



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT-  
ORCON~~

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~

# Afghanistan Situation Report

26 October 1982

~~Top Secret~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT-  
ORCON~~

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 1/17/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON~~

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~

AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS



PERSPECTIVE

AFGHAN REFUGEES: LONG-TERM BURDEN FOR PAKISTAN . . . . . 6

The Afghan refugees will present a problem of increasing complexity and a growing threat to Pakistan's internal stability throughout the 1980s.

This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to [redacted]

[redacted]  
SC 03189/82

26 October 1982  
NESA M 82-10574CX  
SOVA M 82-10167CX

### Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan



Small circles on map are  
refugee camps. Lines  
show international borders.

26 October 1982  
NESEA M 82-10574CX  
SOVA M 82-10167CX

PERSPECTIVE

AFGHAN REFUGEES: LONG-TERM BURDEN FOR PAKISTAN

Demographic Arithmetic. We expect that the Afghan refugees will present a problem of increasing complexity and a growing threat to Pakistan's internal stability throughout the 1980s. We believe that the sheer size of the refugee population--the largest in the world--will strain the government's ability to accommodate the refugees as well as its ability to limit their threat to political stability.

The US Census Bureau estimated that there were 2.5 million refugees in Pakistan as of mid-1982, based on the numbers of refugees registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees between 1979 and the end of 1981, estimated net gains of 25,000 during 1982, and the estimated number of births and deaths occurring in the refugee population. The Census Bureau projects that the refugee population will reach 2.7 million by 1985 and 3.2 million by 1990, even assuming that no additional refugees will arrive or be repatriated after 1982.\*

While US and international observers agree that Pakistan's international prestige has been enhanced by its acceptance of the refugees and by its willingness to share its limited resources to care for them, the economic costs have been high. The government estimates its assistance costs for 1982-83 at \$555 million--over and above aid provided by international relief organizations for

-----  
\*Estimates by various organizations on the size of the refugee population ranged between 2 million and 2.7 million during spring and summer 1982. The Pakistani Government estimate, based on renewed efforts by Pakistani relief officials to count camp populations, was 2.7 million as of 31 July 1982. Although officials say that net inflow was "only a trickle" during the first half of 1982, they still expect an increase to 3 million by the end of the year.

UN agencies in May 1982 agreed to provide food rations for 2.2 million refugees rather than dispute numbers;

We believe that the US Census Bureau estimate, based on both UN camp registrations and documented demographic growth assumptions, is reasonable and can be used with some degree of confidence.

1982 at \$230-250 million. [REDACTED] Pakistani costs should be considerably lower than the government's official estimate--on the order of only \$80-100 million. [REDACTED] the difference between Pakistani and Western estimates to inclusion in the assistance estimate of indirect costs such as road and railway repair, law enforcement, reclamation of devastated forest and grazing areas, and reimbursement for damage to private properties. [REDACTED]

### Social Tensions

Most refugees are Pushtun tribesmen who, according to local and national Pakistani sources, have been received as brothers by the Pakistani Pushtuns of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and as Muslim brothers in need by all Pakistanis. Despite these ethnic ties, government authorities say that preservation of public order is their greatest concern in the volatile tribal areas where nearly all refugees reside. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] last June more than a hundred were killed in sectarian fighting in Kurram Agency, which also involved Afghan refugees. Officials fear that even minor disagreements between refugees and the local population or between rival refugee groups could lead to a pattern of increasingly serious incidents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Islamabad, which is concerned that unrest could be exploited by Soviet-sponsored agents, has adopted preventive measures:

- Refugee camps have been deliberately situated away from more populous centers.
- Refugee areas are rigorously policed.
- Grazing, water, and land rights have been carefully defined between locals and refugees.
- Where resentment toward refugee aid has been vocal, local inhabitants have been granted aid commensurate with that given to the refugees, or restitution has been made by the government to the aggrieved party. [REDACTED]

### Strategic Risks and Pakistani Apprehensions

The support of the insurgency in Afghanistan by groups using refugee encampments in Pakistan constitutes a rationale for Soviet incursions into the country. [REDACTED] there is growing concern among thoughtful Pak-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON~~

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~

istanis, who draw an analogy with the Palestinians that these well-armed groups could become a troublesome security problem in the borderlands. Dispersing refugee camps to other locations away from the border would dilute their status as an attractive nuisance target for the Soviets, but those refugees most actively engaged in cross-border activities would probably resist leaving the frontier area. [REDACTED]

Pakistani officials fear the Soviet use of Afghan refugees and Pakistani Pushtun tribesmen for subversive activities in the politically volatile borderlands. They are apprehensive that should the refugees lose faith in an eventual return to their homelands, they may well become active in tribal politics, rekindling agitation for an autonomous Pushtunistan on Pakistan territory. Their presence in large numbers in the borderlands would cause those demands to pose a serious threat to the government's efforts to integrate the tribal areas into the political life of Pakistan. [REDACTED]

#### Outlook

In our opinion, Pakistan's peacekeeping efforts in the borderlands have been made more difficult by the introduction of more numerous and sophisticated weapons among refugee groups and local tribesmen in the wake of the Afghan insurgency. Warfare is almost a sport among the Pushtun. In a tribal society that traditionally settles disputes with guns, intertribal clashes are likely to escalate quickly out of control. On another level, a disquieting factor for the Pakistani military, in any future confrontation with armed Pushtun tribesmen, is the experience and confidence the Pushtun have gained in combating technologically superior Soviet forces. [REDACTED]

We believe that the refugees are facing a prolonged or indefinite stay in Pakistan, despite the effort of the government to characterize them as "temporary guests". The refugees are unlikely to return to Afghanistan permanently as long as a Soviet-backed government is in power. Even if conditions in Afghanistan become conducive for repatriation, it is unlikely that all of the refugees will return, particularly the landless laborers among them. The longer their sojourn in Pakistan, the more likely that a larger number will take up permanent residence in Pakistan and strain the overburdened Pakistan economy. [REDACTED]