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Nationality Trends and Political Stability in the Soviet Union

A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

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Nationality Trends and Political Stability in the Soviet Union

Overview

Preliminary results from the 1979 census reveal that the three major Slavic nationalities (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians) account for 72 percent of the population of the USSR. But relatively low birthrates among these groups mean that their share of the population will drop to about 67 percent by the end of the century.

The USSR's ethnic diversity has a profound impact on Soviet domestic life. Labor force shortages in the 1980s are traceable in part to the lower level of geographic mobility of the less developed minorities in the Soviet southern tier. The Soviet Union's vast educational system must cope with a growing proportion of non-Slavic youngsters. The language barrier is also a handicap to the successful integration of ethnic minorities in the Soviet armed forces.

The policy devised by the Soviet leadership to deal with ethnic minorities combines gradual modernization with rigid suppression of nationality-inspired separatism. Any demands that conflict with government and party interests, including expressions of ethnic loyalties outside the narrow limits approved by the leadership, are promptly repressed.

Modernization is the inducement: non-Russians are encouraged to support the Soviet system through a carefully calculated series of educational, economic, and social programs designed to accelerate the integration of the more traditional minorities. These programs are based on the belief that reducing the social and economic inequities that distinguish minorities in the Soviet Union will help promote common values and minimize resistance to the party-dominated political system.

So far, this combination of sanctions against separatism and incentives to adjust to the system has worked fairly well. Although many of the more traditional minority groups lag substantially behind the Russians, social and economic disparities are gradually decreasing. Key indicators of integration—education, occupation, Communist Party membership, and Russian bilingualism—show that differences are gradually diminishing.

The evidence indicates, moreover, that modernization has been accompanied by significant changes in some values among traditional minorities. The most compelling evidence is the dramatic change taking place in the role of women among Soviet Muslims in the USSR's southern tier. Examination of fertility trends indicates that Soviet Muslims—groups often thought of as particularly resistant to the effects of social change—are experiencing essentially the same demographic transition through which the

USSR's European nationalities have already passed. These trends provide partial support for the Soviet assumption that modernization promotes common values and behavior.

The net effect of Soviet programs to promote the modernization of the more traditional minorities has been to increase diversity within those groups. This development decreases the number of issues that can be used to mobilize nationality groups against the Soviet regime. The well-educated, white-collar Muslim urban dweller, for example, will not identify strongly with the same economic and social issues as the semiliterate Muslim collective farmer.

Another aspect of Soviet nationality policy that has kept minority opposition to the Soviet system at manageable levels is the apparent awareness of the leadership of the risks involved in a heavyhanded approach. Modernization in every society involves changes in life styles and values that are often socially disruptive. Too rapid or too coercive change has the potential to generate backlash among individuals who find their prestige eroded by the new ways.

Soviet nationality policy has worked best when it has encouraged, not mandated, change in desired directions. The current Soviet leadership has chosen to temper its demands for minority adjustment to the Soviet system with concessions. This approach has not eliminated the dislocations associated with social change, however, and the regime has displayed no reluctance to use force to deal sternly with public dissent. Isolated occurrences of anti-Soviet protest from various ethnic groups have been quickly suppressed, and the Soviet control networks have minimized minority opportunities to organize a systematic anti-Soviet movement.

The problems of governing a nation of more than 262 million people divided into a multilingual society of more than 100 nationalities will continue to be a challenge to the political skills of the leadership for the foreseeable future. Over the past several decades, however, the predominant response of the Soviet nationalities to the requirements and opportunities of the Soviet system has been to adapt, not rebel.

We do not know whether the leadership that succeeds Brezhnev will be willing or able to maintain the balance between concession and coercion, or to continue the gradual reduction of social and economic disparities between

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ethnic groups. The current mix of social and economic programs, however, and the leadership's willingness to use force to keep nationality activities within acceptable limits has worked fairly well in containing what could be a potentially explosive source of political instability. As long as the Soviet leadership is able to continue these policies, nationality-based challenges to the Moscow leadership are likely to remain spontaneous, unfocused, and manageable.

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Nationality Trends and Political Stability in the Soviet Union

Soviet watchers in the West are focusing increased attention on ethnic pluralism in the USSR.¹ The Soviet regime shares many of the problems of other multiethnic states. Over one-fourth of the USSR's 262 million citizens are members of non-Slavic minorities -- groups separated from the dominant Slavic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians) by differences in language, social and economic status, culture, and tradition. From Moscow's standpoint, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the so-called national question is the existence of large social and economic disparities between the nationalities.

Although Soviet approaches to resolving the national question have varied over the years, the current policy is a combination of coercion and incentives. The negative side of Soviet nationality policy is control: the coercive network that operates in the USSR to control the population as a whole also operates to restrain minority dissent. Western political scientists analyzing collective violence stress the importance of the personal costs versus benefits of antiregime activities. Other things being equal, the incidence of political violence tends to be lower in nations where the coercive capacity of the state is high and where the penalties for antiregime activities are more severe. The existence of an extensive control network in the USSR and the serious personal risks entailed in articulating antiregime sentiments in the Soviet Union act to mute expressions of political dissidence and greatly complicate the use of reported "ethnic incidents" as a barometer of nationality threats to the Soviet system.²

¹ The increasing interest in nationalism in the USSR is evident in both academic and general literature. General treatments of the nationality question include Katz; Simmonds; Azrael; and, more narrowly focused, Rakowska-Harmstone. The nationality problem has been studied in terms of Soviet foreign policy in Tillet; in terms of social mobility in Silver, 1974; and in terms of modernization in Vardys. Typical of the coverage of the larger circulation press are Meyer; *The Economist*; and *U.S. News and World Report*.
² See appendix I for a more complete discussion of the limitations of field reporting for studying ethnic attitudes and behavior in the USSR.

This paper is an evaluation of the other side of Soviet nationality policy -- a pragmatic series of programs carefully calculated to maximize adjustment by non-Russian minorities to the demands of modern Soviet life. These programs involve recognition and acceptance of the persistence of ethnic diversity and a determination to mute those ethnic differences that are viewed as contrary to national interests. In the lexicon of CPSU nationality policy, Moscow's goal is to promote "the flowering and convergence [sblizheniye]" of socialist nations:

The essence of CPSU nationality policy at the present stage consists in the constant consideration of both the overall interests of the USSR as well as the interests of its constituent republics. CPSU nationality policy is directed at the complex development and economic specialization of all union republics, toward the flowering and convergence of the cultures of all peoples of our country.³

A related plank of Soviet nationality policy is the "friendship of peoples" (*druz'zha narodov*), which essentially means a process of instilling Soviet citizens of all nationalities with an emotional identity with the Soviet Union and an official intolerance for nationality-based prejudice.

These general goals have specific implications for Soviet demographic, investment, educational, language, and party recruitment policies; policies that dovetail with Soviet economic and military manpower needs. For example, overall nationality goals require the development of technically advanced industry and highly mechanized agriculture in all-union republics. Another requirement flowing from overall nationality goals is enhanced occupational opportunities for all national groups. Russian language fluency—a key to upward mobility—is promoted and encouraged, but schooling and newspapers in the minority language are

³ "Natsionalnaya Politika KPSS."

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also available, at least for the larger minorities. Latent minority group members are co-opted into the system through higher education and party membership.

The current Soviet programs and policy goals, as articulated in the press, represent a retreat from the earlier stress placed on *slivaniye*—cultural homogeneity resulting from complete erasure of ethnic identities. Most current Soviet discussions of nationality policy refer to *slivaniye* as a process that must await "the final victory of Communism." In part, this change in emphasis reflects Soviet ethnographic findings, which indicate that ethnic identity, typified by native language affiliation and some ethnic customs and patterns of social interaction, such as preference for a spouse of the same nationality, are more persistent than Soviet leaders had expected. The leadership is willing to tolerate cultural differences (that is, differences in cuisine, architecture, and dress) that are not viewed as conflicting with basic system values. At the same time, it has strongly promoted the modernization of the more traditional nationalities and their integration into the Soviet political and economic system.

In assessing the results of Soviet nationality policy, it is important to distinguish between various dimensions of ethnic assimilation, as applied to the Soviet case:

- Sovietization: the process of accepting basic system values.
- Social assimilation: the extent to which group members socialize freely with persons outside the group.
- Identity assimilation: the weakening of ethnic consciousness or identity.

The Soviet leadership has achieved some success in promoting Sovietization. Movement toward social and identity assimilation has been much slower—a trend recognized and apparently accepted by the Soviet leadership.

The distinction between various dimensions of assimilation is important because some Western social scientists studying ethnicity have suggested that it is a serious error to use variables measuring the extent of social and identity assimilation (such as rates of ethnic intermarriage and native language affiliation) as in-

dicators of the potential for ethnic dissent. Western studies suggest that it is acculturation in this case—Sovietization that provides the necessary basis for political stability; members of an ethnic group can retain their ethnic identity and distinctive social patterns while displaying strong support of most system values. In the United States, ethnic identity, cultural traditions, and social patterns have persisted long after groups have become well integrated into the economic and political structure. In other words, ethnicity, like region, class, gender, or occupation, may be an important aspect of one's identity without in any way conflicting with loyalty to the political system. These findings suggest that the vitality of ethnic identity as an effective rallying point for popular opposition depends directly on the degree to which members of an ethnic group are united by common values and goals that are incompatible with those of the Soviet system. Successful Sovietization—the inculcation of basic system values—provides the basis for political stability by muting value differences and hence decreasing the potential for nationality-based cleavages.

This is not to say that ethnicity loses all political relevance for non-Russians who have become thoroughly integrated into the Soviet economic and political system. Ethnic and religious loyalties may be invoked to provide a broader ideological umbrella for groups with diverse (and sometimes incompatible) interests and goals. But both history and social science theory suggest that such alliances are far more tenuous, far less enduring sources of opposition than those based on shared values and common economic and social interests. The Soviet leaders are apparently aware of the potential dangers posed by coinciding ethnic, social, and economic cleavages. They hope to minimize these dangers by encouraging the integration of less modernized minorities into modern society—a step they believe will lead to Sovietization.

Not all Soviet minorities trail the dominant Slavs in levels of modernization. The Soviet nationality question is further complicated by the existence of several

* The distinction we draw between acculturation (what we are calling Sovietization) and assimilation is one that is recognized in several social science disciplines.

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"overachieving" groups—Jews, Georgians, and, to a lesser extent, Armenians. These groups are ahead of the Russians in several major indicators of modernity, including education, occupational status, and party membership. The process of Sovietization, involving the gradual reduction in social and economic differences between nationalities, requires the erosion of the relative advantage of these groups over time. Convergence in social and economic status involves both convergence up, as the underdeveloped minorities narrow the Russian lead, and convergence down, as the comparative advantage of the "overachieving" groups is gradually eroded. Because the traditional minorities are much more important numerically and because deprivation along ethnic lines has played a major role in destabilizing multinational states, the emphasis in this study will be on trends affecting the modernization of the more traditional minorities.

How successful has the Soviet leadership been in promoting modernization? Three types of evidence are examined here: fragmentary material from public opinion surveys; statistics measuring changing rates of minority participation in the economic and political system; and behavioral indicators of value change involving shifts in the traditional social position of women drawn from sociological, ethnographic, and demographic studies.

Sovietization of Ethnic Minorities in the USSR
Public Opinion Surveys. The most direct measure of Sovietization is data from public opinion surveys about individual values. There is no direct way for a Western researcher to measure popular aspirations in the Soviet Union. The limited insights that may be drawn from published Soviet surveys and the more frequent nonquantitative discussions of Soviet values in the Soviet press suggest that the concerns of the average Soviet citizen center on family welfare, including childrearing and children's occupational opportunities; on job satisfaction and esteem; on material well-being, including availability of housing, consumer goods and services, and individual economic opportunity; and on continued peace. A high priority was placed on these goals by all groups surveyed in a 1971 Georgian study,

which included both Russian and Georgian respondents.

Published Soviet surveys that present findings about basic values by nationality group are quite limited, but those that are available indicate that age, social and economic status, and educational differences—not ethnicity per se—account for most of the variation in values. For example, a 1971 study of ethnic Russians and Moldavians in Kishinev revealed few differences in social values between the two nationalities. Well educated people of both nationalities, however, tended to value creativity and interesting work more highly than did respondents with lower educational attainments.

Changing Rates of Minority Participation in the Economic and Political System

An alternative measure of Soviet success in promoting Sovietization is the change (or lack of change) displayed by disadvantaged ethnic groups in overcoming prior disparities. Four indicators of minority participation will be examined here: education, occupation, Communist Party membership, and Russian bilingualism (see table 1).¹ These indicators were chosen because they provide a fairly good composite profile of a group's position not only relative to the Russians, but also in the modernization process itself. The data presented below reveal a gradual narrowing of social and economic differences between Russians and non-Russians and, by implication, increased sharing of some basic values.

These trends are important because recent Western studies of factors that produced conflict in a variety of political systems point to perceived prejudicial treatment as a major source of political discontent. Nationality or race is much more likely to become a focal

¹ Soviet reports of opinion surveys should be viewed with caution, particularly given the small number that have dealt with the values of Soviet citizens. It is noteworthy, however, that similar results have been obtained in the United States and other widely polled countries—citizens' concerns focus on the family, economic progress, the future of their children, and on issues of war and peace.

² See appendix II for a more complete discussion of methodological issues associated with measuring social change in the USSR.

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Table 1

Percent

Sovietization of Soviet Nationalities, 1970

	Education (Completed Secondary Education and Above) ^a	Occupation (Specialists With Higher Education) ^b	Political Participation (CP Members, 1976) ^c	Russian Fluency (Native or Fluent Command of Russian) ^d
Slavs				
Russians	25.6	7.0	10.6	99
Ukrainians	23.7	5.4	8.6	51
Belorussians	20.9	5.0	9.0	68
Balts				
Estonians	24.2	8.0	6.8	33
Latvians	23.9	6.8	6.2	50
Lithuanians	16.4	6.1	5.9	37
Muslims				
Kazakhs	19.1	6.7	10.7	44
Kirghiz	19.0	6.2	7.2	19
Uzbeks	19.9	5.6	7.4	15
Tadzhiks	17.0	5.0	6.4	16
Turkmen	17.2	6.1	6.7	16
Azerbaijanis	22.6	7.5	10.8	18
Balkars	16.7	6.9	11.8	73
Tatars	16.3	4.5	8.0	73
Bashkirs	12.4	3.4	8.0	58
Chechens	7.4	1.9	4.3	68
Other				
Georgians	40.5	10.8	12.1	23
Armenians	31.0	9.6	11.4	38
Moldavians	10.8	3.0	4.0	40
Jews	70.6	31.6	16.7	95
Buryats	22.1	11.8	11.6	74
Yakuts	18.9	8.1	8.8	45
Komis	16.3	6.4	12.4	80
Chuvash	14.3	3.8	8.0	71
Udmurts	11.9	3.0	7.2	81
Mordvinians	10.9	2.5	8.6	88
Maris	9.4	2.5	6.0	71

^a Ten years old and older.

^b Aged 25-59.

^c Aged 20 and above.

^d Total population.

Indicators were computed from data provided in the following sources:

Education: *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (hereafter cited as *Itogi, 1970*), volume IV, pp. 393-433.

Occupation: *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), p. 240. Nationality age groups computed from data in *Itogi, 1970*, volume IV, pp. 360-382.

Political Participation: *Partiynoye stroitelstvo* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 87. Nationality age groups based on projections computed from data in *Itogi, 1970*, volume IV, pp. 360-382.

Russian Fluency: *Itogi, 1970*, volume IV, pp. 20-22.

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point for political unrest when deprivation follows ethnic or racial lines, that is, when members of certain groups see themselves as deprived of economic, political, and social status largely because of their race or ethnicity. The four indicators provide a rough measure of how evenly opportunities are distributed across ethnic and regional lines. Tracking change in participation rates over time allows us to measure the extent to which differences in group participation in the economic and political system are being narrowed.

At the individual level this translates into a straightforward measure of social mobility: If I am willing to punch the proper tickets (education, party membership), will I be able to get ahead? Do I have more opportunity to do so than the generation before me? To the extent that the answers to these questions are increasingly affirmative, the basis for broad-based political discontent should be considerably reduced. The behavioral indicators are, therefore, measures of the results of two closely interrelated but analytically distinct processes: the willingness of the Soviet leadership to promote minority social and economic mobility by co-opting those minority group members willing to adjust to the demands of the system, and the willingness of the non-Russian minorities to exploit these opportunities by buying into the system. For many minority citizens, the decision to adapt to Moscow's demands is one of pragmatic economic self-interest; they are reluctant to challenge the system. Nonetheless, both the regime goal of promoting minority modernization and minority adaptiveness must be present for progress to be made in minority participation.

Education

The most significant achievements in narrowing the gap between Russians and non-Russians have been made in the field of education—an area that is relatively responsive to policy choices.² Non-Russian educational gains are particularly important since education is a key not only to upward social mobility, but also to many other changes deemed desirable by Soviet leaders—for example, increases in non-Russian ur-

² It should be noted, however, that the educational qualifications of parents exert a substantial indirect influence on the educational opportunities of children. Secondary school students with highly educated parents are more likely to attend college than those whose parents are less educated. The increasing educational attainments of the less-modernized nationalities should be judged accordingly.

banization, in the proportion employed in noncollective farm occupations, and in fertility declines for the less-modernized minorities. Soviet studies have also linked higher educational levels with officially approved attitudes, such as an increase in approval of interethnic contact and a decline in religious belief.

The levels of educational achievement presented here, such as incomplete and completed secondary schooling, were chosen with these linkages in mind. Particular attention was paid to those indicators that provide a rough measure of individual social mobility. Because Soviet studies have shown that the great majority of youngsters aspire to white-collar status, college education—the most direct and quickest way to achieve entry into the more prestigious white-collar jobs—is a particularly important indicator of individual opportunity. So too, although to a lesser extent, is specialized secondary school training, since those graduates are eligible for lower level specialist and technician jobs.³

The differences among ethnic educational levels are narrowing. Although non-Russian gains are most significant in higher education, the narrowing cuts across all levels of education and all nationality groups—including the Muslims, whose gains have been substantial. The trends are apparent in historical data and in age-specific student and educational attainment data. The greatest gains have been made by young non-Russian females, whose educational level has particular significance for ethnic fertility levels. This latter point will be discussed in more detail below.

The extent of convergence in ethnic educational attainment is shown in table 2.⁴ Between 1959 and 1970 all Muslim groups except the Azerbaijanis experienced

³ Vocational-technical school graduates, who are recruited to blue-collar jobs in industry, agriculture, construction, housing and transport, are not included in this discussion. Vocational-technical training does not provide entry into the highly prized white-collar professions, but rather to jobs such as driver, sewing machine operator, weaver, tractor operator, bricklayer, and miner. Furthermore, data providing the breakdown of vocational-technical pupils by nationality is not available.

⁴ The methodology used throughout this study involves standardizing available published data to the relevant age groups for each nationality; computing Russian indices; and, examining change in average deviation (obtained by averaging the absolute differences of the Russian indices for a given year) score over time. See appendix II for a more complete discussion of the need for these procedures.

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Table 2

Indexes of Change in Ethnic Educational Attainments, 1959-70

	Incomplete Secondary and Above ^a		Complete Secondary and Above ^a		Completed Higher ^a	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
Slavs						
Russians	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ukrainians	93	99	79	93	68	78
Belorussians	82	86	72	82	52	67
Balts						
Estonians	95	91	103	95	84	98
Latvians	113	96	99	93	76	84
Lithuanians	55	70	52	64	56	71
Muslims						
Kazakhs	71	77	58	75	44	64
Kirghiz	79	79	59	74	36	58
Uzbeks	82	81	57	78	36	53
Tadzhiks	79	77	49	66	32	47
Turkmen	96	85	54	67	44	56
Azerbaijanis	95	83	88	88	92	82
Balkars	63	70	39	65	20	64
Tatars	87	87	54	64	40	49
Bashkirs	72	73	42	48	24	33
Chechens	29	43	13	29	4	16
Other						
Georgians	125	114	181	158	228	187
Armenians	117	102	135	121	152	122
Moldavians	56	67	28	42	16	31
Jews	202	162	396	276	1,068	764
Buryats	79	84	71	86	72	104
Yakuts	62	74	57	74	44	73
Komis	83	81	71	64	44	49
Chuvash	88	83	54	56	32	38
Udmurts	68	74	43	46	24	31
Mordvinians	56	63	34	43	20	24
Maris	61	65	33	37	20	27
Average deviation	26.9	22.2	52.1	38.0	91.4	69.8

^a Indexes were computed from the percent (age 10 and over) with the given educational attainment. Source: *Itogi, 1970*, volume IV, pp. 393-433.

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Table 3

Completed Secondary

Generational Change in Educational Attainment, 1970

	Ages 30 +	Ages 16-29
Russian	100	100
Ukrainian	81	108
Belorussian	70	99
Estonian	98	85
Latvian	96	86
Lithuanian	56	74
Kazakh	64	91
Kirghiz	64	100
Uzbek	66	103
Tadzhik	56	88
Turkmen	56	90
Azerbaijani	100	95
Georgian	179	136
Armenian	138	116
Moldavian	28	60
Average deviation	32.1	13.0

Source: Indices were computed from data provided in *Itogi*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 549-553.

substantial increases relative to the Russians, although several of the Muslim peoples (the Chechens, Bashkirs, and Tadzhiks) still have attainment levels that are less than half those of the Russians.

The gains among non-Russians came about largely among young people. Table 3 presents data on the educational attainments of 16- to 29-year-olds as compared with earlier generations. As noted, the average deviation for complete secondary education and above among the 16- to 29-year-olds has been significantly lowered. Even more compelling are the data for 16- to 19-year-olds. Among this age group only four of the 14 major nationalities score below the Russians in completed secondary education, and all six of the Muslim groups outscored the Russians (figure 1). Much of this convergence in completed secondary education is due to the Soviet program of universal secondary education. The younger Muslims, however, are also closing the gap with the Russians in completed higher education (table 4). The generally high educational attain-

Table 4

Completed Higher Education Among 20-29 Year Olds, 1970

	Percent	Index
Russian	5.4	100
Ukrainian	3.9	72
Belorussian	3.9	72
Estonian	5.9	109
Latvian	4.4	82
Lithuanian	5.2	96
Kazakh	5.2	96
Kirghiz	5.4	100
Uzbek	4.8	89
Tadzhik	4.0	74
Turkmen	4.6	85
Azerbaijani	5.2	96
Georgian	8.2	152
Armenian	6.5	120
Moldavian	2.8	52


Source: *Itogi*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 549-566.

ments of young non-Russians have important economic and military manpower implications, since it is these young people who are entering the labor force and conscript pool in the 1980s.

Not all ethnic educational data, however, form such a consistent picture of convergence with Russian scores. Table 5 presents relevant student data for specialized secondary school enrollments for 1959, 1970, and 1975. While non-Russians on the whole displayed large increases during this period, the record is an uneven one. Most of the convergence in minority scores occurred between 1959 and 1970. There was a slight increase in group differences between 1970 and 1975. Enrollments per thousand (as standardized to the relevant age group) actually declined between 1970 and 1975 for all groups, and some groups lost ground to the Russians despite huge percentage increases in enrollments. The Kirghiz, for example, increased their enrollments by 30 percent compared to the Russian increase of less than 2 percent, but their Russian index

Figure 1

Differences in Attained Education Among 16- to 19-Year-Olds in 1970



score declined by about eight points. This is due to large increases in the number of Kirghiz in the student age pool composed of 16- to 24-year-olds. Similar declines in ethnic student ratios may be expected for groups with very young age structures since large increases in student age population make it difficult for the regional school systems to adjust immediately to the increased demands placed upon them. Contrary to the general Muslim pattern the Kazakhs and Tatars have consistently enhanced their position relative to the Russians across all three time periods.

It can be argued that educational data are not comparable across ethnic groups because of qualitative differences in education. An examination of the Soviet educational system, however, fails to provide evidence of substantial qualitative differences. First, programs and, to some degree, curriculums are fairly well standardized nationwide. Second, the available quantitative indicators of educational quality by republic suggest a fairly narrow spread. The RSFSR usually falls in the lower third on these major indicators, including

student/teacher ratios, percent of teaching personnel with completed higher education, per pupil expenditures for general and specialized secondary education, and proportion of full-time daytime students. It should be noted that while these indicators embody factors considered by both Soviet and Western educators as key elements in quality schooling, none of these measures addresses directly the issue of student performance, since results of standardized testing by republic and ethnic group are not available. It seems clear, however, that the qualitative differences affecting non-Russian and, in particular, Central Asian education, may have been somewhat overestimated. Even accounting for possible qualitative differences not captured by the eight indicators depicted in table 6, the presumed advantages of an RSFSR schooling do not offset the significant educational gains displayed by the less modernized minorities.

The data charting nationality convergence in educational attainment are best evaluated in a historical perspective. Most of the nationalities that trailed the

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Table 5

Student Enrollment in Specialized Secondary Schools:
1959, 1970, 1975

	1959		1970		1975	
	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Index
Slavs						
Russians	9.4	100	13.8	100	12.2	100
Ukrainians	7.1	75	12.7	92	1.3	93
Belorussians	6.6	70	12.4	90	11.3	93
Balts						
Estonians	12.5	133	12.9	93	12.8	105
Latvians	9.8	104	12.4	90	12.9	105
Lithuanians	10.7	114	16.9	122	15.9	130
Muslims						
Kazakhs	6.2	66	9.8	71	9.6	79
Kirghiz	5.4	58	9.0	65	7.0	57
Uzbeks	4.6	49	8.5	61	6.7	55
Tadzhiks	3.5	37	6.9	30	5.3	43
Turkmen	5.4	57	7.7	56	6.3	51
Azerbaijanis	5.7	60	10.7	77	7.5	61
Balkars	7.9	84	15.9	115	9.0	73
Tatars	5.5	59	11.8	85	10.9	89
Bashkirs	4.6	49	10.1	73	8.9	73
Chechens	4.3	46	7.0	51	5.6	46
Other^a						
Georgians	6.0	63	11.0	80	8.6	70
Armenians	6.4	67	12.3	89	9.9	81
Moldavians	3.7	39	8.3	60	7.3	60
Jews	NA	NA	18.7	135	19.1	156
Buryats	11.4	121	13.9	101	12.4	102
Yakuts	8.0	84	12.0	87	9.9	81
Chuvash	4.6	48	9.7	70	8.3	68
Udmurts	4.7	50	9.4	68	8.0	65
Mordvinians	3.1	32	9.8	71	8.8	72
Maris	3.8	40	9.0	65	7.3	60
Average deviation		37.6		25.2		30.9

^a Ages 16-24.

^b Komi data not available: combined with Komi-prmyak.

Source:

Enrollment data located in: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1969* (Moscow: Statistika, 1970), p. 690.

Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), p. 196.

Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), p. 208.

Nationality age groups derived from: *Itogi, 1970*, volume IV, pp. 360-382; and *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda* (hereafter cited as *Itogi, 1959*) SSSR, pp. 211-225; and *Itogi, 1959*, RSFSR, pp. 388-409.

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Table 6

Indicators of Educational Quality (1975) by Republic

SSSR	Student Teacher Ratios (General) ^a	Percent of Teachers With Higher Education (General) ^b	Per Pupil Expenditure		Sixth Grade Graduates	Percentage of Day Students ^c		
			General Education	Specialized Secondary		Graduates From Complete Secondary	Special Secondary Graduates	College Graduates
RSSSR	17	61	171	228	93	71	64	67
Ukrainian	16	72	178	267	97	69	62	57
Belorussian	15	65	189	348	98	79	66	65
Estonian	14	65	205	383	98	78	72	71
Latvian	14	65	217	395	97	71	71	69
Lithuanian	16	56	200	409	94	66	71	66
Kazakh	17	56	161	311	92	79	70	67
Kirghiz	17	64	152	363	95	83	73	67
Uzbek	17	71	156	315	97	84	70	57
Tadzhik	17	62	168	381	97	89	74	70
Turkmen	19	68	173	313	97	88	71	67
Azerbaijani	16	64	157	339	92	79	69	64
Georgian	12	74	220	464	98	87	85	53
Armenian	15	69	196	387	95	87	77	70
Moldavian	16	60	171	360	98	73	72	67

^a Source: *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 26-67.
^b Ibid. pp. 99-110.
^c Source, number of pupils: *Narodnoye*, pp. 18-24, 119-136
Source, expenditures: *Gosudarstvennyy byudzhel SSSR i*

byudzhety sovuznykh respublik ("Finansy," 1976), pp. 37, 40, 46
^a Source, number of pupils: *Narodnoye*, p. 156.
Source, expenditures: *Gosudarstvennyy*, p. 55.
^c Source: *Narodnoye*, pp. 93-96, 180-207, 252-281

Russians in education in 1959 and 1970, particularly the Central Asian groups, were largely illiterate in the 1920s. For example, whereas 45 percent of the Russians could read or write in 1926, all but 11 percent of the Azerbaijanis, 2 percent of the Turkmen, 5 percent of the Kirghiz, 7 percent of the Kazakhs, 4 percent of the Uzbeks, and 2 percent of the Tadzhiks were totally illiterate.

Occupation

Increasing minority educational attainments have been paralleled by trends in occupational areas. This is an important point because increasing educational opportunity does not necessarily lead to fuller minority participation in modern society. To the extent that well-educated minorities are unable to achieve analogous occupational status, increasing minority educa-

tional levels may be socially destabilizing by promoting a revolution of rising expectations. Hence, minority occupational trends are an important indicator of leadership willingness and ability to open up appropriate occupational opportunities for the younger generation of increasingly better educated non-Russians. The record thus far is fairly bright from the regime's point of view. Non-Russians have made substantial increases in their representation in the noncollective farm work force and in white-collar and specialist employment, with somewhat more uneven progress in ethnic representation among scientific workers.

Non-Russian participation in the noncollective farm work force has increased significantly. Table 7 presents a breakdown in the noncollective farm, blue-collar work force (*rabochiy*) for the major nationalities

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Table 7

Workers as Percent of Employed Population

Nationality	Percent 1959	Russian Index	Percent 1970	Russian Index
Russians	54	100	63	100
Ukrainians	34	63	47	75
Belorussians	31	57	53	84
Estonians	51	94	57	99
Latvians	46	85	54	86
Lithuanians	34	63	52	83
Kazakhs	44	81	65	103
Kirghiz	22	41	41	65
Uzbeks	27	50	39	62
Tadzhiks	18	33	37	59
Turkmen	22	41	32	51
Azerbaijanis	24	44	50	79
Georgians	22	41	41	65
Armenians	38	70	60	95
Moldavians	13	24	32	51
Average deviation		40.9		23.9

* Within respective republics.

Source: Data compiled from M. I. Kulichenko (ed.), *Natsionalnye otnosheniya v razvitiy sotsialisticheskoy obshchestve* (Moscow: Mysl, 1977), p. 93.

Table 8

Agricultural Employees With Mechanized Jobs

	1959	1970
Russians	100	100
Ukrainians	69	61
Belorussians	46	57
Estonians	59	101
Latvians	56	83
Lithuanians	43	61
Kazakhs	64	64
Kirghiz	27	25
Uzbeks	38	32
Tadzhiks	22	23
Turkmen	38	38
Azerbaijanis	29	26
Georgians	13	11
Armenians	29	24
Moldavians	38	39
Average deviation	55.3	50.5

Source: Kulichenko, p. 95.

within their respective union republics. Between 1959 and 1970, all of the major nationalities, with the exception of the Estonians, experienced large increases relative to the Russians in the proportion of the labor force engaged in such occupations. These increases were most pronounced for the Muslims. The blue-collar category, however, includes both agricultural workers on state farms and industrial workers. Occupational progress by non-Russian groups in industrial jobs can thus be measured only indirectly, since separate data on ethnic representation in industry, construction, and other "modernized" blue-collar occupations are not available for the most part. Fragmentary data on individual minorities, however, suggest that the increased ethnic representation in the blue-collar category has been paralleled by increasing representation in the "modernized" segments of the blue-collar work

force. Data on Azerbaijani workers in Azerbaijan, for example, reveal a significant increase in ethnic Azerbaijani participation in the industrial, construction, and rail transport work force.¹⁶ Data on levels of modernization within the agricultural work force tell a somewhat different story (table 8). Here the greatest gains were made by the Baltic groups; and three out of six of the Muslim nationalities lost ground to the Russians between 1959 and 1970. Thus, while the

¹⁶ The percentage of Azerbaijanis in each occupational category was indexed to the percent of Azerbaijanis among working-age people of Azerbaijan. The indices, which are rough measures of Azerbaijani representation, increased between 1957 and 1973 as follows: industrial workers, 60 to 79; construction workers, 79 to 95; and, rail transport workers, 80 to 108. This method tends to understate Azerbaijani representation in those industries as a proportion of employed Azerbaijanis, because a significant but unknown number of working-age women remain outside the work force.

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Muslim groups now have increasing proportions of their work force employed in industrial and other noncollective farm occupations, those groups who remain within the agricultural work force still hold a large share of the nonmechanized jobs.

A better indicator of upward mobility for minorities is their representation in the white-collar work force, for which data are more available. Relative increases in non-Russian employment in white-collar jobs were registered for nearly all minority groups. These increases were particularly striking for Soviet Muslims, who increased their representation in the white-collar work force as a whole and also in the better paid and more sought after specialist jobs (table 9). Table 10 presents ethnic breakdowns of specialists and scientific workers for three time periods. The most significant change is the relative increase in the proportion of non-Russian, college-educated specialists. Between 1959 and 1970 the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen substantially narrowed the gap separating their scores from the Russians, with both the Kirghiz and Kazakh rate exceeding the Russian by 1975. Similar but less substantial gains were made by non-Russians in improving their position among employees with specialized secondary education. Data on the structure of this growing native elite indicate that non-Russians, particularly Muslims, made substantial gains between 1939 and 1970 in scientific and production-related white-collar jobs (table 11). The large bulge of school-age Muslims has also resulted in a dramatic increase in the native teaching staff—a trend that will probably continue for the next several decades if the educational trends of the 1960s and 1970s continue.

Recent ethnic data on scientific workers (academies, researchers, and assistants) reveal a more mixed picture. Both Georgians and Armenians still retained a substantial lead over Russians in 1975, but their lead was slowly being eroded. Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen actually lost ground relative to the Russians, while Kazakh and Kirghiz gains were only marginal.

These data suggest that the Soviet efforts to promote non-Russian participation in the industrialized work force has been most successful in paring down the non-

Table 9

White-Collar Employees as a Percentage of the Employed Population, 1959-70*

	1959		1970	
	Percent	Index	Percent	Index
Russians	22	100	28	100
Ukrainians	13	59	16	64
Belorussians	13	55	15	60
Estonians	22	100	25	100
Latvians	19	86	23	92
Lithuanians	14	64	18	72
Kazakhs	16	73	22	88
Kirghiz	8	36	15	60
Uzbeks	8	36	16	64
Tadzhiks	8	36	15	60
Turkmen	9	41	17	68
Azerbaijanis	15	68	21	84
Georgians	23	105	26	104
Armenians	22	100	25	100
Moldavians	4	8	7	28
Average deviation		38.4		24.3

* Nationalities within titular republic

Source: Kulichenko, p. 93.

Russian collective farm work force, promoting fuller minority representation in white-collar jobs, and encouraging ethnic participation in midlevel specialist and college-educated positions. Continuing shifts along these lines could help ease the projected labor problems of the 1980s. More importantly, this trend could help promote acceptance of basic system values by the less modernized minorities.

Political Participation

Non-Russian minorities are also making strides in Communist Party membership. Minority membership trends are an important dimension of occupational opportunity because party membership is an important ticket to upward mobility and a key indicator of economic and political integration in the Soviet Union. Among white-collar employees, party membership is apparently seen as a prerequisite for a successful ca-

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Table 10

Specialists With Higher Education and Scientific Workers *

	Specialists			Scientific Workers		
	1959	1970	1975	1959	1970	1975
Russians	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ukrainians	75	78	80	42	50	51
Belorussians	70	72	74	42	44	46
Estonians	107	115	112	107	99	95
Latvians	97	98	92	96	89	87
Lithuanians	72	88	88	63	71	69
Kazakhs	75	96	101	47	52	52
Kirghiz	75	89	101	42	47	47
Uzbeks	72	81	96	50	46	43
Tadzhiks	59	72	79	41	39	37
Turkmen	70	88	93	46	40	41
Azerbaijanis	127	108	115	120	94	87
Georgians	205	155	148	169	126	117
Armenians	175	138	137	175	143	139
Moldavians	30	43	53	15	22	24
Average deviation	34.6	20.7	17.3	45.8	38.4	38.5

* Indices computed from number of specialists per thousand adults, aged 25-59. Nationality age groups computed and projected from data in *Itogi*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 360-380 and *Itogi*, 1959, SSSR, pp. 211-225.

Source, specialists: *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), p. 240.

Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka i kultura v SSSR (Moscow:

Statistika, 1977), p. 296.

Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu (Moscow: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, 1960), p. 617.

Source, scientific workers: *Narodnoye*, 1971, pp. 270-271.

Narodnoye, 1977, pp. 308-309.

Narodnoye khozyaystvo, 1959, p. 757.

reer. Table 12 presents Communist Party membership data by major ethnic group for three time periods, plus the relevant Russian indices. Large increases in membership were registered by the three Baltic nationalities, whose low levels of party representation in 1959 were probably a reflection of their comparatively recent inclusion in the USSR. Several of the non-Russian groups have higher rates of party membership than the Russians—notably Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, and Armenians. Uzbeks, Ukrainians, and Belorussians have been steadily narrowing the gap in party membership rates, while Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik rates dropped in the early 1970s.

In evaluating Communist Party membership data for the less modernized minorities, it should be noted that

levels of party membership are considerably higher among white-collar workers and individuals with higher education. A recruitment bias toward white-collar and well-educated groups is evident in all party organizations for which relevant data are available. Those data suggest that past underrepresentation of some of the less modernized minorities was a result of their educational and occupational levels and that recent gains in representation result, at least to some degree, from increased educational attainment among the younger age groups of these minorities.

"Native" representation among republic political elites is also fairly high. Although data on minority participation within the local, regional, and republic party committees and government organizations are less

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Table 11

Native Elites: Index of Employed Population in Given Occupational Categories, 1939-70

	Administration Managerial		Productive		Intelligentsia				"Mass" (Teachers)	
	1939	1970	1939	1970	Scientific		Creative		1939	1970
					1939	1970	1939	1970		
Russians	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ukrainians	70	85	68	66	70	56	65	63	86	84
Belorussians	69	82	54	61	50	46	35	43	82	84
Estonians		140		99		131		231		101
Latvians		119		94		90		189		89
Lithuanians		102		74		89		109		86
Kazakhs	82	107	24	60	20	62	65	80	85	119
Kirghiz	61	77	9	32	10	63	70	83	77	106
Uzbeks	66	67	13	31	20	63	87	57	62	100
Tadzhiks	73	77	11	26	20	48	65	63	87	95
Turkmen	67	85	14	32	29	51	70	89	81	104
Azerbaijanis	85	106	32	52	90	108	135	100	89	130
Georgians	110	122	82	80	200	156	143	163	140	151
Armenians	130	117	95	80	200	131	283	163	136	125
Moldavians		37		18		25		49		68
Average deviation	24.3	20.2	54.4	39.7	63.6	35.5	45.8	31.0	20.6	15.0

Source: Kulichenko, p. 97.

complete than for party membership, the available material indicates that the relative level of minority group representation is greater among party and government officials than within the rank-and-file party membership." These comments apply to most of the key policymaking posts in the republic party and government apparatus.

Even in the area of internal security—traditionally thought of as a haven for Russian dominance in the provinces—native representation is significant. Half of

"Grey Hodnett's comprehensive examination of republic elites revealed that in only two republics—Belorussia and Moldavia— was the ethnic share of leadership positions less than their share of the republic population.

See also appendix II for a discussion of the need to consider only the appropriate age groups when attempting to measure representativeness. This approach reveals even greater native representation among the republic party and government elite.

the republic KGB chairmen are "natives"; 69 percent of the republic Administrative Organ department chiefs (the agency within the party apparatus that monitors military and internal control functionaries), and 85 percent of the republic-level MVD chiefs are "natives." These officials, like their ethnic Russian colleagues, serve at the discretion of the top party leadership. The high level of non-Russian participation in the Communist Party, in its "leading organs" (party committees) at republic and local levels, and in government agencies attests both to the party leadership's recognition of the need to co-opt minorities by promoting their participation in the political process and to minority willingness to exploit these opportunities. These trends also suggest that minority opportunities for political and economic participation are broader than had previously been assumed.

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Table 12

CPSU Membership: 1959, 1970, 1975^a

	1959		1970		1975	
	Percent	Index	Percent	Index	Percent	Index
Slavs						
Russians	8.5	100	10.6	100	10.6	100
Ukrainians	5.7	67	8.3	78	8.6	82
Belorussians	5.7	67	8.5	81	9.0	86
Balts						
Estonians	3.5	41	6.1	57	6.8	64
Latvians	3.4	40	5.7	54	6.2	59
Lithuanians	2.9	34	5.2	49	5.9	56
Muslims						
Kazakhs	8.1	95	10.5	99	10.7	102
Kirghiz	5.4	64	7.6	72	7.2	69
Uzbeks	5.4	64	7.3	69	7.4	70
Tadzhiks	4.6	54	6.5	61	6.4	60
Turkmen	5.4	64	6.8	64	6.7	63
Azerbaijanis	7.1	84	10.8	102	10.8	103
Balkars					11.8	112
Tatars					8.0	76
Bashkirs					8.0	76
Chechens					4.3	41
Other						
Georgians	10.1	119	11.9	112	12.1	115
Armenians	10.1	119	11.5	109	11.4	108
Moldavians	2.1	25	3.7	35	4.0	38
Jews					16.7	158
Buryats					11.6	110
Yakuts					9.8	93
Komis					12.4	117
Chuvash					8.0	76
Udmurts					7.2	69
Mordvinians					8.6	81
Maris					6.0	57
Average deviation		35.9		26.9		25.4 ^b

^a Twenty years old and older. Nationality age groups computed and projected from data in *Itoji*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 360-382 and *Itoji*, 1959, SSSR, pp. 211-225.

^b For the 15 groups measured in 1959 and 1970.

Source: *Partiyaya zhizn*, no. 10, 1976, p. 16.
Partiyoye stroitelstvo (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), p. 69.
KPSS: Spravochnik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965), p. 6.

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Russian Bilingualism

In promoting minority integration into modern Soviet life, one of the more troublesome problems for the regime is the language barrier. The Soviets are attempting to overcome this by promoting Russian as the medium of communication between its citizens. Russian is the primary language of the political leadership and of scientific and technological documents, and Russian is the command language of the Soviet Armed Forces. Russian fluency is thus an important key to upward social and economic mobility. In addition, Russian bilingualism has been linked in Soviet ethnographic studies with a variety of approved attitudes and behavioral patterns, including high levels of interethnic contact.

Soviet language policy, like nationality policy itself, has two interrelated goals: to allow continued linguistic pluralism; and to increase fluency in Russian as a second language. The first plank in Soviet language policy (in the parlance of Soviet writers, "equality of languages") reflects in part a willingness to tolerate the continuing attachment of non-Russians to their native language, and in part a recognition of the political benefits of promoting linguistic differences among, for example, the various Turkic-speaking Muslims. Theoretically, all Soviet citizens have the right to receive schooling in their native language. In practice, this right is enjoyed largely by the major nationalities residing within their titular republics and in areas of sufficient minority concentration to warrant the formation of separate minority schools and classes. For minority citizens residing outside their republics and smaller minorities within the RSFSR, the right to schooling in their native language is much more limited.

The second plank in Soviet language policy—increased fluency in Russian as a second language—reflects the leadership's perception of the desirability of having all Soviet citizens attain some level of fluency in Russian. In the 1950s and 1960s, the focus shifted toward the promotion of Russian bilingualism, and this shift is reflected clearly in current education policy.

Students in the Soviet Union attend general educational schools of three basic types: national schools; Russian-language schools; and mixed-language schools—schools with parallel programs of instruction

in two or more languages. The proportion of non-Russian youngsters being taught in the Russian language is not known, but it is probably quite high among the minority nationalities in the RSFSR, where minority language instruction is limited in many cases to the early elementary grades. The situation among the titular nationalities is less clear, since only fragmentary, dated, and sometimes conflicting data have been released. The trend, however, appears to be one in which an increasing number of students receive instruction in Russian. For example in 1955 22 percent of Turkmen students were taught in Russian, but by 1964 the percentage had reached 28 percent even though there were considerably more students in the latter period.

In the national schools where the medium of instruction is the native language, Russian is taught as a second language. The frequency of Russian instruction varies from republic to republic, although all regions introduce it in the elementary grades. Some republics have experimented with preschool Russian programs. Uzbekistan, for example, has a 70-hour program for nursery school youngsters. Frequency of instruction in elementary and secondary school varies from four to six hours per week. Russian classes continue through grade 10, with some schools offering advanced Russian language and literature electives.

Soviet officials have complained that Russian-language programs in the national schools suffer from teacher shortages, lack of effective teacher training, inadequate visual aids, and shortages of other teaching materials. Soviet investigators have found that the opportunity to participate in a Russian-language environment is crucial to the development of Russian fluency. To this end, some school systems have organized Russian field trips and other extracurricular activities, while others have promoted "mixed schools" where the non-Russian students can associate with Russian-speaking students on the playground and during extracurricular activities. In spite of recurrent difficulties, recent efforts to upgrade Russian-language programs in all republics may help alleviate teacher shortages and uneven language requirements. To the extent that the recommended changes, which involve standardized requirements, improved syllabuses, increased numbers of language teachers, and improved teaching techniques, are successfully adopted, these efforts should

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result in at least marginal gains in Russian fluency among graduates of general education schools.

Although school appears to be the non-Russians' major initial exposure to Russian-language learning, the typical non-Russian is exposed to the language in other forums as well. Exposure to Russian-language speakers in mixed ethnic workplaces and residential areas probably varies from region to region. In Central Asia, for example, many street and transportation signs are in Russian, much of the television and radio programming is in Russian, and a significant portion of the periodical press is Russian. This is particularly true of the scientific, technical, and academic press. Thus, urban residents have more opportunity and need to use Russian than non-Russians in rural areas. For young Soviet males, a key stimulus and opportunity to achieve at least some fluency in Russian is the two- to three-year military experience.

How successful has the Soviet leadership been in promoting its language policy? Only a relatively small proportion of non-Russians have shifted their native language affiliation, and this proportion increased only marginally during the 1970s. Soviet data, however, reveal that the frequency of Russian bilingualism is high and appears to be increasing. Overall levels of Russian fluency according to 1970 census data were depicted in table 1. As is evident from this material, the smaller non-Russian minorities display considerably higher levels of Russian fluency than do the major nationalities. This is apparently due to differences in educational programs, which limit the opportunities available to the smaller nationalities for schooling in the native language, as well as more frequent opportunity and need to use Russian in daily life.

Soviet ethnographic and linguistic studies indicate that the fluency levels reported in the 1970 census may somewhat understate bilingualism, using the term in its broadest sense, that is, understanding and speaking another language. Surveys reveal that many non-Russians speak, understand, and use Russian at work, or listen to Russian-language television and radio programs, but such individuals may not necessarily report fluency in the census. For example, the 1970 census indicated that 53 percent of the adult Avar populace reported fluent Russian ability. A survey of 1,523 Avars reported, however, that 98 percent of the re-

spondents residing in urban centers understood Russian with 90 percent claiming to speak it. The corresponding percentages for two rural samples were 83 percent and 63 percent for comprehension and 82 percent and 62 percent for speaking ability. Similar findings were reported in a 1971 Institute of Ethnography survey in Moldavia. The survey revealed that 84 percent of the rural respondents and 94 percent of the urban respondents reported fluency in Russian, while the 1970 census results show that only 49 percent of the adult Moldavians reported a "fluent command." A third example of apparent discrepancy between the census data and more limited social survey data is provided by a 1971 study of cultural life and language usage in Georgia. The sample included two groups of scientists, factory workers, and collective farmers. All survey respondents claimed Russian fluency with 40 to 80 percent (depending on the social class surveyed) claiming good to fluent command. The census, by contrast, indicated that only 31 percent of the working age Georgians claimed a fluent command. Although the census data on fluent command of Russian provide a useful source for evaluating bilingualism, survey findings such as these suggest that the census captures only one aspect of Russian-language capability, with many more individuals understanding, speaking, and using the language but not well enough to report "fluency." It should be noted that both the census and the survey interviews are conducted in person; such personal interviews represent an important check on overestimates of linguistic abilities.

The ethnographic and linguistic surveys discussed above also provide insight into the question whether Russian bilingualism is increasing or decreasing. Lack of analogous data from the 1959 census precludes a precise analysis of trends in Russian-language fluency. Soviet surveys suggest, however, that Russian bilingualism is positively correlated with educational level, occupational level, urban residence, regional mobility, party and Komsomol membership, and youth (table 13). Education appears to be the single most important factor in the development of Russian bilingualism—a natural outgrowth of a deliberate effort to promote Russian speaking through the school system. The higher bilingual rates of urban residents is

* The survey results included those who described their fluency as limited but sufficient to communicate with others in Russian.

Table 13
Effect of Age on Russian Fluency

	Total Fluency	30 Years Old and Above	16-29 Years Old
Slavs			
Russians	100	100	100
Ukrainians	51	48	78
Belorussians	68	68	92
Balts			
Estonians	33	30	55
Latvians	50	50	74
Lithuanians	37	38	69
Muslims			
Kazakhs	44	46	74
Kirghiz	19	20	46
Uzbecks	15	17	33
Tadzhiks	16	18	37
Turkmen	16	20	34
Azerbaijanis	18	23	33
Other			
Georgians	23	26	31
Armenians	38	44	52
Moldavians	40	41	66
Average deviation	62.1	60.7	41.7

Source: *Itoji*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 360-382.

explained by Soviet researchers as an outgrowth of the greater need for Russian language experienced by urban dwellers, who have higher levels of interethnic contact (figure 2)."

The survey data provide some indication of probable future fluency trends. Fluency will probably increase among those ethnic groups whose urbanization rate is increasing. Ethnic educational and occupational gains also point to further increases in levels of bilingualism, particularly among the younger age groups. The high rural birth rates of some groups, however, may result in a slight decline in fluency rates for these groups.

"Using census data on Central Asian minorities, Silver 1976 found that bilingualism was correlated with the percentage of Russians in the republic population; urbanity alone did not exert an influence when Russian level was held constant.

Moreover, the proportion of Russians in some Central Asian regions has declined. These two factors may lead to some decline in fluency among the groups affected. The extent to which educational and occupational gains will counteract these factors is not known, but it is likely that overall Russian-language fluency will increase throughout the Soviet Union in the coming decade. Responses to the questions on Russian fluency in the 1979 census provide additional support for this hypothesis.

The Social Position of Women

The behavioral indicators of minority economic and political participation are direct measures of ethnic modernization and only indirect measures of Sovietization, which involves value change. Although the two processes are closely related, it might be argued that individuals may choose to participate in the system only for its material benefits, while retaining basic values that set them apart from the mainstream of Soviet society.


To test this hypothesis, more direct measures of value convergence were examined. This investigation concentrated on value change among the Soviet Union's more traditional and less modernized nationalities. The lack of appropriate statistical data precluded an assessment of the more sensitive aspects of value change among such groups, such as religious belief." Fortunately, however, surrogate indicators of traditionality, such as those relating to the social position of women, were more readily available. These changes in the role of women provide an important test of the extent to which increased participation by the traditional minorities has been accompanied by a breakdown in the traditional values that had previously distinguished them from more modernized groups.

For both ideological and pragmatic reasons, the Soviet state has promoted the integration of women into the modernized work force. This process involves a modi-

"Western research in a variety of countries demonstrates conclusively that religious beliefs and values can not be measured by behavior, such as church attendance or the wearing of religious artifacts. In those studies, the "ritualistic" dimension of religiosity is not related to the religious belief dimension. It follows, therefore, that the presence of icons in the home or reported mosque attendance are not valid measures of attachment to religious doctrine. Attempts by Western analysts to measure the strength of religion using those kinds of indicators are very likely to be misleading.

Figure 2

Differences in Russian Fluency by Residence in 1970



Source: ITOGI, 1970, Volume IV, pp. 20-42.

fication of traditional values limiting appropriate female roles to those of wife, homemaker, and mother. Because the way people feel about their home and family is much more resistant to change and much less responsive to direct policy manipulation than, for example, education, increased economic and political participation may not lead to immediate shifts in values and behavioral patterns relating to family life and sex roles. Changes in these highly personal values can be expected to lag well behind other indicators of Sovietization.

Soviet efforts to erode traditional values regarding woman's role in society, particularly as those efforts affect the Muslim women of Central Asia, thus provide another measure of shared values (Sovietization). This process can be roughly gauged by changes in behav-

ioral patterns, such as female educational levels, female educational attainments relative to male attainments, and rates of early marriage. Across all of these indicators, the less modernized groups are rapidly closing the gap between their scores and those of the more modernized Russians.

The most significant gains have been made in female educational attainment, particularly those of Central Asian women whose access to education had historically been limited by traditional stress on the woman's maternal role. Table 14 presents data in index form on female educational levels for 1959 and 1970. It may be seen that for incomplete secondary education and above, Jewish, Georgian, and Armenian women outscore the Russian women for both time periods, although their lead is being trimmed. Uzbeks,

Table 14

Change in Women's Education: 1959-70*

	Incomplete Secondary and Above		Complete Secondary and Above	
	1959	1970	1959	1970
Slavs				
Russians	100	100	100	100
Ukrainians	86	87	72	84
Belorussians	77	82	68	78
Balts				
Estonians	96	93	104	99
Latvians	87	97	98	97
Lithuanians	60	70	53	69
Muslims				
Kazakhs	52	68	32	59
Kirghiz	60	70	30	54
Uzbeks	66	73	27	53
Tadzhiks	63	67	20	42
Turkmen	83	79	22	45
Azerbaijanis	78	71	54	60
Balkars	45	61	19	48
Tatars	84	86	53	63
Bashkirs	65	69	37	46
Chechens	7	27	3	49
Other				
Georgians	125	115	180	155
Armenians	116	103	133	119
Moldavians	58	62	24	38
Jews	206	166	384	266
Buryats	69	80	59	80
Yakuts	54	73	45	71
Komis	81	82	71	66
Chuvash	76	77	45	49
Udmurts	61	69	39	44
Mordvinians	47	56	27	37
Maris	47	55	23	29
Average deviation	35.0	27.0	62.2	41.7

* Ages 10 and older.

Source: *Ilogi*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 393-433.

Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and Tatars considerably narrowed the gap between 1959 and 1970, although the Azerbaijanis and Turkmen fell further behind.

for complete secondary education and above, the picture is a more consistent one of large gains by all the less modernized minorities. The greatest change (in narrowing the gap between male and female educational attainments) was made by Muslim women. Significant gaps between male and female educational attainments for several of these Muslim groups reflect the influence of Islamic family traditions on the role of women. These trends have been accompanied by a rise in female labor-force participation among more traditional nationalities, as well as growth in female representation in the modernized sectors of the work force.

Another indicator of changing attitude toward women's role is family size. The data on female education summarized above revealed an increasing range of options outside the home for even the less modernized women. Traditional values supporting large families might persist, however, long after education and labor-force participation for women have gained wide social acceptance. Measures of fertility and family size expectations reveal that large families remain popular among the less modernized nationalities, and that as a result there are wide regional and ethnic differences in fertility. Differences in ethnic fertility levels widened during the intercensal period (1959-70). Several of the Muslim groups displayed substantial increases in child-to-woman ratios, following a pattern of demographic transition observed among other modernizing people.

Primitive demographic conditions are marked by high birth and death rates, and a low rate of population increase. Traditions supporting early marriage and a limited role for women outside the home reinforce preferences for large families. Religion is also a factor since religious beliefs directly affect family-related values. Islam, for example, is closely linked with a value system that heavily influences the woman's role and reproductive behavior. Muslim tradition supports male domination, high female illiteracy rates, and the physical seclusion and oppression of women. In spite of the traditionally high value placed on large families,

child-to-woman ratios may be at moderate levels during this stage because of high infant mortality. More precise measures of fertility rates are also relatively low because of poor health care for mothers and their unborn children.

The first stage of the demographic transition involves substantial improvements in agricultural methods, resulting in more stable food supplies. Population growth is rapid. The second stage is associated with the onset of industrialization. Death rates decline significantly because of improvements in health care, but the continuing preference for large families keeps the birth rate high.

Modernization, however, ultimately undercuts both the value system that forms the basis of the preference and tradition for large families and the economic incentives to maximize family size. Urbanization, education, economic and geographical mobility, and access to mass communications undermine the authority of the older generation and weaken the effects of the rural community on family size preferences. The third stage of demographic development is reached as families begin to limit childbearing. More rural inhabitants move to urban areas, impelled by rural overpopulation and the incentive of broader occupational mobility in the city. Other aspects of urban life that lead to smaller family size include housing shortages, reduced economic benefits accruing to large families, and the recruitment of women to the urban labor force.⁴ In addition, the availability of birth control methods produces gradual decreases in birth rates and a slowdown in population growth. The fourth stage of the demographic transition is reached when conscious family limitation is accepted throughout society. This process may extend over decades. In the Soviet Union, as in other culturally heterogeneous societies, the regional and ethnic differences in modernization rates has meant that the demographic transition has taken place at different times for different groups.

As suggested by the data in table 15, the Slavs and Balts have already reached the final stage. The Georgians, Moldavians, Tatars, and Armenians are just entering this stage, while the Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis,

⁴ The typical urban, employed woman, for example, faces a working day of five to six hours of housework--a factor that sharply curtails fertility.

Table 15

Differentiation in Fertility:
Child/Woman Ratios, 1959-70^a

	1959	1970
Slavs		
Russians	.863	.727
Ukrainians	.714	.691
Belorussians	.836	.759
Balts		
Estonians	.638	.677
Latvians	.612	.675
Lithuanians	.823	.859
Muslims		
Kazakhs	1.896	2.213
Kirghiz	1.885	2.445
Uzbeks	1.878	2.401
Tadzhiks	1.782	2.422
Turkmen	1.809	2.384
Azerbaijanis	1.711	2.082
Balkars	1.698	1.616
Tatars	1.105	1.002
Bashkirs	1.431	1.540
Chechens	2.204	2.257
Other		
Georgians	.905	.933
Armenians	1.240	1.203
Moldavians	1.190	1.099
Buryats	1.460	1.563
Yakuts	1.494	1.622
Komis	1.052	1.044
Chuvash	1.037	1.154
Udmurts	1.131	1.105
Mordvinians	.933	1.015
Maris	1.146	1.310

^a The ratio used here (children 0-9/women 20-49) was employed in place of the conventional child-woman ratio (children 0-4/women 15-44) because of data limitations.

Source: Data computed from *Itogi*, 1959, SSSR, pp. 211-225 and *Itogi*, 1970, volume IV, pp. 360-382.

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and some of the smaller Muslim groups in the RSFSR are generally in the third stage. The remaining Muslim groups (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen) are by and large in the second stage and exhibit continued high birth rates. Their fertility rates are expected eventually to show the same declines as those displayed earlier by the more modernized groups.

I believe that no demographer challenges the fact that these (Central Asian) Republics will inevitably change to the new kind of reproduction situation that now characterizes the central and western parts of the country. It is simply that the demographic revolution in Central Asia is being completed somewhat later than in other areas.

The Soviet assumption that the currently high fertility rates of the less modernized groups will exhibit similar declines under the impact of modernization and the changing role of women appears to be a sound one. To test the hypothesized relationship between fertility and socioeconomic level, the fertility levels of 36 ethnic groups were examined. Urbanization, overall ethnic educational level, and occupational level all display relatively strong negative correlations with fertility. A much more precise predictor of fertility, however, is the integration of women into the economy. The data reveal a very strong statistical link between emancipation, defined as the ratio between male-to-female educational levels, and fertility. The substantial increases in female education levels among the less modernized groups, therefore, suggest future declines in their fertility.

This prediction is also supported by the results of Soviet social surveys on expected family size (the number of children an individual woman expects to have). Overall ethnic differences in expected family size are, as might be expected, quite substantial, varying from two for Russian women to six for Uzbek women. The younger generation of Muslim women expect much smaller families than did their counterparts in the 1960s. Muslim women from urban areas, particularly large cities, reported a much smaller expected family size than did their rural counterparts. Educational level was also negatively correlated with expected family size. These results cut across all ethnic groups, but were most striking for the less modernized women.

* Perevalentsev

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These research findings support the conclusion that traditional values regarding family size and the role of women are slowly eroding among the less modernized nationality groups.

Conclusion: An Assessment of Soviet Nationality Policy

Soviet nationality policy has attempted to maximize minority integration into the Soviet system while containing within manageable limits the inevitable dislocations that accompany social change. So far this combination has been fairly effective. Moscow has displayed little reluctance in repressing those Soviet citizens - Slav and non-Slav alike - who refuse to adapt to the requirements of the Soviet system. Minority citizens who espouse ethnic separatism are quickly suppressed, and provincial leaders must tread a careful line between articulating the interests of their home regions and promoting "bourgeois nationalism."

But if the Soviet regime has been quick to repress national separatism, it has also been willing to reward those who abide by its rules. To those citizens the regime has offered educational and occupational opportunity as an inducement to buy into the system. As a result, many of the social and economic disparities between nationality groups are being reduced.

What do these trends mean for Soviet political cohesion? The Soviet programs that have sponsored increasing modernization of the more traditional groups are based on the assumption that the removal of social and economic differences will strengthen Soviet cohesion by promoting a common value system and way of life. Some Western observers have questioned this assumption. Modernization in a multiethnic society, they suggest, is politically destabilizing because it exacerbates nationality-based tension and provides the modernizing, but still disadvantaged, ethnic groups with a native elite capable of stimulating popular unrest and channeling it into broad-based political opposition.

Available evidence, however, provides at least partial support for the Soviet assumption that modernization promotes shared values. As the more traditional minorities become more fully integrated into modern

society, they are gradually developing both lifestyles and value systems that resemble those of the more modernized Slavs. The most compelling evidence for the increased sharing of basic system values is the changing role of women among even the most traditional minorities. Examination of fertility trends indicates that Soviet Muslims—groups often thought to be particularly resistant to the effects of social change—are following essentially the same demographic transition that was followed earlier by ethnic Russians.

Most non-Russians, including the traditional minorities, retain a strong sense of ethnic identity, which could provide a rallying point for anti-Soviet opposition. Under severe economic stress, for example, ethnic loyalties might be invoked by opposition leaders who wished to unite groups with diverse economic and political interests. Under such circumstances, ethnic identity could crystallize into an anti-Soviet movement, exacerbating existing economic or political grievances.

Both history and social science theory suggest, however, that ethnic identity is a far more powerful destabilizing force when social and economic interests coincide with ethnicity. If all Muslims, for example, lived in isolated rural areas, worked on collective farms, and had little educational or occupational mobility, then government policies allocating resources for rural housing and services would affect all Muslims in similar ways. In that case, the cultural grouping (Muslim) would be coterminous with an economic interest group. As the white-collar segments within Muslim nationalities develop, however, the number of Muslims who have bought into the Soviet system increases. The likelihood that well-educated, white-collar Muslim urbanites will identify strongly with the same issues that mobilize semiliterate Muslim collective farmers is lessened. So, too, is the likelihood that Muslims can be mobilized as a collectivity against Soviet authority. In the Soviet context, modernization of the more traditional ethnic groups increases pluralism within them by fractionalizing their economic interests and value systems.

This trend also has significant implications for the Soviet ability to deal with dissent arising from social, economic, or occupational grievances. Moscow's abil-

ity to contain an anti-Soviet challenge from the industrial labor force—for example, may likewise be enhanced by an ethnically diverse industrial work force. In effect, divergent ethnic loyalties that cut across social and economic lines can act to undercut opposition based on social and economic interests, making the situation more manageable for Soviet authorities.

A second and closely related aspect of nationality-based change is the nature of the demands placed on minorities by the Soviet leadership. Modernization involves changes in lifestyles and values that are often socially disruptive. In the USSR, it is the younger, better educated, and Russian-fluent minorities who can take advantage of the opportunities for upward mobility. Groups that formerly enjoyed high status—religious leaders and village elders, for example—find that the bases of their prestige are being eroded by the new ways. Too rapid or coercive change has the potential of generating a conservative backlash among these fading elites.

Soviet nationality policy has worked best, from Moscow's standpoint, when it has encouraged, but not mandated, change in desired directions. In recent history, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to temper coercion with concessions. The changing policy with regard to Muslim women is a case in point. The initial, heavyhanded Soviet efforts in the 1920s to emancipate Muslim women provoked broad-based, conservative male outrage in the Soviet southern tier. The Soviets apparently learned from this experience; their subsequent policies were more moderate, avoiding a heavyhanded approach while providing strong incentives for desired change through gradual increases in female education levels and labor-force participation.

Moscow has also had to use care in its dealings with the "overachieving" minorities, such as the Jews, Georgians, and Armenians. The Sovietization process involves a gradual erosion of the lead these groups have historically enjoyed over the Russians on several key indicators of status. The potential discontent within groups experiencing a relative decline in standing is dramatized by the large number of Soviet Jews who

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have taken advantage of the opportunity to emigrate. The Soviets evidently hope to contain dissent within such groups by maintaining a fairly high degree of access to educational and occupational advancement. Georgian educational attainments are not declining; they are growing less rapidly than those of the Russians and the less modernized minorities. In any case, the Soviet leadership is apparently willing to risk the resentment among the relatively small number of "overachievers" in order to accelerate the pace of modernization among the less developed, but numerically larger, nationalities.

So far, this approach has worked fairly well for the Soviet authorities. It has not eliminated the inevitable dislocations that accompany rapid social change, but it has kept ethnic protest spontaneous, unfocused, and at a level that is easily manageable by a powerful security apparatus willing to use force to suppress dissent. Over the past several decades the predominant response of Soviet minorities has been to adapt, not to rebel. This response is likely to continue as long as the Soviet leadership is willing and able to maintain current trends toward social and economic equality between ethnic groups.

* It should be remembered, however, that a significant, but unknown, proportion of Soviet Jews are dropping their identity as Jews and assimilating to the Russians. Why the Jews who emigrated chose to leave and how other ethnic groups (including the Russians) might react if given similar opportunities are important questions that are beyond the scope of this paper.

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Appendix A

Measuring Political Unrest

Measuring trends in political unrest is difficult even when social and political data are far more accessible and political reporting is far more complete than is the case within the Soviet Union. One frequently used indicator is the incidence of collective political violence. Since the Soviets do not provide accounts of such incidents. [

] Conclusions based on such sources must be approached with caution. Studies of political violence in Western societies, where political reporting is far more complete than in the Soviet Union, have been shown to be invalid because the mass media do not report violent incidents consistently over time or place. It is unlikely that [

] are more accurate in their reporting on the extent of political violence in the USSR. [

] we cannot make authoritative statements about the scope of political violence in the USSR or whether it is increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same.

For several reasons available data on political violence in the USSR are inadequate to support the sort of conclusions that are often based on them. The number of incidents (nationality-inspired or otherwise) that are reported is in part an artifact of the collection process. As Intelligence Community interest grows, so do collection requirements. This, in turn, uncovers more evidence and further increases intelligence interest. [

] These differences in collection rates make the problem of keeping track of political violence almost impossible.

Narrowing the focus to the ethnic dimension of social and political unrest introduces additional potential sources of confusion. The first involves sorting out economic grievances from ethnic ones. Is pressure for more participation in the economic planning process a manifestation of nationalism when it comes from Alma

Ata, but a sign of economic parochialism when it comes from Sverdlovsk? Is shopper resentment over a shortage of butter in Baku a manifestation of Azerbaijani nationalism, but a consumer issue when the complaints come from ethnic Russians?]


The second problem involves determining the extent to which expressions of interethnic tension can be equated with anti-Soviet unrest. Overt expressions of ethnic hostility need not be directed against the central Soviet leadership. The May 1978 demonstrations in Soviet Georgia were an expression by ethnic Abkhazians of anti-Georgian (but not necessarily anti-Soviet) sympathies. The Abkhazian demand that their autonomous republic be shifted to the RSFSR might have been an embarrassment to the Moscow leadership, but it was scarcely an immediate threat to Soviet political cohesion

The twin problems of selective exposure and selective perception further complicate assessments of Soviet ethnic trends by Western visitors. [samizdat writers. Useful as these accounts are for providing insight into some aspects of ethnic life, conclusions regarding the scope and change in ethnic nationalism in the USSR are only as valid as the evidence on which they are based. Western visitors and newsmen normally do not interact with broadly representative samples of Soviet citizenry. They tend to be overexposed to two Soviet points of view—those of Soviet officials and those of disgruntled Soviet citizens. Neither perspective is likely to be representative of the general public.]

Similar caveats apply to assessments offered by [samizdat writers. The perceptions are those of individuals who have made a strong commitment (in some cases, with great cost) to either leave or alter the Soviet system. Moreover, personal assessments are based on limited data. Outside of personal contacts with family, friends, and colleagues, the majority of Soviet citizens rely primarily on the same sorts of media information that form the backbone of

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Western analytical assessments of the Soviet situation.
These data constraints limit the kinds of judgments
that such information can support



In sum, the fragmentary nature of the available reporting on ethnic-based unrest effectively precludes use of that data to track levels of popular discontent over time. The evidence indicates that anti-Soviet discontent associated with ethnic or regional differences has appeared sporadically throughout the USSR's 60-year history; so, too, have expressions of unrest involving consumer, religious, and human rights advocates. This very limited information does not permit further generalization.

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Appendix B

Measuring Ethnic "Convergence"

As noted above, Soviet commentators stress the degree to which the party's nationality policy has contributed to "convergence" of Soviet nationalities through educational, occupational, social, and economic gains by the less modernized minorities. Western scholars, on the other hand, have been more concerned with identifying existing differences in ethnic access to political and economic power, pointing to the contradiction between Soviet claims and minority realities. The data available to make an assessment of minority change are published Soviet statistics on demographic, educational, occupational, and party membership trends.

It is necessary, therefore, to examine what constitutes valid evidence of growing equality or inequality. Soviet authors—intent on highlighting the extent to which past disadvantages are being overcome under Socialism—tend to rely on percentage rate of change as a measure of minority progress. This approach inflates the gains made by many of the less modernized groups because they begin from a very small base. Calculated this way, for example, the increase between 1959 and 1970 in the percentage of Bashkirs with complete secondary education from 6 to 12 percent is seen as an increase of 100 percent. Over the same period, the Russian percentage increased from 15 to 25 producing a percentage rate of change of only 67 percent. A different approach to presenting the data (one favored by Western analysts) is to examine relative percentage point change. In this case, the Russians increased their score by 10 percentage points, while the Bashkirs increased theirs by only six.


From these same data, one may thus conclude either that the Bashkirs are catching up to the Russians because their rate of change is much greater or that they are falling further behind because their percentage point increase was less than the Russians. Neither method provides a useful index of convergence. If one seeks to measure Bashkir convergence relative to the Russians, a more reasonable approach is to compare the Bashkir position vis-a-vis the Russians in 1959 with that in 1970, using index numbers. In each case,

minority scores on a given variable are divided by the relevant Russian score with the result multiplied by 100 to obtain the appropriate index. A score of 100 indicates parity with the Russians. This approach provides a statistically neutral tool for determining the narrowing or widening of ethnic differences over time. To examine the extent to which several groups are converging with the Russians, the average deviation from the Russian score can be compared for variables at several points in time. To the extent that the average deviation decreases, the groups can be said to be moving closer to the Russians—that is, narrowing the gap. In the example of Bashkir educational attainments presented above, it can be shown that the Bashkirs marginally moved closer to Russian attainments, with their index score increasing from 40 to 48 between 1959 and 1970. It is this indexing method that is used throughout the study.

A second way in which the choice of presenting information can bias results is the tendency to ignore the importance of significant variations in age structure between nationality groups caused by their differing birth rates. Take the issue of Communist Party membership: one frequently used approach in determining if a group is under- or over-represented is to compare the nationality's percentage of CPSU membership with its percentage of the total population. For example, the Uzbeks made up 3.8 percent of the Soviet population but only 1.9 percent of the CPSU membership in 1970, a significant underrepresentation. One can quantify this evidence of Uzbek underrepresentation by indexing; that is, by dividing the population percentage into the party membership percentage and multiplying the result by 100. On the resultant index, a score of less than 100 indicates underrepresentation. In this case, the Uzbek score is only 50. But this statistical manipulation is misleading since the minimum age for party membership is 18, and most members are much older. Because the Uzbeks have a relatively young age structure, (Figure 3) comparing their participation rate with their share of the total population tells us little

Figure 3

Age Group Structure by Nationality in 1970



Source: ITOGI, 1970, Volume IV, pp. 549-553.

about the opportunity and willingness of the adult Uzbek population to join the party. Standardized to a more appropriate age structure (20 years of age and older), the Uzbeks attain a far higher score of 76.¹¹ This still indicates substantial underrepresentation, but is a more accurate reflection of the real state of Uzbek participation in the CPSU.

The methodology used throughout this study involves these procedures:

- Standardizing available published data to the relevant age groups for each nationality.

¹¹ In 1967, only one-third of 1 percent of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was under 20 years of age.

- Computing Russian indices.
- Examining shifts in average deviation from the Russian score over time.

Appendix C

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