

4 NOV 1960

4605

NIE 20-60

1 November 1960

SECRET

RR

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE  
NUMBER 20-60

PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE NORTH  
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Submitted by the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

Concurred in by the  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

*on 1 November 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

**\*\* ACCOUNTABLE DOCUMENT \*\***  
RETURN TO SPECIAL REGISTRY,  
Room 7E-47 Hqs.

SECRET

Nº 373

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- c. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- e. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department of Defense
- i. Director of NSA for the National Security Agency
- j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:  
**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

### WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

#### DISTRIBUTION:

White House  
National Security Council  
Department of State  
Department of Defense  
Operations Coordinating Board  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

# PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

## THE PROBLEM

To identify the principal problems likely to confront NATO over the next decade.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. NATO now appears to be approaching a stage in which its basic concepts and arrangements will come under increasing question. New challenges are being posed by increased Soviet power and assertiveness and by the unsettled state of the underdeveloped world. The costs and risks involved in meeting these challenges are increasing. Finally, relationships within the alliance are being complicated by the re-emergence of Western European economic strength and self-confidence, and by the increasing independence displayed by NATO countries in the pursuit of their own interests. At least for some years to come the attitudes of the UK, France, and West Germany in particular toward NATO problems and relationships will probably be greatly colored by their differences over questions of economic and political integration. (Paras. 7-12, 38-44)

2. NATO will clearly have to deal with the doubts within its membership about the basic military strategy of the alliance. Despite continuing US reassur-

ances regarding the firmness of its NATO commitments and the importance of Europe for the US, there is increasing disposition to question whether the US can in fact be counted on to risk nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression against Europe—or, more immediately, whether a confident and assertive Soviet leadership will feel as restrained as it has been by US nuclear power. Although NATO's European members wish to retain the protection provided by US strategic nuclear forces, the growth of Soviet nuclear missile power has led to increasing interest in creation of European nuclear deterrent forces as well. At the same time, there are also likely to be growing pressures from some European sources to reduce the reliance of Shield force strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, both in response to popular apprehensions regarding nuclear warfare in Europe and in order to give NATO a wider range of choice on how to resist nonnuclear threats. In any event, NATO leaders would almost certainly consider that they would have to have

sufficient tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal to counter possible Soviet resort to such weapons.<sup>1</sup> (*Paras. 14-25*)

<sup>1</sup>The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, non-concurs in Conclusions 2 and 3 and in the supporting discussion. He notes that no evidence has been adduced to support the judgments and prognoses made in these paragraphs. He considers that the conclusions are, therefore, essentially predictions of the present and future rationale of governmental leaders of NATO nations. To accept these predictions, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, considers that one must ascribe to those leaders the simultaneous espousal of several contradictory and inconsistent theses, including the following:

a. There are rising aspirations for NATO "nuclear deterrent forces" but growing abhorrence of Shield force "reliance on tactical nuclear weapons" (without clear definitions of either term nor description of the intended distinction in terms of yield, delivery system, target type or target location).

b. The US is becoming increasingly fearful of exposure to "nuclear devastation" while the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly unconcerned over its exposure to the same hazard.

c. There is reluctance to accept and support MC-70 force levels (due, implicitly, to budget factors) but willingness to invest *more* than the MC-70 requirements if "less reliance on tactical nuclear weapons" was adopted as NATO strategy.

d. The USSR is altering its strategy to contemplate seriously a major assault in Europe not accompanied by a nuclear attack on US nuclear retaliatory forces nor by use of nuclear weapons in Europe; but the USSR is scaling down its military forces by one-third and is increasing the nuclear armament of those forces.

e. The USSR will plan on US reluctance to "risk nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression against Europe"; while recent USSR strategic pronouncements increasingly emphasize the importance of surprise, the advantage gained by first-strike against an enemy's nuclear capability, and the impossibility of localizing any major overt military action between the Bloc and the Free World.

f. A NATO "nuclear deterrent" would give the Soviets a factor "to reckon with" to counteract US hesitance to use its own nuclear forces to counter Soviet attacks against Europe; but there is growing European concern that "even a tactical nuclear exchange" would have "devastating effects for the heavily populated critical areas of Europe."

3. Popular reluctance to support substantial Shield forces is still widespread and might increase—particularly in the event that Soviet diplomatic and military policy encouraged the belief that any substantial effort was unnecessary as well as possibly misdirected. Under such circumstances, some move toward scaling down formal requirements might come to be the only way of placing NATO military planning on a politically supportable basis. However, we believe that Western consciousness of the Soviet threat will probably remain sufficiently great to make at least the principal European NATO members feel compelled to maintain their present general level of military effort. If there were agreement on a Shield force strategy placing less reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, the European NATO members might accept and support a somewhat higher level of effort.<sup>2</sup> (*Para. 26*)

4. The growing assertiveness of France, and to a lesser degree West Germany, will almost certainly require that they be given a greater influence in the military and possibly the political affairs of the alliance, though de Gaulle's efforts to establish France as the spokesman for the continental members of NATO will almost certainly continue to incur widespread opposition. Meanwhile the question of military integration is likely to become more acute, not only because of de Gaulle's advocacy of the alternative concept of national forces but also because of the probable growth in the requirements for unified procurement and command as military weapons systems

<sup>2</sup> See the footnote by the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, on Conclusion 2.

become more costly and complex. (*Paras. 29-32*)

5. The years ahead are likely to witness increased pressures from various quarters to have NATO members coordinate their policies not only in the NATO area but throughout the world. Some European leaders are deeply troubled both by the growing representation of the underdeveloped world in the UN and by the alacrity with which the Sino-Soviet Bloc has sought to encourage and exploit the erosion of traditional Western influences in that area. However, continuing differences of outlook within NATO will make actual development of a coordinated policy extremely difficult, while the strength of neutralism in the underdeveloped countries will make most of them reluctant to accept development assistance under NATO auspices. (*Paras. 33-35*)

6. US actions and policies will continue to be of critical importance to the vitality and policies of the alliance. NATO's European members feel less dependent on US material support and are likely to be more assertive and critical in their attitude toward the US than in the past, but they will continue to depend on association with US economic and military strength and on US leadership in the continuing contest with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. They can probably be persuaded to assume a greater part of the financial and military burdens of the alliance and might accept some reductions in US force commitments to the extent that these could be justified militarily. However, they would be seriously disturbed by any unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe which appeared to reflect a downgrading of NATO in US priorities. (*Paras. 45-47*)

## DISCUSSION

### I. BASIC FACTORS AFFECTING NATO DURING THE 1960's

7. Despite the recurrent crises and changing circumstances which NATO has encountered in its initial 11 years, it has thus far come through with remarkably little alteration in its basic concepts and makeup. Though the specifics of military strategy and planning have changed (especially through the incorporation of West German forces into NATO and the introduction of nuclear weapons), NATO has continued to rely on the concept of tactical forces backed up by massive US strategic nuclear power. Despite a continuing shortfall in European military contributions to NATO, it has remained a key element in the defense of the West. Though the alliance has been marked by recurrent frictions, notably on matters outside the NATO area, it

has remained the cornerstone of the defense policy of most of its members.

8. NATO now appears, however, to be approaching a stage in which its basic concepts and arrangements will come under increasing question. Certain key elements of the changed situation are already at hand or clearly in the making, notably: (a) increased Soviet power and assertiveness; (b) the unsettled state of the underdeveloped world; (c) the increasing costs and risks involved in meeting these challenges; and (d) the changing relationships within NATO. These are briefly discussed below.

9. The growth of Soviet military and economic power has produced a confident, assertive, flexible adversary who believes that a situation of mutual deterrence is emerging in which there will be new opportunities for ad-

vancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means without serious risks of general war. Although Soviet tactics may vary greatly over the next decade, the USSR will almost certainly exploit the increased prestige and bargaining strength which its technological advance and growing military and economic power provide.

a. NATO itself is likely to remain the object of an intensive and wide-ranging admixture of Soviet pressures and inducements aimed at disrupting the alliance, playing on such issues as Berlin and the "German problem." In this the USSR will seek to exploit the great sensitivity of the Federal Republic on these issues and the varying and often unenthusiastic support accorded the West Germans by some of their NATO allies.

b. The worldwide spread of Bloc influence and initiative threatens the interests of NATO members in the underdeveloped world.

c. Meanwhile the assertiveness of the Chinese Communists—who we believe are capable of developing an operational nuclear capability within the period of this estimate—is likely to pose new problems for the US and possibly other NATO members and to cause new strains between the US and various of its NATO allies.

10. Even without the Communist threat, many parts of the underdeveloped world, and especially areas of traditional Western influence, are likely to continue in turmoil. By the end of the 1960's most colonial territories will have become independent and new forms of association between them and the West may have developed. However, the immediate prospect is for a period of confusion and acrimony in which the divergent policies of individual NATO members will be hard to reconcile. The underdeveloped nations, with their growing strength in the UN, will almost certainly band together on colonial issues and will probably make increasing efforts to exert concerted pressure on the great powers in fields directly affecting NATO, such as disarmament and East-West negotiations. And at least in the absence of large-scale and sus-

tained external economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries, the economic gap between the technologically advanced West and the underdeveloped world will widen, thus deepening the psychological divisions between the two areas.

11. The costs and risks involved in these challenges appear to be steadily increasing. In addition to the economic problems created by the changing situation in the underdeveloped world, the increasing sophistication and complexity of new weapons is placing an ever-increasing price tag on maintaining a modern military posture. Meanwhile, continuing advances in various aspects of military technology, including the space field—and the possible spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries—have created the fear in many parts of the NATO community that without drastic arms reduction and control the danger of nuclear war will grow.

12. The relationships within the alliance have become more complex. Although the US has retained military and political leadership in the alliance, there is concern in Western Europe about US will and ability to exercise this role. At the same time, the nations of Western Europe have regained self-confidence and are showing increasing independence in the pursuit of their own interests.

a. The dramatic resurgence of Western Europe has left most of its members bustling and prosperous, no longer forced to depend upon the US for economic assistance and heavy military subsidies. At the same time, however, this resurgence is probably intensifying the popular preoccupation with personal well-being which has made many European parliaments reluctant to meet NATO defense commitments.

b. The re-emergence of an economically strong Europe has been accompanied by increased confidence, vigor, and assertiveness among its key members, not only vis-a-vis the US but also vis-a-vis one another. De Gaulle's France is seeking in various ways to establish its own leadership and to impose its own concepts in Western affairs. West Germany is dissatisfied over its "second class" status and

aspires to a greater voice in Western councils. The UK is increasingly concerned about maintaining its special relationship with the US in the alliance, while Italy and the smaller NATO countries are torn between the attractions of closer association with their larger European neighbors and the fear of being completely overshadowed.

c. Finally, the creation of the European Economic Community (or Common Market), with its political as well as economic implications, has added a new and critical dimension to the interplay of European forces. The year 1970 may see a Europe economically and to an increasing degree politically integrated, or one in which the UK and its Outer Seven partners are still isolated from a cohesive continental bloc, or one in which the march of economic integration has not basically altered present political relationships. In any case, we are convinced that the UK, France, and West Germany, in particular, will be deeply involved in a struggle over questions of economic and political integration for some years to come and that this will inevitably greatly color their attitude toward NATO problems and relationships.

## II. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS FOR THE ALLIANCE

### A. General

13. The nature of some of the problems which will confront NATO over the next decade is already apparent and in some cases the search for solutions has already begun. It is clear, for example, that NATO must deal with the growing doubts within its membership about the basic military strategy of the alliance—doubts not only about the continuing validity of the Shield force concept reflected in the present planning document, MC-70,<sup>3</sup> but also about the protection for Europe actually provided by the strategic Sword forces. The changing relationships within the alliance are posing a host of problems and differences regarding the direction and organization of

<sup>3</sup> MC-70, "Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963," Final Decision on Report by NATO Military Committee by the North Atlantic Council, 9 May 1958, with corrigenda 1, 2, and 3.

NATO. Meanwhile, the erosion of Western positions in the underdeveloped world, coupled with the attempts of the Bloc to advance its influence there, is lending new urgency to questions about how far NATO members should go toward coordinating their political, military, and economic policies outside the present NATO area.

### B. Basic Military Strategy

#### *Strategic Nuclear Deterrence*

14. So long as the Soviet nuclear capability was relatively modest and dependent on a bomber delivery system, there was only limited disposition to question the original concept of relying ultimately on the threat of nuclear retaliation by US strategic forces to deter Soviet military aggression in Europe. Many Europeans continued to regard NATO primarily as a means of formally binding the US to such a strategy and of making this clear to the USSR and their own publics. With the growth of Soviet nuclear and missile power in the last few years, however, serious doubts have emerged about the continuing adequacy of this concept. Although the fears, widely expressed in the US that the US may be vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack do not appear to have greatly affected European opinion as yet, European NATO leaders have increasingly taken for granted that a period of "nuclear stalemate" is at hand or fast approaching in which neither side would be willing to strike the first nuclear blow, because it would incur unacceptable damage in return.

15. Despite continuing US reassurances regarding the firmness of its NATO commitments and the importance of Europe for the US, there is thus increasing disposition to question whether the US can in fact be counted on to risk nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression against Europe—or, more immediately, whether a confident and assertive Soviet leadership will feel as restrained as it has been by US nuclear power. Key European leaders, notably Adenauer and de Gaulle, fear that the changing strategic balance will make the US (as well as the UK) less willing to stand firm against Soviet politico-military pressures. There are appre-

hensions that the US—concerned with modernization of its own defense and long-range strike capabilities (for which advanced bases in and around Europe are generally of decreasing importance), with balance of payments and other economic problems, and with the problems of maintaining its special position in Latin America and the Far East—may cut down on its European commitments.

16. The result has been growing interest in the major continental NATO countries in creating European nuclear deterrent forces. In this view such forces, if not wholly under European control, should be at least far more responsive to European needs and desires than are the existing US nuclear deterrent forces. Thus, even in situations in which the US might appear hesitant to use its strategic nuclear forces to counter Soviet attacks against Europe, the USSR would still have to reckon with the possibility of nuclear retaliation by a European force.

17. Although various political and prestige considerations are also involved, this reasoning has provided the rationale for independent British and French nuclear weapons programs. For a similar admixture of reasons the West Germans are showing increasing interest in nuclear weapons under NATO control, although they continue their emphasis on keeping the US and its strategic forces closely bound to NATO. Some of the smaller NATO members remain unwilling to have nuclear weapons, US or other, on their soil. However, we consider it likely that European desire for a strategic deterrent of their own will increase with the growth of Soviet missile capabilities.

18. There have been various suggestions that the US assist in development of a nuclear force under NATO control. It is argued that this would avoid wasteful duplication in the extremely expensive fields of nuclear weapon and missile development and, by providing for NATO control, would reduce the risks generally associated with a spread of nuclear weapons. We believe that many NATO members would accept in principle the creation of a multilateral NATO capability under SACEUR control and not subject to US veto. However,

retention of warhead control in the hands of a US national as SACEUR would probably fall short of European aspirations for control of their own defenses and might be ineffective in persuading the USSR that a genuinely independent European nuclear force had been created. Alternative NATO control arrangements satisfactory to all concerned would be extremely difficult to work out. France appears determined to proceed with development of its own independent nuclear capability, and, at least for the present, would probably oppose the organization of a NATO nuclear force. However, the French might eventually be willing to cooperate in a NATO nuclear force once they had been assured of an independent national capability and had satisfied themselves they were accepted as a nuclear power along with the US, the USSR, and the UK.<sup>4</sup>

19. In the absence of progress toward development of a US-backed NATO nuclear force, West German interest in securing access to nuclear weapons by other means will probably be stimulated. Bonn would probably first seek to obtain nuclear weapons through bilateral arrangements with the US—a move which would be bitterly opposed both by the Soviets and by many NATO members. If this proved unfeasible, West Germany might decide later in the decade to attempt to associate itself with the French and the other EEC countries in a purely continental nuclear program.<sup>5</sup> While the creation of a continental nuclear grouping including West Germany would also encounter major political difficulties and perhaps vigorous opposition from the UK, it would probably not actually split NATO. The magnitude of the Soviet threat would impose a continuing need for the continental NATO members to stick together not only with each other but with the UK and the US.

<sup>4</sup> See SNIE 20-2-60, "NATO Reactions to Possible Forms of US Nuclear Assistance," dated 11 October 1960, for further discussion of the problem of nuclear weapons sharing.

<sup>5</sup> This subject is more fully discussed in NIE 100-4-60, "Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries," dated 20 September 1960.



### *The Future of the NATO Shield Forces*

20. There is also likely to be increased uncertainty in some European quarters about the military validity and political practicality of the present NATO Shield strategy. As reflected in MC-70, this calls for development of a force equipped with tactical nuclear weapons consisting of some 30 divisions in Central Europe, together with substantial air and naval components. The basic concept is that such a force would be able to deal with various forms of hostile military action short of a massive Soviet assault on Western Europe and, in the event of general war, to prevent or delay the overrunning of Western Europe by Soviet forces pending the outcome of the strategic nuclear exchange. An essential element in this concept is a heavy reliance on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons from the outset as a means of offsetting the overwhelming numerical preponderance of Soviet forces.
21. The question of the size and mission of NATO's Shield forces has always been a particularly vexing one, producing persistent disagreement even among military strategists. Some have argued that US nuclear retaliatory forces provided the only effective counter to Soviet military might and that all that was needed by way of a NATO Shield was a minimal force which would symbolize NATO determination to resist aggression and which, if attacked, would serve as a "tripwire" for strategic nuclear retaliation. Others have felt that the West must go far beyond the present program in attempting to match Soviet forces in Europe. These differences over Shield strategy are being exacerbated by the growth of Soviet nuclear power and its implications for NATO reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.
22. As the Soviet nuclear stockpile continues to grow, the USSR will find it correspondingly easier to respond in kind to NATO use of tactical nuclear weapons without significantly reducing Soviet strategic attack capabilities. The USSR already has sizable numbers of short and medium range missiles which could be used for this purpose. Among Europeans there is concern that even a tactical nuclear exchange would have devastating effects for the heavily populated critical areas of Europe in which NATO bases and installations are concentrated.
23. There is in addition a continuing question as to how far the European NATO members are actually prepared to go toward providing defense forces of the size and quality deemed necessary on military grounds—a question given further urgency by the announced US desire to have the Europeans take over an increased share of the common defense effort now that Europe is again economically strong. The force goals set out at Lisbon during the height of the Korean War have long since been drastically scaled down. Nonetheless, several of the European countries have been persistently derelict in meeting their NATO commitments. Large segments of the European electorate have been preoccupied with pocketbook issues, skeptical about whether the kinds of war NATO is preparing for will ever be fought, or generally hostile to the idea of military preparations. As a result some parliaments have been unwilling to provide sufficient appropriations to meet NATO force goals or have adopted short conscription periods which have made it difficult to develop and maintain adequately trained, combat-ready forces. In addition some countries have subordinated NATO commitments to special national requirements. For example, the bulk of the French NATO-committed forces has been fully engaged in Algeria for the past several years. The British have repeatedly sought to reduce their troop strength in West Germany, citing their budgetary problems and their need to be able to deal with trouble spots outside the NATO area.
24. NATO Shield forces will almost certainly undergo some modification in the years immediately ahead. How NATO policy is likely to veer with respect to the extent to which NATO Shield forces should rely on tactical nuclear weapons and the size of the force required is far from certain. The complex military judgments required, in which US thinking will play a key role, involve doctrinal differences which cannot be readily re-

solved. Much will also depend on the extent to which Bloc policies appear to reinforce or reduce the requirements for Shield forces. In the last analysis, the decisions and budgets involved must be approved by political leaders who must be mindful of the popular mood.

25. We believe that there are likely to be growing pressures from some European sources to reduce the reliance of the Shield force strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, both in response to popular apprehensions regarding nuclear warfare in Europe and in order to give NATO a wider range of choice on how to resist nonnuclear threats. However, many Europeans will probably continue to believe that nuclear weapons provide the only real deterrent to Soviet aggression against Europe and will argue that increased NATO emphasis on conventional capabilities would weaken the credibility of this deterrent. In any event, NATO leaders would almost certainly consider that they would have to have sufficient tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal to counter possible Soviet resort to such weapons.

26. Popular reluctance to support substantial Shield forces is still widespread and might increase—particularly in the event that Soviet diplomatic and military policy encouraged the belief that any substantial effort was unnecessary as well as possibly misdirected. Under such circumstances, some move toward scaling down formal requirements might come to be the only way of placing NATO military planning on a politically supportable basis. However, we believe that Western consciousness of the Soviet threat will probably remain sufficiently great to make at least the principal European NATO members feel compelled to maintain their present general level of military effort. If there were agreement on a Shield force strategy placing less reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, the European NATO members might accept and support a somewhat higher level of effort.

#### *Arms Limitation and Control*

27. Intimately related to the future of NATO's military posture is the question of arms limitation and control. Khrushchev has already

demonstrated that he regards "disarmament" as a rewarding theme to exploit and that he is capable of manipulating it for political ends. In an era of mounting military expenditures and of revolutionary advances in military weaponry, disarmament is likely to have a growing appeal to large segments of the NATO public. Involved in the disarmament issue is not only the question of nuclear controls, with its special implications for the French, but the politically delicate question of the extent of Germany's rearmament. This has already contributed to friction between the UK and West Germany.

28. Over the next decade the USSR will continue to make persistent and skillful use of the disarmament issue, and Western popular and political pressure for some sort of progress in this field will grow. Under such pressures, unless NATO is able to develop and maintain a unified position on arms limitation and control there is likely to be a danger that differences over this subject will damage the cohesion of the alliance.

#### C. NATO Organization and Leadership

##### *The Overall Direction of the Alliance*

29. In practice, NATO has thus far been dominated by the US and the UK. Actual power has, of course, been primarily concentrated in the hands of the US, which has been NATO's principal source of arms and equipment and which, through a series of US Supreme Commanders, has taken the lead in the military planning of the alliance. However, the UK has in effect also occupied a special role by virtue of its close political and military ties with the US and its possession of a nuclear capability. Although France is represented along with the US and the UK in the Standing Group, which prepares the basic directives for NATO military planning and preparations, its military preoccupations outside Europe have helped relegate it to a secondary role. West Germany, together with the lesser NATO members, is represented in the military command structure but not in the Standing Group.

30. These relationships are now coming under increasing challenge from France and West Germany, both of which feel that they should play a more active role. The principal initiatives thus far have come from de Gaulle, who has made a series of proposals generally designed to replace the NATO concept of military integration with one of national forces. He has also sought to promote closer and more comprehensive political coordination and to develop a French-led continental bloc which would have a voice second only to that of the US in NATO councils. Pressures for readjustment are also coming from West Germany, which will almost certainly wish to play a role commensurate with its growing economic power and the growing importance of the West German military contribution to NATO—e.g., to achieve membership in the Standing Group. These pressures will almost certainly require some adjustments in the control of military policy.

31. It appears almost certain that France and Germany will also exercise greater influence on the political policies of their allies than in the past, especially if integration under the Common Market produces greater political cohesion on the continent. However, many of the divergencies of national interest which have thus far inhibited broad NATO coordination outside the military field will remain operative. Additional NATO machinery for political coordination would go part way toward satisfying French aspirations but would not overcome the obstacles to full coordination noted above. Not only the UK but also most of the smaller NATO members would oppose institutional arrangements making France the spokesman for continental interests in NATO. Even the Germans, despite their special ties with the French, would not accept such arrangements.

#### *Integration Versus National Forces*

32. We foresee no easy solution to the military problems posed by French advocacy of the concept of national forces. NATO has never been fully integrated despite its multinational command and staff arrangements and the common infrastructure system. Some

major forces involved in NATO planning have remained under national control—notably the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), the UK Bomber Command, and the US Sixth Fleet—and most logistic arrangements are purely national. However, NATO planning has stressed greater integration and of late the West Germans have come forward with strong pleas for a unified logistic system which would provide their growing military establishment with needed support facilities in the NATO rear areas. It is possible that in some cases greater French autonomy might be accepted without precluding effective cooperation and coordination. However, it is likely that the requirements for unified procurement and command will grow as military weapons systems become more costly and complex.

#### D. The Scope of NATO

33. The years ahead are likely to witness increased pressures from various quarters to have NATO members coordinate their policies not only in the NATO area but throughout the world. To a considerable extent the chief motivations will remain those which have operated more or less unsuccessfully in the past. Individual members will desire to secure the support of their allies (especially the US) in their efforts to deal with pressures against their special interests in Asia or Africa. They will also fear that one or another of their allies (notably the US) is pursuing policies in other parts of the world which may involve undue risks for NATO. However, the erosion of the Western position in Asia, Africa, and even Latin America—and the alacrity with which the Sino-Soviet Bloc has attempted to exploit this situation—appear to be giving new cogency to the contention of de Gaulle and others that without coordinated action by NATO the alliance may find itself outflanked. Some European leaders are deeply troubled by the growing representation of the underdeveloped world in the UN. They fear that, even if these states do not fall under Communist influence, the weakness, irresponsibility and anti-Westernism of many of their leaders will pose increasing problems for NATO.

34. Actual development of a coordinated NATO policy, however, will be extremely difficult. For the immediate future the issue will probably revolve around the efforts of France, Belgium, Portugal, and perhaps the UK to secure unified support for their policies in Africa. However, there are significant differences in outlook in NATO on colonial matters, not only between the above-mentioned countries and others such as the US, West Germany, and the Scandinavians, but also among one another. Moreover, some NATO countries would be unlikely to participate in a coordinated NATO economic and technical assistance program. This is especially the case with France and Portugal, whose African policies are designed to preserve special economic and political ties with their present or former colonial territories.

35. Over the next decade it will become increasingly difficult in many former colonial areas to preserve the kind of special economic and political relationships with the metropole called for under the French Community and at least initially contemplated by Belgium for the Congo. This is especially so in view of the tendency of many new countries to adopt nationalistic economic policies, the falling off in many instances of foreign investor confidence, and the probable expansion of Bloc trade and aid activities. Such prospects may give rise to new proposals for NATO programs in the economic development field. However, the strength of neutralism in the underdeveloped world will make the underdeveloped countries reluctant to accept assistance under NATO auspices. In these circumstances, the NATO countries will have to consider whether to proceed on a bilateral basis or to use the UN or other international organizations as a channel for development aid.

#### E. Other Problems

36. Various other problems also exist or may arise:

a. There will be the continuing problem of East-West trade (e.g., levels of credit granted by NATO countries to Bloc countries, dependence on Bloc purchases) and the related question of trade controls.

b. The question will continue to be raised regarding NATO's relationship with other Free World alliances. The membership of some NATO countries in two or more alliances will continue to pose problems in the future.

c. Specific problems will arise as to whether in certain instances NATO members should act in their collective NATO capacity or through the UN, or other international organizations.

d. The question of NATO membership is likely to come up again, particularly with regard to Spain.

e. Succession problems having significant implications for NATO are likely to arise not only in the crucial cases of France and West Germany, but also in such countries as Turkey and Portugal and possibly Italy.

37. Other possible developments in the course of the decade could have important implications for NATO. For example:

a. If serious declines in the level of economic activity of some or all of the NATO members were to take place, strains among NATO members in the economic sphere might be greatly increased. If a major economic recession occurred in the US, the alliance would encounter very great difficulties.

b. If a radical break in the Sino-Soviet alliance should occur, as we believe unlikely, it might substantially affect the nature of the Soviet threat to Europe.<sup>6</sup>

c. There is also the possibility of technological military developments which might necessitate extensive reconsideration of NATO strategy over and beyond that discussed in Section II B above.

### III. THE INTERPLAY OF NATIONAL FORCES

#### A. General

38. Solution of the problems discussed above is complicated by the fact that they are linked together, along with the critical problems of economic integration and trade blocs, in a complex readjustment of relationships not

<sup>6</sup> See NIE 100-3-60, "Sino-Soviet Relations," dated 9 August 1960, especially paragraphs 5 and 67-71.

only as between the US, Canada, and the European NATO members but among the latter. Thus, proposed solutions to any given problem will be judged by NATO's European members not only in terms of their value in strengthening the alliance as a whole but also for their implications for the individual national position and aspirations of the country or countries concerned.

#### B. France

39. De Gaulle's return to power has brought important elements of strength to France and the West. He has overcome, at least for the present, the political weakness and drift which had previously disrupted and immobilized France. However, the extreme character of many of his views has posed major problems in NATO; indeed, one of the principal questions facing the alliance is how to accommodate de Gaulle without weakening NATO's posture.

40. De Gaulle will almost certainly continue in various ways to press toward his goal of establishing French power and leadership on the continent. He recognizes a continuing need for NATO and for close US association with it. However, his belief that integration of forces in NATO represents a derogation of national sovereignty will not die easily. De Gaulle will also continue his efforts to establish French hegemony by developing the EEC into a politically as well as economically close-knit bloc. This will almost certainly involve major strains with the UK and at least intermittent friction with the smaller EEC countries and West Germany. Without progress toward an Algerian solution, the bulk of French forces will remain in Algeria and the French will probably be more vehement than ever in their demands for support from their allies.

#### C. West Germany


41. West Germany will also play a more active and assertive role in NATO affairs in the next decade. To be sure, the West Germans will almost certainly continue to believe that they cannot go it alone and must instead base their policies on participation in a strong, US-supported NATO and on strengthening their economic and political ties with France and their other EEC partners. However, the re-emergence of German economic and military strength is already producing changes in the German mood—a greater sensitivity to British and other Western criticism of the sort roused by the antisemitic incidents and the attempted base agreement with Spain of last winter, and a greater dissatisfaction with WEU arms restrictions directed at them, in both the nuclear and nonnuclear fields. They are likely to bring recurrent pressures on their allies for political support on such issues as Berlin and reunification, and to criticize the British for what they regard as weakness vis-a-vis the Bloc and as divide-and-rule tactics vis-a-vis the continent. At the same time there is likely to be continuing rivalry with France for political leadership of the continent. This is likely to manifest itself in recurrent friction with France over the pace and manner of economic and political integration and over the issue of military integration, on which West German views differ sharply from those of de Gaulle. Adenauer's disappearance from the scene would probably lead to an increase in German assertiveness, but probably not to a significant shift from present policies—either toward a militant reunification policy or toward neutralism and accommodation with the East.

#### D. The UK

42. In the next decade, the UK's pre-eminent position among the European members of NATO is likely to face serious challenges. The creation of the Common Market threatens to exclude the UK economically and to an increasing degree politically from the continent; the European Free Trade Association

(EFTA, or Outer Seven) promises little by way of compensating benefits nor has it been very effective thus far as a bargaining device. The UK has had to back away from its ambitious efforts of the late 1950's to develop and produce its own long-range missiles. With the growth of West German military power the importance of the British Army on the Rhine has declined.

43. British accommodation with the Common Market will remain difficult to achieve. Although the British will to some extent be able to play on West German resentment of French efforts to dominate continental affairs, these prospects are dimmed by German suspicions of British policy toward the continent and by the persistent suspicion of the Germans among the British people. At least for the present, the strong interest in negotiation with the USSR displayed by the government, and even more strongly by the Labor opposition, will add to British difficulties.



#### E. The Smaller NATO Countries

44. The smaller members of the alliance will also have their problems—those in the Outer Seven because of the threat to their economic interests in the Common Market area, the EEC members because of the looming power of France and West Germany, and all of them because the growth of big power influence will relegate them to seats even further to the rear in the NATO conference room. On the whole, however, we believe that these countries will continue to believe that their interests can best be served within rather than outside the alliance.

#### IV. THE ROLE OF THE US

45. In contrast to the early years of the alliance, we see the NATO of the 1960's as one in which Western European members feel less dependent on US material support and are more confident and assertive. Hence they are likely to be less responsive to US wishes than in the past and will probably seek in various ways to enhance their own status vis-a-vis the US.

46. Nevertheless, even a more fully integrated and self-sufficient Western Europe would not match the power of either the US or the USSR, and would continue to depend on association with US economic and military strength and on US leadership in the continuing contest with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Indeed, the growth of Bloc power and of Bloc pressures against the non-Communist world may push the European NATO members toward even closer association with the US than at present. Specifically, the European NATO powers will continue to rely on US strategic deterrent forces to play an important role in bolstering European defenses and on the US to carry much of the burden of weapons development. They will also continue to look to the US—as the most powerful NATO member, and one largely detached from intra-European bickering—to take the lead in proposing policies and resolving differences.

47. Hence the European NATO countries will remain highly concerned to assure continued full US participation in the alliance, despite their tendency to be less tractable under US leadership than in the past. They can probably be persuaded to assume a greater part of the financial and military burdens of the alliance, and might accept some reduction in US force commitments to the extent that these could be justified militarily. However, they would be seriously disturbed by any unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe which appeared to reflect a downgrading of NATO in US priorities.

SECRET

SECRET