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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
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
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Communist China - USSR: *Token Diplomacy*

Recent diplomatic moves by both sides are unlikely to lead to any significant breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations. On 15 August, Moscow announced that it had replaced its chief delegate to the Peking border talks, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, with Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev. Although Ilichev is of slightly lesser rank than his predecessor, his appointment has reaffirmed Soviet interest in continuing the negotiations and has ostensibly satisfied China's strong desire that the talks be continued at the deputy foreign minister level. Nevertheless, the Chinese almost certainly view Moscow's choice with some ill feeling, particularly because Ilichev was closely associated with virulent anti-Chinese propaganda during the Khrushchev era and has been in partial disgrace since Khrushchev's ouster.

Ending a four-month period of parrying strong Soviet efforts to accredit an ambassador to Peking, the Chinese chargé in Moscow told foreign diplomats last week that agreement has been granted Vasily Tolstikov. As in the case of Ilichev, Moscow's ambassadorial choice has little appeal for the Chinese. Tolstikov, the former chief of the important Leningrad party apparatus, has no diplomatic experience and is known for his orthodox views on ideological matters. The Soviets probably intend to cite his appointment, as well as the dispatch of their new chief negotiator to Peking, as evidence of their desire to normalize relations.

They probably judge that the onus now is on Peking to reciprocate. Thus far, however, there has been no firm indication as to when the Chinese will send an ambassador to Moscow.

China's precise motivation for ending its delay on accepting a Soviet ambassador remains unclear. Chinese officials in the past had voiced strong concern that Moscow would use the appointment to downgrade the crucial Peking border talks to the ambassadorial level. Moscow's designation of Ilichev as the new head of the Soviet delegation no doubt reassured the Chinese somewhat over Soviet intentions. In any case, Peking almost certainly decided that further stalling would have been counterproductive and would have opened China to charges that it is the intransigent party in the dispute.

Peking's acceptance of Tolstikov, like Moscow's appointment of Ilichev, is largely an empty gesture and reflects little prospect for movement in the deadlocked border talks or improvement in the strained relations between the two states. This point was most vividly brought home by propaganda exchanges earlier this month in which the Chinese voiced unusually strong concern over Moscow's "greedy ambitions" against China, while the Soviets accused Peking of attempting to "sabotage" the border discussions.