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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 22 May 1972, Helsinki:*

Garthoff noted that the US side did not find satisfactory Soviet objection to our proposed agreed interpretive statement.

He provided the text of such a statement. The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than fifteen hundred kilometers. (Garthoff later advised Kishilov that, if "the 1500 kilometers" proposed was a more significant restriction than the east of the Urals provision, we could consider a somewhat reduced radius.) The Soviet participants agreed to report this suggestion to their Delegation for consideration. They both asked whether, if it were acceptable, the US side remained ready to make a unilateral statement concerning deployment at Grand Forks. Garthoff confirmed the readiness of his Delegation to proceed on the basis proposed on May 20, simply substituting the new agreed statement for the one cited in quotation marks in the draft of May 20. Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov expressed appreciation.

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Grinevskiy suggested that if the US side could accept the latest Soviet formulation on dismantling and replacement of ICBM launchers, perhaps they could meet us on the question of OLPARs. He asked what the US position on OLPARs was, since we had rejected 10 million and 7 million. Garthoff said that the US position remained 3 million. Grinevskiy suddenly agreed that the Soviet side could accept 3 million as the OLPAR level, if the dismantling provision were agreed upon, as an agreed interpretive statement rather than a provision in the text, and assuming agreement on the truncated version of the interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement.

Grinevskiy and Kishilov tentatively agreed to Garthoff's suggestion that the Russian could remain "kosmicheskiye ob'yekty" and the English remain "objects in space." In general, the text would need to be conformed, but there was agreement on the basic text including the level of 3 million.

*Reported remarks of Soviet advisor Smolin during a meeting of the Editorial Working Group, 23 May 1972, Helsinki:*

The participants reached agreement in conforming the interpretive statement on OLPARs. Shaw noted that, in preparing the document on the ABM Treaty agreed statements (see Section U) the absence of a statement on the location of ABM sites in defense of ICBMs did not mean that the US side was withdrawing this statement. Smolin agreed.

Shaw gave the Soviet participants a copy of the English language US version (distributed earlier) and a copy of the English language Soviet version. The participants did not review these documents as this had already been done twice in the case of the former.

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Garthoff began by giving the Soviet participants the texts of a revised US proposal for the text of Article III of the Interim Agreement, and the text of an associated formal Protocol. He noted that, in line with the interest Semenov had shown in a formal signed Protocol, the proposal had been cast in that form. In addition, there were differences in formulation, as the Soviet Delegation would see. Grinevskiy and Kishilov read the texts attentively, but did not discuss them in any detail. They took note of the fact that there was no longer a reference to 740 launchers or any other intermediate specified level. Garthoff confirmed that fact, and noted that the baseline was operational and under construction at date of signature. Grinevskiy noted the US level specified the 44 submarines and 710 launchers, and Garthoff confirmed that this was in keeping with the exchanges dealing with that subject, and marked no change from the position as it had been described by Ambassador Smith. Grinevskiy and Kishilov expressed understanding that the level would be so specified, and that other considerations to be discussed in that connection were unchanged.

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Garthoff asked for Soviet reaction to the May 20 US proposed provision on replacement and dismantling procedures. Grinevskiy said that his Delegation had spent most of the morning and part of the day before thinking over this question and it continued to consider it necessary that replacement occur at the time that a replacement submarine became operational, rather than at time of launch.

Grinevskiy also reaffirmed Soviet objection to any provision on notification, other than agreeing to include a reference to notification in the part of the statement referring to procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

During this discussion, various notes had been made on older texts, with the Soviet participants insisting that any possible changes of this kind must be in terms of tying dismantling to the time when replacement submarines become operational. At the conclusion of the discussion, Garthoff said that the US position might be amended if the various changes discussed could be agreed, and on that basis distributed a current text reflecting the various points which had been discussed:

"Dismantling or destruction of SLBM and older ICBM launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be accomplished by the time the replacement submarine becomes operational. Such dismantling or destruction, and prior notification thereof, shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission."

Grinevskiy then said that he wished to recall that when Minister Semenov had referred to possible agreement on dismantling and had provided a text on May 18, he had expressed a Soviet preference for an agreed statement.

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Grinevskiy agreed that the tentatively agreed interpretive statement would be: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

On dismantling and replacement, Grinevskiy said that his Delegation had considered the US proposal and wished to present a new draft which it hoped would be acceptable. He then submitted a text:

Dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types constructed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new launchers on modern submarines shall be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Such dismantling or destruction, as well as notification thereof, shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Grinevskiy returned to Article IV of the Interim Agreement, noting that his Delegation had instructions to include in it a reference to modernization and replacement of ballistic missile submarines, as well as the existing reference to launchers. He suggested something along the following lines: "The Parties may also undertake modernization and replacement of older ballistic missile submarines with new ballistic missile submarines." Garthoff said that he thought consideration could be given to including reference to replacement of SLBM submarines, but he did not think the language Grinevskiy had suggested was quite appropriate. Grinevskiy said the particular language he used was not important, but it was important to his Delegation to fulfill its instructions and therefore they wanted this subject taken up in the modernization and replacement article.

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Submarines "under Construction"

Grinevskiy asked if the US side was still seeking an agreed definition of "under construction". Garthoff confirmed that we are, and said that it was even more necessary now. He noted that the phrase was in the Soviet draft, and was an essential element in the US draft. Grinevskiy again noted that the phrase "operational and under construction" did not appear in the Soviet draft in relationship to the final levels.

Garthoff asked if the US side had a correct understanding that Semenov had indicated that there was no difference in the views of the two sides over the meaning of "operational", but that there was a difference with respect to "under construction". Grinevskiy and Kishilov confirmed that.

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Turning to the proposed interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement, Garthoff asked for reaction of the Soviet side to the text he had given them on May 20. Grinevskiy said that he had made clear the firm Soviet position against a definition of "heavy" ICBMs.

Garthoff pressed Grinevskiy for comments on the second half of the sentence, on which the Soviet side had made proposals. Grinevskiy was at first wary about discussing it, but when Garthoff put brackets around the first part of the sentence, to mark the reaffirmed Soviet objection, Grinevskiy was prepared to discuss the second half. He began by asking the US position on the phrase "observed by national technical means of verification". Garthoff said it was not acceptable. Grinevskiy said that he would be prepared to take up with his Delegation the possibility of the American formulation for the sentence minus the clause defining a heavy ICBM. Garthoff said he would report to his Delegation on the same basis, but hoped that Grinevskiy would be able to confirm whether his Delegation would be prepared to accept the US formulation for the second clause if the first were omitted. He noted that the word "significant" had been used, rather than the earlier Soviet proposed word "substantial". Grinevskiy agreed to go back to his Delegation on that basis.

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Grinevskiy turned to the interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement. He asked first if the US side could not consider including the phrase "observable by national technical means of verification." Garthoff said it could not. Grinevskiy then said that his Delegation was prepared to agree to the US formulation on significant increase in silo dimensions, if the US side agreed to drop the definition of a heavy ICBM.

Garthoff said that the US side continued to believe that it was important to have a common understanding on what constitutes a heavy ICBM, that it maintained the position it had taken in defining "heavy" ICBMs, and that if it did agree to a joint interpretive statement not including that definition it would reserve the right to reaffirm its position. On that basis, he thought his Delegation would be prepared to consider the agreed statement relating only to silo dimensions. But before going beyond that, he would want to hear considerations of the Soviet side on other disagreed matters.

Grinevskiy appeared to be taken aback, and said that the discussion that morning had not referred to any conditional package deal. Garthoff recalled that on May 20 Grinevskiy himself had proposed the possibility of linking a US dropping of the definition of heavy ICBM in exchange for Soviet agreement to a level of 7 million as the OLPAR ceiling. Grinevskiy said that he had understood that this proposition was not acceptable to the American side. Was Garthoff now suggesting a linkage to the OLPAR issue? Garthoff said that what the American side had rejected was Grinevskiy's suggestion of agreeing on an OLPAR level of 7 million in conjunction with dropping a definition of heavy ICBM from the agreed interpretive statement relating to Article II. He confirmed that he had not explicitly made any connection that morning, and repeated that was why he was now suggesting that other matters be addressed



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so that his Delegation could consider the Soviet suggestion for a compromise agreed statement on Article II in a broader context of reciprocal moves by both sides to resolve the complex of open issues. Grinevskiy said he did not know how to proceed. He did not have instructions that would permit leaving the statement on Article II up in the air while proceeding on to try to solve other issues. Garthoff suggested that in that case Grinevskiy proceed on the assumption that the American Delegation would agree to the compromise on the Article II statement, although in fact this position would be reserved pending discussion of the other issues. Grinevskiy finally agreed to go forward on that basis. The tentatively agreed interpretive statement was, "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Grinevskiy said that he had a few questions to ask with respect to the new draft Article III and Protocol which Garthoff had given them that morning. He asked what was covered by the term "submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers" in the first clause of Article III. Garthoff replied that it referred to SLBM launchers on submarines. Grinevskiy asked what kinds of submarines. Garthoff said it applied to old and new launchers on all kinds of submarines carrying ballistic missile launchers. Specifically, the Polaris, Poseidon, G-class, H-class, and Y-class submarines. Kishilov nodded as though this was the explanation they had expected to hear. Grinevskiy asked what the US side considered to be "older" SLBM launchers, and what it considered to be "modern" SLBM launchers. Garthoff explained that we regarded as older SLBMs those of types originally deployed on G-and H-class submarines, and still comprising the great majority of launchers on submarines of those classes, while modern SLBMs would be types initially deployed on the Y-class and on any follow-on submarines.

Grinevskiy then raised one other question, initially in terms of the last words of Article III, but extended by Kishilov to also refer to paragraph

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1 (b) of the Protocol. The question was whether the reference to modernization and replacement provisions should not apply only to older SLBM launchers. Garthoff said that the language of paragraph 1 (b) of the Protocol was definitely intended to apply to replacing modern as well as older types of ICBM launchers, and therefore the reference in Article III should also be the same.

Grinevskiy then asked whether the US side still considered a definition of submarines "under construction" to be necessary. His Delegation continues to regard it as unnecessary. Garthoff said we did still consider it to be necessary. Grinevskiy said that he could confirm that his Delegation did not see any difference of view over the question of what constitutes an operational submarine. However, there was "possibly some difference" on submarines under construction, and the Soviet side did not think it was necessary to get into the problem of working out agreed definitions.

Grinevskiy suggested that if the US side could accept the latest Soviet formulation on dismantling and replacement of ICBM launchers, perhaps they could meet us on the question of OLPARs. He asked what the US position on OLPARs was, since we had rejected 10 million and 7 million. Garthoff said that the US position remained 3 million. Grinevskiy suddenly agreed that the Soviet side could accept 3 million as the OLPAR level, if the dismantling provision were agreed upon, as an agreed interpretive statement rather than a provision in the text, and assuming agreement on the truncated version of the interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement.

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Shaw gave the Soviet participants clean copies of the US draft text in English of both the US and Soviet versions of the Interim Agreement (see Section U).

Smolin noted that, in accepting the documents, there was still some question about modifying Article IV. Shaw acknowledged this.

Shaw and Smolin exchanged new draft texts of statements on dismantling and on heavy ICBMs. No language discrepancies were found. A composite US text of the agreed statements was prepared. Shaw noted that the absence of a statement regarding submarines "under construction" did not mean that the US side was withdrawing this statement. Smolin acknowledged this.