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CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE

THE LABYRINTH — THE MEMOIRS OF HITLER'S SECRET SERVICE CHIEF. By *Walter Schellenberg*. (New York: Harper. 1956. Pp. 423.)

A nimble, detached, and cynical mind aided Schellenberg in avoiding entanglement in the mysticism and ritualistic claptrap with which Himmler and Heydrich had indoctrinated the leadership cadres of their SS Elite Guards, without — on the other hand — implicating him in conspiracies against the regime. By no means a blind adherent of the Fuehrer, his boast to have on occasion registered dissent from some of Hitler's more outlandish "intelligence" schemes, can be believed. Among the blind, Schellenberg was one-eyed. His special calling as chief of the regime's foreign intelligence service sharpened his critical faculties, enabling him to gain a more timely and accurate grasp of the obstacles in the way of Germany's quest for world leadership.

Schellenberg was an avowed protege of Himmler's and of Heydrich's. The former held a protecting hand over Schellenberg until the bitter end, a circumstance aiding Schellenberg's phenomenal luck in surviving the vagaries of the Third Reich. It may be said that he paid a debt of gratitude to Himmler by painting him in *The Labyrinth* as a weak rather than a vicious man. It is difficult to visualize in Schellenberg's characterization of Himmler the protagonist and executor of a carefully planned program of mass extermination on a scale the modern world had not heretofore witnessed.

The Labyrinth throws into relief one salient aspect of Schellenberg's personality: his exceptional dexterity in the manipulation of power factions within the leadership of the Nazi Party without ever becoming too closely identified with any one of them. As a handy introduction into the techniques for survival, *The Labyrinth* can be recommended.

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Only toward the end, when there was little more to lose, did Schellenberg decide to take calculated risks. The *Bernadotte* episode, though abortive, was handled by Schellenberg with some of the daring and imagination that stemmed from despair.

While his rank and position doubtlessly afforded Schellenberg a vantage point from which to observe Germany's inexorable drift toward defeat, he was frequently found wanting in the intellectual equipment needed to project events, which he correctly observed, into a framework of global developments. The outline of peace terms which he presented to Himmler at Zhitomir reflects a surprising degree of naivete in gauging the temper of the world powers ranged against Germany — their willingness to accept Germany's ascendancy in the European concert as a permanent arrangement he took blithely for granted.

On the other hand, some of Schellenberg's more visceral responses turned out to be sound, for example those reflected in his assessment of Britain's determination to fight to the end. He clearly perceived the folly of Hitler's policies in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union and vainly raised his voice in protest.

Not having read the complete manuscript of Schellenberg's memoirs, it is difficult for me to pass judgment on whether or not certain notable omissions should in fairness be blamed on Schellenberg rather than on its publisher. The translation from the German is mediocre, and regret must be voiced that the final editing job, which would have benefited from annotations, was not entrusted to a man of the calibre of Trevor-Roper. In the circumstances, the reader in search of true enlightenment about the inner workings of the German Secret Service, should be cautioned to beware, because *The Labyrinth* is replete with factual inaccuracies and naturally suffers from its author's bias. What it conveys at best is an episodic study of human behavior under conditions of strain inflicted by a struggle for supremacy within an oligarchy untrammelled by human laws of ethical standards and dedicated to the methods of genocide and terror to maintain its sway.

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Contrasted with most of the Nazi biographies, as well as those written by leading men of the Third Reich who claimed to have belonged to the opposition, it lacks the whining self-righteousness, the posture of injured innocence, and frantic endeavor to blame the next guy, the shameless alacrity in throwing overboard the ballast of long-standing friendships, the perfunctory expressions of horror at the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, which make the perusal of most of them such a repugnant chore. In my talks with Schellenberg, which took place in 1945 in the Military Intelligence (MI) Interrogation Center at Oberursel, I found him to be personable, adaptable, and yet not devoid of a certain dignity in facing up to the prospects of being called to account for some of the activities in which he had been engaged. He did not go out of his way to pin responsibility on his former associates, nor did he pretend that his efforts to bring about a negotiated peace were motivated by considerations other than a clear realization that Germany's game was up.

Schellenberg makes passing reference to his interrogation by the British service. As a matter of fact, he had been subjected to an exceedingly painstaking debriefing, backed up by a formidable body of detailed data at the disposal of the so-called Counter Intelligence War Room, a joint British-American enterprise, representing probably the most competently operated repository of counterespionage data the world had ever seen. The British report on Schellenberg was up to the customarily high professional standards of their services, especially in the field of intelligence reportage. Even today a reading of the Schellenberg report can be considered a rewarding professional experience, although most of the incidents it relates are devoid of contemporary significance. In a way it represented a milestone in the field of counterespionage, inasmuch as never before in modern history had an opportunity offered to perform an autopsy on the remains of the intelligence services of a defeated world power.

Twelve years have dimmed my recollection of some of the details of the Schellenberg interrogation report. I do recall that the British interrogator poked fun at Schellenberg's rather

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romantic concepts of the British Secret Service and at the inaccuracies of some of the factual data with which he tried to back up his views. However, I am somewhat inclined to doubt British candor on that score. After all, the Venlo incident must still have rankled with them; the interrogation report on Schellenberg in the version made available to us was singularly uncommunicative concerning that incident. In talking to him about the aftermath of the Venlo incident, I found him reluctant to go into any detail. Since my brief did not call for coverage along those lines, I abstained from exerting pressure. (At the time I drew the possibly erroneous inference that the British had requested him to restrain himself in passing out information concerning the results of the Stevens-Best debriefing.) I am, incidentally, prepared to believe his protestations that the abduction of Stevens and Best was contrary to his own ideas regarding long range exploitation of the link to the British service, and that he acquiesced in participating in the kidnapping only with great reluctance.

In the chapter on *The Reichswehr and the Red Army* little is being added to the already known. The analysis given in John W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Nemesis of Power* has a much more authentic ring. My own opinion, conjectural at best, is that the purge of the Soviet command had been in the cards for some time, that the deception practiced by the Germans was recognized by Stalin as such, but that it came in very handy to garb the purge of Tukhachevsky and his associates with a cloak of legality. The rifling of the German General Staff's archives is unlikely to have yielded more than official data pertaining to the various transactions which, with the full knowledge of the Kremlin, enabled the Reichswehr to avail itself of the logistic support of the Red Army in secretly rebuilding its cadres.

In the chapter on *Active Espionage*, Schellenberg rehashes the Sosnovsky espionage case without adding anything new. (For reasons best known to the publishers, the names of the principals are not spelled out in full.) After the end of the war Sosnovsky returned to West Berlin, and it is fair to assume

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that he resumed his erstwhile activities, this time in the employ of the Polish Communist services.

The investigation of the *Beer Cellar Explosion* fails to provide an answer to the pivotal question: who actually engineered it? It has never been satisfactorily explained why the Nazis forewent the opportunity of putting the alleged perpetrator, a man named Elser, on show trial. In fact Elser was never brought to trial but put away in the Dachau concentration camp where he suffered death just before Germany's surrender. The actual criminal investigation was conducted under the aegis of Amt V, the Criminal Police Division of the RSHA. I talked after the war to Kriminalrat Hans Lobbes, who had been in charge of the investigation and who claimed that Elser's guilt had been proven beyond peradventure: he too was unable to shed light on the identity of the actual instigators.

The chapter on *A Japanese-Polish Conspiracy* does scant justice to the scope and success of the collaboration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and elements of the Polish resistance. Onadera, the senior representative of Japanese intelligence in Europe, is referred to as "The Japanese Ambassador in Stockholm," although the position occupied by him was that of Military Attaché. (The report of his interrogation should be considered required reading for anyone interested in the Japanese modus operandi.)

Schellenberg makes passing reference to Colonel Ronge, the chief of the Austrian Secret Service, in the days of the Austrian Empire known as the Kaiserlich — Koenigliche Evidenzbuero. At the time Schellenberg met him Ronge was a historical relic, having been the head of the Austrian counterespionage service since before World War I. His name at that time became associated with the uncovering of one of the Okhrana's most brilliant and successful espionage operations, the recruitment of Col. Alfred Redl, a high-ranking Austrian staff officer, as a Russian espionage agent. Ronge broke this case — too late, however, to prevent the Russians from getting their hands on Austria's war plans. Many Austrian, Czechoslovak, and Polish intelligence officers counted themselves among Ronge's most prized pupils, and the enlistment of his services by the Germans is

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bound to have yielded a wealth of significant personality information. Among ranking Austrian intelligence officers who switched sides at the time of the Anschluss was Colonel (later General) Lahousen de Vivremont, who promptly joined the Abwehr (military intelligence). It was he who had the foresight to keep a copy of Canaris' diary, produced it before the Nuremberg Tribunal, and rendered testimony which implicated Field Marshall Keitel and General Jodl in the perpetration of war crimes.

Schellenberg devotes one paragraph to *Operation Northpole*, which contains nothing new. Northpole undoubtedly ranks among the best counterespionage operations undertaken by the German services and it brought in its wake one of the most serious setbacks suffered by the Allied side in the silent war.

Schellenberg's account of *Aktion Bernhard*, the RSHA's counterfeit enterprise, sheds significant light on his accuracy as a reporter of facts and the extent of his truthfulness in relating facts that might conceivably implicate him in the very practices for which he castigates Kaltenbrunner, Mueller, and Meisinger. The true story underlying "Aktion Bernhard" has been told in a carefully documented article in the July 1957 issue of *Harper's Magazine*, entitled "The World's Greatest Counterfeiters," by Murray Teigh Bloom. The reader is invited to study that article and in its light assess Schellenberg's veracity in stating that "the most skilled engravers in Germany were drafted (sic), sworn to secrecy, and set to work in three shifts." No doubt Schellenberg knew better.

How much did Schellenberg's organization effectively accomplish in its operations targeted against the USSR? In going down the list of Amt VI's major exploits, the reader will be arrested by the claim that through one of its centers direct connection had been established with two of Marshall Rokosovsky's General Staff officers. I have seen no mention of this alleged penetration in any other pertinent debriefing. I doubt its authenticity. I venture the guess that this alleged operation, if it in effect existed except in the imagination of a fabricator, was controlled on the other end.

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Operation Zeppelin, the massive drop of parachute agents behind Soviet lines, constituted the main effort of Amt VI directed against the territories of the USSR still under Kremlin control, particularly the Caucasus. After the German surrender, the British service undertook what looked to me like a carefully planned roundup of VI C (USSR and Far East division) key personnel headed by SS Sturmbannfuhrer Hengelhaupt, which made it rather difficult for us in the field to form a first-hand assessment of the efficacy of "Zeppelin" in terms of its intelligence productivity. (Needless to stress, I am not suggesting that this information was purposely being withheld from us.) Conceptually, the operation depended on the success of illegal entry into territory in which the organs of the NKVD reigned supreme: it is fair to assume that the Soviets countered "Zeppelin" with an equally massive defense taking full advantage of the enormous manpower reserves of their internal security service. Schellenberg in his description of "Zeppelin" concedes that the NKVD succeeded in inflicting sizeable losses and in undermining it from within, aided and abetted by the treatment the Germans were meting out to Russian minorities. The defection of Colonel Rodionov, if true, would testify to the high quality of the NKVD's countermeasures. More likely than not Rodionov was a Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) infiltrator rather than a disaffected collaborator of the Germans, as Schellenberg wants his readers to believe.

The next operation mentioned by Schellenberg, the *very important center* taken over from the Abwehr, is in fact one of the legendary operations of World War II. Its principals were a White Russian General named Turkul, a White Russian intelligence operator named Ira Longin with a long record of intelligence work under the aegis of a heavily penetrated White Russian emigre organization in Yugoslavia, and a Jew named Kauder, alias Klatt. The operation had been masterminded by the chief of Abwehrstelle Sofia, Colonel Wagner, alias Dehlius. It eventually moved to Vienna and thence to Salzburg just one step ahead of the advancing Soviet armies. During the war the Allies had effectively monitored and de-

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coded the traffic of two transmitters (Max and Moritz) under Klatt's control. It had never been possible, however, to monitor the traffic allegedly being transmitted from the USSR by Klatt's well-placed sources, and consequently the Allied services entertained serious doubt as to the authenticity of the material, although its outstanding quality appeared to argue against outright fabrication. After the war, the British service, operating on the hypothesis that Ira Longin, and presumably Klatt also, were in fact high-level Soviet agents, made a determined attempt to break the case but failed to extract confessions from Ira Longin or his associates. This notwithstanding the fact that the British have never been shaken in their conviction that the intercepted material was in fact Soviet deception and that, toward the end of the war, the RIS used the Klatt channel to launch items of major strategic deception. The British cited the operation as a classical example of RIS deception and as an illustration of Soviet willingness to sacrifice whole divisions for the purpose of establishing the validity of a controlled channel. The German General Staff and especially its chief, Generaloberst Guderian, placed unreserved trust in the reliability of the material produced by the Klatt combine; Guderian in person, at a conference specifically called to decide the fate of Klatt and his associates, stated in emphatic terms that the General Staff would not want to be held accountable for the consequences should it be decided to liquidate the net.

In the chapter on *Operations of the Secret Service*, Schellenberg claims that Germany was exceptionally successful in "her wireless defense organization," boasting that "at one time we had at least sixty-four 'turned-round' stations transmitting to Moscow for us." I consider it next to impossible to arrive at a reliable estimate of the relative successes of Germany's W/T defense system without an equally dependable estimate of the total strength of active Soviet W/T transmitters operating from soil under German control. Also, the unknown factor of the incidence of Soviet triples among the 64 doubles, renders a purely statistical approach as a gauge of German successes quite meaningless. Suffice it to say that

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the German services were able to develop a cadre of experts in the field of countering Soviet W/T operations, who were able to attain a number of outstanding successes. Amt IV, (Gestapo) rather than Schellenberg's organization, scored heavily in this field. Source material on this subject is contained in the debriefing of Kopkow, who was in charge of the responsible branch in Amt IV. One of the best Amt IV operatives in the field was an Austrian named Sanitz, whom the Soviets abducted from a Vienna hospital only to return him to freedom a few years later.

The Case of Richard Sorge, as related by Schellenberg, merely proves that Schellenberg has since joined the ranks of those who suspected all along that Sorge was a Soviet spy. Schellenberg refers to him as an associate of "the IVth Division of the MVD" although it is pretty well agreed by now that he was an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (RV).

In the chapter captioned *At War with Russia*, Schellenberg commends Fremde Heere Ost, a department of the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) serving as repository and evaluation center for all military intelligence obtained on the Soviet Union, which was headed by General Gehlen, as "doing excellent work in the correlation and objective evaluation of information." This accolade appears of more than historical interest in the light of subsequent developments, since historically speaking, Fremde Heere Ost formed the nucleus of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), with General Gehlen as its first head.

Of some interest is Schellenberg's description of his relations with SS Sturmbannfuehrer Meisinger, one of the stalwarts of Amt IV, who at the time of Germany's surrender served as Police Attaché with the German Embassy in Tokyo; a cover designation designed to conceal the identity of his parent organization, the Gestapo. Like SS Gruppenfuehrer Heinrich Mueller, the chief of Amt IV, Meisinger had come up through the ranks of the old Bayrische Staatspolizei. I can bear out Schellenberg's rather graphic description of the man, having seen him in Oberursel. He was eventually turned over to the Poles, who strung him up. In this context it may

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be well to comment on the fact that the worst elements in the RSHA were for the most part Bavarians and Austrians. The backbone of Amt IV consisted of Bavarians of the stripe of Mueller and Meisinger. Kaltenbrunner, the last head of the RSHA, was an Austrian from Linz. Prussians of the calibre of Diehls, Gisevius, and Kriminalrat Heller in the end wielded little influence.

I found the discussion of Mueller particularly interesting because it dwells on the existence of left-wing tendencies among the SS leadership. In this context Schellenberg purports to quote remarks made by the chief of Amt IV which Schellenberg construed as suggesting a decided change in Mueller's outlook toward possibility of a separate peace with Russia. I am unable to place my hands on the source material, but it has been seriously contended that the RIS, through the device of the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) was able to disaffect a significant segment of the Gestapo.

The French end of the doubling operation, involving the Grand Chef Trepper himself, had been placed in the care of a Kriminalrat Pannwitz, a representative of Amt IV B, the counterespionage branch of the Gestapo. From all accounts he and his associates handled the operation with great skill and imagination — according to some with too much of the latter because, so the allegation runs, the build-up material passed to the Moscow Center in the end provided the Soviets with a pretty accurate reading of German capabilities and intentions in France. The school of thought which in effect suspected a Soviet triple operation found sustenance in the disappearance of Pannwitz and his rumored apprehension by the Soviets. (Pannwitz has in the meanwhile returned from Soviet imprisonment, and a competent interrogation will no doubt serve to shed light upon some of the hidden recesses of the Red Orchestra compromise.) Mueller himself, who spent the last days of the Battle of Berlin in Hitler's bunker in the Reich's Chancellery, likewise disappeared from sight, participating in the sortie of Bormann's group. Schellenberg's belief that Mueller joined the Communists merely repeats the essence of a spate of completely unsubstantiated rumors to that

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effect. The Allies made several vain attempts at enlisting Soviet help in locating Mueller's whereabouts if he was still alive. The only official reaction came from the Soviet Military Attaché in London who, obviously in order to stave off further Allied importuning, queried them with a straight face as to the correct spelling of Mueller's first name. That effectively ended the Allied search.

The chapter on the *Assassination of Heydrich* was obviously written without the benefit of hindsight. As it turned out, Himmler, who "had made up his mind that the whole affair was staged by the British Secret Service, and that the three assassins had been dropped by parachute near Prague for this special purpose" was on the right track. Schellenberg, who suspected Himmler and Bormann, was wrong. No mention is made of the frightful revenge wreaked by Heydrich's successor, Reichs Protektor Hermann Frank, on the village of Lydice.

The personal relationship between Schellenberg and Admiral Canaris was a curiously ambivalent one. It would have been interesting to hear Canaris' side of the story. There can be few doubts that Canaris felt personally attracted to a young SS officer, not cast in the common mold of an SS thug and quite obviously treating the older and more experienced man with considerable deference. Had Canaris been alive to tell his story, he would undoubtedly have dwelled on the many patent advantages to be derived from staying close to a ranking official of Hitler's secret service, a man known to be in the confidence of both Heydrich and Himmler. Schellenberg, on the other hand, is bound to have derived considerable professional benefit from his talks with Canaris and aid in sorting out his own untested ideas on the future complexion of a unified German intelligence system. In his biography, Schellenberg stays just short of admitting that it was he himself who engineered Canaris' downfall. His description of the events leading up to the Admiral's arrest and his own role in the actual detention are a masterpiece of double entendre. Without ever frontally attacking the former chief of Germany's military intelligence service, Schellenberg manages to convey

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to the reader the impression that Canaris was in fact an unprincipled toady (tears at Heydrich's funeral "After all, he was a great man. I have lost a friend in him"), a traitor to Germany, and a tottering old fool (the tearful embraces in Fuerstenwald). Schellenberg's surmise that Himmler was instrumental in staving off Canaris' execution is unsupported by any other facts available to me. Some light has in the meanwhile been shed on the circumstances surrounding Canaris' execution in the trial against SS Standartenfuehrer Huppenkoten, the last head of Amt IV B, who implemented the order. Kaltenbrunner, the chief of the RSHA, whom I questioned on this matter in May 1945, disavowed all direct responsibility in the execution, but referred to the contents of the famous diary kept by the Admiral as irrefutable evidence of his treasonous activities. There can be no doubt that Canaris was privy to the plot of the 20th of July, without lending it much active support, and that the activities of General Oster had deeply implicated him. Since the end of the war an attempt has been made to vindicate Canaris, casting him in the role of the actual mainspring of the German resistance. This, in my estimation, is a patently incorrect assessment of a man who, in spite of many decent impulses and an exceptionally clear perception of Germany's ultimate doom at a time when Hitler's power seemed to have reached its zenith, failed to measure up to the exigencies of true greatness.

In passing, Schellenberg offers a fairly accurate appraisal of prevailing conditions in the Abwehr, pointing to Canaris' penchant for "over-inflating his organization, indiscriminately enrolling serious workers and dubious riffraff," feebly attempting reforms and then allowing them to peter out. He fails to mention that in those very respects his own organization, the foreign intelligence branch of the RSHA, Amt VI, could hardly be set up as a shining example, and that the subsequent merger of the two organizations brought no tangible improvements.

There was no love lost between Schellenberg and Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the new chief of the RSHA who in 1943 was appointed by Hitler personally to step into the position made

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vacant by Heydrich's untimely death. Schellenberg confines himself to discussing the professional rivalries between himself and his nominal superior in essentially personal terms, making no bones of the fact that he would have liked to bring about a secession of Amt VI from the main body of the RSHA. Kaltenbrunner clearly perceived that Schellenberg posed a serious threat to his position and was not about to allow the foreign intelligence service to be wrested from his control. Schellenberg merely hints at this by complaining that Kaltenbrunner "sought to surround himself entirely with Austrians," actually a carefully conceived strategem which confronted Schellenberg in his own organization with a sizeable bloc of "Austrian" officials whose first loyalty belonged to Kaltenbrunner himself. They consisted for the most part of members of the old Austrian Nazi underground who, like Kaltenbrunner, came out of hiding at the time of the Anschluss. Their intellectual leader was the redoubtable Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl who has publicized in a book entitled "The Secret Front" what might be referred to as the Austrian contribution to the German intelligence effort. The division of Amt VI which dealt with operations in Southeastern Europe bore the designation VI E. Under the powerful aegis of Kaltenbrunner it soon became one of the most favored elements of the RSHA, being used by him also as Hauskapelle, a German euphemism for an espionage apparatus within an intelligence organization. In listing the professional exploits of his organization, Schellenberg makes no mention whatsoever of VI E which, for example, played an important part in the overthrow of the Horthy regime in Hungary, replacing it with the Arrow Cross movement and its leader Szalazy. Schellenberg may be forgiven for not mentioning a staybehind operation in the Balkans, organized by VI E personnel, which never came to fruition, because of the supervening collapse of Germany. Among the more prominent RSHA officials representing the Austrian clique could be found Skorzeny, who headed a special department concerned with action-type operations, and the notorious Eichmann, in command of a special task force gathering up Jews in occupied countries and channeling them into extermi-

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nation camps. Through Dr. Hoettl, Kaltenbrunner made a belated attempt at establishing his own channel to the Allies by means of contacting the office of Allen Dulles, representative of the Office of Strategic Services in Bern. Kaltenbrunner, from the moment of his capture by American troops in May 1945 until his demise at the end of a rope, insisted that his classification as war criminal was the result of a terrible misunderstanding; while it was true that in his capacity as chief of the RSHA he was also in charge of Amt IV, the executive arm of Germany's genocidal program, in actual fact the chain of command had completely bypassed him, with Mueller directly taking his orders from Himmler. During several sessions I had with him shortly after his capture he plead with considerable eloquence that his overriding concern had been intelligence, more specifically the conduct of operations in Southeastern Europe. This story he repeated so persistently that in the end he may have come to believe it himself. Schellenberg's account certainly fails to support it.

The merger of Amt VI and the Military Intelligence Service, the Abwehr, came about in the fall of 1943. The affair was solemnized at a meeting in Salzburg over which Kaltenbrunner presided. During an interim period the basic structure of the Abwehr had been left intact, affiliating it as a quasi self-contained operating branch named Mil Amt to the main body of the RSHA and placing it in the charge of a career General Staff Officer, Colonel Hansen, who — it soon appeared — was not equal to the task. Hansen was arrested after the 20 July attempt, and — as Canaris correctly surmised — a wealth of incriminating material was found in his files. The arrest was likewise carried out by Schellenberg, a fact which he fails to mention. Hansen was found guilty of treason and hanged. In the summer of 1944 the amalgamation of the Abwehr was completed, and its various tasks were divided between Amt VI and Amt IV B. Schellenberg's account is incorrect in stating that the following took place: "From the middle of 1944 I took over Canaris' Military Intelligence Department, incorporating its various tasks in departments IV and VI of the Counterespionage organization." In actual

fact the counterespionage branch of the Abwehr, which bore the designation of III F, was integrated with the counterespionage service of the RSHA, Amt IV B, and was thus *not* placed under Schellenberg. After the surrender of Germany, this fact became a source of unpleasantness to the old III F crowd, who found themselves lumped together with the detested Gestapo and exposed to its odium.

Out of the blue, the name Dr. Langbehn is thrown into the debate. First, Dr. Kersten inquires whether Schellenberg had frequent conversations with him, and subsequently Himmler begs Schellenberg "to improve his relationship with Langbehn as well." In the chapter on *Peace Feelers*, the reader is told that Dr. Langbehn had been negotiating with Allied representatives in Switzerland and that he had done so (or was alleged to have done so) with Schellenberg's blessing. In the chapter on *The Downfall of Admiral Canaris* Schellenberg complains that Mueller and Kaltenbrunner had tried in 1943 to denounce Schellenberg as a British agent in connection with the Langbehn affair. To the uninitiated reader the story as it stands is meaningless. Actually the Langbehn incident deserves less cursory treatment. The relationship between Langbehn and Himmler in fact represented Himmler's first sub rosa contact with the German resistance movement which in 1944 led to the abortive July attempt. Himmler eventually withdrew his support from Langbehn and permitted him to be executed. It has been alleged that the growth of the anti-Nazi resistance movement and the surprisingly ramified strength it displayed during the critical days of July 1944 cannot conceivably have escaped the vigilance of the Gestapo. At least — so the argument runs — both Mueller and Himmler must have been cognizant of its scope and of the nature of its plans. Some such thought may have crossed Hitler's mind when he entrusted the investigation of the 20 July plot to Kaltenbrunner rather than to Himmler. It would have been interesting to learn the full story, if we can assume that Schellenberg was in possession of all the facts. There are in Schellenberg's book some oblique references to the fact that Himmler was loath to have Schellenberg concern himself with Canaris' oppositional

activities and Schellenberg confessed himself to being somewhat puzzled by Himmler's solicitude for the Admiral's fate. Quite conceivably there may have been a side to Himmler's extra-curricular plans and activities completely unknown to Schellenberg.

Schellenberg's persistent attempts to win over his protector, Himmler, to an active exploration of possibilities to negotiate peace with the Allies, culminating in a talk with Himmler in Zhitomir which Schellenberg describes, naturally colored his quest for intelligence. Operation "Cicero" and the intelligence it yielded, in the sight of Schellenberg, served their principal purpose by demonstrating the turn of the tide to Germany's detriment. Schellenberg makes no mention in this context that, in order to derive maximum benefit from the total of the German intelligence product, he co-opted into Amt VI Dr. Giselher Wirsing, a historian of vast experience, whom he commissioned to prepare intelligence summaries. These summaries, put out at irregular intervals, were known as *Egmont Berichte*. They were given the highest classification with a distribution confined to six officials of the Third Reich, among them Hitler, Kaltenbrunner, Himmler, and Ribbentrop. Their underlying purpose, as clearly understood by Wirsing, was to buttress the Schellenberg thesis of the necessity of a negotiated peace. In reconstructing some of the reports as originally submitted by him (no originals have been located), it was clearly revealed that the "Cicero" material formed the backbone of the *Egmont Berichte*.

A few comments regarding Schellenberg's personal record may be in order. He came up through the ranks of the old Gestapo. Beyond reasonable doubt, he acquired first-hand knowledge of the methods applied by that organization in extorting confessions. Those methods were quite prevalent and by no means spontaneous. As a matter of fact, the orderly German mind had in fact conceived a bureaucratic term for the practice of torture which can be found in numerous official documents: "*verschaeufte Vernehmung*." I am inclined to give credence to Schellenberg's aversion to such practices, and the incident described as evidence of this may have occurred.

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However, the fact that his record is a relatively unblemished one should be attributed to luck rather than to predisposition. Had Schellenberg been ordered by Himmler to take over the command of an SS Einsatzkommando, I strongly doubt that he would have staked his career and possibly his life on a refusal. (The Chief of Amt V, Kriminalrat Nebe, a professional criminologist with no Nazi background, was assigned to the command of an Einsatzkommando and is alleged to have superintended large-scale liquidation of Russian civilians behind the German frontlines. Schellenberg presumably would have done the same, if ordered.) Schellenberg's role in bringing about the release and exchange of Jews in German captivity is not in contradiction to this analysis of his character. His errands of mercy were part and parcel of a cold-blooded deal in which the imprisoned Jews were mere pawns. He must have had a clear appreciation of the fact that any further large-scale atrocities would merely lead to an intensification of Allied punitive measures and that by means of serving as an "honest broker" in putting across those transactions, he stood a good chance of extricating himself from a share in the collective responsibility which his associates, especially his great protector Himmler, had incurred. I have a clear recollection of discussing with Schellenberg the odious role played by Himmler in the perpetration of what may go down as world history's most colossal crime, without evoking more than an expression of polite doubt whether or not those crimes were politically sound. The reader is bound to carry away the same impression after reading the chapter on *Operation Zeppelin*.

Summing up my impressions of *The Labyrinth*, I fail to discern in its narrative any significant contributions to our understanding of the principles of intelligence tradecraft, let alone their application. Amt VI never developed a coherent and practicable system of intelligence planning. The merger with the more experienced Abwehr came too late to redound to the benefit of Amt VI. Especially in the leadership bracket, the absence of experienced personnel was calamitous. Also, the leading men of Amt VI, and this particularly applies in the case of Schellenberg, were forced to spend an unconscionable

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amount of time in protecting their rear. Special missions, such as the grotesque plan to abduct the Duke of Windsor, monopolized time and effort which could more usefully have been deployed against truly important targets. The fact that Amt VI was unable to shed its close kinship with Amt IV, the dreaded Gestapo, militated against its effectiveness in enlisting the support of elements in disaccord with the excesses of the Nazi system and limited the circle of its operatives to party zealots and SS fanatics whose radius of understanding of world affairs was circumscribed by Nazi doctrine. Germany's collapse brought about the complete obliteration of what has aptly been described as the "SS-Staat" and of its coercive organs. Its practices and concepts have not been bequeathed upon the intelligence service of the Federal Republic. A fitting epitaph for the organization and the men who operated it would thus be: "*Spurlos versenkt.*"

CLINTON GALLAGHER

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