


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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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19 September 1969
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
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
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

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NO RESULT APPARENT FROM KOSYGIN - CHOU EN-LAI MEETING


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There is no indication that the meeting in Peking on 11 September resulted in any significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese behavior suggests the contrary.




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NO RESULT APPARENT FROM KOSYGIN - CHOU EN-LAI MEETING

There is no indication that the meeting in Peking between Soviet Premier Kosygin and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on 11 September resulted in any significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese behavior suggests the contrary. It seems almost certain that the hastily arranged meeting occurred at Soviet initiative, perhaps with the North Vietnamese acting as intermediary.

Kosygin probably used the occasion to emphasize the seriousness with which Moscow views the present border confrontation and to underscore Soviet determination to react forcefully to any Chinese provocations. At the same time he probably reiterated Soviet willingness to hold talks on the border problem and may have attempted to keep China under pressure on this issue by indicating that the situation was getting out of control.

Such a presentation would have served several Soviet purposes. It would have dramatized to the Chinese at an authoritative and personal level the grave view Moscow takes of what it regards as provocations against the USSR. The Soviets probably believe that Peking is willing to accept a continuation of the present level of border conflict unless it can be convinced that Moscow is prepared to take harsh measures. At the same time, the Soviets are clearly unhappy about the tendency of much of the Communist movement and the

rest of the world to apportion blame equally in the dispute.

The Soviets see themselves at a disadvantage because many of their enemies and allies believe they can take advantage of Moscow's preoccupation with the Chinese. Moscow probably hopes that Kosygin's dramatic visit will serve to show that it is seeking to settle differences peacefully. The Soviets have refrained from polemics against Peking since the meeting, probably to underscore their stance as the party willing to moderate the dispute, and perhaps also to emphasize to China their willingness to take some of the heat out of the situation.

Kosygin's cold reception in Peking and the terse Chinese communiqué on the meeting were clearly designed to avoid the impression of formal Sino-Soviet discussions. The Chinese were probably reluctant to talk directly with Kosygin, but may have been unwilling to bear the onus for refusing to meet, particularly in light of Ho Chi Minh's last testament appealing for unity between the two parties. In addition, the Chinese are undoubtedly concerned over the possibility of a serious escalation of the conflict and may have seen some advantage in sounding out Soviet intentions.


It is too early to tell whether Peking will respond in a positive fashion to the Soviet initiative. On the propaganda

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front, however, Peking is maintaining an air of implacable hostility. On 16 September China made a forceful attempt to portray the USSR as the aggressive party in the dispute by calling attention to the possibility of an atomic attack by "social imperialism"--a clear allusion to recent public speculation concerning a possible Soviet pre-emptive strike against China. The statement is part of a slogan for this year's National Day celebrations on 1 October and

is likely to aggravate tensions between Moscow and Peking further.

The Soviet stand-down in polemics is unlikely to last much longer in the face of the continuing stream of invective from Peking. China's behavior could allow the Soviets to re-enter the propaganda battle with the renewed claim that Moscow had sought to temper the dispute but is compelled to defend itself against Peking's "aggressive" intentions.



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