


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1976

THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS

by

[]

NOTE: Other CIA offices were consulted during the preparation of this paper. The author is grateful for the many useful suggestions which were received, although the responsibility for the analytical judgments is his. Further comments will be welcomed by the author

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NOTE

This paper [redacted] [redacted] aim at a more comprehensive understanding of the political and organizational context of Soviet foreign policy-making.* [redacted]

Significant changes in the role, scope, and structure of the foreign policy apparatus under the Brezhnev regime have been stimulated by the expansion of Soviet external relations, the growing interdependence of foreign and domestic policy, and the increased concern for improving the effectiveness of policy-making machinery. Prior to the 1970s when a more activist phase in Soviet diplomacy was initiated under the rubric of the "peace program," foreign policy occupied a relatively secondary and dependent place in the overall policy-making process. Since then it has assumed a position of fundamental importance with the result that the foreign policy-making process has become relatively more institutionalized and less ad hoc than in the past.

*This study does not deal in depth with the role of the Soviet military in foreign policy-making. [redacted]

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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

A distinct trend toward greater rationalization and professionalization has marked the Soviet foreign policy process over the past decade. The result is a more formally defined policy-making system in which lines of authority are clearer and procedures more regularized. In particular, coordination mechanisms have been strengthened, the role of specialized staffs and foreign affairs experts has increased, conventional sources of information have been improved while new analytical capabilities have been developed, and short- and long-range policy planning has been upgraded. These developments, a logical result of the current regime's commitment to a business-like approach to policy-making, also reflect the Soviet leadership's recognition that foreign policy now occupies a major part of its activity, even affecting to a considerable extent the domestic policies and priorities with which it has long been concerned.

The key element in the clarification of the lines of decision-making authority has been Brezhnev's ascendancy in foreign affairs. Since 1971 he has assumed considerable authority for routine as well as crisis-situation decisions. All the major foreign affairs institutions have been put under his command as General Secretary, "head" of the Politburo, and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. Brezhnev's personal staff has a central role in coordinating activities of various lower-level organizations involved in policy formulation and implementation and in filtering incoming information required by Brezhnev.

The Politburo as a whole, and Brezhnev's senior colleagues in particular, nonetheless, are informed, consulted, and ultimately must approve decisions on major foreign policy questions. And despite the partial centralization of power under Brezhnev, various important foreign policy tasks remain the province of numerous Party, government, and non-official institutions. Indeed, increased participation in policy-making by a wider circle of institutions and individuals is a hallmark of the Brezhnev era.

The elevation of Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Politburo indicates that the relationship between Party and government institutions

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at the apex of the decision-making process is approximately equal. However, at lower levels the Central Committee's International and Bloc Departments appear to have a more decisive role than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), even though foreign policy is ostensibly a governmental function. Moreover, these Party institutions exercise general oversight over implementation of leadership decisions by the MFA and other non-Party institutions.

Changes in the role and structure of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus represent internal adaptation of the political system to the USSR's growing role in world affairs and the increased complexity of its foreign relations. The particular form that such changes have taken, however, is unique to the present regime and may disappear or be altered when Brezhnev leaves the scene. Any successor Party leader may, after consolidating his personal authority, reshape the decision-making process to fit his own style and preferences. While such specific changes cannot be predicted, the trend toward increased institutionalization in Soviet foreign policy-making, transcending individual personalities and leadership changes, seems likely to be maintained over the long-term.

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I. THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Politburo Decision-Making. The Politburo of the Communist Party's Central Committee (CC) makes final decisions on all major and many secondary foreign policy and diplomatic issues. The emergence of collective leadership as the normal pattern of Soviet decision-making in the post-Stalin era has been reinforced by certain rules and procedures adopted by the present regime. The Politburo (now, with the death of Marshal Grechko, comprised of 15 full and 6 candidate members) plus the 5 CC Secretaries who are not members, meets regularly, usually weekly, to consider the most important policy issues on the basis of careful preparation and coordination of materials and policy recommendations at lower levels of Party and government. Meetings are also called on an ad hoc basis in connection with critical diplomatic developments.

[REDACTED] The final agreements reached during Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States and at the Brezhnev-Ford talks in Vladivostok in November 1974 were submitted to the rest of the leadership for ratification shortly after these meetings were concluded.

The principle of collectivity is also carefully upheld in procedures for coordinating Politburo members' views and votes between weekly sessions.

[REDACTED]

The Politburo and Foreign Affairs. Traditionally an institution mainly concerned with domestic policy, during the 1970s the Politburo has become more actively and deeply involved in foreign affairs. According to several top Party leaders, it devotes as much as half its time to questions of foreign policy and diplomacy with which it is sometimes concerned on a daily basis.

In theory, all voting members have equal rights and responsibilities for determining policy decisions regardless of whether their collateral

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assignments in the Party or government involve foreign affairs. In practice, the Politburo's enlarged focus on external relations and the demands of efficiency in decision-making have resulted in a division of power and responsibility within the top leadership. The predominant influence over both routine, day-to-day decision-making and crisis management is wielded by Brezhnev personally, several other senior political figures, and the bureaucratic chieftains who manage the key government national security hierarchies. The role of this "inner cabinet" for foreign affairs is institutionalized in a Politburo sub-committee for political-military affairs, the Defense Council.

Brezhnev's Preeminence. Since early 1971 Brezhnev has steadily and substantially enlarged his prerogatives both in formulating policy and conducting diplomacy, making himself in effect the USSR's primary foreign affairs official. At the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev announced the "peace program" which set out the general line of Soviet policy aimed at normalizing relations with the West. Shortly thereafter Western leaders were informed that the General Secretary had assumed personal command over Soviet relations with the United States and West Germany and Moscow's policy in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Through his conduct of personal diplomacy at the summit level with foreign leaders, Brezhnev has acted as a de facto state leader. Since 1972 he has further legitimated his role as the USSR's leading statesman by signing inter-governmental treaties on the authority of his Party title.

The division of foreign policy activity among Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, and President Podgorny, which was maintained between 1965 and 1971 as an expression of genuine collectivity in foreign affairs, has been substantially affected by the reduction of the role of the latter two. Kosygin's position and by extension that of the government in relation to the Party generally have declined noticeably. Until 1971, Kosygin had been the chief spokesman on relations and the main executor of diplomacy vis-a-vis the West. His role represented a trend toward greater involvement by non-Party organs, a trend that was dramatically reversed by Brezhnev's assertion of his own and the Party's authority.

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Brezhnev has secured organizational support for his foreign policy course by gaining control over the key components of the Party and government bureaucracies.

-- The Party's executive arm for managing foreign relations, the CC Secretariat and the foreign policy departments of the central Party apparatus, work in direct support of the General Secretary's office. The two CC Secretaries who manage these departments, Ponomarev and Katushev, and their principal subordinates, report directly to Brezhnev.

-- Foreign Minister Gromyko and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs work under Brezhnev's guidance. This was confirmed by a Soviet official in 1971, and [redacted] the close Brezhnev-Gromyko working relationship dates back to at least 1967.

-- With the cooptation to full membership on the Politburo in April 1973 of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB head Andropov,* functional unity between decision-making and policy implementation was achieved. These nominally government executives have been directly subordinate to Brezhnev, who has privately referred to them as "my ministers."

Brezhnev's Private Secretariat. For the dual purpose of managing the overall policy process and conducting diplomacy, Brezhnev has assembled a highly qualified group of foreign policy advisors within his own private secretariat.** These advisors serve as a general substantive staff that not only provides the General Secretary with information and counsel, but also appears to have wide-ranging authority for coordinating policy and negotiations. This auxiliary apparatus has undoubtedly enabled Brezhnev to reduce his dependence upon the regular

*Andropov was a candidate member in 1967-1973.

**Brezhnev has had a full-time foreign policy advisor, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, on his staff since 1961; the others have been added since 1971.

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Party and government foreign affairs departments while simultaneously increasing his control over the latter.

As Brezhnev established his preeminent position in the ruling oligarchy, he accorded his advisors increasingly greater public recognition and political status. K. V. Rusakov, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, and A. I. Blatov are identified in the press and official communiqués by the title "assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU." A fourth aide, Ye. M. Samoteykin, holds the lesser rank of "consultant." The three assistants have relatively high positions in Party and state bodies.* All three also retain the high diplomatic ranks they acquired while serving in the Foreign Ministry.



In terms of prior organizational affiliation and substantive knowledge, the profiles of Brezhnev's aides complement one another and reflect a wide range of experience in areas which are of central importance in current Soviet foreign relations. Rusakov, who has served in both the Foreign Ministry and the CC department for Bloc relations, is Brezhnev's top expert on Eastern Europe and China. A career foreign service officer before he joined Brezhnev's staff, Aleksandrov-Agentov handles general East-West relations, American affairs, and perhaps arms control issues as well. In addition, he has a role in German affairs. Blatov, like Rusakov, has worked in both the diplomatic corps and in the CC; he is regarded as an authority on Germany (East and West) and France and continues to cover both Bloc and non-Bloc affairs. Samoteykin also came out of the Foreign Ministry where he concentrated on Finland and the Scandinavian countries. Since joining Brezhnev's secretariat, he has expanded his portfolio to include Middle Eastern and South Asian countries.

The General Secretaryship and Foreign Affairs. The post of General Secretary endows its incumbent with certain prerogatives not shared by other Party leaders, but it is not in itself a legitimate

*Rusakov is a full member of the Central Committee, and Aleksandrov-Agentov is a candidate member. Both were elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1974. Blatov was elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in 1975 and to the Party's Central Auditing Commission in 1976.

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basis for exercising control over foreign policy. Logically, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers has a better claim on the job of foreign policy leader, as Kosygin demonstrated from 1965 to 1971, but Brezhnev cannot simultaneously occupy both the top Party and government executive positions because of a ban on doing so agreed to by the post-Khrushchev oligarchy. Hence, Brezhnev has tried to institutionalize the role of primary foreign affairs official by surrounding it with symbolic representations of legitimacy. During the period between the 24th Party Congress in 1971 and the spring of 1973, he sought the support of the rest of the leadership by continually demonstrating first the promise and then the concrete success of the "peace program," that is to say, Brezhnev's personal power and prestige were largely a function of his foreign policy achievements.

A major augmentation of Brezhnev's role occurred at the Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1973, when the entire Politburo including the senior members of the leadership joined in effusive encomiums of détente and singled out Brezhnev's great personal contribution to it. Following the Plenum, Brezhnev's hand was perceptibly strengthened, and he showed considerably greater self-confidence and authority in the course of his subsequent visits to Bonn, Washington, and Paris where he was received with all the honors due a head of state.

Simultaneously, a sustained effort was begun to enhance Brezhnev's prestige as a world statesman and to embellish his image as an international peacemaker. His collected speeches on foreign policy were published in August 1973 and a second, supplementary edition was released in November 1975, signifying his role as the leadership's key spokesman, theoretician, and practitioner in this area. Other symbolic gestures, such as the awarding of the Lenin Peace Prize on May Day 1973 and the World Peace Council's Gold Medal in November 1975, were part of this image-building process. This has continued more or less unabated in the press and other media.

The Politburo Seniors. Below Brezhnev there is a core group of senior Politburo leaders who constitute an informal "inner group" and who carry more weight than their junior colleagues across a broad

spectrum of policy issues, including foreign affairs. This group includes Podgorny, Kosygin, Suslov, and Kirilenko. Only the latter, who serves as Brezhnev's second-in-command, can be considered an unqualified Brezhnev supporter. Despite his preeminent position within the leadership, Brezhnev does not entirely dominate the policy process largely because these senior leaders retain significant individual and collective power which acts as a limiting factor upon Brezhnev's freedom in decision-making. Any major foreign policy decision would probably require the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of one or more members of this group in order to be adopted and implemented.

The Ministers. The promotions of Gromyko, Grechko, and Andropov to the Politburo in April 1973 should not be viewed as institutional representation of their respective bureaucracies per se so much as a reflection of their personal standing and Brezhnev's own political preferences. All three men had been working closely with [] [] [] Brezhnev in addition to regularly participating in Politburo meetings for several years prior to 1973.

At the same time, this was the first major restructuring of the Politburo in many years, and its broader organizational implications are not insignificant. The Politburo's foreign policy-making capabilities were certainly enhanced by the promotion of men with considerable technical ability and bureaucratic experience from advisory to decision-making roles. (Politburo membership has always been heavily weighted with Party politicians and administrators with little or no substantive experience in foreign affairs.) Furthermore, this undoubtedly has allowed for more effective top-level coordination and integration of the various aspects of national security policy as well as of domestic and foreign policy.

The Defense Council. Primary responsibility for national security policy-making is lodged in the Defense Council.* Its members include

*The Defense Council was recently and apparently for the first time openly identified in the Soviet military press. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 April 1976.

Brezhnev, who acts as chairman, Podgorny, Kosygin, Ustinov,* and before his death, Grechko. [redacted]

[redacted] Chief of the General Staff Kulikov may be either a permanent or ex officio member, and the General Staff reportedly serves as the secretariat to the Defense Council.

The Defense Council's main purpose is to coordinate the various political, military, economic, and technical considerations underlying Soviet defense decision-making, and it frames policy positions which are usually submitted to the entire Politburo for final deliberation. In recent years it has assumed a larger role in foreign policy-making as well, especially as it relates to defense issues. Soviet SALT policy has been a major concern of the Defense Council, which also appears to be the USSR's key crisis-management body and national command authority.

The Middle East Crisis, October 1973. [redacted]

Brezhnev was clearly in charge throughout the events of October. [redacted]

*Ustinov has been the CC Secretary responsible for overseeing the all-important defense industrial sector of the Soviet economy. A long-time candidate member of the Politburo, he was elevated to voting status at the 25th CPSU Congress, and subsequently upon the death of Marshal Grechko, named Minister of Defense.

II. THE ROLE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENTS

The Secretariat. The permanent staff ("apparatus") of the CC Secretariat is organized into functional departments which are deeply involved in the formulation of policy and are responsible to members of the Secretariat for supervising every aspect of Soviet policy execution. All government ministries and other agencies are subject to the control of the Secretariat exercised through one or more of the Central Committee departments. The relevant foreign affairs departments are the International Department, the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (or Bloc Department), and the Department for Cadres Abroad.

The Secretariat's role in the foreign policy process is pervasive. It functions as both a generator of policy and as a supervisor of its implementation. On the basis of materials prepared and coordinated

by the CC departments, the Secretaries formulate the agenda for the Politburo's weekly meetings. They also review inputs of information and/or recommendations from the Council of Ministers and other government organizations and channel them into the decision-making process. Secondary issues which arise between regular Politburo sessions are coordinated among the top leaders by the Secretary or Secretaries assigned specific competence in a given policy area. Once the Politburo has reached a decision, the Secretariat is responsible for elaborating and executing the matter, and later assessing how well it was carried out.

At least five of the current eleven CC Secretaries have either general or specific foreign affairs responsibilities:* Brezhnev, overall responsibilities; Suslov, general foreign relations with emphasis on ideology and international Communist affairs; Ponomarev, relations with non-ruling Communist Parties and relations with the West and Third World; Katushev, Bloc relations and Asian Communist Party-states; and Ustinov, defense and defense industry questions. Politburo and Secretariat membership overlaps to form an interlocking directorate with respect to foreign policy-making. Three secretaries --Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ustinov--all have a direct voice in Politburo decision-making. Ponomarev is a candidate member. Katushev does not have a seat on the Politburo, but he regularly attends its meetings.

The International and Bloc Departments. The USSR maintains three types of relations with the outside world: conventional inter-governmental relations ("state" foreign policy); relations with foreign Communist Parties ("Party" foreign policy); and relations with socialist parties, radical movements, and front organizations. Each type of foreign policy is conducted on a different level by different means, but the individual strands of all three are ultimately joined together under the general supervision of the CC International

*The specific responsibilities of the two secretaries added at the time of the 25th Congress in March-April have not been revealed. However, one of the two, in particular, M. V. Zimyanin has a background in ideological-propaganda work and is thus likely to have some foreign affairs role.

and Bloc Departments. These two departments are organized mainly along geographical lines. Together their various sub-divisions cover the entire Communist and non-Communist world, and they resemble a large foreign office in their organizational structure.

"Party" Foreign Policy: Relations with Foreign Communist Parties. There is a general division of labor between the two departments in which one, the Bloc Department, is primarily responsible for relations with ruling Communist Parties (CPs) in Europe and Asia and the other, the International Department, for relations with non-ruling CPs in the West and Third World. But when relations with the international Communist movement as a whole (i.e., ruling and non-ruling CPs) are involved, departmental lines are blurred and the two function as one unit. Policy materials prepared in one department are coordinated with the other, or they are jointly prepared by inter-departmental task forces. The two departments cooperate, for example, in the publication of a classified "information bulletin" dealing with current international affairs and the world Communist movement which is circulated within higher Party circles.

"State" Foreign Policy. It was once believed on the basis of their overt activities that these two CC departments were responsible solely for inter-Party ties. In fact, analysis of their internal bureaucratic functions shows that they play an exceedingly important part in the formulation and implementation of "state" foreign policy* decisions. They serve in effect as the Party's "general staff" by formulating policy positions, devising overall strategy and tactics, planning policy programs, and coordinating policy operations. In doing so, the two departments have clear precedence over the chief government executive body, the Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Hereafter the term "foreign policy" refers exclusively to state relations.

On the state level, the Bloc Department is charged with developing Soviet policy toward the East European and Asian Communist Party-states, including China, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Inter-governmental relations supervised by the Department fall into three basic categories. One of its key objectives is to coordinate Soviet and East European foreign policies to the maximum extent possible through the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee mechanism. While the purely military aspects of the Warsaw Pact alliance lie within the USSR Defense Ministry's purview, when military and political issues intersect the Bloc Department has the guiding role. Bilateral and multilateral economic relations within the Bloc, which are conducted through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, are managed by a special sector within the Department.

The International Department and Soviet Foreign Policy. Under the present CPSU leadership the CC International Department has functioned with clearer lines of responsibility than heretofore with regard to relations with the West and Japan, and it has contributed to the general regularization of foreign policy decision-making.* []

[] its part in policy formulation has been known for some time. More recently, the Department and some of its leading officials have also begun to play a more overt role in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy.

Policy Formulation. One of the Department's key tasks is to provide the Politburo with advice, information, and estimates on foreign policy matters. Data for these purposes are drawn from the intelligence gathering and diplomatic reporting agencies as well as the Department's own resources. Its own functionaries are frequently assigned to Soviet embassies [] and they also travel abroad on TDY. []

*During the fifties and into the sixties this Department put much of its emphasis on policy toward the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America because they were considered vitally important to overall revolutionary struggle against the Western industrial nations.

[] []

In addition to country and area experts assigned to various geographic sectors, the Department relies on its own in-house "brain trust" organized as a separate consultants' sector. This sector also employs the services of outside consultants and experts who have regular staff positions in Soviet academic institutions and the Academy of Sciences' foreign policy "think tanks."

Preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates is a constituent part of the Soviet policy-formulation process. [] [] [] the flow of materials from the CC apparatus to the Secretariat and Politburo contains an indistinguishable combination of both intelligence and policy recommendations. That is, the intelligence and policy-making functions are combined rather than separated as in most Western foreign-policy bureaucracies.

Policy Planning and Coordination. In addition to advising the Politburo on foreign policy, the CC staff performs extensive executive functions with respect to the planning and coordination of policy in which it commands the full cooperation of government agencies. Planning includes broad, long-term analysis of major problems confronting the leadership, as opposed to the daily operational duties of line officials. Coordination involves supervision of line agencies and officials aimed at assuring harmonious interaction in pursuit of established priorities and purposes. [] []

[] [] This is clear also from what is known of the responsibilities of the organizations in Eastern Europe which are the counterparts of the Soviet International and Bloc Departments. In one such case, the organization in question is charged with serving as the executive arm of the Politburo and CC Secretariat in overseeing the preparation of policy programs with respect to all foreign countries and for obtaining the cooperation of other agencies in the implementation process.

Relations with the Foreign Ministry. The most direct form of Party control over policy implementation is exercised through supervision of the Foreign Ministry by the CC Secretariat and its two foreign affairs departments, much in the same manner, for example, in which the CC Agriculture Department oversees the Ministry of Agriculture. These Party organs cannot, of course, duplicate the detailed technical work of the MFA, but the evidence indicates that there is continuous coordination between Party and government organizations and personnel. Such coordination usually involves lateral contact between deputy chiefs, or in some cases heads of sectors, in the International and Bloc Departments, and deputy foreign ministers. When major policy issues are involved, the line of communications runs between the appropriate CC Secretary (Ponomarev or Katushev) and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

However, Gromyko's elevation to the Politburo, which puts him one rank above Ponomarev and two ranks above Katushev, and his close working relationship with Brezhnev raises the possibility that he personally and his Ministry as a whole have become somewhat more independent of close CC supervision in the same way in which they have been removed from day-to-day oversight by Kosygin and the Council of Ministers. There is some evidence to show that, while the Ministry is not completely autonomous vis-à-vis the Party apparatus, regular Party supervision has gradually shifted from the CC to Brezhnev's personal secretariat, at least on major policy questions. A Soviet [] recently stated, however, that although Gromyko can make independent decisions on some issues, such decisions must still be cleared through the Secretariat and the CC before final deliberation by the Politburo.

There is reason to believe that the CC foreign departments may also have responsibility for approving the Foreign Ministry's yearly work program for its headquarters' operations and embassies and consulates, for reviewing the discussions of its governing body, the Collegium, and for coordinating policy statements made publicly or through diplomatic channels. This is the case, at least, in several East European countries.

Support for Brezhnev and Détente. The International Department has begun to play a more important role in Soviet state relations in

the 1970s. Several non-Communist countries maintain contact with CC functionaries through their embassies in Moscow. More important, Ponomarev's diplomatic activities have expanded substantially in recent years. The pattern of his contacts during 1971-1975 indicates considerable time spent with foreign ministers, premiers, vice presidents, and presidents of both Western and Third World countries. Wearing his hat as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities, Ponomarev led the first Soviet parliamentary delegation to the United States (20-29 May 1974) to sound out Congressional attitudes toward détente. A year later he was host to Senate and House delegations during their return visits to the USSR.

Both Ponomarev and his deputies have been observed working in direct support of Brezhnev. The deputy chiefs of the International Department are very important figures in the Soviet foreign policy establishment because they have a more direct channel to the top leadership and a greater share in shaping policy than do their Foreign Ministry counterparts, the deputy foreign ministers. The principal deputy chief, V. V. Zagladin, is a case in point. Since '73 he has accompanied Brezhnev abroad on several state visits and has served as an advisor to the General Secretary during meetings with foreign officials in the USSR.

The International Department As An International Actor. The International Department does not, of course, maintain official diplomatic relations with foreign governments; that is the Foreign Ministry's business. Nevertheless, it has at its disposal a variety of mechanisms through which it can exert its influence abroad and support Soviet foreign policy by non-diplomatic and covert means. Mention has already been made of ties to pro-Moscow CPs in non-Communist countries, which the Department trains, funds, and gives guidance to, and of the practice of stationing functionaries in Soviet embassies.

An entire sector in the Department is involved in directing the activities of international front groups and organizations, which are aimed at attracting both Communist and non-Communist support for Soviet policies.

As detente has gathered momentum, the Department has attempted to revive the "united front from above" tactic of forging relations with the leaderships of the major European socialist and social democratic parties. Most notable have been Ponomarev's and Zagladin's efforts since late 1973 to establish an ongoing party-to-party dialogue between the CPSU and the German Social Democratic Party to include discussion of diplomatic questions.


Department for Cadres Abroad. In addition to its direct supervision of policy and administration, the CC Secretariat exercises a variety of controls over Soviet foreign service personnel. A special CC Department for Cadres Abroad clears personnel appointments and promotions, conducts Party political and organizational work, oversees career training, and evaluates both the professional and psychological qualities of these personnel. For these purposes, the Department maintains its own representatives in the Foreign Ministry's headquarters and in some, if not all, missions abroad. It has apparently increased in staff size and responsibility in recent years coincidental with the expansion of Soviet foreign relations.

III. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not in charge of foreign policy but only diplomacy. The role of diplomacy in Soviet relations with the outside world has always been a variable, never a constant, and

subject to fluctuations over time. Today, however, the business of diplomacy--negotiations, treaties, other legal agreements, international conferences and meetings--is considered serious business. As a result, the Ministry's expertise and organizational mission have become more relevant to the implementation of foreign policy, and its professional role has been enhanced considerably. This is particularly evident in Gromyko's rise in status and in internal changes in the Ministry's staffing and structure.

Gromyko. The Soviet Foreign Minister's role is largely a function of his personal relationship to the top Party leader, who is also usually the chief architect of foreign policy. When Khrushchev took charge of Soviet foreign policy, he bypassed the Ministry completely and in doing so he frequently went out of his way to belittle Gromyko personally. Brezhnev, on the other hand, has assigned Gromyko a prominent place in the overall process of formulating and implementing foreign policy.



Under Brezhnev the increased concentration of foreign policy powers in the hands of the top Party leader has been accompanied by an increase in the Foreign Minister's authority. In 1969-70, for example, Brezhnev made Gromyko his personal representative in charge of the preliminary talks with Bonn's ambassador to Moscow and the subsequent protracted negotiations with Chancellor Brandt's foreign policy advisor that led up to the Soviet-German treaty of August 1970. Since that time, Gromyko has acted in a similar capacity on a number of important occasions. He apparently has some degree of authority, albeit limited, to conduct negotiations and make initial decisions on his own.

Gromyko's elevation to the Politburo in 1973 was a unique event which recorded his increasingly important role in Soviet foreign policy. The product of a bureaucratic career, he is the first

foreign minister to be coopted into the Politburo on the strength of his professional accomplishments rather than as a political figure.

Party Efforts to Improve the Foreign Ministry's Operations.

By the late sixties it was clear to the Soviet leadership that the Foreign Ministry, until then one of the most enervated of Soviet institutions, had to be infused with new content and purpose. On orders from the June 1967 CC plenum, the Department for Cadres Abroad launched a major study on the Ministry's organization, staffing, and operations. The study when completed the following year noted the increasing scope and complexity of Soviet foreign policy activity and said that this required more stress on the political and professional training of Soviet diplomatic officials. Accordingly, a number of specific educational, organizational, and administrative measures were laid down which aimed at raising the effectiveness of MFA personnel.

Gromyko reportedly was ordered to improve the work performance of all sectors and levels of the Ministry's headquarters staff ("central apparatus") and its foreign representations. Additional staff was to be recruited where appropriate from the ranks of Party and government cadres with administrative experience and from among foreign affairs specialists in the central Party apparatus and academic institutions. In some cases, higher salaries for MFA executives were approved.

Special emphasis was put on securing more international legal and economic specialists for the diplomatic corps. The course of study in the Ministry's Institute of International Relations was reduced from six to five years, in order to graduate more young diplomats at a faster rate, and its program in international law was reinstated after having been abolished years before. The Ministry's information collection and reporting function was to be improved. For this purpose diplomats were permitted to expand ties and contacts with representatives of political, business, and civic circles, ties and contacts which theretofore were largely assigned to the intelligence services.

The Deputy Foreign Ministers. Next to Gromyko in the Ministry's chain-of-command are one first deputy and eight deputy ministers. Overall supervisory responsibilities, both administrative and substantive, are divided among them, with the first deputy acting as Gromyko's right-hand man. In running the Ministry, the deputy ministers are quite important, since intra-organizational decision-making is extremely concentrated at the top. By and large, they are not key actors in the foreign policy decision-making process, though this is subject to specific issues and circumstances. The deputy ministers, all of whom are experienced diplomats, do on occasion become involved in policy implementation when they act as troubleshooters in diplomatic hot spots or serve as heads of Soviet delegations to international conferences and negotiations.

What is of significance in regard to the deputy ministers is the turnover in their ranks in recent years, the rate and scope of which suggests a deliberate policy of bringing new talent into the Ministry's top management level. Only the first deputy and two of the deputy ministers have been in their present positions since the mid-fifties. Two were promoted to their current ranks in the mid-sixties and the rest during the period 1970-1975.

More important, with one exception, these men were promoted from within the career foreign service, and owe their advancement to experience and ability rather than Party position. This pattern contrasts with the past practice of assigning career diplomats, on the one hand, and Party careerists and government officials, on the other, in approximately equal numbers to executive positions. Over the long run this may ensure greater professional autonomy for the Ministry as a whole.

An even more extensive turnover has been carried out in the ranks of the chiefs of the geographic departments who, in addition to the foreign minister, his deputies, and a few heads of functional bureaus, sit on the Ministry's coordinating board, or Collegium. All seven departmental heads/Collegium members received their present assignments between 1970 and 1975.

Administration for Planning Foreign Policy Measures and Information Departments. Two important organizational innovations that were implemented in direct response to the 1968 CC decree and attest to high-level concern for enhancing the Ministry's capabilities for executing foreign policy tasks were the revamping of the policy planning directorate and creation of a new information processing and dissemination mechanism.

The Administration for Planning Foreign Policy Measures (UPVM, after its Cyrillic abbreviation) was created in 1965, but did not achieve importance until three years later when the CC became interested in its operations. Both its current and long-range planning functions were improved and expanded, and for this purpose the Party ordered that highly qualified personnel from within the Ministry and from academic institutions be recruited for its staff.

UPVM's staff currently consists of 50-60 diplomatic officers, many of whom are in the higher diplomatic ranks and have advanced degrees. Staff members are paid on a higher-than-average diplomatic salary scale, and in general UPVM is considered an elite organization within the Ministry. Its chief divisions are organized geographically, and they include American, European, Asian, and African bureaus. There is also a "scientific work section" that is responsible for liaison with foreign affairs research institutes in the Academy of Sciences and other academic institutions.

As the word "measures" in its title indicates, UPVM's mandate is limited to translating higher-level policy directives into operational plans and programs. It does not determine policy goals nor does it coordinate policy positions with the other Party and government institutions. Its primary purpose is to elaborate long-term trend projections in international affairs for the benefit of the foreign minister's office and the Collegium. In recent years, however, UPVM has succeeded in expanding its functions and becoming directly involved in current operations. Its preparations for high-level meetings and backstopping of key negotiations in particular have won it a solid reputation in the Soviet foreign policy establishment. The American division, for example, drafted seven of the ten basic position papers for the 1972 Soviet-American summit and the important "Basic

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Principles of Mutual Relations" document signed by the two countries. UPVM and some of its senior staff members have played an important role both in the negotiations and in backstopping at the SALT, MBFR, and CSCE talks.

The Information Department, a relatively new MFA division, was set up in 1968, and the staff now numbers about 40-50. Its primary function is to transmit policy guidance to Soviet embassies, and this was in response to the CC's call for more regular and more systematic communication of important Party and government decisions to ambassadors and other diplomatic officials. Therctofore this task was assigned primarily to the MFA's geographic bureaus.

The Department's secondary function is to survey and analyze foreign press materials. For this purpose there is a press attaché in each Soviet embassy, ostensibly assigned to the Press Section but actually reporting to the Information Department in Moscow. Bulletins released to embassies to keep them informed on current events are prepared in the Department on the basis of materials it collects from abroad. The Department also responds to requests for policy guidance from Soviet radio and television officials.

IV. COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY (KGB)

In the Soviet view espionage and diplomacy constitute complementary rather than mutually exclusive elements in the overall process of Soviet foreign policy, and this is reflected in their direct fusion in Soviet missions abroad.

The KGB: Organization and Functions. Two sub-organizations of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) function in direct support of the foreign policy apparatus--the First Chief (Foreign) Directorate and the Second Chief (Internal Counterintelligence) Directorate.

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Except for espionage missions assigned to the Soviet military intelligence service (GRU)* and political intrigues managed directly by the Central Committee, the First Chief Directorate has exclusive competence for all clandestine activities abroad. The activities include conducting intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action operations; maintaining security among Soviet citizens abroad; and training and monitoring the activities of Soviet Bloc intelligence services.

From the perspective of foreign policy decision-making, the Directorate's key role is that of collector and disseminator of positive political, economic, scientific, and some military intelligence. Intelligence collection is centered in eleven regular departments which conduct operations in designated geographic or linguistic areas. These departments supervise, maintain, and staff the KGB's "legal residencies" (field stations) located in Soviet missions abroad, providing them with operational support and guidance as well as intelligence requirements.

A separate organization within the Directorate, the Information Service or Service Number 1, is primarily responsible for the preparation and dissemination of intelligence reports. It processes almost all the classified information (except scientific-technical data**) obtained from the operational departments and from Bloc intelligence services.

*Generally speaking, there is a division of labor between the civilian and military intelligence services in that the KGB's collection units are oriented toward acquisition of political information and those of the GRU toward military data. In practice, however, there is some overlap which tends to blur this functional distinction. The GRU's chief organizational mission is to collect strategic intelligence which includes political, economic, sociological, scientific and technical as well as purely military information. Conversely, the KGB may be called upon to obtain data which is predominantly military in nature.

**A special sub-directorate for scientific and technical intelligence handles operations in this area.

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Disseminated information is normally sent directly to KGB Chief Andropov by the head of the First Chief Directorate. The most urgent reports, which usually arrive by cable, are sent directly to the highest Party and government officials.

The First Service publishes a weekly intelligence bulletin which is circulated to Politburo members, CC Secretaries, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the General Staff, and other recipients as appropriate. Special analytical reports and intelligence estimates, not normally included in the weekly bulletins, are sent only to consumers with a special interest in the material or at the request of the CC or head of the First Chief Directorate. The First Service also provides rapid reference service for the Soviet leadership and conducts oral and written briefings for the Politburo.

Normally the First Service does not levy collection requirements. Such requirements come directly from the CC, which also serves as the coordinator of requirements from other Party and government agencies.

The Second Chief Directorate does not conduct foreign operations. But, in addition to surveillance of the Soviet population, it is charged with the twofold task of spying on and subverting foreign diplomats, on the one hand, and denying them access to information and unapproved contacts with Soviet citizens, on the other. It places particular emphasis on human and technical penetration of foreign embassies and consulates as well as recruitment of diplomats who later will return to their home offices as "agents of influence." This Directorate also conducts operations within the USSR against foreign tourists, students, and journalists.

The KGB Abroad: Espionage and Diplomacy. US intelligence experts estimate that, on an average, 30-35 percent of all Soviet officials posted to foreign countries are staff officers assigned to either the KGB or GRU. KGB officers generally outnumber their military counterparts two-to-one. In some countries, particularly in the Third World, the complement of intelligence officers (from both services) in Soviet missions may run as high as 75 percent of the staff. The number of intelligence officers stationed in a

particular country depends upon the total size of the Soviet mission and Soviet intelligence objectives.

All levels and components of Soviet embassies and consulates, except the posts of Ambassador and CC representative, the number one and two positions, have been used at one time or another to provide diplomatic cover for intelligence officers. KGB officers, moreover, are both numerous and influentially positioned in higher diplomatic slots. The KGB "resident" (station chief) is almost always assigned to the embassy with the rank of Counselor or First Secretary. KGB officers also occupy other high-ranking slots ranging from First Secretary through Attache in numbers that are often equal to those of bona fide diplomats.

Intelligence officers who are assigned integrated cover in the foreign service combine the duties of spy and diplomat. The allocation of functions and personnel assignments between the KGB and the Foreign Ministry is a matter for high-level Party decision. Under Stalin the secret police controlled all personnel assignments and placed its own functionaries in leading positions in MFA headquarters and the diplomatic corps. At present the KGB-MFA relationship is more a working partnership on fairly equal terms in which the latter provides the overt framework of diplomatic contacts and stations abroad which the former uses for its own purposes of espionage and subversion.

The KGB and Foreign Policy-Making. The KGB's major source of influence over foreign policy is derived from the importance and sensitivity of its functional responsibilities--collecting and disseminating foreign intelligence, on the one hand, and recommending and conducting covert political actions, on the other.

Like any large bureaucratic organization, however, the KGB carries some political weight and can make its views known. At present, the KGB has access to Party policy-making through its Chairman, Andropov, in his role as a full member of the Politburo and, probably, as a member of the Defense Council. While Andropov serves as a direct link between the top leadership and the bureaucracy he heads, in the final analysis he is a career Party official who owes his primary loyalty to the CPSU and his current status to Brezhnev personally.

V. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Knowledge and comprehension of the outside world come to Soviet policy-makers from a number of sources, including regular diplomatic reporting and intelligence gathering. These sources have been appreciably augmented over the past decade by research and analytical capabilities centered in academic institutes formally under the aegis of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It is impossible to determine the extent to which the Kremlin relies on these institutes in order to reduce the hazards of making decisions on the basis of incomplete, inadequate, or inaccurate information. In a rare public comment on the institutes' role, however, Brezhnev recently acknowledged their key contribution to the formulation of Soviet détente policy. "The study of the present balance of forces in the world arena," he stated in an address to the Academy, "made it possible to elaborate a broad foreign policy program, a peace program."

IMEMO and IUSAC. The two principal institutes charged with keeping Soviet foreign policy officials informed on the internal and external affairs of the major Western countries are the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute of the United States and Canada (IUSAC). IMEMO, the prototype Soviet foreign affairs institute, focuses heavily on Western Europe and Japan, although it also conducts research on Third World countries and areas as well. IUSAC, the newest institute, reflects the increasingly specialized area/country orientation adopted in the formation of institutes during the sixties. Its primary concerns are US foreign policy (with special emphasis on Soviet-American relations), politico-military affairs, and internal developments in the political, economic, technical-scientific, social, and cultural areas of American life. (Research on Canadian affairs consists largely of studying Canadian-American economic relations.)

The Soviets have not followed the American practice of setting up civilian "think tanks" to examine their own country's military doctrine, strategy, and defense posture--these subjects are the exclusive province of the military establishment. The military affairs sections of the two institutes are primarily responsible for keeping

abreast of the latest developments in civilian-military relations, defense decision-making, strategic doctrine, and arms control policy in NATO countries, especially the United States. Staffed largely by retired military officers plus a few civilian experts, these sections focus on the political and politico-military rather than the purely military and technical aspects of strategy and defense posture. IMEMO, however, maintains a special "closed" military-technical-economic section that does classified research for the Soviet general staff.

Both institutes have substantial resources, material as well as human, at their disposal. With a total work force of 700, IMEMO has 560 professional staff employees, 320 of whom have advanced degrees. Given its much more restricted geographic focus, IUSAC's staff size is impressively large. Of approximately 300 total employees, half are professionals, and nearly 100 have advanced degrees.

Because of their academic status, these institutes are in a unique position among other Soviet organizations to gain access to a wide range of foreigners and foreign institutions. Over half of IUSAC's professional staff members, for example, have visited the United States at least once, and several have spent considerable time in this country either on extended academic exchanges or as members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the Soviet Embassy in Washington. During the eighteen-month period alone ending December 1975, IUSAC hosted more than 600 American officials, businessmen, scholars, etc., in Moscow.


The Institutes and the Foreign Policy Process. Apart from their purely academic endeavors, the institutes serve as reservoirs of factual knowledge and analytical support for Soviet policy-makers. In the case of IMEMO and IUSAC, the primary consumers of institute-prepared materials are the CC International Department and Brezhnev's personal staff. The institutes also on occasion carry out special projects on a contract basis for government ministries and state committees, but this type of work is less frequent and less important than that done for higher Party organs and officials.

It should be emphasized that the institutes do not play a formal, institutionalized role in the policy-making process. But by means of

their accumulation of facts, analysis, and estimative judgments in a largely non-regularized interaction process with Soviet policy-makers the experts may on occasion provide input into the decision-making process. What they do not do is make recommendations or suggestions regarding Soviet policy.

At the same time, however, under the present regime the institutes have come to be more routinely called upon to prepare policy-relevant submissions for the use of Soviet policy-makers. Some of the major documents and resolutions presented at the 23rd and 24th CPSU Congresses were written by academic specialists. In preparation for the 25th Congress, IMEMO is reported to have drafted a major study comparing the relative balance of power between East and West in terms of scientific-technological capabilities.

Still another way in which the experts get drawn into the policy-making process is through the writing of background studies and briefing papers for Soviet leaders. Analysts at both IMEMO and IUSAC, for example, contributed written reports on SALT and MBFR to Brezhnev's briefing book for the second Soviet-American summit in 1973



While the institutes do not directly participate in policy-making, they do have at their disposal the means for regularly disseminating their ideas and views within the upper echelon of the Soviet Party and government hierarchies. Both IMEMO and IUSAC publish their own monthly in-house journals as well as occasional monographs and books. These publications are notable in the Soviet context for their more reasonable and less doctrinaire content as compared to the sloganeering and propaganda stereotypes found in the mass circulation press. The potential that such publications have for influencing policy-makers should not be overestimated, but according to several sources they are widely read by the Soviet "attentive elite."

IMEMO and IUSAC are also reported to publish limited circulation (500 copies) "information bulletins" for dissemination within the top levels of the Party and government hierarchies. These bulletins contain both straightforward reporting of factual material drawn from the world press and original analyses written by institute experts. This is a potentially significant development, since heretofore the preparation of similar publications was entrusted solely to the CC foreign affairs departments.

Special Role of the Two Directors. The respective directors of IMEMO and IUSAC, N. N. Inozemtsev and G. A. Arbatov, are both much more influential in their own right than their official titles indicate. Each man has served in responsible positions in the Party apparatus, and they both occupy high-level positions in Party and government political bodies. While these status indicators are not significant per se, they signify that Inozemtsev and Arbatov are important personages in the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

Both men are known to have direct access to the inner circles of Soviet decision-making. Arbatov is one of three or four key advisors on whom Brezhnev relies for interpretation of developments in the US and in Soviet-American relations. One measure of his importance, as his colleagues at IUSAC point out with considerable pride, is the fact that he accompanied Brezhnev to the US in 1973. Inozemtsev is also reputed to have ties to Brezhnev, and appears to associate closely with Suslov and Ponomarev as well. Arbatov and Inozemtsev both occasionally write important articles, which usually appear in Pravda, Izvestia, and Kommunist and reflect top level views and thinking on foreign policy. Such articles generally correlate highly with what is known about decisions reached for example at CC plenums.

VI. THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING APPARATUS

Because of the considerable effort being made to increase the flow of trade, technology, and investment capital from major Western industrial nations, foreign economic policy issues at present occupy a central place in the overall scheme of Soviet foreign affairs decision-making. As Brezhnev pointed out in his speech to the 25th Party Congress, "Politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade are interwoven in our foreign economic relations."

Foreign Economic Policy Decision-Making. As is the case with other aspects of Soviet international policy, the Politburo is the paramount decision-making body with respect to foreign economic policy. Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev, [redacted] regularly attends Politburo meetings, not just sessions of the Council of Ministers, because the latter simply does not have the authority to decide key policy questions. During recent Soviet-American negotiations over grain and oil sales, Patolichev [redacted] had worked out his government's positions in advance in consultation with Brezhnev and [redacted] reported to the General Secretary on a daily basis.

Next to Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, long regarded as the most consistent promoter of East-West economic cooperation as a means of sustaining internal growth and modernization, is probably the most influential figure in foreign economic affairs. His first deputy in the Council of Ministers, Mazurov, is another Politburo member who has a specialized interest in economic policy.

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers has a much larger part to play in both formulating and implementing foreign economic

policy-making than in political and military aspects of foreign policy. It works out many of the plans and proposals which eventually reach the Politburo for decision and coordinates the activities of subordinate government agencies concerned with foreign economic relations. The Presidium's broader scope in the foreign economic sphere is a corollary of its internal role in economic policy-making and administration. It is in fact organized along the lines of an economic affairs cabinet; five of its ten deputy chairmen have specific collateral responsibilities that involve foreign trade, economic, and scientific-technical relations. The key deputy chairmen concerned with East-West relations are V. N. Novikov, head of the special Commission for Foreign Economic Questions attached to the Presidium and responsible for coordinating subordinate government ministries and state committees involved in economic relations with non-Communist countries, V. A. Kirillin, Chairman of the powerful State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST), and I. V. Arkhipov. Arkhipov's responsibilities appear to overlap with Novikov's, or more likely, there has been worked out a division of labor in which the former handles economic relations with the Western industrial nations and the latter with Third World countries. Arkhipov's appointment to the Presidium in April 1974 was regarded as an effort to strengthen the hand of the foreign trade bureaucracy in governmental decision-making. Arkhipov is not only a long-time foreign trade official, but also a reported Brezhnev protégé.

Gosplan. Because foreign economic activity is considered a constituent part of the national economic planning process, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) plays a major role in working out overall patterns and levels of trade and other forms of international economic cooperation. Two of its branches, the Foreign Trade Section and the Section for Foreign Economic Cooperation with Capitalist Countries, work with subordinate agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) and the SCST in formulating plans. Gosplan determines priorities for foreign purchases and approves hard-currency allocations for them. It reviews all import/export plans submitted by the MFT and SCST before such plans are sent to the Council of Ministers. According to the Deputy Chairman of Gosplan responsible for foreign trade, his organization assumes a particularly active and direct role in policy-making where large-scale, multi-faceted agreements, such as "compensatory" or barter arrangements, are involved.

Ministry of Foreign Trade. The state monopoly of Soviet foreign trade means that the government is the intermediary for all commercial transactions with foreign firms and companies. The MFT is the principal agency for the administration and regulation of foreign trade and other forms of economic agreements. The MFT draws up drafts of trade treaties and in appropriate cases signs them and formulates both long- and short-term export and import plans. Actual negotiations are conducted by more than fifty All-Union Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) which are supervised by the Ministry. These organizations are juridically and budgetarily independent corporations chartered by the Soviet government and have monopoly rights for the export-import of of specific commodities. There is chronic criticism in some circles in the foreign trade bureaucracy of the fact that these FTOs rather than the ultimate user/producer in the industrial ministries or individual enterprises negotiate trade and commercial agreements. The practice of including representatives from industrial ministries in negotiations has increased in recent years, but the latter do not exercise any decision-making authority, merely acting as technical consultants.

State Committee for Science and Technology. The SCST is responsible for formulating and implementing government policy with regard to the introduction of new technology and technical processes into the Soviet economy. In the foreign sphere, it directs the Soviet effort to acquire the latest in science and technology from abroad. Soviet realization that the USSR must abandon its traditional autarkic policies if it is to derive benefits from the "scientific-technological revolution" through external relations has led to an important and expanding role for SCST. It engages in direct negotiations with foreign firms and signs virtually all scientific-technical cooperation agreements. Deputy Chairman Dzherman M. Gvishiani is in charge of SCST's foreign operations. An outspoken advocate of East-West cooperation and frequent visitor to Europe and America, Gvishiani is also Premier Kosygin's son-in-law.

There is a long record of bureaucratic rivalry between SCST and MFT. Because many of the most important Soviet deals with the capitalist countries involve both commercial and scientific-technological aspects, each organization can claim responsibility

for conducting negotiations and signing agreements. This rivalry has been fueled in the last few years as economic interaction with the West has increased. It is not uncommon for SCST officials to snipe openly at the MFT's bureaucratic inefficiency in the presence of Western businessmen and officials.

The two major foreign area research institutes, IMEMC and IUSAC, and their respective directors, Inozemtsev and Arbatov, have been at the forefront of a campaign to provide theoretical and practical rationales for a program of national modernization in cooperation with the industrially developed capitalist countries. IMEMO's emphasis is on forecasts ranging from one to ten years which enable Soviet planners to factor foreign economic relations with the West into their calculations. IUSAC concentrates on more practical studies, sometimes on contract for Gosplan, the MFT, and SCST, which outline problems and prospects for implementing foreign economic agreements. Inozemtsev and Arbatov serve as policy consultants and have participated in trade talks on behalf of the Soviet government.

Another research organization whose staff members are consulted on foreign economic issues is the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System (IEWSS). Like IMEMO and IUSAC, it has publicly advocated a broader, more expansive conception of the role of external ties in Soviet economic planning. A Soviet economist [redacted] recently informed US officials that on orders from the CC a meeting scheduled for early March 1976 would include participants [redacted] as well as IMEMO, Gosplan, and MFT who would discuss measures for centralizing control over and improving management of the foreign economic policy machinery.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

To what extent do current trends point to fundamental changes in the structure and functioning of the foreign policy apparatus? To what extent do they represent highly personalistic and ad hoc adaptations which will not outlast the present leadership? For example, it is obvious that several important developments strongly

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reflect Brezhnev's personal style and preferences, and that when he departs from the Politburo certain changes will occur. His successor will not immediately enjoy either the power or prerogatives which it took Brezhnev some six years to acquire. The next Party head may not concentrate so heavily on foreign affairs, he may not decide (or be permitted) to assemble a strong personal foreign affairs staff, and he may not display a penchant for summit diplomacy. There may well reappear a more fluid situation characteristic of the period 1965-1970.

Considering the vital part foreign affairs now plays in the overall decision-making process, however, it can be estimated that, after an initial period of consolidating his own position within the leadership, any successor Party leader will of necessity have to assume a direct and active role in foreign policy to maintain his guiding role in Soviet decision-making. The need for a strong personality as a source of dynamism and coherence in policy formulation may stem as much from objective requirements of the Soviet political system as from the personal ambitions of a potential leader.

Other broader influences which have resulted in the reshaping of the foreign policy-making process will remain at work in the foreseeable future. The most important of these has been the USSR's expanded role in world affairs and the enlarged scope and complexity of its foreign relations. The pragmatic bent and realistic approach of the present leadership have also had an effect on the policy process, and this style of leadership will probably be carried over and become even more pronounced in the next generation. The Politburo will continue to be the central arena for strategic-level decision-making, and, based on the last few years experience, its reorganization into a more effective and efficient foreign policy decision-making body is likely to become a permanent feature of the Soviet system. Past experience and present practice suggest that overall planning, coordination, and supervision of policy implementation will continue to be lodged in the Party apparatus' foreign affairs sections. Steady progress in the development of research in the foreign affairs institutes and an increasing legitimization of the role of academic experts also promise to become fixed patterns. And as long as emphasis continues to be placed on the conduct of


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Soviet relations with the West on the state level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will provide increasing diplomatic support and technical expertise in support of Soviet foreign policy. Its role in policy formulation, though enlarged is still limited, and its subordinate status vis-à-vis the Party's ruling bodies is not likely to be fundamentally altered.

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