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29 June 1961

SC No. 01170/61
Copy No. 250

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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









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Leadership within the South Korean junta is still not firmly established, and there continue to be reports of plots to oust the coup leader, Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui. Pak's primary support comes from junior officers who are pushing for a clean-up of the military. This, however, has aroused the opposition of senior generals identified with the Rhee and Chang Myon regimes. Police-state controls are being used increasingly in an attempt to assure Pak's position.



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SOUTH KOREA

The struggle between the group of younger officers supporting Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui and senior officers led by Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, nominal head of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), appears to be intensifying. The inner circle of the junta led by Pak has not yet consolidated its control over the military, and there continue to be reports of plots to oust Pak. The impatient reform-minded junior officers are eager to oust all senior generals identified with the Rhee and Chang Myon governments.

Pak appears to be moving toward ever-increasing police state controls to assure his position. Security boss Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil has ordered the armed forces purged of all personnel involved in antirevolutionary or anti-Pak activities. He reportedly has warned the army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o, that any interference with the purge would cost him his position.

Kim Chong-pil and Pak have been close associates since the inception of the 16 May coup. On 14 June, Kim was named director of the newly organized South Korean central intelli-

gence agency, which has responsibility for coordinating the collection of information, including military, and investigation of all matters at home and abroad related to national security and criminal activity.

Recently promulgated ex post facto laws are so broadly drawn that almost any person regarded as a threat to the junta could be accused of some act making him liable to the death penalty or a long prison term. Retired Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, newly appointed defense minister, has observed that the situation within the Supreme Council and nation can be stabilized only by the emergence of an unchallenged leader.

Meanwhile, public references by the regime to its initial pledge to return the government to civilian control are becoming more vague. The appointment of the first two civilian cabinet ministers on 22 May--to head the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development--is not a harbinger of an early return to civilian authority, although additional civilians may be appointed to head other largely economic ministries.

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