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(b)(3)

[Redacted] 2/15

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(S)

ORD-0017-84

3 FEB 1984

[Redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. E. Hineman
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM : Philip K. Eckman
Director of Research and Development

SUBJECT : UCLA Arms Control Verification Conference

1. In the interest of maintaining relationships with centers of academic excellence and in advancing scholarship on the important question of verification of arms control agreement, ORD's [Redacted] initiated steps to provide partial support [Redacted] for a conference on verification problems organized by and held at the Center for International Studies, UCLA. (See UCLA proposal, Attachment 1; and, ORD Project Approval Memo, Attachment 2). The substance of the conference, conference arrangements, attendees, etc. were not influenced by ORD. ORD sponsorship and the conference was endorsed by SOVA (see Attachment 3). Although UCLA apparently anticipated a contract with the Government, no contract has been executed as of this date.(U)

2. SOVA's Senior Analyst for Arms Control Issues, [Redacted] attended the conference. He felt it was quite useful and would further expand understanding of verification problems. The conference was attended by leading academic and government experts on arms control, such as Ambassador Robert Buckheim, Ambassador to the ASAT talks; Warren Heckrotte, Deputy Chairman of the US delegation to the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations; and Arnold Horelick of RAND. (U)

3. In connection with the conference, an alleged security incident described in the attached press clipping (Washington Post, 1/27/84), apparently occurred (see Attachment 4). It involved an AFOSI security challenge to a paper prepared and delivered by Professor Jeffrey Richelson of American University on "Technical Collection and Arms Control." The AFOSI mistakenly believed that

This document is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED FOR RELEASE
upon removal of embargos. DATE: MAY 2001

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: UCLA Arms Control Verification Conference

Richelson planned to present a paper they had already reviewed and thought should be classified. The talk Richelson gave is summarized by the SOVA attendee in Attachment 5. Richelson maintains his facts were all derived from open sources. In any case, no information was provided to Richelson by ORD, nor was his paper (or any other) reviewed by this Office. (U)

4. Consistent with Agency policy, the UCLA administration was mindful of and approved Agency support. (U)


Philip K. Eckman

Attachments:
as stated

~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF CONTRACT AND GRANT ADMINISTRATION
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

January 12, 1984

[Redacted]
1820 North Fort Meyer Drive
Rosslyn Station
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear [Redacted]

On behalf of The Regents of the University of California, I am pleased to present the enclosed proposal for your review. The proposal requests \$10,853 in support of a conference entitled "Verification and Arms Control" to be held at UCLA January 25 and 26, 1984. The conference will be coordinated by Drs. Michael Intriligator and William Potter of the Center for International and Strategic Affairs.

JAN 13 1 42 PM '84
OFFICE OF CONTRACT AND GRANT ADMINISTRATION
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

As requested by [Redacted] of your office, also enclosed is a copy of the University's current Indirect Cost Negotiation Agreement.

In order to facilitate your review, please contact either Dr. Intriligator or Dr. Potter at (213) 825-0604 with any questions about the proposed conference. Please contact me at (213) 825-8563 with any questions of an administrative nature. If an award is made, it should be issued in the name of The Regents of the University of California and forwarded to this office. Your interest in this project is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Connie Whitley

Connie Whitley
Contract and Grant Officer

Enclosures: Letter dated 1/11/84 from Dr. Potter
1 copy of referenced proposal
Negotiation Agreement dated 7/14/82

cc w/encl: [Redacted]

cc: Dr. Michael Intriligator
Dr. William Potter

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

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CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 825-0604

11 January 1984

[REDACTED]
Office of Research and Development
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear [REDACTED]

Attached is the formal proposal we discussed requesting support for a conference on "Verification and Arms Control" to be held at UCLA, 25-26 January 1984. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

William C. Potter
Associate Director

gp
Enclosure

cc: [REDACTED]

PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON VERIFICATION
AND ARMS CONTROL

Submitted by the
Center for International and Strategic Affairs
University of California, Los Angeles

A. Conference Focus and Rationale

Despite the centrality of verification to the arms control process, little serious discussion of the topic is available in the open literature. (One exception is the volume, Verification and SALT edited by William C. Potter, 1980.) The conference on Verification and Arms Control, to be held at the University of California, Los Angeles (January 25-26, 1984) is designed to remedy, in part, this problem. The conference will bring together leading academic and governmental specialists on arms control and verification to identify what is known about the subject and to explore new research strategies in the field. Papers presented at the conference will be published in a book edited by Dr. William Potter in the CISA book series, Studies in International and Strategic Affairs.

Papers presently committed for delivery at the conference are:

TECHNICAL COLLECTION AND ARMS CONTROL
Jeffrey Richelson
American University

VERIFYING THE TEST BAN TREATIES
Warren Heckrotte
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE IN THE AREAS OF BIOLOGICAL
AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
F.R. Cleminson
Canadian Government, Department of External Affairs

VERIFYING BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS
Dean Wilkening
The Rand Corporation

VERIFICATION OF TEST LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
 Gordon Kane
 The Rand Corporation

COOPERATIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION: HOW FEASIBLE?
 HOW EFFECTIVE?
 James Schear
 Harvard University

VERIFICATION AND THE RISK OF STRATEGIC BREAKOUT: THE SOVIET
 PERSPECTIVE
 Stephen Meyer
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

THE ROLE OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE IN CONGRESSIONAL
 DEBATES
 Michael Krepon
 The Carnegie Endowment

THE POLITICS OF VERIFICATION
 Mark Lowenthal
 Congressional Research Service (on leave at U.S. Dept. of State)
 Joel Wit
 Georgetown University

In addition to the formal paper presentations, a substantial portion of the conference will be devoted to discussion by other invited participants. It is anticipated that paper authors will revise their contributions for the book publication in light of this discussion. Individuals invited to participate in the general discussion include:

Lew Allen, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 Robert Barker, ACDA
 Steven Brams, New York University
 Robert Buchheim, Former SCC Chairman
 Paul Davis, Rand
 James Digby, Rand
 Leon Fuerth, House Intelligence Committee
 William Graham, RDA
 Roland Herbst, RDA
 Arnold Horelick, Rand
 Gerald Johnson, TRW
 Amrom Katz, RDA
 Michael May, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 Roger Molander, Roosevelt Center

Eric Newson, Senate Select Intelligence Committee
Riley Newman, UC Irvine
Robert Perry, Rand
Alan Platt, Rand
George Rathjens, MIT
Jack Ruina, MIT
Herbert York, UC, San Diego

B. Deliverable

CISA will provide as a deliverable five copies of the conference proceedings and five copies of the book based on the conference, as soon as it is published.

C. Principal Investigators and Conference Coordinators:

Dr. Michael D. Intriligator
Dr. William C. Potter

D. Budget

Travel:

8 East Coast airfares
8 West Coast airfares

Room:


16 x \$50/night x 2 nights
5 x \$50/night x 1 night

Meals:

1 lunch x 24
2 dinners x 24
1 breakfast x 24

Administration:

Telephones, xerox
Secretary



Publications:

Conference brochures and announcements
Editing and indexing



TOTAL

Less UCLA Support

Net support requested

Indirect costs (26.2%)

CW

NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
Colleges and Universities
A-88 Negotiation

DATE JUL 14 1982

INSTITUTION: University of California
LOS ANGELES CAMPUS

FILING REF.: This repla
Negotiation Agreeeme
dated October 1, 1979

The indirect cost rates contained herein are for use on grants and contracts with the Federal Government subject to the conditions contained in Section II and III.

SECTION I: RATES

Type	Effective Period		Rate*	Locations	Applicable To
	From	To			
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	38.7%	On-Campus	Organized Research
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	29.3%	Off-Campus	Organized Research
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	50.9%	On-Campus	Instruction
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	21.6%	Off-Campus	Instruction
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	26.2%	On-Campus	Public Service
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	24.1%	Off-Campus	Public Service
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	35.4%	(a)	Research
Fixed	7/1/82	6/30/84	16.3%	(b)	Research

(a) Schlichter Hall

(b) General Clinical Research Center, Health Science Center

*Base: Modified Total Direct Costs consisting of:

- 1) Salary and Wages including tuition remission provided to students as compensation.
- 2) Fringe Benefits
- 3) Materials and Supplies
- 4) Services

SECTION II: TREATMENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS AND PAID ABSENCES

Treatment of Other Fringe Benefits

This organization charges the actual cost of each fringe benefit direct to Federal projects. However, it budgets fringe benefits on project proposals by using a composite rate. The current composite fringe benefit rate may be verified by calling the HHS negotiator identified in this agreement. Following is the list of fringe benefits at the University:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| . Worker's Compensation | . Disability Insurance |
| . Health Plan Contribution | . Life Insurance |
| . Retirement System Contribution | . Unemployment Insurance |
| . FICA | . Dental Plan Contribution |

Treatment of Paid Absences

Vacation, holiday, sick leave pay and other paid absences are included in salaries and wages and are charged to Federal projects as part of the normal charge for salaries and wages. Separate charges for the cost of these absences are not made.

SECTION III: GENERAL

A. **LIMITATIONS:** Use of the rates contained in this agreement is subject to any statutory or administrative limitation applicable to a given grant or contract and the availability of funds. Acceptance of the rates agreed to herein is predicated on the conditions: (1) that no costs other than those incurred by the grantee/contractor were included in its indirect cost pool as finally accepted and that such costs are legal obligations of the grantee/contractor and allowable under the governing cost principles, (2) that the same costs that have been treated as indirect costs are not claimed as direct costs, (3) that similar types of costs have been accorded consistent accounting treatment, and (4) that the information provided by the grantee/contractor which was used as a basis for acceptance of the rates agreed to herein is not subsequently found to be materially incomplete or inaccurate.

B. **ACCOUNTING CHANGES:** The fixed rates contained in this agreement are based on the accounting system in effect at the time the agreement was negotiated. Changes to the method of accounting for costs which affect the amount of reimbursement resulting from the use of this rates require the prior approval of the authorized representative of the cognizant negotiation agency. Such changes include but are not limited to changes in the charging of a particular type of cost from indirect to direct. Failure to obtain such approval may result in subsequent cost disallowances.

C. **FIXED RATES:** The fixed rates contained in this agreement are based on an estimate of the costs which will be incurred during the period to which the rate applies. When the actual costs for such period have been determined, an adjustment will be made in a subsequent negotiation to compensate for the difference between those costs used to establish the fixed rate and actual costs.

D. **USE BY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES:** The rates contained herein was negotiated in accordance with the authority set forth in OMB Circular A-88 and should be applied to the extent provided in such Circular to grants and contracts to which OMB Circular A-21

E. SPECIAL REMARKS:

(1) Definition of On-Campus, Off-Campus and Special Rates

a. Definition of Off-Campus rate

The off-campus rate is applicable to those projects conducted at facilities not owned by the University.

b. Use of On-Campus and Off-Campus rates

Projects conducted entirely on-campus or entirely off-campus:

Projects conducted entirely on-campus or entirely off-campus will be applied the on-campus or off-campus rate respectively.

Projects conducted partially off-campus and partially on-campus:

If the project involves work at both on-campus and off-campus sites, either the on-campus or off-campus rate generally should be applied, consistent with where the majority of the work is to be performed. Salary cost is generally accepted as a measure of work performed in terms of the total project.

The use of both on- and off-campus rates for a given project may be justified if both of the respective rates can clearly be identified with a significant portion of salaries and wages of the project. For purposes of this provision significant is defined as approximately 25% or more of the total costs and project's total salary and wage costs exceed \$250,000.

c. Other special rates

These rates apply only to the facility or program to which they are identified. If any additional special rates become necessary the establishment of such rates should be coordinated through the cognizant negotiation agency.

By the Institution

For the Regents of the University
of California

Earl F. Cheit /s/

Earl F. Cheit

Name Acting Vice President--Financial
and Business Management

Title JUL 29 1982

Date

By the Cognizant Negotiation Agency
on behalf of the Federal Government

Dept. of Health and Human Services
Agency

David S. Low /s/

David S. Low

Name Director, Division of Cost Allocation

Title JUL 14 1982

Date

~~SECRET~~


ATTACHMENT 2

ORD-0084-84

16 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Research and Development

FROM :



SUBJECT : Request to Fund an Unsolicited Proposal for a Conference on Verification of Arms Control Agreements. (U)


1. Summary:

The [redacted] requests permission to award a sole source contract to the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, for a conference on the verification of arms control agreements. The conference will bring together leading academic and government experts on verification to explore political and technical problems of verification and to identify fruitful new areas of research. (U)

The proposed conference will cost about [redacted] SOVA is the customer for this project. COTR will be [redacted] (U)

2. Background

The Center for International and Strategic Affairs is a research institute at UCLA. Scholars affiliated with the Center conduct research and teach courses in international conflict, strategic theory, nuclear proliferation, and arms control. Each year, the Center publishes dozens of books and monographs and holds one or two conferences on these subjects. (U)



~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Request to Fund an Unsolicited Proposal for a Conference on Verification of Arms Control Agreements. (U)

A number of Agency analysts have attended these conferences over the past few years. They have been allowed to participate without charge. SOVA plans to send its Senior Research Analyst for Arms Control Issues to the proposed conference on verification of arms control agreements. (U)

Dr. William Potter, Associate Director of the Center, phoned me in November to see if Agency support would be available for this particular conference on verification and arms control. I told him to send me a short proposal which I received in mid-December. I sent a copy to SOVA to see if they were interested.

Because of the holidays I did not hear from SOVA until early January. The attached memo to C [redacted] from Chief, [redacted] Division, SOVA, endorsed the proposal and pointed out that the subject of the proposed conference is of high interest to the Agency, and the publication of its proceedings will be useful for both Agency and academic personnel who study arms control.

In early January, before [redacted] decided to recommend funding for the conference, Dr. Potter told me he would proceed with the conference even without Agency funds albeit on a smaller scale. I nevertheless recommend that we support this conference because of its value to SOVA, and because the Agency has benefited without cost from past conferences at the Center. Moreover, this is an opportunity for ORD and the Agency to establish and maintain firmer ties with a respected part of the academic community.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Request to Fund an Unsolicited Proposal for a Conference on Verification of Arms Control Agreements. (U)

3. General Description of the Effort:

The purpose of the proposed conference is to explore what is known at the unclassified level about verification and to examine new and innovative approaches to the monitoring of arms control agreements. Experts on arms control, strategic theory, Soviet politics, and selected methodologists will be brought together at UCLA. Through the presentation and evaluation of papers, participants will identify fruitful directions for new research on verification and will propose new methodologies that can be used in that research. (U)

The conference should bring SOVA participants up to date with the latest academic thinking in this field and should permit them to identify new methodologies that can be adapted or developed for use in their intelligence analyses. (U)

Conference proceedings will be published. (U)

4. Technical Risks/Issues:

None. (U)

5. Project Management - COTR:

COTR will be [REDACTED] (U)

6. ORD Customer -- Rationale for ORD Support:

SOVA is the customer for this project. (U)

The conference will focus on verification methodologies and explore ways in which new verification methodologies could be developed. It is, therefore, appropriate for ORD to sponsor it. (U)

7. Estimate of Costs:

The cost of the conference is [REDACTED] There were no prior costs. No follow-on work is anticipated. But, SOVA requests for additional work in this field may be stimulated by this conference. (U)

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SUBJECT: Request to Fund an Unsolicited Proposal for a Conference on Verification of Arms Control Agreements. (U)

8. Duration of the Contract:

The contract will run from January through 31 December 1984. The conference will be held 25-26 January but the proceedings will not be published until the end of the year. (U)

9. Expected Follow-ons to Proposed Work:

No further conferences are planned on this subject for the next few years. The conference may, however, stimulate a SOVA request for more research on the verification of arms control agreements. (U)

10. Security Requirements:

The conference and proceedings will be unclassified. All aspects of the proposed contract will be unclassified. (U)

11. Special Items:

None. (U)


Stanley A. Feder.

ATTACHMENTS:

Statement of Work
Sole Source Justification
SOVA Memo Requesting Support
Unsolicited Proposal

APPROVED:

Philip K. Eckman, D/ORD

Date

~~SECRET~~

11 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief,
ORD,

FROM:

Chief, [REDACTED] Division
Office of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT:

Proposed UCLA Conference on "Verification and Arms Control"

1. We have received your memorandum and attachments regarding the proposed conference at UCLA on "Verification and Arms Control." While SOVA is unable to offer resources to sponsor the meeting, the Office would endorse ORD's offer to provide the funds needed by UCLA to complete preparations for the event and would be interested in sending [REDACTED] to attend.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED] of your office on this subject, and we understand that [REDACTED] has talked several times with Michael Intriligator and William Potter of UCLA, the organizers of the Conference. We understand that any further arrangements for ORD's support of the Conference will be carried out between Messrs. [REDACTED] and Intriligator.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Officials Hinted Prosecution Over Speech, Professor Says

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

An academic preparing to speak at a conference on verification and arms control this week was warned by Air Force investigators that he could be prosecuted under espionage laws if he spoke, it was learned yesterday.

Jeffrey Richelson, a professor of government at American University, was shaken by the warnings but made his presentation at the University of California at Los Angeles because his material was obtained from public sources.

In addition, Richelson and several colleagues at the two-day conference said the investigators apparently were operating under the mistaken assumption that he was going to deliver another paper that they had obtained and thought should be classified even though it, too, was based on public sources.

"I thought they were sort of basically harassing me without any real cause," Richelson said. "Although they said that wasn't their intent, they wouldn't give me any specifics about what the problem was . . ."

The officials reportedly involved in the episode, Richard M. Shaad of Detachment 1841 of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations in Los Angeles and Lt. Col. Bruce Weaver, deputy security director for the Air Force space division, were not available for comment.

Space division spokesman Col. Geoff Baker said last night, however, that the officials are far from satisfied and have referred the matter to "higher authorities" who have it "under investigation."

"The whole thing smacked of intimidation and harassment to me," said Michael Intriligator, director of UCLA's Center for International and Strategic Studies, where the conference took place. "It raises the legal issue of prior restraint."

Center associate director William Potter, who arranged the conference, said he took a call from Shaad about

an hour before the program was to begin at 1 p.m. PST Wednesday. It was to start with Richelson's talk on "Technical Collection and Arms Control," basically a presentation on limitations and capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance satellites such as the "KH(Keyhole)-11."

Potter said Shaad "was afraid [Richelson] might reveal information which was of a classified nature, and asked if we could postpone his presentation until later because they were waiting instructions from Washington. He [Shaad] emphasized his office dealt with felony cases."

Potter said that he and Richelson called Shaad and that "it became apparent that they did not know the title of Mr. Richelson's paper."

Richelson said Shaad had obtained a copy of a paper done by Richelson last fall, a history of the "Keyhole Satellite Program" since the 1950s. Richelson said he thinks the Air Force obtained the copy within the last few days when a West Coast colleague, to whom he had sent it, left it on his desk where a security officer noticed it, decided it was classified and confiscated it.

Richelson said Shaad refused to discuss his objections over the telephone, and came to the center with Weaver. Richelson's talk was postponed until 3 p.m., and the officers appeared about 2:45 but "didn't explain what was wrong with the paper," the professor said.

Instead, Richelson said, they "sort of cautioned me about being careful about discussing classified information" in his presentation "and about being subject to FBI prosecution and investigation."

Mark Lynch, an American Civil Liberties Union expert in national security law, said it was clearly established in World War II that the espionage law cited to Richelson does not apply to information available from public sources.

Baker said Richelson once had a government security classification that created enduring obligations after it expired.

Washington Post Jan 27, 1984 PA2

8. The presentation on "Technical Collection and Arms Control by Jeffrey Richelson (American University) was not well received by most of the participants. More than half of his presentation consisted of a "laundry list" of imagery and SIGINT resources drawn from data in Aviation Week, Congressional testimony, and other public sources, with little attempt at assessing the capabilities of these systems to contribute to verification of compliance. He did note, however, that their capabilities are often exaggerated and cited the following factors as eroding their performance:

- intermittent coverage
- malfunctions of systems
- darkness and cloud cover
- more targets than the systems can be expected to cover (as a corollary, he noted that arms control targets might not be given high priority in such a regimen)
- inability of SIGINT satellites to collect as well as ground-based sites in Iran

He emphasized in closing that the nation needed continuing developments in the technical capabilities needed for verification in order to have sufficient confidence to enter into any arms control treaty.

9. The overall reaction of the audience was that Richelson had not suggested what we were to do with the vast amount of virtually undigested data that he had presented. It was suggested that he add some interpretation and analysis to his paper.

Contract Support of Technical Conferences: Feb 1982 - Feb 1984

TITLE

DATE

COST

CONTRACTOR

[REDACTED]

Conference on Arms
Control Verification

[REDACTED]

25-26 Jan 84

[REDACTED]

Center for International
and Strategic Affairs,
UCLA

[REDACTED]