



Directorate of  
Intelligence

826

~~Secret~~

W



# Terrorism Review



June 1986

Declassified and  
Approved for Release  
July 2000

54

~~Secret~~



430

3 8 5 5

166

## Chile: Rising Political Violence'

We conclude that the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) is making considerable headway in its campaign to stage frequent antiregime protests, harass the security forces, and gain acceptance as the country's leading opposition forces. The PCCh is one of the oldest, best organized and, after Cuba's, the largest such party in Latin America.

[REDACTED]

We believe, however, that the Communists will succeed in neither becoming Chile's main opposition force nor in destabilizing the Pinochet regime any time soon. In our judgment, the PCCh will not deviate from its basic strategy of seeking to oust Pinochet by force, and we believe that it is following a timetable that calls for launching an all-out insurrection within the next three to four years

### Violence on the Rise

[REDACTED] following a monthlong series of university student protests during April—in which the Communists played a prominent role—leftist terrorist activity has intensified. Over the May Day weekend there were numerous bombings, including one against the US Ambassador's residence claimed by the PCCh-affiliated Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), and shootouts between terrorists and police and Army units resulting in several casualties (see inset and accompanying article

' Chile was the scene of more terrorist bombings (865) than any other country in the world during 1985. The above article describes the political strategy of the parent group of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which was responsible for most of those incidents.

on the FPMR). There were repeated violent confrontations between protestors and the security forces that resulted in considerable property damage in the capital and in several provincial cities.

**Leftist Terrorist Bombings in Chile**

1983—139

1984—735

1985—865

1986—continuing unabated (in April alone, there were at least 85 bombings. [REDACTED])


We believe that the bulk of these bombings have been carried out by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). [REDACTED]


The FPMR's favorite targets have been electrical power grids—it frequently blacks out Santiago and much of central Chile—railway lines, commuter buses, and public establishments in major cities, but most of its bombings apparently have been staged to avoid widespread civilian injuries. [REDACTED]

Scattered protest activity has persisted since May Day, while student leaders have threatened to call a prolonged strike unless the government ends its intervention in the universities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has predicted that the security forces' strong-arm methods against students and faculty will backfire, leading many Chileans to question the government's ability to quell student agitation. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] We believe that the Carabineros—who have become overextended as they have tried to contain repeated protests—are in fact becoming frustrated over what





*Suspected terrorists rounded up* [redacted]

they perceive as Pinochet's favoritism toward the Army and his recent decision to replace Carabineros with Army troops in many crowd control missions.



The quality of life is said to be deteriorating in the numerous slums ringing Santiago, where youth unemployment ranges up to 50 percent.

[redacted] the poor are becoming politically radicalized and increasingly receptive to the violent line urged by the PCCh and other far-left

groups. Moreover, leaders of several moderate opposition parties have told [redacted] that the government's heavyhanded actions during recent repeated sweeps of slum neighborhoods have produced a sense of "rage" among the poor that contrasts with the fear produced by previous dragnets. We believe that this adds to the explosive situation in the slums and ultimately will benefit the Communists and their allies.

**Moderate Opposition Activities**

Moderate opposition forces are also gearing up for more forceful antiregime activities. The key player is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which reportedly decided recently to push vigorously for a national strike.

[redacted] Christian Democratic leaders, moreover, have acknowledged that there is substantial grassroots cooperation between their party and the Communists, which they justify by citing Pinochet's intractability on political liberalization and the need to convince the

armed forces through demonstrations and other opposition activities that Chile is becoming ungovernable under Pinochet's harsh policies.

An influential minority of the Catholic Church's 31 bishops and lower levels of the hierarchy reportedly are pressing for a more activist Church stance against Pinochet. According to the press, even Cardinal-Primate Fresno met several weeks ago with representatives of the PCCh-led political coalition to discuss the worsening political situation. This, in our view, was a significant development, because Fresno had previously avoided open contact with the Communists and had strongly urged the moderate opposition to forgo all political collaboration with the PCCh. In addition, the country's conference of bishops issued a strong statement in April urging constitutional reforms—widely interpreted as a call for direct presidential elections in 1989—and that even progovernment groups endorsed the bishops' stand.

Finally, in May some 18 leading professional, academic, social, and labor organizations of varying political hues created a so-called National Civic Assembly and promulgated a set of demands for urgent political and economic reforms. They also elected a multiparty directorate that includes two Communists and a few other far leftists.

the Christian Democrats—the main force behind the Civic Assembly—believe they can mobilize considerable popular support for such protest activities as business shutdowns, strikes by professional guilds, and a campaign to withhold debt and mortgage payments. Leaders of the Civic Assembly reportedly hope that these acts of civil disobedience will create growing uncertainty and help build further support for the planned national strike.

**Government Reaction**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Army troops were deployed in unprecedented numbers over the May Day weekend and that the security forces often used excessive force against demonstrators. In addition Army units led sweeps of slum neighborhoods in recent weeks.

There is accumulating evidence that many of Pinochet's civilian advisers and some military officers—including most of the junta members—want him to step down in 1989, liberalize the political process, and negotiate with moderate opposition groups to prepare for a transition to civilian rule before the end of the decade. Many of his advisers have urged him to take these steps to head off a rising tide of protest activity in 1986 and avert a chaotic situation in later years that would enhance Communist prospects to promote an all-out insurgency.

Pinochet has refused to budge as pressure has built within the regime for some show of flexibility and opposition protests have continued. In several recent speeches, he has rejected modifications to the Constitution—which allows for his reelection in a single candidate plebiscite in 1989—and refused to speed up political liberalization.

[Redacted]

**Outlook**

We believe the Communists have little chance of sparking a successful uprising against Pinochet over the next year, but that they will continue to make headway in their efforts to sow violence and uncertainty. Moreover, moderate opposition groups will probably cooperate more frequently and openly

with the PCCh, at the risk of adding to a climate of violence and of playing into Pinochet's hands. Given Pinochet's current intransigence, the moderates seem prepared to take this risk in order to pressure the military into making Pinochet more flexible. [REDACTED]

The test of the Communists' strength—and that of the moderate opposition—will, in our view, be their ability to sustain the current level of protest activity and to build momentum toward a national strike during the next three to four months. Even though protest activity is likely to continue at a high level for several more months—accompanied by frequent and increasingly lethal terrorist bombings—prospects for a successful prolonged national strike do not appear bright at present. Opposition protest activity, increased terrorism, and growing unease within the government and the armed forces over Pinochet's leadership, however, will probably leave the President more and more isolated. He may also have to contend with having his authority undermined within the military. Many officers are beginning to question the soundness of his decisions and may begin to pressure him to shift course or face a more open challenge from the military. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(REVERSE BLANK)

### Chile: The Dangerous FPMR

On 11 March the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) officially began its "first offensive of 1986" by blowing up two high-tension towers and temporarily cutting off power to the city of Santiago. Two weeks later, on the night of 26 March and the morning of 27 March, the group set off more than 40 bombs in the cities of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepcion in support of Student Mobilization Day.

The FPMR—an urban terrorist group affiliated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh)—has been responsible for most of the 1,600 bombings that have occurred in Chile over the past two years

The FPMR also has been responsible for the increase in anti-US attacks in Chile since 1983. Most of these attacks have been against nonofficial targets—such as businesses, Mormon churches, and binational cultural centers—although the group also detonated a car bomb in front of the US Consulate in Santiago last July.



#### Origins and Organization

The FPMR apparently was formed in 1983 by members of various Chilean leftist organizations—including the PCCh, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Socialist/Almeyda, and the La Chispa group—who probably were frustrated by the loss of momentum both in the legitimate protest movement and in terrorist violence. The group claimed responsibility for its first terrorist attack in December 1983 but didn't begin to gain prominence until it carried out a one-week-long, coordinated bombing campaign in late October 1984.

The FPMR took its name from Manuel Rodriguez, a 19th century guerrilla leader executed by the Spanish during the wars of independence.

FPMR terrorists imposed an armed escort from the Chilean Paramilitary Police Force at a clandestine press conference in December 1985.

~~Secret~~





~~Secret~~

38

3 8 9 3





The FPMR also has become increasingly bold and sophisticated in its operations. In October 1984 it conducted the first successful car bombing in Chile




injure five people. Three more car bombings—including one last February that wounded 14 policemen in Santiago—have been conducted since then. In another development the FPMR fired rockets successfully for the first time late last year in attacks against an electrical power plant in Valparaiso and an Army airfield in Santiago.

Although the bulk of its bombings are still directed against domestic targets, the FPMR also attacks US and other foreign interests in Chile. We believe the FPMR was responsible for seven anti-US attacks in 1984 and 10 in 1985, including one against a Coca-Cola facility in Santiago that caused \$2 million in property damage. In July 1985 the group also bombed six Mormon churches and the US-Chilean cultural center, reportedly to protest the proposed accord on the use of Easter Island as an emergency landing site for the space shuttle. The car bombing of the US Consulate last July was the first FPMR attack against a US Government facility.

**Dangerous Prospects**

We expect that the FPMR will continue to pose the main terrorist threat in Chile over the next two or three years.

We also anticipate that the FPMR will increase its political activity in order to expand its narrow base of popular support in the cities. According to press reports, FPMR leaders say that the organization is still in its "preparatory phase" and that a "general armed struggle" is two or three years away. PCC and FPMR leaders probably calculate that a successful popular uprising requires neighborhood rebellions and prolonged and widespread strikes, in addition to dramatic terrorist attacks.



(REVERSE BLANK)