CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable

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COUNTRY

JAPAN RYUKYU ISLANDS

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SUBJ

APPROVED FOR RELEAS DATE: APR 2001

CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE THAT NUCLEAR BASES ON OKINAWA NOT MILITARILY NECESSARY FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE IN THE FAR EAST

ACQ SOURCE

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1. BY EARLY NOVEMBER 1968 PRIME MINISTER SATO EISAKU'S QUASI-OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA HAD REVIEWED THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA AND HAD CONCLUDED IT WAS NOT NECES-SARY, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MILITARY STRATEGY, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN "NUCLEAR" BASES ON OKINAWA. THE FINDINGS OF

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Ur THIS GROUP

"PASES SUB-COMMITTEE"/, UNDER FORMER JAPANESE
NAVY CAPTAIN KUSUMI TADAD, WEIGHED HEAVILY IN THIS DECISION.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS UNIT, WHICH IS ONE OF THE TWO SUB-COMMITTEES, KUSUMI IS INFLUENTIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITY.) THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT EARLY REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, WITH AMERICAN RIGHTS TO BASES UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NOW APPLY TO THOSE IN JAPAN, IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE POLITICALLY, BUT MILITARILY FEASIBLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF JOINT JAPAN-AMERICAN DEFENSE NEEDS.

WITH THIS CONCLUSION BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT UNLESS

OKINAWA IS RETURNED TO JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY AT AN EARLY DATE,

THE EFFECT OF A DELAY IS LIKELY TO BE "DISASTROUS" ON JAPANAMERICAN RELATIONS.

THE GROWING NATIONAL

TOWNSCIOUSNESS" AMONG JAPANESE IS A PRINCIPAL, AND USUALLY
OVERLOCKED, FACTOR STIMULATING THIS DEMAND FOR REVERSION,

AS WELL AS LEFTIST AGITATION.) THEY FEEL IT IS INCREASINGLY
DIFFICULT TO FORESEE ALL THE UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES OR

THINK OF HOW THESE CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE FORESTALLED. MOST OF

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THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS, WHO REALIZE THAT JAPAN NEEDS THE UNITED STATES AS MUCH OR MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES NEEDS JAPAN, ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE OKINAWA PROBLEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT, IF THIS PROBLEM REMAINS UNSETTLED, IT COULD POLARIZE PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN JAPAN SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES THAT EVEN AUTO-MATIC RENEWAL OF THE SECURITY TREATY IN 1970 COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. THEY FEEL THAT AT A MINIMUM THIS PROBLEM WOULD STIMULATE GREATER AND MORE WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY E0 12958 THE COMMITTEE'S CONCLUSIONS 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs PRESENCE IN JAPAN. ON NICLEAR BASES HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO PRIME MINISTER SATO, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL CARRY GREAT WEIGHT, BUT SATO'S REACTION IN TERMS OF FORMING ANY NEW POLICY ON OKINAWA REVERSION IS NOT KNOWN. THE RESULTS OF THE OKINAWAN ELECTION WILL INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON THE PRIME MINISTER TO PUSH BOTH FOR EARLY REVERSION AND FOR LIMITED BASE RIGHTS. IN EFFECT THERE IS NO CHOICE FOR EITHER THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE UNITED STATES, SINCE SHOULD THE UNITED STATES MAINTAIN A RIGID POSTURE ON THE NUCLEAR BASE QUESTION, IT WOULD RISK LOSING JAPAN AS A COOPERATIVE PARTNER IN DEFENSE MATTERS.)

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