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13 April 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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36-228500/1

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DATE: SEP 2000


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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 12 Apr)




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
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
Syrian military leaders have run into difficulties in reconstituting a civilian government. Political leaders, including imprisoned President Qudsi, are refusing to participate in a regime dominated by the army and are demanding restoration of constitutional government. The military command appears to be reneging on its promise to hold a plebiscite on the question of union with Egypt, but pro-Nasir sentiment remains strong. Since the junta lacks

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support from both the conservative business and property-
owning elements and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists,
its life is likely to be short. [REDACTED]




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SPECIAL ARTICLES



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
SYRIA

Syrian army leaders who assumed power on 3 April have reached an impasse as to how to rule the country. While they want to throw a cloak of constitutionality over their regime by returning the country to civilian hands, they also want to retain ultimate control. Since no strong man has emerged from among the military leaders, the present prospect for a military dictatorship without further upheavals does not seem bright.

Civilian political leaders, on the other hand--especially imprisoned President Qudsi--are loath to take responsibility. Qudsi is reluctant to reassume office without guarantees from the military that they will back a constitutional regime and refrain from constant interference in governmental operations. The fate of the former cabinet, also now in prison, adds to this reluctance. The military leaders seized power without considering the constitutional and practical consequences, while the political

leaders appear to have learned little from recent Syrian history. Neither group seems prepared to compromise.

The military command also seems overconfident regarding the extent of its suppression of the recent pro-Nasir upsurge in the country and, while still paying some lip service to the idea of a loose union with Egypt, hedges on its previous promise for a plebiscite on the union question. The command's present middle-of-the-road ideas run counter to the interests of the country's two most important political groupings--the extremely conservative business and property-owning elements who backed the Qudsi-Dawalibi regime and brought on its downfall, and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists. As the present junta lacks support of either right or left, its life is likely to be short. Any change in the composition of the ruling group will probably involve a shift to the left. [REDACTED]



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