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Training LDC Personnel: Moscow's Investment in Political Penetration

An Intelligence Assessment

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by

Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.

Comments and queries are welcome

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GI 83-10181
August 1983

Training LDC Personnel: Moscow's Investment in Political Penetration

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 22 July 1983
was used in this report.*

Moscow is training an increasing number of students, military personnel, and civilian technicians from less developed countries, both in the USSR and in LDCs themselves, as a means of penetrating these countries. Instruction stresses development of practical skills but is heavily laced with Marxism-Leninism. Training is administered through three programs:

- An academic program providing a skills-oriented education at universities and specialized institutes in the USSR.
- A military training program—primarily in host countries—offering instruction in basic and sophisticated military hardware, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and intelligence collection.
- A technical training program for specialists, including civilian engineers, trade unionists, and journalists.

These programs—although evidently not administered from a central point—collectively provide the Soviets with the means of achieving immediate and long-range objectives, not the least of which is the opportunity to penetrate overtly and covertly the political, military, and technical establishments of target countries. The programs provide the opportunity for penetration in three ways. First, they develop individuals whose future career paths may give Moscow access to the levers of power in their country. Secondly, they create a network of individuals who have a common training experience and who in time may permeate the elites and power structures of their countries. Indeed, the Soviets have established “returnee” clubs in LDCs to keep the Soviet connection alive among their LDC alumni. Finally, they provide, especially through the military training program, a means for Moscow to place significant numbers of Soviets in target LDCs. In this regard, the proliferation of advanced combat aircraft and missiles particularly has enhanced the opportunities for Soviet technical military instruction in LDCs.

Moscow continues to increase the resources devoted to these programs. We estimate that the number of academic students being trained in the USSR reached 50,400 as of December 1982, a 250-percent increase in 10 years. The estimated number of Soviet military technicians providing training in LDCs amounts to 17,500, a marked increase from the 9,900 posted a decade ago. LDC military personnel from 25 countries and insurgent groups are also being trained in the USSR. Moreover, the functional scope of the military training program has been expanded to include tactical training in insurgency, counterinsurgency, and intelligence operations—training, which in our view may be designed to assist LDCs in protecting their “revolutionary gains.”

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We believe the Soviets most certainly view the training programs as a success. The academic program has not yet produced an LDC president or prime minister, but the USSR can count among its alumni a member of the ruling Sandinista Directorate, four LDC cabinet ministers, three ambassadors, and three subcabinet directors. It also has alumni in the insurgency movements against the governments of El Salvador and South Africa. Moreover, some of the bureaucracies and professions in key LDCs have many graduates of Soviet universities. The military training program has had the greatest impact among heavily dependent clients in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the Soviets have also benefited from the hard currency earnings of in-country military training.

These gains are not without some costs. Some LDC students return from study in the USSR unconverted to Marxism-Leninism and critical of KGB surveillance, travel restrictions, and racial discrimination. Trainees in the military programs complain about blatant Marxist-Leninist proselytizing and deliberate undertraining so as to tether their armed forces to Soviet advisers. Also, the need to accommodate large numbers of Soviet military personnel in-country has engendered mixed reactions among LDCs. At its worst, Soviet insensitivity to Egyptian nationalism played a part in provoking Egypt's expulsion of 5,500 technicians in 1972. In Algeria and Mozambique, respectively, the defense ministries are now attempting to diversify weapons procurement and to use Indian instructors for Soviet equipment in an attempt to reduce the Soviet role.

The Soviets appear to be targeting about 15 key developing countries in particular. They have provided the largest number of academic scholarships to seven LDCs, which together account for nearly half of the LDC students in the USSR; these countries are Afghanistan, Jordan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, North Yemen, Colombia, and Syria. Moscow's in-country military training personnel are heavily concentrated in Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola, and the Yemens. Madagascar, Mali, and Congo, none of which had Soviet military advisers 10 years ago, appear to be emerging targets for the military program. Intelligence training appears to be focused on Syria, North Yemen, Congo, and Nicaragua

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Training LDC Personnel: Moscow's Investment in Political Penetration

Training programs for LDC personnel provide Moscow an opportunity to penetrate key Third World countries.¹ Such training—which is evidently not administered centrally—is performed in three separate programs aimed at academic students pursuing careers in the professions, military personnel obtaining weapons training or preparing for command, and civilian technicians attempting to acquire enhanced skills. Soviet-trained LDC personnel take positions in their countries' governments, military establishments, intelligence services, media, universities, and trade unions. Roughly 100,000 LDC students have been graduated from Soviet academic training programs alone. These graduates form a network with a common training experience and in some instances have permeated the elite and power structures of their countries. Some individuals have chosen career paths that provide Moscow access to the levers of power in those countries. Moreover, Moscow's military training programs place significant numbers of Soviet personnel in target LDCs.

The Academic Program

Soviet academic training for LDC nationals specializes in producing engineers, medical doctors, agronomists, lawyers, and other professionals suited for the demands of LDC development, according to open sources. The course of study is four to seven years, including a year or more of Russian language training, and includes Marxism-Leninism as a standard part of the curriculum. Moscow also offers a specialized secondary education for LDC students at vocational and technical schools, summer school courses, and through on-the-job training in Soviet factories and plants. The secondary education is a three- to four-year program.


LDC students may attend most Soviet institutions of higher education, but they tend to concentrate at the schools with facilities for language training. The



Patrice Lumumba University

largest concentration is at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, which is dedicated exclusively to students from developing countries. It admits a steady flow of LDC students, including some who have not completed their secondary education or who have not been preselected through bilateral government exchange agreements. Although the curriculum is specially designed culturally and academically for LDC students, the dropout rate for some entering classes has been as high as 50 percent, according to open sources. Many LDC students also attend the state universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Tashkent as well as engineering institutes in Moscow and Leningrad.

Moscow completely subsidizes the academic program. Free tuition, medical care, living expenses, and round trip airfare attract LDC students, most of whom cannot finance a Western education. The Soviets award scholarships directly through their embassies in LDC capitals, cultural centers, friendship societies, and official exchange agreements administered by indigenous ministries of education, universities, or the local Communist parties. Soviet international front organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the International Union of Students (IUS), also award scholarships to trade unionists

¹ Data for this paper were provided by  all-source intelligence.

and students, respectively. According to the Czechoslovak press, recipients of IUS scholarships are expected to guarantee that after finishing their schooling they will become not only well-qualified specialists but also propagators of IUS doctrine, which is geared to support Soviet policies on a wide range of political issues.

The Soviet academic program is not comparable to a quality Western education, but the education received is a practical one, often equipping graduates for promising careers in their own countries. Indeed, graduates acquire the basic professional and technical skills that often enable them to qualify for relatively elite positions. Many LDC students go to the USSR to be educated despite a preference for training in the West simply because they lack a better alternative.

The Soviets cull the LDC student population residing in the USSR for potential pro-Soviet leaders.

They organize LDC students in each university or institute into Provisional University Committees (PUCs). PUC leaders tend to be pro-Soviet students. The Soviets give them special privileges and money to use in proselytizing new arrivals. Each PUC has a Soviet adviser who is probably a KGB officer. In addition, the LDC student leader of each PUC reports regularly to a Soviet official in the local municipality who, in turn, provides advice and money for PUC activities.


To ensure that LDC students retain Soviet connections on their return home, Moscow recently has begun extending invitations to selected graduates to visit the USSR for conferences in their specialty fields, all expenses paid.

activities such as "returnee clubs," book clubs, and photography clubs also keep the Soviet connection alive.

Program Expansion

The number of LDC students enrolled in Soviet universities has more than tripled in the last 10 years. We estimate that Moscow has steadily increased the total number of scholarships awarded from 14,400 in 1972 to 50,400 in 1982 (figure 1). The Soviets now provide academic scholarships to 94 LDCs, 14 more than 10 years ago.

Figure 1
LDC Students in the USSR,
1972-82



The regional allocation of scholarships is changing. More are being awarded to South and East Asia, notably to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. The Middle East share has also grown as more scholarships are awarded to Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to have the largest share of a larger academic program (figure 2)

Moscow has provided the largest number of scholarships to seven LDCs, which together account for nearly one-half of the LDC students studying in the USSR. These countries are Afghanistan, Jordan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, North Yemen, Colombia, and Syria (table 1):



- Since 1979 more Afghans have been studying in the USSR than any other LDC nationality. Moscow and Kabul signed a long-term academic training agreement in 1980, and Kabul also is restructuring the Afghan national education system in line with the Soviet system.

Figure 2
Geographic Origins of LDC Students in the USSR, 1972 and 1982

Percent

1972: 14,400 Students

1982: 50,400 Students



- The number of Jordanian Palestinians studying in the USSR reached 4,400 in 1982. [] reports indicate that most Jordanian Palestinian students in the USSR are studying medicine, engineering, or agronomy.
- The number of Ethiopian students in the USSR increased dramatically after the Mengistu coup in 1974. Many of those participating in the Soviet academic program have not yet returned, given the four- to seven-year Soviet curriculum.
- The Syrian Government allows the Soviet Embassy to offer scholarships directly to students. The USSR-Syrian Friendship Society, Ba'th Party, and labor unions also offer scholarships. [] at least 190 undergraduates and 60 graduate students departed for the USSR in the 1982/83 school year, raising the total to nearly 2,700, more than double the number 10 years ago.
- In Madagascar the Soviets awarded 236 scholarships for 1982/83, bringing the total number of students in the USSR to 2,100. About 60 students returned to Madagascar in 1982, 80 percent of whom had been trained as engineers and technicians. The remaining 20 percent are Russian-language teachers, economists, and psychologists.
- Figures published by the North Yemen Ministry of Education indicate that 785 Yemeni students went to the USSR in 1982, increasing the total number studying there to 2,000.
- Some 2,000 Colombian students currently study in the USSR, including trade unionists who, [] study a mix of trade union tactics and Marxist-Leninist ideology

Table I
USSR: Training Students From Selected LDCs *

	Number of Students		
	1972	1982	Change
Total	9,715	41,160	31,445
Rapid growth	3,140	24,380	21,240
Afghanistan	750	7,535	6,785
Jordan	500	4,400	3,900
Ethiopia	270	3,640	3,410
Madagascar	45	2,095	2,050
North Yemen	275	2,000	1,725
Colombia	300	2,000	1,700
Syria	1,000	2,670	1,670
Moderate growth	4,590	16,090	11,500
Angola	30	985	955
Congo	420	1,350	930
Nicaragua	115	1,000	885
Ghana	35	800	765
South Yemen	225	960	735
India	390	1,085	695
Dominican Republic	45	725	680
Tunisia	90	750	660
Peru	130	770	640
Panama	100	675	575
Lebanon	360	800	440
Tanzania	175	600	425
Cyprus	395	800	405
Mozambique	30	395	365
Togo	75	440	365
Algeria	840	1,200	360
Nepal	300	600	300
Sri Lanka	75	375	300
Mali	255	500	245
Costa Rica	175	420	245
Guinea	180	420	240
Ecuador	150	380	230
Grenada	0	60	60
Decline	1,985	690	-1,295
Somalia	430	0	-430
Egypt	455	185	-270
Indonesia	200	0	-200
Chile	200	45	-155
Zaire	250	115	-135
Sierra Leone	450	345	-105

* These estimates are based on the number of scholarship awards per country. Yearly data are available in *Communist Aid to Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*, published annually.

Moscow also uses academic scholarships to nurture relations with a broad group of countries in the Caribbean, Central America, the Mediterranean, and West Africa. The numbers are not as large as for the larger recipients but nevertheless impressive for small countries. These include Nicaragua, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Mali, Tunisia, and Panama:

- The number of Nicaraguan students in the USSR has increased from 130 in 1979 prior to the Sandinista revolution to 1,000 in 1982. The Soviets work through the Nicaraguan Council of Higher Education to award scholarships. In December 1982 Moscow and Managua agreed to recognize each other's educational degrees.
- Cyprus had 800 students in the USSR for the 1982/83 school year. Soviet scholarships go principally to lower income families as rewards for loyal service to the local Communist party, according to
- In the Dominican Republic, the number of Soviet scholarships is increasing because of opportunities created by changes in Dominican domestic politics. Until 1981 Moscow dispensed academic scholarships solely through the Dominican Communist Party. Since then scholarships have also been dispensed by Juan Bosch's new Dominican Liberation Party. About 130 Dominican students departed for the USSR in 1982.
- The Soviet Ambassador to Mali has commented publicly that 500 Malian students are in the USSR and that some may stay as long as nine years.
- [] reports that 750 Tunisian students were in the USSR in 1982, 640 of whom were on official scholarships provided by the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education to its Tunisian counterpart. Moscow has also offered 110 nonofficial scholarships directly to Tunisian students.
- The Soviets also have an active scholarship program in Panama for secondary education in the USSR. They dispense the scholarships through the Human Resources Institute, the local Communist party, the leftist student federation, and the leftist labor union. Panamanians learn electrical and chemical engineering, road construction, fishing, agriculture, and use of water resources.

The Military Training Program

The scope of military training for LDC personnel, both in-country and in the USSR, closely parallels the volume and sophistication of arms deliveries. The proliferation of advanced combat aircraft and missiles—especially among newer, inexperienced clients—has enhanced the opportunities for Soviet military technical instruction. For example, Moscow sent 100 missile experts to Tanzania for the first time in 1975 to provide basic, practical instruction, [] soon after Dar es Salaam turned to the USSR for SA-3 and SA-7 missile systems and other weapons. Similarly, the main function of Soviet pilot instructors in Syria was originally to upgrade the capabilities of experienced Syrian pilots to fly newly delivered MIG-23 aircraft. More recently, according to [] pilot losses in the 1982 Lebanon war led Syria to enlist Soviet help in training newly recruited pilots.

Despite increased training in LDCs, the widest variety of military instruction still is given in the USSR. Moscow provides technical training at military and higher military schools, which offer both theoretical and practical training for LDC officers; at academies, which typically give advanced training; and at special institutes, which provide brief courses on specific subjects such as weapons firing, according to [] and open sources. Short technical training courses in maintenance and repair are given at state manufacturing facilities such as the Zhitomir Tank Plant, according to []

Training for pilots and for some weapons technicians is lengthy, largely because of the difficulty of the subject. Syrian officers enrolled to become SCUD rocket technicians, for example, have remained in the USSR for four years, [] Ethiopian MIG-21 pilot candidates study for two years []

Tactical and certain operational and intelligence courses, by contrast, are not as complex. Courses for South Yemeni radar operators and pilots undergoing refresher training, for example, have been of short duration []

A growing LDC demand for Soviet intelligence and security experts has been encouraged by Moscow. The Soviets now provide security and intelligence training and assistance to several LDCs to assist them in protecting their "revolutionary gains." [] courses in surveillance and intelligence collection methods are given both in the USSR and in LDCs, principally to Middle Eastern and North African students. Soviet experts have been sent to LDCs as politically diverse as Congo, Syria, and Nicaragua:

- To provide instruction in-country as in Congo where five Soviets were assigned in March 1983 to the State Security School in Brazzaville, []
- To advise on intelligence collection, as in Syria in 1981, []
- To keep other foreigners under surveillance in an LDC. []


Program Expansion

The military technical services program for LDCs has expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s. We estimate, [] that in 1982 a record 17,500 Soviets were in LDCs, up from 9,900 in 1972 (figure 4). This program has expanded beyond its historic Middle Eastern and North African clients to encompass Sub-Saharan African and Latin American clients (figure 5). Moscow is providing military technical services in 30 LDCs, a net gain of 10 clients since 1972. In seven key countries where the Soviets had a military presence 10 years ago, the number of Soviet military personnel has increased by a total of nearly 300 percent (table 2).

LDC military personnel from 25 countries and insurgent groups [] About 2,800 trainees departed for the Soviet Union in []



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Figure 3
Odessa LDC Training Area



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
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Figure 4
Soviet Union: Military and Quasi-Military Personnel in LDCs, 1972 and 1982

Thousand persons



1982, principally from the Middle East and North Africa, compared to 2,300 a decade earlier.² Altogether about 9,000 LDC military personnel were receiving training in the USSR in 1982, slightly less than the number of such personnel in the NATO countries. (S NF)

Large numbers of Soviet military technicians are posted to Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Algeria:

- About 4,500 Soviet military personnel are in Syria. Moscow benefits from the collection of intelligence both on the Syrian military and on Israel's US-made military equipment, the insertion of the USSR as a political factor in the Middle East, and the firsthand acquisition of information in an area of potential Soviet military intervention.

² We believe these are minimum figures for LDC military personnel in the USSR.

Table 2
USSR: Military and Quasi-Military Personnel in Selected LDCs *

	Number of Persons		
	1972	1982	Change
Total	9,360	17,385	8,025
Rapid growth	3,360	16,900	13,540
Syria	1,140	4,500	3,360
Libya	20	2,000	1,980
Ethiopia	0	1,700	1,700
Afghanistan	400	2,000	1,600
Angola	0	1,200	1,200
North Yemen	100	1,200	1,100
South Yemen	200	1,000	800
Mozambique	0	800	800
Algeria	1,000	1,500	500
Iraq	500	1,000	500
Moderate growth	0	485	485
Madagascar	0	160	160
Mali	0	150	150
Congo	0	100	100
Nicaragua	0	75	75
Decline	6,000	0	-6,000
Egypt	5,500	0	-5,500
Somalia	400	0	-400
Sudan	100	0	-100

* These estimates are based on all-source intelligence. Yearly data are available in *Communist Aid to Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*, published annually.

- The number of Soviet technicians in Ethiopia continues to grow, and now totals 1,700. Moscow and Addis Ababa have signed a series of contracts since 1977 providing for Soviet technical services. [] also indicate that Soviet instructors teach armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry tactics and assist in the planning of military operations on both the Eritrean and Somali fronts.


Figure 5
Geographic Distribution of Soviet Military and Quasi-Military Personnel in LDCs, 1972 and 1982

Percent


1972: 9,900 Personnel

1982: 17,500 Personnel

Middle East-72
South Asia-4
Latin America-4
Sub-Saharan Africa-10
North Africa-10



Middle East-40
Latin America-1
South Asia-13
North Africa-21
Sub-Saharan Africa-25



• Moscow had about 1,200 military technicians in Angola in 1982. [] Angolan officers are attending a four-year course in the USSR in military science as a step toward promotion to general officer rank, []

• Although Mozambique is attempting to diversify its sources of military equipment and training, [] believes that the level of Soviet technicians remained constant the last two years. Maputo has Soviet advisers assigned to brigade commanders and political commissars and technical specialists assigned to the chiefs of logistics, technology, health, engineering, and communications. Technical specialists also serve within the motorized infantry, commando, tank, and air defense battalions, []

• The USSR remains Algeria's primary military supplier, and at least 1,500 Soviet military technicians are in Algeria. However, Moscow no longer has a monopoly on military instruction in Algeria, since Algiers has diversified its military procurement to include Western equipment []

[] Moscow probably hopes, nevertheless, that Algiers will move leftward in the near future. The Soviet training presence limits Western influence and earns hard currency

Insurgent and irredentist groups, especially those based in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, have become increasingly important as sources of military trainees in the USSR. We estimate []

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that nearly 5 percent of Third World trainees sent to the USSR in 1978-82 were nongovernment personnel—mainly Palestinians and Zimbabwean insurgents—who received conventional military training. Moscow has provided guerrilla training in the USSR to South African insurgents []

[] also reports that Soviet instructors trained South African insurgents in basic infantry tactics and other subjects in 1979.

Congo, Madagascar, and Mali appear to be emerging targets for Moscow in the military program. None of these three had in-country Soviet military instructors 10 years ago:

- In Congo, Moscow primarily provides military instruction to Congolese Army, Navy, air, and paramilitary units. A great number of Congolese are receiving military training in the USSR, []

[] This includes political instruction in "Marxist philosophy" and "socialistic practices in the Soviet Union," along with training in a range of military subjects such as tactics, armored vehicles, topography, and military engineering. []

- The Soviet military presence in Madagascar is growing, [] Soviet instructors in Madagascar are working with all branches of the Army, including artillery, armor, and military schools. Antananarivo pays their expenses for food, housing, and transportation. Soviet aviation technicians and support personnel also are present in Madagascar.

- Moscow is the leading supplier of equipment to the Malian military and has 150 Soviet military personnel in Mali. [] Mali's Air Force commander argues that the Soviets are the only large-scale source of grant military assistance. Malian pilots and missile technicians are training in the USSR. []

Civilian Technician Program

The civilian technician program—which provides training for LDC economic technicians in the USSR in development-related skills—is the smallest of Moscow's three training programs. The number of civilian technician trainees doubled between 1972 and 1981 but declined marginally in 1982 to 1,700. Forty-one percent are from South Asia, principally Afghanistan and India; 25 percent from the Middle East; 21 percent from Sub-Saharan Africa; and 13 percent from North Africa. Arabs are trained on Soviet fishing vessels, and Mongolian youths are in Soviet technical schools to learn construction, dyeing, and woodworking. Presumably some Grenadians will receive technical training in the USSR under the terms of the \$10 million economic aid agreement signed in 1982.


A Program Assessment

In view of the increasing emphasis given these training programs, Moscow almost certainly considers them a success. The Soviets have been able to acquire access to the government, the military, and professional groups in 94 developing countries through the bilateral working relationships they create and through followup efforts with program alumni. Moscow can exploit the access to develop additional official and unofficial ties. Moreover, the programs generate long-term opportunities for political penetration at low cost to Moscow and earn hard currency from in-country military instruction.


The Soviet academic program has not yet graduated an LDC president or prime minister, but the USSR can number among its alumni a member of a ruling revolutionary directorate, four LDC cabinet ministers, three ambassadors, and three subcabinet directors.³ These individuals and others are making []

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


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Even without achieving high positions, returning LDC graduates of Soviet schools may saturate and control their professions and bureaucracies:

- In the Dominican Republic, several returnees are working in the Agricultural, Public Works, and Communications Secretariats. Others hold influential positions in the country's largest university. Democratic leaders have expressed concern to the US Embassy about the number and positions of Soviet-trained students.



- In Syria, virtually all returning graduates are employed by the Syrian Government, including the universities, which are government owned. Several alumni have risen to be deputy ministers and university vice presidents. Soviet-educated Syrians are concentrated in the Ba'th ruling party. Ba'th organizations in the universities are heavily staffed with Soviet-trained engineering professors []
- In Cyprus, [] Soviet-educated returnees are scattered in influential positions throughout the community, particularly in the media. Of the 12 Communists in the Cypriot House of Representatives, seven are Soviet alumni.
- Jordan is also sensitive to the number of Soviet-trained returnees [] quips that meetings of the Jordanian medical association soon will be conducted in Russian, []
- [] anticipates that, through sheer force of numbers, Soviet-trained civilians will inevitably gain positions of influence in North Yemen.

The military training program probably has had the greatest impact among heavily dependent clients, either as a result of a long-term relationship, as with Syria, or as a payoff from a rapid Soviet initiative in a crisis situation, Ethiopia being a case in point. Some LDCs, such as India that have the financial means and independence, can limit Soviet influence by diversifying arms suppliers and associated training.

In addition, the Soviets have benefited from the hard currency earnings generated by their military training programs in LDCs. Since the mid-1970s, Moscow has required payment in hard currency for Soviet services from financially well-off clients rather than providing grant aid. We estimate []

[] that receipts from these clients, principally oil-rich states in the Middle East and North Africa, totaled about \$550 million in 1978-82, more than double the revenues of the previous five years. About three-fourths of these receipts probably were payments for Soviet performance of various military-related functions in LDCs, since Moscow absorbs most of the costs of training in the USSR. []

Soviet training programs have not been successful at all times, however. Some LDC students have complained bitterly about their experiences in the Soviet Union. Heavyhanded KGB surveillance, travel restrictions, poor housing conditions, racial discrimination, and the cold Russian winters are objects of scorn, [] academic performance. Furthermore, some students come away from the USSR unconvinced that Marxism-Leninism is a viable doctrine. These students may discourage some potential candidates from participating in the program

The military training program has also provoked some criticism from LDC clients when Soviet attempts to gain influence and deliberately "undertrain" are blatant. Early this year Iraq considered replacing Soviet

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MIG-23 instructors with Egyptians after the Soviets refused to divulge exact performance characteristics of the aircraft, []

[] Ethiopian Air Force technicians studying in the USSR (who had previous US training as a standard of comparison) have faulted poor substantive presentations, proselytizing efforts, and a condescending attitude by instructors, []

[] At its worst, Soviet insensitivity to Egyptian nationalism played a part in provoking Egypt's expulsion of the entire Soviet military contingent in 1972. Also, the added opportunities intelligence training programs provide for Soviet penetration have prompted some of Moscow's dependents to attempt to put limits on this type of training. []

Outlook

[] we expect the programs to continue to grow in the near term. The Soviets are realizing gains from these programs and presumably consider the risks of disillusionment or of expulsion to be manageable. Many of the target LDCs, whose leaders benefit from these programs, are likely to continue to take advantage of the Soviet training offers. This is all the more likely to be the case as an increasing number of graduates return to take positions of relative power and influence in their home countries. As opportunities permit, the Soviets will continue to expand the military training program. The military training program is a quick and highly visible means for Moscow to demonstrate support for an LDC regime. Moreover, Moscow often benefits financially from these programs or from the associated weapons sales by earning hard currency. We expect, based on the pattern of the last few years in Central America and the Caribbean, that these regions will be a focus of further growth in the training programs, although Moscow's other high priority targets will continue to receive significant training assistance

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