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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
USSR: "Containing" China 9



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

EUROPE

USSR: *"Containing" China*

Moscow is displaying fresh signs of concern over Communist China's stepped-up efforts to secure wider international recognition. The Kremlin would clearly like to limit Peking's international contacts in order to maintain China's sense of vulnerability to Soviet military and political pressures and to avoid providing it with additional outlets for anti-Soviet activity. Nevertheless, the Soviets seem somewhat at a loss for an effective means to counter the trend toward increased international acceptance of the Chinese.

Although the USSR has avoided public comment on Canada's recognition of Peking, which was announced on 13 October, its activity behind the scenes underscores concern that other states

will follow Ottawa's lead.



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Moscow is also troubled by the prospect that Peking may eventually gain membership in the UN, but the Soviets found it expedient this year to revert to their traditional stance of public endorsement of Peking's "rights" in that body. Last year, with Sino-Soviet tensions at their height as a result of border fighting, Gromyko omitted the usual statement of support for China from his General Assembly speech, but this year he called for "full restoration" of Peking's "rights." This gesture was clearly dictated by Moscow's present policy of minimizing unnecessary public friction with China.

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Ironically, Moscow's effort to establish a degree of stability in its state relations with China is inhibiting the Soviets from undertaking a more

forceful and open campaign to limit Peking's diplomatic gains. A resort to diplomatic arm-twisting would belie Moscow's assiduously cultivated image that its relations with China are on the mend, and might make Peking less willing to persist in its reciprocal restraint. Moreover, such quixotic tactics might also damage Moscow's efforts to improve bilateral ties with states now seeking closer relations with Peking. Finally, the USSR undoubtedly appreciates that many of the most important factors improving China's international position are beyond its power to influence.

In the immediate future, the Soviets can be expected to make additional low-key approaches in an effort to delay Chinese recognition and UN representation. On certain issues, such as "two China" proposals, Moscow will be free to campaign more vigorously, arguing publicly that Peking is the sole representative of China but privately admitting, as it did to the Belgians a few months ago, that Peking's presence on the Security Council would be "embarrassing" to the USSR. Over the longer term, however, the Soviets may fall back on the widely shared hope that broader diplomatic ties will increase pressure on Peking to follow a more moderate international course.

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