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11 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 3:30 p.m., on Thursday,
10 September

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, Dr. McMillan,
and General Carter

1. The meeting opened with distribution to each member of a copy of "SKYLARK Status Report for Week Ending 4 September." Each member read the entire report thoroughly and questions were asked and answered by those present. Great interest was shown in the report. Mr. McCone proposed and it was agreed to concentrate on getting BIRD WATCHER installed on two of the four aircraft as a minimum, if at all possible prior to 5 November. It was also agreed that Kelly Johnson should be informed that the Executive Committee of NRO laid great stress on this project and was following it closely on a weekly basis through the SKYLARK weekly reports. Action: DD/S&T to follow up on the above two requirements and report results.

2. The future U-2 program was then discussed and it was generally agreed that the best solution to the problem would be to modify existing SAC aircraft on a reasonable turn-in basis without establishing a crash production line -- say on the basis of modifying four per year. It was also agreed that we should see whether or not some other contractor was in a position to do the work on a much cheaper basis than Lockheed. Both of these agreements are to be considered in a plan to be submitted by Colonel Ledford. This plan is to develop a schedule of modifications and estimated completion dates and to include a listing of the actual modifications required. The general consensus was that modifying to U-2H was probably as far as we should go. Action: Colonel Ledford to prepare such a plan and show it to

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General Carter prior to any further action with the NRO Executive Committee. Action: The charts used by Colonel Ledford at the prior briefing were supposed to have been reproduced, at my direction, on 8 x 10 sheets and provided all members of the Executive Committee. Mr. Vance was provided some sort of photographic copy about 3 x 4 inches, and these were not satisfactory. I gave him the book of 8 x 10 reproductions provided me by DD/S&T and he retained that book. I want to know why my instructions were not complied with, and soon.

3. Dr. McMillan then briefed on the problems causing the delay in the [REDACTED] and indicated that they centered around command and control instructions being reliably received -- apparently electrical malfunctions of some sort. The latest date for the [REDACTED] is now set at 25 September.

4. Secretary Vance then brought up the U-2 flight to cover [REDACTED] and was under the impression that it would be done from [REDACTED] and required either an American [REDACTED] I told him the flight had previously been done by [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] and I saw no reason why we could not follow this routine again. Certainly this would be a much better procedure than trying to do it out of [REDACTED]

5. Dr. McMillan reported that he did not yet have signatures of all members of the Land Committee on the Land report but that it was generally encouraging as to the prospects for [REDACTED] Certainly he was all ready to proceed on a Phase I type of operation, and it was agreed that when the final Land report was submitted, Dr. McMillan would review it and report to the Executive Committee prior to going ahead with any big program.

6. Mr. McCone then reported that in following up on suggestions made at previous meetings of the Executive Committee, a plan had been developed to establish a small CIA element to assist General Greer by having this element co-located with General Greer and conduct CIA CORONA activities on the West

Coast. Mr. McCone said he contemplated having [redacted] in place in several weeks to be in charge of the CIA operations. [redacted] in addition to being the head of the West Coast CIA activities, would also provide a single point of contact for Greer and for Washington on CIA CORONA matters. He would provide advice and guidance to General Greer, would be responsible for all CIA contracting and all CIA security responsibilities. In addition, he would control the CIA group [redacted]. All of this was designed to give a single cohesive input to the CORONA program from the CIA and to revitalize our participation in that program. [redacted] would be ~~report to and be responsible to~~ ^{report to and be responsible to} General Greer and would ~~be authorized to communicate~~ ^{be} have direct lines of communication back to the DD/S&T here in Washington so that he could obtain additional advice, guidance, and assistance from our Headquarters competence as might be needed. We might augment [redacted] by the assignment of a couple of additional technical people at a later date. Mr. McCone pointed out that the successful operation of this plan required a clear-cut understanding of the Executive Committee as well as clear-cut instructions to Greer. I stated that these instructions should include participation of the CIA in all contractor/supplier meetings, a satisfactory working relationship with Aerospace Corporation who now has a systems engineering role, and a firm position in the Configuration Control Board or whatever new coordination mechanism is established for the system. Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone agreed that the veto concept of the Configuration Control Board was not working properly and that the Control Board, ~~whenever it was not in agreement,~~ ^{act as an advisory} should ~~present its conflicting~~ ^{board} views to General Greer for decision ~~(and in the event these are major problems, (such decision might have to be made back at the Washington level.)~~ All of these points seemed to be agreed by everyone present but it was decided that I would prepare a memo for Dr. McMillan establishing the working relationships as we see them and proposing the type of guidance General Greer should receive from Dr. McMillan. Such a memo is being prepared and I will furnish the Executive Committee copies of it. Action: General Carter to prepare appropriate memo. *(wish to review this)*

who would be responsible for final decision

7. Mr. McCone then brought up the problem of competing contracts being negotiated by General Greer along the ~~_____~~ concept. He specifically mentioned Itek, Perkin-Elmer, and Fairchild along the lines of the Wheelon memo. Dr. McMillan indicated that he may have been responsible for Greer's actions and that Greer may have misunderstood his instructions. Mr. McCone said that a senior executive of Fairchild, whom he knew personally, had telephoned him inquiring as to a proposed contract with Greer which appeared to be in direct competition with a CIA program ~~he was aware of and which in fact would have been a contract to disprove the feasibility of _____~~ Dr. McMillan said he was not aware of this facet of the contract and would look into it right away. Mr. McCone pointed out that we had already contracted for a backup study by Perkin-Elmer in the event Itek proposals proved infeasible and that while he was always one to encourage the greatest diversity in think projects in order to ensure success, he thought it put the Government in an untenable position when two separate agencies ~~were negotiating on contracts designed to downgrade proposals of the other agency.~~ He said he would like to have this gone into thoroughly by Dr. McMillan and reported back to the next Executive Committee meeting. Action: None required by CIA until McMillan reports back.

(but not referring to the memo's contents)

for the same product or objective

8. There was general discussion of the USIB actions at the morning meeting same date, particularly with regard to the crisis satellite. Nothing new was added that had not already been discussed at USIB. Both Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance thought that perhaps we were looking at the same target too often in the Soviet Union and Dr. McMillan confirmed that he had the same impression. In other words, we should be careful that COMOR was not getting into a repetitive rut, doing the same thing over and over again with inadequate imagination as to new areas, new targets, and frequency of observation. Action: Mr. Reber, please take a look at this and give me an informal memo.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

*Dictated but not read by General Carter

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