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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

17 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

SUBJECT: Comment on (attached) [redacted] Chinese Communist
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Report

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

1. [redacted]

The parent document, distributed to Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments abroad, appears to be an official "how to think about" China's 1960 foreign policy, the lessons learned and mistakes made, and the prospects for China's foreign policy in 1961.

2. The document is extraordinary in the light it shed on Chinese thought. In particular, the document reveals:

- a. Considerable confidence regarding the foreign scene.
- b. A view of the world which is not myopic, but, except perhaps for an overestimation of US and Western economic ills, appreciates keenly the opportunities and problems at hand.

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c. Emphasis upon flexibility and diversity of tactics in pursuit of chief strategic goals.

d. The principal such goal in "to point the tip of our sword at American imperialism."

e. Emphasis on the struggle against India.

f. Admission of mistakes, and enjoinders towards greater efficiency and effectiveness.

g. In so doing, emphasis upon ideology, both as regards substance and "working style."

h. Anticipation that President Kennedy will be a difficult ("tricky") enemy.

i. Estimates that 1961 will bring:

1) A more tense world situation, but not all-out war.

2) Bloc states will sign peace treaties with East Germany, if no US-Soviet "summit" occurs.

3) Laos events will move to Communist advantage, but this will be "a long, drawn-out affair."

4) Continuing Chinese efforts to "establish our beach-head in Africa and Latin America."

5) Maintenance of status quo in China's relations with the West; Chinese emphasis on trying to exploit the "contradictions" among the Western countries.

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3. There are a number of references to Sino-Soviet dispute.

These reveal:

a. Differences with the USSR are serious but must be considered minor; the higher good is Bloc unity.

b. China was under unprecedented attack from three sides during 1960: "USSR, India-Indonesia and the United States."

c. Chinese sensitivity to any Soviet-US detente.

d. Chinese resolve not to "violate the spirit" of the Moscow Conference, nor to "kick up a dispute." And, while being always prepared for a dispute, "we must not discuss political problems on our own with brotherly parties." The USSR, incidentally, is referred to as "the big brother."


e. Chinese expectation of more cordial Sino-Soviet relations than has apparently proved the case since the document was written (January 1961).

f. Several hints of extremely important agreements, reached just after the Moscow Conference, which are to set new directions in Sino-Soviet cooperation. These agreements are not defined. (I continue personally to feel -- as I did in November-December -- that the 6 December Statement was reached in conjunction with some kind of Sino-Soviet deal which involved more

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concessions on the Soviet part than a bowing to certain Chinese positions in the text of the Statement. Such a deal could have been concerned with Soviet policies towards the West, Chinese influence in Asia, or assistance to China in the acquisition of modern weapons systems. There is, alas, no confirmation to date of such business.)

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