rwandan minors, which includes upwards of 300,000 orphans, or lawyers and judges to deal with the tens of thousands of jailed genocide suspects, which now number roughly 130,000. Thousands of rape victims found themselves struggling to deal with the physical and psychological trauma as well as the social isolation and ostracism that followed the crime. Thousands of women became pregnant as a result of rape, and many were infected with AIDS—approximately 11 percent of Rwandans are now HIV-positive, according to one survey. [REDACTED]

The FAR, defeated but largely intact in the refugee camps of Zaire, vowed to one day launch an invasion to return the Hutu to power. In the meantime, they regrouped, recruited, trained, and conducted guerrilla attacks against civilian and military targets in western Rwanda. [REDACTED]

Vast sums of international assistance flowed into the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania—especially after a cholera epidemic swept the Goma, Zaire camps in late July and early August—leaving less aid for the new regime in Kigali. International donors—spurred on by France, [REDACTED]—conditioned aid to Kigali on the RPF making the new government more inclusive and reigning in RPA abuses.

- A coalition government was formed roughly on the basis of the Arusha Accord—commonly referred to in the plural as the Arusha Accords—which established the number of ministerial and National Assembly positions each party received. The positions set aside for the MRND, however, were assumed by the RPF, and the new position of vice president was created for Kagame. Several donors, particularly Belgium, criticized the new government for excluding the MRND even though earlier efforts to co-opt MRND moderates were rebuffed.

- Widely respected for its discipline and professionalism throughout most of Rwanda's four-year civil war, the RPA deteriorated significantly in the last months of the war and the aftermath of its victory. Originally a tight-knit and experienced force, the RPA had swollen to 20,000 men by April 1994, 35,000 by June, and 50,000 by September. Most of these new recruits lacked the experience of fighting for Museveni's NRM and underwent an extremely abbreviated training program, if any at all. Many of those who joined during or after the genocide were motivated by a desire for revenge. These factors led to an increase in RPA abuses. Moreover, the new regime lacked the resources to pay its troops, resulting in more looting, shakedowns, and armed robberies. ■

Rebuilding in the Shadow of the ex-FAR/I. During the next two years, Rwanda made small gains in rebuilding the country. Although still a fraction of its pre-war level, GDP grew by nearly 25 percent in 1995, and almost 13 percent in 1996. The education and judicial sectors slowly resumed operation. Most significantly, an uneasy peace was restored throughout most of Rwanda, occasionally broken by former Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe (ex-FAR/I) raids launched from the refugee camps. ■

The threat of renewed war continued to hang over the RPF-led government, however, and the ex-FAR/I raids became an increasing frustration. Moreover, the continued refusal of more than one tenth of Rwanda's population to return from their self-imposed exile undercut the coalition government's claim to legitimacy. When Zairian Tutsi in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Zaire began to suffer persecution at the hands of the Hutu refugees and local non-Tutsi Zairians, Kigali saw an opportunity to address several concerns simultaneously. In late September, the Banyamulenge—Tutsi from South Kivu—with Rwandan assistance, began a military offensive aimed at the refugee camps and the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ). The corrupt and inept FAZ mounted little resistance to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL), as the rebel group became known, and the rebels quickly overran much of eastern Zaire, including the refugee camps. Roughly 750,000 Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda from Zaire in November 1996. They were joined a month later by another half million from the camps in Tanzania. ■

With the closure of the camps—and the subsequent fall of Kinshasa to the rebels—Kigali hoped the ex-FAR threat had been destroyed. The massive refugee return had been so large and so rapid, however, that the RPA had been unable to screen the returnees. Ex-FAR/I fighters, mixed in with the returnees, infiltrated back into Rwanda and—supported by fighters who had remained in the insurgents' rear bases in eastern Congo (Kinshasa)—resumed guerrilla attacks against the Army and Tutsi civilians in northwestern Rwanda. ■

Renewed Genocide Unlikely... [REDACTED]

We judge that several of the conditions that allowed the genocide to occur in 1994 are not present in the current situation. Most significantly, the RPF-led regime—in stark contrast to its predecessor—is not attempting to exploit racism and instead appears to be genuinely committed to promoting reconciliation and creating a “non-ethnic” society. In addition, the many Hutu were traumatized by the genocide and are unlikely to engage in such large-scale killing again, especially without the assistance and support of the government and confidence that they would not be punished for their crimes. [REDACTED]

The insurgents maintain a base of popular support in the northwest but have been unable to muster support in other areas of the country.

- Northern Hutu from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures traditionally have competed with southern Hutu—centered in Gitarama Prefecture—for political control of Rwanda. Rwanda’s first President, Kayibanda, was from Gitarama and favored his fellow southern Hutu. After Habyarimana took power in a coup in 1973, the center of power shifted to the north, and now southern Hutu are generally apprehensive about supporting an insurgency that aims to put northerners back in power.
- The insurgents have not disclosed any political platform, apart from continued genocide and return to Hutu rule.
- The ex-FAR/I—beaten by the RPA during the civil war and again during the ADFL’s RPA-supported march across Zaire/Congo—have not fared well against the army, and Hutu civilians are hesitant to side with a force that controls no territory, lacks the resources to provide for large numbers of people, and appears to have little chance of militarily defeating the regime.
- The rebels have grown increasingly brutal with the Hutu population. Insurgents frequently murder Hutu they accuse of collaborating with the government, and in late May, according to press reporting, the rebels attacked civilians who had recently abandoned them, killing roughly 100. [REDACTED]

Prior to the current conflict in Congo, the ex-FAR/I appeared to lack ready access to fresh stocks of arms and ammunition. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moreover, [REDACTED] until recently, the

ex-FAR/I rarely utilized heavy weapons, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- Typically, less than half an attacking insurgent force carries firearms—the remainder use “traditional” weapons—and those armed with rifles carry little ammunition, [REDACTED]
- Kabila’s willingness to support the ex-FAR/I in retaliation for Rwandan involvement in the current Congo conflict is likely to result in increased access to ammunition and arms—including heavy weapons—for the Hutu rebels. [REDACTED]

...But Low-Level Insurgency Will Continue to Hinder Reconciliation [REDACTED]

Insurgent activity, which spiked in early summer 1997 and again in mid-winter 1997-98, appears to have tapered off since. The insurgents remain particularly active in several communes of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures, but they have also conducted raids and ambushes in Gitarama, Kibuye, and Byumba Prefectures. Although the insurgency is not regime threatening, it hinders government reconciliation efforts and political, economic, and justice reform.

- Continuing ethnic killings reinforce distrust and suspicion between Tutsi survivors and their Hutu neighbors. The insurgency, combined with a lack of progress in punishing the principal perpetrators of the genocide, has created an environment in which violence has become an accepted means of resolving even relatively minor disputes.
- The government has made little progress on political reforms, including plans to conduct local elections and prepare for elections of National Assembly deputies—currently appointed by their parties, per the Arusha Accord.
- The Rwandan economy has yet to reach its pre-war levels. Insecurity in northwestern Rwanda, the traditional breadbasket for the country, has created large food shortages.
- Although authorities have released several thousand genocide suspects from prison—primarily the sick, old, very young, and those against whom there is little evidence—large-scale releases are unlikely as long as the risk persists that those released will join the insurgency. [REDACTED]

The RPA's deployment of several thousand troops to Congo has probably left its forces at home overextended, but the insurgents have been unable to take advantage. The heavy pace of RPA counterinsurgency efforts since June and the subsequent casualties inflicted on the rebels appear to have impaired insurgent capabilities.

- At least three senior insurgent commanders were killed in separate RPA operations in Gisenyi Prefecture from mid-July to early August. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, continuing support among family members and extremist civilians in the northwest, and the rebels' ability to perpetrate guerrilla and terror-style attacks with minimal sophisticated weaponry make it unlikely the RPA will eliminate the insurgency. Intense pressure from RPA counterinsurgency operations in northwestern Rwanda probably will force the insurgents to shift operations to other areas, increasing the number of attacks in previously stable areas such as Kibuye and Byumba Prefectures. Insurgent activity will probably increase in the near-term because of support from Congo, but the intensity and frequency of insurgent attacks will again decline as the insurgents continue to take heavy casualties, draw down their renewed—but still limited—stocks of ammunition and arms, and alienate the Hutu population. Low-level insurgency will continue to drain scarce government resources and hinder reconciliation and reform for the foreseeable future. [REDACTED]

Appendix I

Major Events in the Rwandan Conflict

November 1959	Ethnic fighting results in hundreds of Tutsi deaths; tens of thousands flee into exile in Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire
1 July 1962	Rwanda gains independence from Belgium
December 1963	Tutsi exiles invade from Burundi but are quickly defeated; roughly 10,000 Tutsi are massacred in reprisals in the following two months
5 July 1973	Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana takes power in a bloodless coup
1980	The Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), predecessor to the RPF, forms in Uganda to promote exiles' "right of return"
December 1987	RANU becomes RPF; it advocates right of return by force if necessary
1 October 1990	RPF invades Rwanda from Uganda
4 August 1993	Arusha Accord signed, to be implemented within 37 days
October 1993	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) deploys to monitor cease-fire
6 April 1994	President Habyarimana's plane is shot down on approach to Kigali; killings begin in the capital within hours
8 April 1994	RPF resumes offensive
21 April 1994	Following withdrawal of Belgian contingent, UN Security Council reduces UNAMIR from its height of 2,500 troops to 270
1 May 1994	More than 250,000 Hutu refugees enter Tanzania; 250,000 more in following months
22 June 1994	French Operation Turquoise begins
4 July 1994	RPF seizes Kigali
14 July 1994	Roughly 150,000 Hutu refugees enter North Kivu, Zaire
18 July 1994	RPF announces new government
18-19 July 1994	More than 500,000 Hutu refugees, including remnants of the FAR, cross into South Kivu, Zaire from Zone Turquoise
September 1996	Banyamulenge revolt begins in South Kivu
14 November 1996	Mugunga refugee camp in Zaire falls; 750,000 Hutu refugees begin return to Rwanda
16 December 1996	500,000 Hutu refugees begin returning from Tanzanian camps

Appendix II

Key Points of the 1993 Arusha Accord [REDACTED]

The Arusha Accord, which forms the basis for the current Rwandan government, is a series of six documents negotiated between the RPF and the Habyarimana regime between September 1992 and August 1993. The first, the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement, was signed in March 1991 and amended in September 1991 and July 1992. A series of *Protocols of Agreement* followed:

- *The Rule of Law* (September 1992).
- *Power-sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transition Government* (October 1992, amended January 1993).
- *Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons* (June 1993).
- *The Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties* (August 1993).
- *Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions* (August 1993). [REDACTED]

Basic Principles. The agreements establish the Accord and the Constitution of June 1991 as the "Fundamental Law" of Rwanda. The Accord lists the articles of the Constitution supplanted by provisions of the Accord and declares that, where unforeseen conflicts between the two documents arise, the Accord takes priority. The Accord calls for equality for all citizens without discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, sex, or region—a thinly veiled reference to Habyarimana's patronage of the northwest. The Accord specifically calls for the deletion of reference to ethnicity in government documents, including identity cards—which were to play a critical role in targeting Tutsi for elimination during the genocide. [REDACTED]

The Accord declares the right of return of Rwandese refugees abroad to be inalienable and gives returnees who were gone less than 10 years the right to reclaim any property assumed by others in their absence. The Accord also contains a provision calling for the government to encourage people to settle in villages to facilitate the provision of services—such as schooling, health care, and water—and to "break with the traditional scattered housing." [REDACTED]

The Accord calls for a transition period of 22 months before national elections, beginning with the formation of the government and with one possible extension to be determined by the National Assembly "if warranted by exceptional circumstances

impeding the normal implementation.” Local elections were to begin within six months of the formation of the transitional government. In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF declared a five-year transition would be necessary to prepare for elections, although local elections could start sooner. Following the return of the refugees in 1996, the RPF again extended the transition, stating that the five-year clock restarted with the massive migration. Initial planning for local elections has begun, [REDACTED] but little progress has been made, in part due to the insurgency and in part due to unresolved procedural questions. [REDACTED]

Creation of Commissions and Government Institutions. The Accord calls for the new government to establish National Commissions on: Human Rights, Unity and Reconciliation, Legal and Constitutional Issues, and Elections. The Human Rights Commission was established in late 1997. The government is in the process of setting up the Constitutional and Reconciliation Commissions. [REDACTED]

The principal issue addressed by the Arusha Accord is the structure of the new transitional coalition government, and the distribution of positions among the RPF, the MRND, and the opposition parties. The Accord provides for four main government institutions: the Presidency, the Broad-Based Transition Government, the Transitional National Assembly, and the Judiciary. [REDACTED]

The Presidency. The interim President was to be Habyarimana, so the president’s powers are limited. He represents the government at official ceremonies and in meetings abroad. Otherwise, he serves as little more than a rubber stamp for affirming Cabinet and National Assembly decisions. On any issue where the President can make decisions, the decisions do not become binding until authorized by the Cabinet or the National Assembly. [REDACTED]

The Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). The Accord established the BBTG as the most powerful government institution. The Prime Minister—the first of whom, MDR leader Faustin Twagirimungu, was specifically named in the Accord—heads the government. The Cabinet, in which all of the major parties were to be represented, is to reach decisions by consensus or a two-thirds majority if consensus cannot be reached. This is one reason the Rwandan government is often slow, but unified, in passing legislation or making controversial decisions. The distribution of ministries within the BBTG is spelled out. The RPF was to receive five ministries, most significantly the Ministries of Interior and of Rehabilitation and Social Integration—the two most likely to deal with refugee issues. Additionally, one of the RPF ministers was to hold the title of Deputy Prime Minister. The MRND was to hold five ministries, including Defense. The MDR received three ministries beyond the Prime Ministry, most significantly Foreign Affairs. The Social Democrat Party (PSD) was to hold three portfolios, including Finance; the Liberal Party (PL) three portfolios, including Justice; and the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) one minor ministry.

Following the genocide, the MRND was outlawed and its ministries assumed by the RPF, much to the outrage of the other coalition partners, because the Accord calls for the ministries of any defaulting party to be divided equally among the remaining parties.³ ■

The National Assembly. The National Assembly holds three three-month sessions annually. National Assembly deputies vote as individuals rather than strictly along party lines. The distribution of seats within the National Assembly is also spelled out in the Accord: MRND, RPF, MDR, PSD, and PL were to receive 11 seats each, and PDC was to receive four. One seat was set aside for each remaining party.⁴ With the backlash against the RPF following its seizure of the MRND's ministries, that party's seats in the Assembly were divided among the remaining parties, per the Arusha Accord. ■

Integration of the Army. Another major issue addressed in the Arusha Accord is the integration of the RPA and the FAR. The Accord calls for a four-brigade, 13,000-man, standing force to be achieved through significant demobilization by both armies. RPA fighters were to hold 40 percent of the enlisted billets and 50 percent of the officer billets; RPA and FAR officers were to receive an equal number of command positions. Moreover, the two forces were to divide the top two positions in any unit, that is, an RPA commander would have a FAR deputy and a FAR commander would have an RPA deputy. The Accord also called for one RPA battalion to be deployed to Kigali to protect RPF officials prior to implementation of the remainder of the Accord, particularly the creation of the BBTG. ■

Observing the Spirit, If Not the Letter, of the Agreement ■

With the exceptions noted above, the RPF-led government has attempted to maintain the spirit of the Arusha Accord.


- The Cabinet has undergone several reshuffles, but the general distribution of seats among the parties has been maintained.
- When Prime Minister Twagirimungu departed in 1995, another MDR politician, Pierre Celestin Rwigima, replaced him.

³ The Accord also makes no mention of a Vice President, a position created by the RPF following the genocide, and assumed by Kagame. The Accord established the Speaker of the National Assembly as interim successor to the Presidency, pending an Assembly vote to choose between two candidates set forth by the former President's party. ■


⁴ This last provision provided Habyarimana the opportunity he sought to delay implementation of the Accord, as he and his clique encouraged the multitude of minor extremist parties to argue that they were entitled to a seat in the National Assembly. The situation was further complicated by the split in most parties between moderate and extremist "Power" factions, with each claiming a right to the seats and ministries reserved for the party. ■

- The Army currently fields between 40,000 and 45,000 men—well over the 13,000 figure established by the Accord—and FAR soldiers compose less than 15 percent of that total. At least 4,000 FAR soldiers have been integrated into the military, however, including several senior officers. One of only four generals in Rwanda is reintegrated FAR, Gendarmarie Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Gatsinzi. ■

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past 


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
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