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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CONGO

The UN military buildup, UN attainment of air superiority, and what Tshombé views as the likelihood of an "all-out" UN offensive have not induced him to pull back his troops, or to consider seriously coming to terms with the central Congo government. The UN action has instead resulted in a Katangan buildup, and a resolve to "fight to the finish." Katangan officials have called for the populace to "poison their arrows" and to "pick out a Swede, an Irishman, and Indian...there are enough to go around." Probably only a military defeat could get the Katanga regime to negotiate on anything other than its own terms, namely the maintenance of Katangan autonomy. Even if Tshombé's forces were dispersed, guerrilla activity in his name might continue.



This is not certain; if Tshombé, however, attempted to compromise Katangan independence--and there is no evidence he is so minded--he would almost certainly be shoved into the background, if not ousted. Tshombé has threatened that in the event of an all-out struggle he will engage in a "scorched earth" policy, including destruction of the important Katangan mining installations, in order to deny these resources to Leopoldville. Tshombé was resisting the counsel of Union Miniere officials that he negotiate with Adoula.

After a week of fighting, including air attacks, Katangan


military morale seems to remain high. Katangan forces are in control of the greater part of the city; the UN holds certain positions in Elisabethville--notably the UN headquarters--but is concentrated at and is in control of the Elisabethville airport. Nevertheless, infiltrating Katanga troops and aircraft have been able to cause some damage in night attacks. UN strength in Elisabethville is now over 4,500; Tshombé's forces number 7,000 to 8,000 plus 200-400 white mercenaries.

The US airlift of UN reinforcements continues to produce a strong anti-American reaction within the Katangan government. Tshombé continues to encourage and capitalize on anti-US and anti-UN sentiment, obviously hoping that sufficient Western pressure could be exerted on the UN to avoid an all-out attack. Tshombé, or his advisers, continue to project the image of Tshombé as a staunch anti-Communist, African leader in charge of the only stable province in the Congo, who has been unjustly attacked by a UN military force bent on seeking revenge for the Katangan "victory" last September. Tshombé was quick to charge that the damage reportedly done to Union Miniere installations by UN aircraft was clear proof that the UN was trying to destroy the Katangan economy, again hoping to produce additional pressures on the UN. There is no good evidence that the damage was deliberate. The UN Command is, however, probably persuaded that Union Miniere is solidly behind Katangan resistance and that it "controls" Tshombé.

UN intentions and capabilities remain uncertain. Opinion appears

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divided as to what should be done and what can be done. In New York, Secretary General Thant has emphasized that the UN has "limited" objectives, that it does not wish to crush Tshombé, but to restore law and order, to protect UN military forces in Katanga, and bring about a reconciliation between Tshombé and Adoula. Ouster of the white mercenaries is allegedly not an immediate objective.

The limited objectives envisioned by Thant, however,

are not always subscribed to by some of the field officials. Resentment over being forced into a cease-fire last September remains strong among UN personnel in the Congo, particularly among the Indian troops. Indian Brigadier Raja has been reported as eager to "clean up" Elisabethville. The Indian chargé, Rahman, assigned to Leopoldville, is in Elisabethville urging vigorous UN military action.

[REDACTED] on 10 December

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as discussing an all-out effort against the city, including a house-to-house cleanup.

Late reports indicated the UN "offensive" was scheduled to begin on 14 December. The UN move could result in heavy civilian casualties and extensive property damage, and may produce a long-term guerrilla-type war, beyond the UN's capabilities to control. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] warns that there appears again to be a dangerous tendency in the UN Command, as there was last September, to underestimate Katangan capacity and resolve to resist. UN officials, however, may believe that a second retreat would be the practical end of any prospects to bring Tshombé to reintegrate Katanga on anything but his own terms.

European Reaction

UN military actions already have provoked strong public and official criticism in Brussels, London, Paris, and Salisbury. In most capitals of Western Europe the view prevails that further UN action will result only in chaos and that the UN must work for a negotiated settlement. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] where the UN action is regarded as naked "aggression." There is little understanding of the UN motivation, and there is real concern for the personal safety of the 15,000 Belgians in Katanga, as well as for Belgian economic interests. While Brussels does not favor and is not aiding Katangan secession, it continues to favor a solution of the Congo problem on the basis of peaceful reconciliation with Tshombé based on a federal Congo. The Belgian Government is afraid strong pressure on Tshombé could result in confiscation of

Belgian enterprises, notably the Union Miniere complex.




Leopoldville

Adoula, in Leopoldville, whose chances for remaining in

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


power rest largely on victory over Tshombé, is clearly awaiting a UN success in Elisabethville. Frustrated by the incompetence and incapacity of his own Congo Army forces to mount a successful invasion of Katanga, he is hoping the UN will do the job for him.

  
Pressures from the "nationalists" in his government may additionally induce him to order General Mobutu's forces, now in Kasai Province, back into northwestern Katanga. In a move to reduce Gizenga's claims to credit for the Congo Army's UN-assisted takeover in northern Katanga, Adoula has sent anti-Tshombé Baluba leader Jason Sendwe to take administrative control.

Congo Army and/or UN forces remain in control of the northern Katanga towns of Albertville, Nyunzu, Niemba, and Kabalo, and the more southerly town of Manono. Both forces have so far avoided a contest of Tshombé's control of Kongolo, but an attack may be imminent.

Stanleyville

Adoula remains cautious about provoking an open showdown with Gizenga, although the Stanleyville leader has clearly separated himself from the Leopoldville government. In a 29 November speech Gizenga criticized Adoula for working with the "imperialists" and as having failed to resolve the Katanga problem, and called on Congo Army troops to follow him. Adoula's caution is a reflection of his inability either to enforce Gizenga's support of the government or to dismiss him. It is also a reflection of the prevailing attitude in the government and parliament that the Gizenga issue is secondary to the problem of reducing Tshombé.

  
 that Adoula is laying the groundwork for a parliamentary censure of Gizenga which would enable him to dismiss Gizenga from his post as a vice premier.  doubts Adoula will push the action before parliamentary sentiment crystallizes or prior to favorable news from Elisabethville.

There have been no further details of the Soviet offer of

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military aid and financial assistance to Adoula, who has recently accredited Soviet, Polish, and Czech diplomats. Should the UN action fail to bring Tshombé into alignment with Leopoldville, the pressures on Adoula would probably be such that he could only avoid ouster by grasping Soviet aid.

Tshombé's holdout is Gizenga's most important weapon in his effort to undermine Adoula's position. Gizenga, nevertheless, remains at least temporarily deserted by his former political supporters now in the Adoula government, and personal rivalries have frustrated his first efforts to bring about an amalgamation of Congo political parties under his control. What limited strength he commands is based on his claim to be the "heir" to Lumumba and his apparent ability to collect--often by force--funds to pay part of the Congo Army.

Gizenga continues to try to maintain himself as the leading anti-Western nationalist alternative to the Adoula government. He apparently does not intend to return to Leopold-

ville and continues to devote his attention to projecting himself as the true leader of the Congo Army "invasion" of northern Katanga. He is attempting to extend his influence beyond his Orientale Province base into Kivu Province. Muhiro, the provincial president in Kivu, who was once before overthrown by Gizenga, claimed on 12 December that Congo Army forces from Orientale responsive to Gizenga were moving into Kivu with the objective of overthrowing his government.

It appears that in any event Adoula will continue to be in difficulty. Even if the UN were to achieve a clear victory over Tshombé, Adoula would still be faced with the problem of Gizenga and the radical nationalists in his own government.

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