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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

In the course of all previous phases of SALT both sides had proceeded from the premise that modernization and replacement of the armaments being limited would not be prohibited. In this connection, in addition to the proposals he had presented the day before, he would state that the Soviet side would consider it necessary to register in the Interim Agreement the right of both sides to modernization and replacement of older submarines by new submarines but without exceeding the number of modern submarines and of the SLBM launchers on these submarines, established at appropriate levels for each side.

┌ *Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:*

Trusov said that since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but the effort to avoid a situation which would in the course of work on modernization and replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller to denote a launcher for a light missile and the larger to denote a launcher for a heavy missile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two types. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means could clearly show whether or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the light missile into the category of heavy.

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*Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
and Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a Delegates'
meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:*

Semenov said that he would comment as a layman once again, with the reservation that he had not had the opportunity to consult with those of his colleagues who were specialists. He wanted to speak because possibly he was the father of this misunderstanding, at least in part. At one time he had said he thought formulation of this question would not prove difficult, but he could see now that he had been imprecise, for we were evidently facing difficulties now which he had not expected. He had believed and continues to believe that the US side will appraise the situation realistically and that we will be able to find a mutually acceptable solution, given a desire on both sides to do so. In connection with ABM limitation, at the proposal or at the insistence of the US side, the Soviet draft of Article VI in paragraph (a) provided an undertaking not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode. Now the US side wanted to make more specific the obligations concerning non-ABM radars, but if we were talking about non-ABM radars we were here touching on some other fields whose specifics we would then have to take into account. He had already noted in past discussions that in our negotiations we had to avoid the temptation of dealing with defense areas other than those we were instructed to deal with.

Semenov said that Smith had once accused him of being too partial to artillery, to which he had referred as "the God of war." However, he would not touch on the question of artillery, otherwise he was afraid he would get in trouble. As for anti-aircraft, it would be correct to say that anti-aircraft defense does not have as great a significance for the US as it does for the Soviet Union. One might ask why this should be assumed, after all, terms were to be equal for both sides. But it was an objective fact that

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could not be ignored. In our negotiations we had to respect the delicacy of such matters. At the same time, the Soviet side was not proposing, did not intend to propose, unequal terms on the question of large non-ABM radars. The Soviet proposal would apply equally to both sides and the terms would be equal too. Reflection on this matter led to the conclusion that the possible solution would not create the risk of laying the basis for an area defense for the United States. He did not think that the US side believed this with respect to the Soviet Union either. Furthermore, there was the obligation in Article I which clearly precluded a territorial defense. He did not think it would be difficult to understand the great importance of anti-aircraft defense for the Soviet Union and it was impossible to ignore this fact in our negotiations. He would tell an anecdote. The Russian writer Saltykov-Shchedrin tells the story of the mayor of a city who received some document in which there was a reference to the United States. There was something in the paper he did not like, so he endorsed it: "close down America." Upon further reflection he added the words: "but, it seems, this does not depend on us." Thus it was clear that we could not ignore the anti-aircraft defense question. He would conclude that we had to search for a mutually acceptable solution, that such a solution could be found, and that this would not mean in any way creating the basis of a territorial ABM system. The Soviet Union was not afraid of such a defense being established in the United States and he believed that the US side also would come to the conclusion that no such defense would be created in the Soviet Union.

Trusov believed that Minister Semenov had quite correctly said that the Soviet side was ready to search for mutually acceptable language that would permit the limitation of non-ABM radars in a certain way, and at the same time would not impose any limitations on the deployment of anti-aircraft systems. He would like to return to what had been said by Shchukin and had been emphasized in Shchukin's statement--that the Soviet side saw no connection between the potential

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of non-ABM radars and the ABM radars named in the US proposal, i.e., the MSR radar being deployed at Grand Forks. In addition, Shchukin had emphasized the thought that the Soviet side could not agree to the establishment of the level 3×10^6 as the standard mentioned by General Allison. Shchukin had not insisted that there be no limit on radars of the potential of the radar Smith had referred to as being in the Moscow system. Thus we would evidently have to continue searching for mutually acceptable language.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

Garthoff wished to propose another approach to reaching a mutually acceptable compromise on Article III of the ABM Draft Treaty. The alternative approach would be based on setting aside all existing ABM radars, operational and under construction, on the two sides, which could be retained, and then specifying additional permitted radar deployments in the future on a basis of precise equal opportunities. The result of this new approach would be to let the Soviet side have the large phased-array radars near Chekhov and Naro-Fominsk and the four large mechanical-scan radar complexes, balanced against the single PAR and single MSR at Grand Forks. In addition, each side could in the future deploy ABM radars within no more than four MARCs for defense of the national capital, and could deploy radars smaller than the MSR within no more than six MARCs at the ICBM defense deployment area. Finally, Garthoff said, he would like to propose an alternative to the MARCs for ICBM defense: namely, a limitation to a given number of ABM radars with smaller potential than the MSR. Such an approach would permit locating such radars on a more dispersed basis: We thought that twelve radars should be sufficient, but were prepared to consider up to eighteen. Garthoff then gave the Soviet participants the text of a draft incorporating the provisions he had outlined. (See Section U.) Grinevskiy and Kishilov asked a number of questions for clarification. In addition, they both remarked that they did not think the proposition was equal, because it meant that the Soviet Union could not have any ABM radars as large or larger than an MSR at the Soviet ICBM defense area, while the US could have PAR or Doghouse-type radars at as many as four complexes in defense of Washington. Garthoff noted that while that was correct, the Soviet side would have two very large radars at Moscow in addition to whatever it deployed within four complexes, and the four mechanical-scan radar complexes to boot. The Soviet participants were still doubtful

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of acceptability of an approach which would not permit the Soviet side any large radars for ICBM defense. Garthoff agreed that if that was considered an essential requirement by the Soviet side there was little point in considering this suggested new approach. Grinevskiy said that he would, despite his doubt, of course report this new suggestion.

Grinevskiy then asked about the two bracketed passages in para 1 (b). Was it the intention that there be no more than eighteen radars within no more than six complexes, or were the two bracketed passages alternatives? Kishilov immediately interjected that of course they were alternatives, and that the American side had earlier proposed six complexes with no numerical limit on radars. He strongly implied that a combination of numerical limits on radars as well as on complexes would be of no interest to the Soviet side. Garthoff said that he thought that a combination of limitation on radars and complexes could be considered, but so could a straight limitation only on numbers of radars, which would permit more dispersed deployment or only on complexes permitting a larger number of radars. The Soviet participants seemed inclined to favor the six complexes. Grinevskiy recalled that in discussion two days earlier he had suggested the possibility of eight complexes.

Garthoff then outlined a second alternative approach. If, as Grinevskiy and Kishilov had indicated might be the case, the Soviet side considered that equality and mutually acceptable terms required the two sides to have comparable large radars at the ICBM defense deployment area, the article could provide for that. The deployment for defense of the national capital could remain six MARCs for each side, plus the mechanical-scan radar complexes for the Soviet Union, and for defense of ICBMs the Soviet side could have one radar comparable to the PAR at Grand Forks and one radar capable to the MSR, and in addition each side could have either an agreed

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number of radars with a potential less than the MSR, or an agreed number of MARCs with the radars of them under that same qualitative limitation. He proposed twelve radars or four MARCs as sufficient, but the Soviet participants immediately objected that this was a step backward, and that in keeping with earlier proposals and suggestions the level should be at least eighteen radars or six MARCs. Garthoff agreed that those figures were appropriate in terms of the discussions to date. He suggested that perhaps the total could be eighteen radars or six MARCs including the two larger radars, with all other radars limited to smaller potential than the MSR. The Soviet participants said that this was too restrictive, that the minimum their side could consider would be the two large radars and six MARCs or eighteen smaller radars. Garthoff said that if such an approach were pursued, it should be clearly understood that the two larger radars on the Soviet side would be limited to equivalents of the American PAR and MSR radars, respectively.

Garthoff then gave them a draft incorporating the points which had just been discussed (see section U.) Garthoff and Grinevskiy amended the draft in pen, in accordance with the discussion outlined above, to substitute the numbers "18" for "12", and "6" for "4".

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Shchukin and Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin said that he would address the question of non-ABM radars that were not in the category of radars referred to in the April 11 version of the Soviet draft for paragraph (b) Article VI of the draft ABM Treaty. He had noted the fact that the US side had substantially changed the language of the statement on Article VI of the draft Treaty. As he understood it, the US side was now proposing that in deploying the radars to which he had just referred, they could not be given a potential in excess of the smallest modern phased-array ABM radar operational or under construction on either side. For the United States such a radar is the one presently under construction at Grand Forks, the radar known as MSR. The potential of this radar was stated by the US side to be less than three million watt-meters squared. Article VI of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems is designed to increase confidence in the limitation of ABM systems and components envisioned in the Treaty and also in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 2, Article I. The Soviet side sees no connection at all between the potential of the MSR under construction at Grand Forks and a limitation on the potential of those non-ABM radars, referred to in paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Soviet Draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. This is further supported by the fact that, as far as he knew, the radar to be used for defense of the national capital of the US, which is to perform a role similar to the MSR under construction for defense of ICBMs, is planned to have a substantially greater potential than the MSR at Grand Forks. The Soviet side cannot consider acceptable those considerations of the US side which would establish limits on the potential of non-ABM radars on the basis of the MSR under construction. Moreover, the Soviet side deems it necessary to reaffirm its position on the proposal calling for prior consultation in the commission to be established under Article XIII of the Treaty. He had in mind the draft statement proposed by the US side and was referring to its last part, which he believed to be unnecessary.

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Nitze said he was confused about why the Soviet position had changed from what he had understood it to be last. It was his understanding that we had agreed that the standard mentioned in the statement would substitute for paragraph (c) of Article VI formally in the joint draft text, in brackets. Such a standard was to be the smallest phased-array ABM radar deployed by either side within modern ABM radar complexes.

Shchukin said that if he recalled correctly, at the present time the words "operational or under construction on either side" were not agreed.

Trusov pointed out that Mr. Nitze had evidently referred to the language proposed by the US side. However, the Soviet side had not said that it agreed with this language. Academician Shchukin had pointed out that in the Soviet draft the reference was to the smallest radars deployed, but the words "under construction" were not included.

Nitze pointed out that in paragraph 2 of Article II of the Joint Draft Text it was stated that ABM system components under construction should be included within the meaning of paragraph 1 of that Article.

Shchukin acknowledged that this was correct, and said that this meant that they would be included in the ABM Treaty and limited under its provisions, but it did not say here that they would become a standard limiting the potential of non-ABM radars.

Nitze wanted to make another point. Initially the Soviet argument had been, under the proposal tabled in Vienna, that the MSR at Grand Forks would require an exception. The reason advanced for the need for an exception was that the MSR at Grand Forks had been initially designed as a component for an area defense and that it was larger than appropriate for defense of ICBM silos and that it would in fact raise questions about whether or not a base was being created for a territorial defense. He would also like to point out that in the plans of the US Government

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to date the MSR for defense of Washington would be equal in potential to the MSR at Grand Forks. Thus the distinction which Shchukin had drawn between them was not pertinent.

Shchukin said that when we had discussed this question before, it had seemed to him that the MSR type radars being developed in the US were those that had earlier been included in the Sentinel system. As far as he recalled, such radars were to be identical, both those to be used for defense of cities and other unprotected locations and those to be used for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Perhaps he had an imprecise impression of the potential of the MSR under construction at Grand Forks for defense of ICBM silo launchers, but such doubts had been dissipated by the statement made by Ambassador Smith. According to his information, the radar planned for defense of Washington was planned to have a potential greater than the MSR at Grand Forks. He asked that the following situation be hypothesized: Suppose a radar with a most limited potential is developed for defense of silo launchers, a potential that is sufficient for that purpose. Would that mean that the construction of a non-ABM radar with such a potential or even larger potential outside the area of ABM deployment would create the threat of establishing a territorial defense? It seemed to him that it would not. Therefore, the potential of the smallest radar within the defense systems of ICBM launchers could not be taken as a measure for limitation of non-ABM radars located in areas other than areas of ABM deployment.

Nitze said that, first, Shchukin had confirmed what Nitze had said earlier--that the MSR had originally been designed as part of a system for defense of either cities or silo launchers. Second, both sides agree that within MARCs for defense of national capitals there would be no limit on the potential of radars that could be built. Thus, whatever some articles in a magazine said on the subject of a possible future radar for the defense of Washington was not pertinent. Third, it seemed quite wrong to have very careful constraints on radars permitted within ABM

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deployment areas and then also permit indiscriminate deployment of other radars with a greater potential anywhere in the country.

Shchukin, replying to the first point, said that he had already confirmed that the radars originally developed for defense of cities, industrial centers and ICBM silo launchers were identical. In this he agreed with Nitze. Secondly, he also agreed that in the discussions so far no limits of any kind have been proposed on the potential of radars to be deployed within MARCs for ABM defense of national capitals. Third, he would like to say that the potential of the smallest radar deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers cannot serve as a criterion that would limit the potential of non-ABM radars located outside agreed areas of ABM deployment. He was saying this because non-ABM radars located outside would not be defending launchers, but other facilities, and therefore the limitation on their potential should be other than the potential of the smallest ABM radar deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Finally, when he had said earlier that initially the ABM radars developed in the US for defense of national capitals and for defense of silo launchers were not identical, he had meant that the solution for radars forming part of an ABM system for defense of national capitals should be higher, that these radars should be larger than those proposed earlier.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

I said that I continued to be unimpressed by the argument that he had made and Semenov had repeated that large phased array radars were needed for SAM purposes. I said that with respect to the air-to-surface missile launched by a high flying plane, it seemed to me that that threat would be eliminated if the high flying plane itself were vulnerable. Shchukin said that he agreed. He said that we, however, had a differential advantage in that our AWACS-type planes could fly over the oceans while they were, in part, surrounded by land masses which they did not control. I said that AWACS had nothing to do with high flying planes. If the planes were high flying, a ground-based mechanical scan-dish radar could see them better than could an AWACS; an AWACS-type of plane was useful only against low flying planes, and as he had agreed with me the other day, large phased array radars were not useful in the low altitude regime because of the short distance of line of sight to the horizon at low altitudes.

At another point Shchukin commented that radars of the MSR and larger size were immensely expensive and that neither side would be able to afford more than a few.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Grinevskiy and Pleshakov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

I berated Grinevskiy for the fact that his Delegation had permitted ours to labor several weeks under the misimpression that the Soviet side had agreed to the MSR as the standard for an OLPAR constraint. Grinevskiy said that his Delegation had always sought to work toward a mutually acceptable solution, and that it would continue to do so. I said that "the ball was now in their court". We expected a constructive Soviet proposal. I noted that we had raised the proposed level from one million to three million, and also resorted to the indirect reference at Soviet behest, although that indirect referent had eventually mislead us. (Minister Pleshakov who also sat across the table, listened to this part of our conversation, and interjected to say that the difference between one and three times to the sixth was not significant, and the Soviets needed a higher level.) Grinevskiy said that it would be necessary to raise the level "somewhat". Subsequently, Grinevskiy was more specific and said it would need to be raised by about one order of magnitude.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 11 May 1972, Helsinki:

Garthoff remarked, personally and frankly, that there was a feeling that the Soviet side had permitted the American Delegation to labor under the misimpression that there was agreement on using the MSR as a standard for OLPAR limitation for more than two weeks. Grinevskiy became very defensive, and said the Soviet side had never said that the MSR was acceptable as the OLPAR standard. He said that Minister Semenov had already said that he might have contributed to a misunderstanding by saying that there was only an editorial difference remaining on the OLPAR question, but the Soviet Delegation had believed and continued to believe that a mutually acceptable solution could be found. Moreover, there had been uncertainty as to the potential of the MSR.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov pointed out that on May 6 the Soviet Delegation had tabled a draft for Article II of the Interim Agreement and the draft of a statement to be attached to it. He wanted to draw the US Delegation's attention to the fact that the totality of obligations incorporated in these proposals completely precluded the possibility during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement of converting launchers for light land-based ICBMs and launchers for older types of land-based ICBMs constructed before 1964 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs. In this connection, the USSR Delegation failed to understand the reasons why the US side had raised the question of defining heavy ICBMs at the meeting of May 7. In the course of all the phases of the negotiations both sides had understood and understand today what particular missiles or launchers we were talking about as heavy. In the Soviet view there was no reason to assume that during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement the sides would not continue to know this. Heavy missiles have certain features that clearly distinguish them from other types of ballistic missiles. These distinctions will continue to exist in the future, too, particularly if the sides undertake the obligation not to increase substantially in the process of modernization and replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the sides. The Soviet side believed that this statement, in combination with the obligation provided for in its draft of Article II, completely precluded the possibility of such conversion and that therefore there was no need for any additional definitions. Trusov said that this completely solved the problem.

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Trusov said he agreed with Minister Semenov. As he saw it, the words "substantial" or "insubstantial", "significant" or "insignificant" had become a part of the arsenal of SALT, part of the language of the documents we were negotiating here. He believed that when we used these terms, we understood what they meant. As for definitions, in this case, since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but the effort to avoid a situation which would in the course of work on modernization and replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller to denote a launcher for a light missile and the larger to denote a launcher for a heavy missile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two types. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means could clearly show whether or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the light missile into the category of heavy. It was equally obvious that some insubstantial increase in the diameter of light missiles would in no way result in even bringing it close to the category of heavy missiles. In these conditions the definition itself was only of philosophical interest.

Minister Semenov remarked that even from the philosophical point of view it was of no interest.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 11 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet side continues to believe that the provision on no substantial increase in dimensions of silo launchers should include a phrase modifying increase as "observable with the aid of national technical means of verification". Garthoff objected categorically.

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Smith said that we believed that at the present time we knew what the Soviet side would call a light missile and what it would call a heavy missile. However, as we looked into the future we saw problems

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in interpreting the words "light" and "heavy." The Soviet side had tried to help us with the word "substantially," an adverb. Adverbs were notoriously slippery things. If he had to explain to his authorities what was meant by "substantially," he would not know how to go about it. He recalled that at an earlier time in our negotiations Semenov had difficulties with this word, when we proposed to use it in connection with transfers to third countries. At that time Semenov had said that he could not distinguish between what was substantial and what was not substantial.

Allison recalled that during a previous phase of SALT, he had discussed this problem with General Trusov and had referred to possible developments in the future, pointing out that it was not simply a matter of current missiles; it was a matter of dealing with missiles of an in-between size. He would point out that a problem could arise with a missile that would fall in a category between the present categories of light and heavy.

Semenov said that he would like to comment on this subject as a layman. As Smith would recall, in all our discussions both sides had taken the position that the Interim Agreement must contain provisions that would have the effect of preventing deployment of heavy missiles and a build-up in such missiles. As justly pointed out by General Trusov, in all the phases of our negotiations the sides had understood and do understand today specifically what missiles are meant. An analysis of the development of the Soviet position would show that in many respects the Soviet side has moved to meet the wishes of the US side; this would become particularly clear if a comparison were made between what the Soviet side had proposed initially and what it was proposing now. If he had understood General Allison correctly, we were now asking a substantially different question and this raised new difficulties in our talks. A freeze was a freeze and we did have a common understanding about freezing the number of modern heavy missiles. On the other hand, the freeze

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would not affect modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms, and in this, too, we seemed to have agreement in principle. The US would modernize its missiles and the Soviet side would do so also, and Semenov did not think that such actions would constitute actions outside the framework of the understanding existing between us. At the present moment we were talking about an Interim Agreement; perhaps it would be advisable to defer the questions arising in connection with the subject of discussion today for solution at follow-on talks, more active negotiations, about which we also had a common understanding. Of course, the category of possibilities was great, but now we had comparatively little time to enable us to go beyond the category of realities.

Replying to Smith's remarks on the subject of what was "substantial" or what was "insubstantial," Semenov would say that Smith had quite correctly noted that such a term had also been used by the US side at one time. He would ask Smith if he had not noticed that a number of ideas were migrating between our two sides. This was quite natural since we were engaged in an exchange of ideas and considerations in a search for mutually acceptable solutions. Such solutions could hardly be found if we did not engage in such exchanges. Personally, he saw nothing wrong in ideas travelling back and forth between the two sides. There was no such thing as a national arithmetic, there was only one arithmetic, and in our negotiations it was essential for us to find common understanding on the principle of mutual acceptability. Both sides had to keep this in mind if we were to have agreement. He concluded by saying that perhaps he had not spoken too precisely, but, after all, he was speaking as a layman.

Semenov said that as a philosopher he would like to say that in this case General Allison was not really interested in what was meant by "heavy," but rather in what was meant by "light." We all know what was "heavy," but in connection with the question of modernization and replacement of missiles in the

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possession of the sides General Allison was trying to approach this matter from the other end, to determine what was a light missile. As a student of philosophy Semenov had spent a great deal of time learning to distinguish between concepts and learning to understand from a logical viewpoint what the substance of a concept consisted of. He therefore knew how to recognize a substitution of concepts when he was faced with it; it was not a new phenomenon, not since the days of the Greek philosophers. He believed that we could hardly engage in such substitutions if our work here was to be productive.

Trusov said he agreed with Minister Semenov. As he saw it, the words "substantial" or "insubstantial", "significant" or "insignificant" had become a part of the arsenal of SALT, part of the language of the documents we were negotiating here. He believed that when we used these terms, we understood what they meant. As for definitions, in this case, since we were engaged in working out an Interim Agreement the important things were not definitions in themselves, but the effort to avoid a situation which would in the course of work on modernization and replacement lead to the result of increasing the numbers of heavy missiles by conversion from other types of missiles covered by the Agreement. This was evidently the main problem. As an example, he wanted to use the equipment on the table before us in order to explain the substance of the proposal tabled by the Soviet side [using ashtrays of two widely differing sizes, Trusov used the smaller to denote a launcher for a light missile and the larger to denote a launcher for a heavy missile]. He said that national technical means of verification would clearly distinguish between these two types. And when we said that in the process of modernization and replacement no substantial increase in the dimensions of the light missiles could occur, it would be obvious that national technical means could clearly show whether or not any increase was substantial enough to bring the light missile into

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the category of heavy. It was equally obvious that some insubstantial increase in the diameter of light missiles would in no way result in even bringing it close to the category of heavy missiles. In these conditions the definition itself was only of philosophical interest.

Semenov remarked that even from the philosophical point of view it was of no interest.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said he wanted to make the following statement: The Soviet side had already stated its position on the US proposal to freeze mobile ICBM launchers. He was now reaffirming this position and believed that in working out a draft Interim Agreement in the light of the May 20, 1971 understanding between our Governments, there was no need to include such launchers in the composition of systems to be frozen. At the same time, the Soviet side had moved to accommodate the US side and agreed to include fixed soft launchers. He said that the solution proposed by the Soviet side fully met the purposes of the Interim Agreement.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 10 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy was quite firm in saying that the Soviet side was not prepared to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze.

Grinevskiy hoped we could make progress on Article II, and said that if we could simply drop the definition of "heavy" missiles, he thought we could readily reach full agreement. I objected that this was a particularly important part of the Article II constraint.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the Soviet Delegation had been instructed by the Government of the Soviet Union to table today as an official proposal new language for Article III of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. (See Section U). He wanted to note that the new Soviet draft of Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems was prepared with account for the useful exchange of views between the sides which had taken place on this question. In addition, the Soviet Delegation had been instructed to transmit texts of draft joint statements on Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems on the following three questions: (a) on non-phased-array ABM radars, (b) on the magnitude of the potential of the smaller of the two large ABM radars referred to in paragraph (b) of Article III, (c) on the location of the center of the area of ABM systems deployment for defense of ICBM silo launchers. Semenov said he would like to read the drafts of these statements and handed them to Smith (See Section U).

Semenov expressed the hope that the new Soviet proposals would be closely studied and would meet with a favorable reaction on the US side.

Semenov wanted to make another statement. In our negotiations, a useful exchange of views had recently been held on the still unagreed question of non-ABM large phased-array radars. Taking this into account, in an effort to resolve on a compromise basis the difference on this question between the Delegations, the Soviet Delegation, on instructions from the Government of the USSR, was submitting for consideration a draft joint statement of the Delegations on Article VI of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems which took into account the positions of the sides on this question. He would like to read and hand over the draft of this statement (see Section U).

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation following a Delegates' meeting, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

On location of Soviet silo defenses in USSR, Shchukin said it was matter of prestige. There were those on Soviet side who thought it was improper for US to dictate location of their defenses.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Trusov and Pleshakov during a conversation following a Delegates' meeting with US SALT delegate Allison, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

I stated that the Soviet proposal put on the table today does not satisfy the requirement for specification on the Soviet side of an ICBM defense deployment area east of the Urals (again used scratch pad and symbols to describe the point). I asked rhetorically--how would we know, without a specification as to geographic location, that the Soviets would not put the site in, for example, the Leningrad area, Volgograd area, etc. Pleshakov interjected to say that this problem could be solved and he emphasized that the Soviet side has no intention of deploying the ICBM defense area in European Russia.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

It was agreed that we would meet formally as the Group of Four the next day at 3:00 p.m. in the American Embassy. The agenda was discussed.

Grinevskiy asked, probably not seriously, whether the American participants would be prepared to discuss Article III of the ABM Draft Treaty. Garthoff said that they probably would not, although it might be useful to discuss the yet unagreed interpretive statement concerning the location of ABM defenses for ICBMs. (From a separate brief conversation with Kishilov, Garthoff derived the clear impression that the Soviet Delegation expects and is prepared to compromise differences on this point by including an undertaking to locate the Soviet ICBM defense deployment area east of the Urals in exchange for American agreement to locate its ICBM defense in the Grand Forks ICBM deployment field.)

Grinevskiy also asked whether the American side would be prepared to discuss OLPARs. Garthoff expressed doubt. Both he and Parsons indicated that the Soviet OLPAR proposal seemed much too high. The Soviet participants considered that their side had made a decisive compromise move by coming down to the level of 1×10^7 , and seemed a bit disconcerted that the American participants did not consider the new Soviet proposal as a basis for agreement.

Grinevskiy expressed the strong hope that the US side would be given instructions permitting it to agree on the Article III provisions which had emerged from earlier discussions and now represented the position of the Soviet Government.

Grinevskiy raised the question of procedures for formalizing agreed interpretive statements. He suggested that he still thought they should

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refer to specific articles of the Treaty or Agreement. Garthoff then again argued that it was unnecessary and could be troublesome to try to relate each interpretive statement to the appropriate articles, since in some cases a statement referred to several articles; for example, the one relating to other "future" ABM systems. Grinevskiy said that he had only expressed a personal view, and they would think further about this matter.

Garthoff said that it would probably be best to group together the statements relating to the Treaty, and separately those relating to the Interim Agreement. But they did not need titles, and did not need a covering record. The Heads of Delegation should initial each statement, after Ambassador Smith had read it in English and Minister Semenov in Russian, with an exchange of agreed translations. Grinevskiy indicated his agreement with this suggestion.

Garthoff then said that on the American side the statements would probably be used separately in conjunction with other commentary discussing various aspects of the Treaty or Agreement. For example, in the message to the Congress there might be discussion of non-transfer, at which point there would be reference to the fact that there was an agreed interpretive statement between the US and USSR, then providing the text. But the collected interpretive statements would not be handled together, and would not be annexed to the Treaty. Grinevskiy noted understanding, and said they would not be "published". Garthoff said they would not be published as an annex to the Treaty, but they would be considered unclassified and would be made public in the manner he had described, in the course of Congressional consideration. Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov expressed understanding and agreement that the statements would be available to each Government to use as they saw fit, including publicly, and attributing to them the status of interpretations agreed by the two Governments.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Trusov and Pleshakov during a conversation following a Delegates' meeting with US SALT delegate Allison, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

In informal conversations following the meeting of Delegates, I told General Trusov and Minister Pleshakov that their number of 10^7 for the OLPAR interpretive statement was too high. The US proposal for OLPARs with a power aperture product not greater than the MSR gave, in the judgment of our experts, ample flexibility to deal with their air defense problem. Trusov and Pleshakov disagreed. Pleshakov stated that 10^7 was an absolutely rock-bottom figure for the Soviets, arrived at after most careful consideration and probably not satisfying the views of all their experts. It was a serious effort to compromise. Trusov agreed. (Conversation was without interpreter and conducted largely with use of scratch pad notes, figures and Pleshakov's limited English. I would observe, however, that Pleshakov's comprehension is fairly good in some areas although his expression in response is weak.)

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation following a Delegates' meeting, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin said he had had great difficulty in getting number ten million for Olpar standard accepted by his delegation.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 14 May 1972, Helsinki:

Garthoff noted that Semenov had said that the Soviet side would have some new proposals to advance in the Group of Four meeting concerning the Interim Agreement. Grinevskiy and Kishilov confirmed this, and implied that these proposals would concern both Article I and Article II and their associated interpretive statements. Both said that they now understood that the size of the ICBM missiles was the most critical element, and Garthoff confirmed that. Grinevskiy suggested that the Soviet side would be able to agree on a way of handling the concept of a "heavy" missile, if the American side could reach agreement on the definition of an ICBM. Garthoff agreed to such a deal, but explained that while the American side could consider a new definition of an ICBM, it could not accept the definition which the Soviet side had last advanced. Grinevskiy still displayed general pessimism about the difficulties in reaching an agreement on Article II. For the first time, he suggested that the reference to dimensions of ICBM "silos", rather than to "silo launchers", was "a step back". Garthoff expressed surprise, and said that this change -- which he had described at an earlier session -- was simply a more precise reference which should help to reach agreement. Grinevskiy said it did not, but was unable to provide arguments except that the term "silo launchers" was used elsewhere in the agreement. Garthoff replied that there was no reference to dimensions of silos elsewhere in the agreement, and that there should be no particular difference over the term. The American side could agree to refer to "silo launchers" if necessary, but there did need to be common understanding as to what was meant by dimensions of silos or silo launchers. Grinevskiy's suggestion that there was a difference making reference to silos "a step back" raised questions as to whether the two sides had a common understanding. He asked if the Soviet

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participants were prepared to discuss further the diagram of silo launchers which he had given them earlier. They said that they might be in a position to do so the next day.

Grinevskiy raised the question of procedures for formalizing agreed interpretive statements. He suggested that he still thought they should refer to specific articles of the Treaty or Agreement. Garthoff then again argued that it was unnecessary and could be troublesome to try to relate each interpretive statement to the appropriate articles, since in some cases a statement referred to several articles; for example, the one relating to other "future" ABM systems. Grinevskiy said that he had only expressed a personal view, and they would think further about this matter.

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Congressional consideration. Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov expressed understanding and agreement that the statement would be available to each Government to use as they saw fit, including publicly, and attributing to them the status of interpretations agreed by the two Governments.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisors Smolin and Chulitskiy during a meeting of the Editorial Working Group, 15 May 1972, Helsinki:

Smolin noted that the reference to further or follow-on talks in three places in the two documents spoke of "strategic offensive arms" but, in the Preamble to the Interim Agreement, spoke only of "strategic arms." He suggested that to harmonize the two documents, the word "offensive" should be included in this Preamble. Shaw recalled that, on the eve of the conclusion of the talks last December, the Soviets themselves had taken out the word "offensive" in the Preamble. He personally saw no objection to reinserting it, but said that he would have to discuss this matter with his Delegation.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Smolin at the meeting of the Editorial Working Group, 16 May 1972, Helsinki:

In reviewing the ABM draft text presented by the Soviets, Smolin noted that it had agreed to the footnote proposed by the US. In regard to Article XIII, subparagraph 1(b), he noted that the Soviet draft referred to "each Party" rather than "either Party" as given in the US JDT. Shaw said that the US Delegation prefers the use of the word "either."

On the interpretive statements, Smolin said that the Soviet Delegation agreed to the idea of having all of them in one document in regard to each Treaty or Agreement. He noted the Soviet heading for this document which would read: "Agreed Statements by Delegations regarding the Treaty on Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems."

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegates Pleshakov and Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 16 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy mentioned that our colleagues on the Editorial Working Group had also been hard at work. Parsons and Garthoff said that they did not yet have a detailed report on the latest meeting, but that they understood work was proceeding satisfactorily. Garthoff noted that there was one point which he wished to take up with Grinevskiy. Smolin had suggested insertion of the word "offensive" in the second preambular paragraph of the Interim Agreement, in the phrase concerning "the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic [offensive] arms." Garthoff noted that in the parallel provision of the ABM Treaty, in the fourth preambular paragraph, the same clause did include the word "offensive." However, rather than add the word into this passage in the preamble of the Interim Agreement, the American Delegation proposed instead deletion of the word in the preamble of the ABM Draft Treaty. He noted that Ambassador Smith would like to make this change, and perhaps Grinevskiy would like to bring this to the attention of Minister Semenov. Grinevskiy agreed to do so. Grinevskiy asked whether the American side had in mind a possibility that further negotiations could lead to an ABM ban, and Garthoff confirmed that this possibility was in mind. Grinevskiy smiled and nodded affirmatively.

Grinevskiy suggested starting first with the ABM Draft Treaty, Article III.

An extraordinary argument of nearly two hours' duration ensued over the minor problem of reconciling the editorial differences concerning the appositional clause describing ABM radar complexes for defense of national capitals. The Soviet Delegation did not accept the simplified form which Garthoff had suggested and the Group of Four had tentatively agreed upon the day before. The gist of the issue was that the Soviet Delegation wished to describe "complexes" as the associated facilities related to a radar or a group

[REDACTED]

of radars, rather than as an area within which radars could be deployed. Garthoff rejected this approach, since it could introduce an element of uncertainty into the obligation, since "complexes" in the technical sense being employed by the Soviet side could theoretically be put more than one in an area of three kilometer diameter, and in that case a side would either be limited to fewer than six such areas, or would have more than six such "complexes," either of which would not be situations intended by the two sides in agreeing upon six ABM radar areas, each with a diameter of no more than three kilometers. In the discussion, Garthoff suggested the possibility of omitting reference to complexes, and simply referring to areas of a given description. Parsons suggested a simplified version along this line. But Grinevskiy persisted in arguing for some variation reflecting the initially expressed Soviet position. He said that the Soviet specialists who understood this question insisted on the point. Garthoff suggested discussing the matter with them, and in due course Minister Pleshakov joined the group. Pleshakov and Garthoff discussed the question for a time in Russian, and agreed upon a simplified reference to "no more than six areas, each having a diameter of no more than three kilometers." Later, however, another text was brought into the room, and Grinevskiy announced that the Soviet Delegation did not accept the formulation which Garthoff and Pleshakov had worked out, and insisted upon reference to complexes. He said that the Soviet side had accepted the American proposal for ABM radar complexes, and wished to maintain it. Garthoff welcomed this remark, and said that since the Soviet side accepted the American concept, there should be no problem in agreeing on any of the several variations which embodied that concept. Finally, after lengthy discussion, Grinevskiy agreed on a variant which Garthoff and Kishilov had worked out, reading as follows: "within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being a circle having a diameter of no more than three kilometers." This text was then agreed, ad referendum to Delegations.

Accordingly, agreement was reached on the whole of Article III (see Section U).

[REDACTED]

Garthoff then noted that, as Ambassador Smith had told Semenov that morning, agreement of the American side to Article III was dependent upon reaching agreement on the interpretive statement relating to location of ICBM defense areas, as well as on inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement. He added that, as Ambassador Smith had also indicated, the American side was prepared to state that its deployment will be centered at Grand Forks. He then gave the Soviet participants the text (in English and Russian) of a draft statement that Ambassador Smith would be prepared to make in the context of an agreed interpretive statement specifying that the US deployment would be west of the Mississippi, and the Soviet deployment east of the Urals.

Grinevskiy accepted the draft with appreciation and without substantive comment. He did, however, state that the Soviet position remained that there was no need to specify east of the Urals and West of the Mississippi. Garthoff remonstrated, and repeated that as had been discussed the day before, and as the US draft made quite clear, an agreed interpretation on that point was essential. Grinevskiy acknowledged understanding this position, and said that he would now take the matter up further with his Delegation.

Grinevskiy asked if the US side had anything further to say about OLPARs. Garthoff replied in the negative, and said that he had nothing more to say at this time, but would like to comment that he did not expect that the American side could agree to the Soviet proposal, and indeed believed that the latest American proposal on this subject remained the correct basis for agreement. Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov again showed unhappiness over this position. Grinevskiy asked whether the US Delegation had received instructions from Washington responsive to the latest Soviet proposal. Garthoff said official instructions had not yet been received, but that unofficial indications had led him to make the comment that the Soviet Delegation should be thinking in terms of a probable American rejection of the Soviet proposal. Grinevskiy became quite heated in defending the latest Soviet proposal as a fair and appropriate compromise, and as the rock-bottom Soviet position on the subject. Garthoff suggested there was no point in further discussion at that time, and the Soviet participants agreed.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 16 May 1972, Helsinki:

Turning to Article II, Garthoff presented a text based on the previous day's discussion (see Section U). Grinevskiy and Kishilov immediately showed their disappointment and dissatisfaction. They described the text as no advance, and even a step back. They repeated the strongly held position of the Soviet side against including any definition of heavy ICBMs, whether in terms of volume of the missile, mention of a particular missile as the standard, or a standard of being larger than the largest existing light missile. Grinevskiy said that the obligations in Article II itself were very important. In addition, the second obligation of making no substantial increase in silo dimensions observable by national technical means was very important. Finally, both sides had a common understanding on which were heavy ICBMs and which were light ICBMs. There had been no differences on this question so far, and therefore no definition was needed. A definition might mislead.

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Grinevskiy mentioned that our colleagues on the Editorial Working Group had also been hard at work. Parsons and Garthoff said that they did not yet have a detailed report on the latest meeting, but that they understood work was proceeding satisfactorily. Garthoff noted that there was one point which he wished to take up with Grinevskiy. Smolin had suggested insertion of the word "offensive" in the second preambular paragraph of the Interim Agreement, in the phrase concerning "the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic [offensive] arms." Garthoff noted that in the parallel provision of the ABM Treaty, in the fourth preambular paragraph, the same clause did include the word "offensive." However, rather than add the word into this passage in the preamble of the Interim Agreement, the American Delegation proposed instead deletion of the word in the preamble of the ABM Draft Treaty. He noted that Ambassador Smith would like to make this change, and perhaps Grinevskiy would like to bring this to the attention of Minister Semenov. Grinevskiy agreed to do so.

Turning to the Interim Agreement, Grinevskiy asked if the American participants had anything to suggest with respect to Article I. Garthoff said that they did, and presented a new draft text to the Soviet participants (see Section U). He noted that it confirmed acceptance of the interpretive statement defining ICBMs, and accepted the Soviet proposal for July 1, 1972, in the basic Article. This acceptance of the July 1 date was in the context of the understanding that there would of course be no new starts of ICBM construction between the present time and July 1, and further had in mind Minister Semenov's remarks of May 6. He noted that in the second interpretive statement the date of signature was retained, because that seemed more appropriate for such a descriptive passage.

[REDACTED]

Grinevskiy expressed satisfaction at agreement on the Article and the first interpretive statement. He questioned the reference to date of signature in the second statement, and said that his Delegation thought that it should also be July 1, in conformity with the agreed date in the Article itself. Garthoff said that his Delegation had considered this question, and, as he had explained earlier, believed that it was more appropriate to refer to an on-going activity such as was described in the interpretive statement by reference to date of signature; the Article represented an undertaking which could be best described in terms of a particular date. Moreover, in similar descriptive passages concerning existing activities or installations, date of signature was the agreed formulation in the ABM Treaty, for example with respect to identifying certain radars in Article III, and also in one of the interpretive statements associated with Article III. After some further argument, Grinevskiy said that he could accept the American proposal. Accordingly, full agreement was reached on Article I and the first two associated interpretive statements. Both sides indicated no change in their respective positions concerning the proposed additional interpretive statement on land-mobile ICBM launchers.

Turning to Article II, Garthoff presented a text based on the previous day's discussion (see Section U). Grinevskiy and Kishilov immediately showed their disappointment and dissatisfaction. They described the text as no advance, and even a step back. They repeated the strongly held position of the Soviet side against including any definition of heavy ICBMs, whether in terms of volume of the missile, mention of a particular missile as the standard, or a standard of being larger than the largest existing light missile. Grinevskiy said that the obligations in Article II itself were very important. In addition, the second obligation of making no substantial increase in silo dimensions observable by national technical means was very important. Finally, both sides had a common understanding on which were heavy ICBMs and which were light ICBMs. There had been no differences on this question so far, and therefore no definition was needed. A definition might mislead.

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Garthoff said that as the Soviet side knew, for more than two years the American side had said in every way it knew how that it was essential to have a clear common understanding on the subject of what a heavy ICBM was. He did not understand how the Soviet participants could describe as a "step back" reference to 70 cubic meters as the threshold defining heavy ICBMs. The day before they had said that from the standpoint of the Soviet side it made no difference whether the definition were in terms of greater than the largest light missile or a volume of 70 cubic meters. Under these circumstances, the American Delegation preferred to revert to the formulation of 70 cubic meters, since it was a more precise standard. Moreover, the Soviet participants should appreciate that a 70 cubic meter standard would in fact permit modest modernization of existing light ICBMs, all of which were below that level. Accordingly, it could hardly be described as a step back from the Soviet standpoint. He could understand that the Soviet participants might, from what they had previously said, not regard that particular formulation as a step forward; perhaps from their standpoint it was a step to the side. But from the American standpoint it represented a correct and necessary definition. Garthoff then asked if, in his comments, Grinevskiy had deliberately used the word "substantial" in preference to "significant." Grinevskiy said that he had, his side preferred the word "substantial." Garthoff said that his side preferred the word "significant," but felt that it needed to be further considered, and that although the term remained without brackets in the text he had just provided, he wished to emphasize that this was still a tentative matter. He asked if Grinevskiy had meant to describe the substantial increase in dimensions observable by national means as a single statement of the obligation; that is, was "observable by national technical means of verification" stated as a limiting qualification on "substantial increase" rather than merely a descriptive phrase identifying the method of verification. Also, did the Soviet side regard the inclusion of that phrase as essential. Grinevskiy said that it was a qualifying element of the sentence, and the Soviet side did consider it essential. Garthoff said that, as he had said previously, the American side considered it not acceptable

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to use such a consideration as an element in defining the very terms of the standard being established.

Garthoff then asked what Grinevskiy had meant when he said that a definition could "mislead." The American position was that a definition was necessary precisely in order to "lead," and we did not see how it could "mislead" to make clear just what obligations the sides were assuming. Grinevskiy replied with a lengthy diatribe repeating familiar arguments such as the fact that throughout our long negotiations there had always been a clear understanding as to what constituted heavy ICBMs, and that a definition was not necessary. Garthoff replied that without agreeing with those considerations, he still did not see how a definition could be misleading. How could the establishment of a clear standard such as 70 cubic meters mislead a side? Grinevskiy responded by saying that suppose a side wanted to build a missile of 71 cubic meters. Garthoff replied that if Grinevskiy was proposing 71 cubic meters as the standard, he thought he could agree. Grinevskiy replied that he did not mean that. Garthoff remarked that, in that case, it would be a violation; but that obviously what a side would do in that case would be to advise the weapons designers as to the limit they would be permitted. Grinevskiy said it was necessary to allow modernization, and both sides knew what heavy missiles were.

Parsons asked whether Grinevskiy was saying that light missiles would remain as they are now, and heavy missiles would remain as they now are. Grinevskiy said that he had only wanted to say that both sides know what they are talking about when they refer to light and heavy missiles.

Garthoff asked Grinevskiy what would happen if there were a difference on understanding of what a heavy missile was at some time in the future. Grinevskiy said that the matter could then be taken up in the Standing Consultative Commission. Garthoff asked if it would not be better to decide such a question now, before a side had taken steps which the other would regard as not consistent with the agreement. Moreover, if we were not able to agree in two years of negotiations, how would the Standing Consultative

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Commission be able to agree when one side had clearly thought that something was not a heavy missile and the other thought differently. Garthoff remarked that the US position on this matter had certainly been clear and consistent throughout the two years of negotiation. Grinevskiy again said it was a step back to refer to 70 cubic meters. When Garthoff challenged this, Grinevskiy and Kishilov both replied that 70 cubic meters was unacceptable, as the Soviet Delegation had said earlier. Therefore, to reintroduce an unacceptable proposal at this late stage of negotiations was a step back.

Kishilov suggested that perhaps the matter should be discussed by Delegations. Garthoff agreed that perhaps that would be useful.

The debate resumed in familiar terms. At one point, Garthoff said that the US will consider any missile above 70 cubic meters as a heavy ICBM. Grinevskiy said that "the Soviet side will take that into account." It was not, however, clear as to whether Grinevskiy meant that the Soviet side would take note of this American view, or would act in accordance with it.