



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


DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE



# Intelligence Memorandum

*India-Pakistan: Comparative Capabilities  
in a New Military Confrontation*



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September 1971~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
13 September 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

India-Pakistan: Comparative Capabilities  
in a New Military Confrontation

Summary

Once again war between India and Pakistan is a real possibility. The friction now centers on East Pakistan rather than Kashmir, the primary issue being the more than 8 million Pakistani refugees that have fled to India.

India emerged from the 1965 war with smaller relative losses of military equipment and personnel than Pakistan. Exact loss figures have never been documented. Both countries probably lost about a third of their tanks, but India appears to have suffered only a 10 percent loss of aircraft--against about 15 percent for Pakistan--and less than 1 percent of its armed forces personnel, whereas Pakistan lost 2 to 3 percent.

India used only small token forces in the air campaign, apparently anticipating a longer war in which its numerical superiority favored a war of attrition. Pakistan, on the other hand, struck quickly at Indian Air Force installations in an attempt to deny the Indians the freedom of action their superiority should have given them. On the ground, Pakistan conducted some initially successful operations, but the Indians appear to have made more effective use of tank units.

*Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated within CIA.*

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Since the 1965 war both India and Pakistan have been replacing their materiel losses, strengthening their forces, and improving the effectiveness of their military organizations. Pakistan has expanded its army by about 100,000 to a total of 284,000. It has added nearly 500 tanks and almost 500 artillery and anti-aircraft guns, most of which came from China, and 60 Soviet artillery pieces to its army inventory. In addition, Pakistan has acquired at least 240 aircraft, about half of which were Communist Chinese MIG-19s and half Canadian or French fighter aircraft.

Similarly, India has increased its ground army by at least 100,000 and possibly as many as 300,000, and currently has close to 1.1 million men under arms. At least 500 tanks have been added to Indian armored units, and India's air defense network has been strengthened by the acquisition of Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. The Indian Air Force has obtained more than 300 Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers and about 150 Indian-built fighter aircraft. The Indian Navy has been expanded with new submarines, missile patrol boats, landing craft, and other ships.

Today, Pakistan's air force is completely equipped with jet aircraft. Because of its small size, however, it has only limited capabilities to defend against Indian air attacks and would not be able to carry out sustained operations because of a limited supply of spare parts, fuel, and ammunition, and a shortage of pilots and technicians.

The larger Indian Air Force is capable of countering intrusions into Indian territory but in a drawn-out conflict would have supply problems similar to those of Pakistan.

If war erupts, the bulk of the action is likely to take place in the west. On the ground, the Pakistani Army probably could resist an Indian invasion of West Pakistan for a short time and, on the offensive, might

be able to achieve a temporary advantage over Indian forces in some areas. It could not fight a long war, however, and the Indian Army probably would be able ultimately to drive the Pakistanis back from the border. There are about 70,000 Pakistani troops in East Pakistan and most of the more than 200,000 in West Pakistan are deployed near the Kashmir border. India's ground forces--nearly four times as large as Pakistan's--include about 100,000 troops near the border with East Pakistan, some 200,000 opposite West Pakistan, and about 150,000 along the China border.

In the east, India would have significant advantage over the Pakistanis. India's air power in this area is superior, and terrain and logistic considerations would facilitate an Indian thrust to seize part or even all of East Pakistan.

Both the Pakistani and the Indian navies are unimpressive in size and capability, and neither is likely to be a major factor in a conflict. Over the past six years, however, both countries have been expanding their fleets--the Pakistanis with three submarines from France and the Indians with 26 ships of various types from the USSR and at least six frigates which they are building with British assistance.

The USSR has supplied large quantities of a wide variety of equipment for India's air force, army, and navy while Communist China has been the principal source of supply for Pakistan. The present military balance still strongly favors India over Pakistan--particularly in a prolonged war--if the USSR and China do not become militarily involved.

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Background: The 1965 War

India emerged from the 1965 war with smaller relative losses of military equipment and personnel than Pakistan. Exact loss figures have never been documented. India admits losing 125 of its 684 tanks, 35 of its 675 aircraft, and approximately 2,500 of its 800,000 personnel. Actual losses may well have been double these. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, are estimated to have lost 250 of their 680 tanks, 21 of their 130 aircraft, and 3,000 to 5,000 of their 180,000 personnel.

While India clearly had the advantage of numerically superior forces in 1965, their performance on the battlefield, at least in the early stages of the fighting, left much to be desired. The air war strategy was evidently based on the assumption that because of the advantage in number of aircraft, time was on India's side. Indian attacks were aimed at airfields, radar installations, and troops and vehicles in the field, but were launched with only small token forces. Moreover, in the early stages of the fighting the Indian Government was reluctant to employ its air force beyond the immediate battlefield.

Pakistan's air war strategy, on the other hand, was an all-out effort to inflict maximum damage on Indian airfields, aircraft on the ground, and radar installations in order to deny the Indian Air Force the freedom of action its numerical superiority should have ensured. As a result of Pakistan's more aggressive action, the Pakistanis destroyed 20 to 30 Indian aircraft--including six Canberra light bombers, and eight Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers--on the ground. The Canberras and Hawker Hunters were at bases near India's eastern border where they were easy prey for the squadron of F-86s based in East Pakistan. The Indian Government, concentrating on confining the war to the western border, had deliberately restricted the movement of these aircraft.

India's strategy of gradual involvement probably would have been successful if the war had lasted longer because the Pakistani Air Force was suffering severe shortages of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts by the time of the cease-fire.

On the ground, after India countered Pakistani attempts to infiltrate "freedom fighters" across the Kashmir cease-fire line, the Pakistanis launched a drive in southern Kashmir toward the main Indian supply line. The Indians replied three days later with a three-pronged attack across the West Pakistan border--one thrust aimed at Sialkot, and the second and third at Lahore, Pakistan's largest city. This counteroffensive was indecisive and the fighting evolved into a war of attrition. India did not take Lahore, although it claimed that it could have done so.

During the fighting, armor played an important role on both sides. Pakistan made effective use of the tank-infantry team, but did not employ its tanks to maximum effectiveness. Many of them became bogged down in marshy areas. In addition, Pakistan lost many tanks to Indian antitank weapons because of a lack of patrolling and reconnaissance, as well as inadequate logistic support.

The Indian Army more than held its own against the Pakistanis. Despite the fact that they were no match for the US-supplied Pattons in the Pakistani inventory, Indian tanks did achieve considerable success. India, however, did not have good air-to-ground cooperation, and there were shortcomings in Indian intelligence.

The fighting ended in late September 1965 when the United Nations was able to effect a cease-fire. In early 1966 a meeting between Pakistani President Ayub and Indian Prime Minister Shastri was held at Tashkent in the Soviet Union. The resultant Tashkent Declaration included a general plan for military withdrawal and resulted in a lessening of tensions between the two countries. Withdrawal of the military forces was accomplished in February and early March 1966 and culminated in the return of all forces to locations within their respective international boundaries, and to appropriate sides of the UN-established 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line.



Force Development Since 1965

Since 1965 both countries have sought to replace materiel losses and improve the effectiveness of their forces.

In the six years since the war, Pakistan has added two corps headquarters and seven infantry divisions-- about 100,000 troops--to its army.

The Pakistani Air Force has added at least 240 combat aircraft to its inventory--including 90 Canadian-built F-86s, 24 French Mirage IIIEs, 122 Chinese MIG-19s, and 4 Chinese-supplied IL-28 jet bombers.

Not much has been done to improve Pakistan's overall naval capability. Inventory additions include three French Daphne class submarines and six Italian midget submarines, but naval personnel strength has increased by only 700.

India has also increased its armed forces. Since 1965 the army's personnel strength has increased by at least 100,000 and possibly as many as 300,000. These personnel were assigned to five new infantry divisions and to four existing divisions to bring them up to full authorized strength. Additions to the army inventory include at least 500 tanks of both Soviet and Indian make, plus numerous artillery pieces and armored personnel carriers.


The Indian Air Force has been increased by some 10,000 personnel over the last six years. Important additions to the jet fighter inventory include about 160 MIG-21s, 139 SU-7s, 53 Indian-built HF-24s, and 92 Indian-built Gnats. Some 150 of these aircraft, however, were replacements for older aircraft.

The navy also has received considerable attention. About 14,000 personnel have been added since 1965. In addition, India has acquired four F class submarines, five Petya class escorts, eight Osa class missile patrol boats, an Ugra class submarine tender, two Polnocny class medium landing ships, a submarine rescue ship, and five small motor gunboats, all from the Soviet Union.

The armed forces of both countries now are stronger and better equipped than they were in 1965, but in terms of equipment and personnel strength, the military balance still favors India, particularly in a prolonged war. (See the table on page 9.)

India and Pakistan: Military Personnel and Equipment  
As of Mid-1971

	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
<u>Air Force</u>		
Personnel	78,200	17,100
Equipment		
Jet fighters		
Mirage IIIE	--	24
MIG-21	170	--
SU-7	139	--
HF-24	55	--
F-104	--	8
MIG-19	--	122
F-86	--	160
Gnat	167	--
Hawker Hunter	98	--
Miscellaneous	163	8
Other		
IL-28 light bombers	--	4
Canberra light bombers	54	--
B-57 light bombers	--	18
Helicopters	161	45
Transports	111	8
<u>Army</u>		
Personnel	1,092,000	284,000
Equipment		
Medium tanks	1,075	1,000
Light tanks	269	94
Artillery, including self-propelled guns	2,560	1,320
Armored personnel carriers	600	100
<u>Navy</u>		
Personnel	33,000	9,700
Equipment		
Cruisers	2	1
Aircraft carriers	1	0
Destroyers and destroyer escorts	11	7
Submarines	4	4
Midget submarines	0	6
Missile patrol boats	8	0
Subchasers, patrol escorts, and other naval ships	14	0



The Air Forces

Pakistan

The Pakistani Air Force is an all jet force which has only limited capabilities in defending West Pakistan's main population, industrial, and military centers from an Indian air attack. The air force would not be able to carry out sustained operations lasting longer than three or four months because of Pakistan's dependence on multiple foreign supply sources--France, the US, and Communist China--a shortage of pilots and technicians, a general lack of spare parts, and the limitation of holding only about a 60-90 day supply of fuel and ammunition.

Air defense missions are performed by five fighter-interceptor squadrons equipped with Chinese-built MIG-19s, US-built F-104s, and French-built Mirage IIIEs. The one squadron of F-104s has only 8 operational aircraft left of the 14 originally supplied. The interceptor squadrons are based at Sarghoda, West Pakistan. (See map, facing).

Missions in support of the army are performed by eight fighter-bomber squadrons equipped with US and Canadian F-86s, French Mirage IIIs, and some MIG-19s. Seven of these squadrons are stationed at bases in West Pakistan, while one overstrength squadron equipped with F-86s is stationed at Dacca in East Pakistan.

Bombing missions are the responsibility of one B-57 squadron and one understrength IL-28 squadron, both based at Masroor, West Pakistan.

[REDACTED]

The alert and the dispersal of aircraft are in part a direct response to Indian activities at 15 airfields-- ten near the India-West Pakistan border and five near the India-East Pakistan border. Pakistan reportedly believes that 12 of these Indian airfields have been reactivated recently, and there is some evidence to support this belief.

India

In a conflict of short duration or against only Pakistan, the Indian Air Force would be capable of countering most air attacks into Indian territory, performing aerial reconnaissance, and conducting ground support, bombing, and transport operations. In a conflict of long duration, or in a larger scale war against both Pakistan and China, however, the Indians would probably encounter support problems because they too are largely dependent on foreign suppliers for spare parts and lack reserves of pilots and technicians.

The Indian Air Force has nearly 50 operational squadrons, and consists of some 1,500 combat and transport aircraft, compared with Pakistan's 500.\* The inventory includes about 35 different types of aircraft acquired from the USSR, the UK, France, the US, and other Western suppliers, as well as those produced in India under license.

Bombing missions are the responsibility of three light bomber squadrons equipped with British-built Canberras--an aging but still effective light bomber.


\* In both cases, the total inventories include trainer and utility aircraft as well as aircraft not operationally assigned.

India recently purchased 22 of these aircraft--ten from New Zealand and twelve from the UK--to replace some of the Canberras that were barely operable, and to bring the three squadrons up to an authorized strength of 16 aircraft per squadron. (See map on page 10 for deployment of Indian air forces.)

Air defense missions are assigned to 16 fighter-interceptor squadrons, of which eight are equipped with MIG-21s and eight with subsonic British Gnat day fighters. Both the Gnat and the MIG-21 are produced in India under license.

Missions in support of the army are assigned to 16 fighter-bomber squadrons. These squadrons are equipped with British Hawker Hunter, French Mystere, Soviet SU-7, or Indian HF-24 aircraft. The Hawker Hunters and the Mysteres now in the inventory will be phased out when sufficient quantities of HF-24s, a subsonic twin-engine jet fighter being produced in India, become available.

The Indian Air Force also has been conducting reconnaissance flights along the Kashmir-Chinese border. Whether these operations are normal or have been initiated because of the tensions between India and Pakistan is not clear.





The Armies

Pakistan

The Pakistani Army could successfully resist an Indian invasion in the west for a short time, and might even be able to achieve a temporary advantage over Indian forces there. In the east, the army would have much greater difficulty in containing the Indians, but it has some chance of delaying an Indian advance long enough to influence a political settlement. In addition, the Pakistani Army is capable of maintaining internal security in the west, but probably cannot maintain full control in the east. Principal weaknesses of the army include its almost complete dependence on foreign sources for materiel, a lack of an organized reserve, inadequate training facilities, and insufficient combined arms training and maneuvers.

The army--with a total personnel strength of about 284,000--is organized into four corps headquarters, 15 divisions (13 infantry and two armored), seven independent brigades, and two independent armored reconnaissance regiments. Some 70,000 troops are now estimated to be stationed in East Pakistan and they are organized into a corps headquarters and three infantry divisions. The remainder of Pakistan's army--including two new divisions which may not yet be combat ready--is in West Pakistan. At least eight divisions are near the Kashmir border, an armored division and an infantry division are located farther south, while two other infantry divisions are reported to be deployed opposite Afghanistan. (See map, facing.) In the event of war, these two divisions would almost certainly move to the front, and parts of one division may already have done so.

The equipment in the Pakistani inventory is of diverse origin. It includes obsolete US M-4 and M-24

tanks, as well as aging M-47 and M-49 tanks, and also tanks supplied by both Communist China and the USSR. The condition and operational status of Pakistani armor are unknown.

Since 25 March, when West Pakistan began moving against East Pakistani "miscreants," the two new Pakistani divisions have been organized and are being equipped with equipment provided by Communist China. At least one of these divisions was being established through fresh recruiting efforts. It is not known if training of these two divisions has been completed.

### India


The Indian Army is capable of maintaining internal security and could successfully defend against a Pakistani attack. If India launched an attack against West Pakistan, it probably--by sheer weight of numbers--could keep the Pakistani Army on the defensive and, given time, could force a Pakistani retreat from the borders.

The army has a total personnel strength of nearly 1.1 million, and is organized into four geographical commands--Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern--which have both tactical and administrative authority. The units which have been identified--almost all of which are near the northern borders--include five corps headquarters, 25 divisions (one armored, 14 infantry, and 10 mountain), 32 independent brigades, and 47 battalion-size combat units. About 200,000 Indian troops are assigned to the West Pakistan border area, about 100,000 to the East Pakistan border area, and about 150,000 along the China border. Another 600,000 troops are deployed elsewhere in India and would be available for reinforcing the forces that might be initially engaged. (See map on page 14 for deployment of Indian ground forces.)

Indian ground force equipment includes British Centurions, Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, and the Vijayanta tank built in India under license from Great Britain. Since 1965, India's greatest relative gain on Pakistan has been in the quality of its armored force. In 1965 it had no tanks able to match the Pattons in the Pakistani forces.

The Indian Army currently is on a low level alert. Compassionate leaves are still being granted, and personnel now on leave are not being recalled.





The Navies

Pakistan

The Pakistani Navy is small, and, although it would be no match against the Indian Navy, it can conduct limited escort, patrol, and coastal minesweeping operations. The ships of Pakistan's navy rarely operate outside the immediate coastal waters of West Pakistan, although at least one of its destroyers recently has been observed at Chittagong in East Pakistan.

Most of the ships in the inventory are old and were supplied by Great Britain on a grant basis. Pakistan, however, has been attempting to modernize its fleet, and recently has acquired three Daphne class submarines from France. The last of the three Daphnes was scheduled to arrive in Karachi, Pakistan's principal naval facility, in June. With the exception of two destroyers, all of the major combatants are operational. (See map, facing.)

India

While the Indian Navy is well equipped to carry out its assigned tasks of escort, coastal patrol, antisubmarine warfare, minesweeping, and amphibious operations, it could not defend India's 2,500-mile-long coastline from minor Pakistani naval attacks or prevent harassment of its sea lines of communication in the event of hostilities. The ships of the Indian Navy operate along India's coasts in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and do not leave this area except on occasional training and goodwill cruises.

Like the Pakistani Navy, most of the equipment in the Indian Navy is old and mostly of British origin. India also is trying to build up and modernize its

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fleet, however. It has acquired 26 ships from the Soviet Union over the past six years--including four F class submarines--and has four more of these submarines on order. India also is building at least six Leander class frigates, with British assistance, as well as inshore minesweepers and coastal patrol boats. New Delhi presently is exploring with France, West Germany, and Italy the possibilities of building in India one of their submarine designs. (See map on page 18 for deployment of India's naval forces.)

India is having problems keeping its major combatant ships operational. Two of its destroyer escorts, one of its cruisers, and one of its F class submarines currently are undergoing major repairs and probably will not be operational for the next several months.

Despite its shortcomings, the Indian Navy can blockade East Pakistani ports.

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Sources of Military Assistance

Since September 1965 Communist China has become Pakistan's most important foreign source of military aid and the Soviet Union has become India's primary source for modern weapon systems. Both suppliers have substantial orders from their clients for additional military equipment which is to be delivered over the next several years. To a large degree, the outcome of a conflict which might occur in the next couple of months would depend on what support the two adversaries could muster in the form of direct foreign military aid or military action. While both sides could absorb large quantities of tanks and other ground force equipment, they probably could not make use of larger quantities of aircraft because both Pakistan and India have only a limited number of trained pilots and technical personnel.

Chinese Aid to Pakistan

Since September 1965 Communist China has provided Pakistan with jet fighters, light bombers, tanks, artillery, and small arms.

[REDACTED] military deliveries to the end of 1970 is estimated at \$155 million.

In November 1970 Communist China agreed to provide Pakistan with equipment for two infantry divisions which were being activated and some of this equipment may have been delivered already.

[REDACTED]

Communist China probably would accelerate deliveries to West Pakistan in the event of a war, employing an emergency airlift of arms similar to that undertaken in 1965. The Chinese may also attempt to negotiate an agreement with Burma for air transit rights to East

Pakistan. This would be Peking's only means of rapid access to East Pakistan without confronting India.

During the 1965 war Peking was able to aid Pakistan simply by placing Chinese troops on alert along the Indian border and by conducting small unit maneuvers. Similar actions could be taken by Peking to support Pakistan if the Indo-Pakistani dispute once again results in hostilities.

These Chinese forces can defend the Sino-Indian border area, but their capability for sustained operations would be limited without additional forces. The Chinese could make diversionary and harassing moves along the border, however, effectively freezing many of the some 150,000 Indian troops along the Chinese border. Direct Chinese military intervention is unlikely. The Chinese have purposely maintained a low posture on the India-Pakistan issue and, in fact, clandestine sources report that Pakistani diplomatic personnel in Peking believe that the Chinese would not go beyond supplying military equipment to Pakistan in the event hostilities occur.

Reserve forces for the Himalayan border region consist of at least a division each in the Sinkiang and Lan-chou MRs and two armies in the Ch'eng-tu MR. Forces from these regions were deployed temporarily to the border during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, and could be recalled again.

The Chinese have no tactical aircraft stationed along the South Asian border. Since 1965, however, measures have been taken to provide for rapid deployment of aircraft to the region. Two airfields have



been constructed and a third improved in Tibet. Additionally, a few other airfields outside Tibet could support limited tactical aircraft operations along the Himalayan frontier.

Pakistan's Other Suppliers

Other Pakistani suppliers include France--which has supplied high-performance fighter aircraft, helicopters, and submarines--the US, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Iran.

Pakistan presently has a variety of military equipment on order from several of its non-Communist arms suppliers, but few of these orders are likely to be filled any time soon. At least four Alouette helicopters--of an order of ten--have been delivered by France since March 1971. Pakistan also has ordered 50 Mirage 5 jet fighters, but delivery of the first 30 is not scheduled until sometime in 1972.

For the past few years, Czechoslovakia has been delivering military vehicles, support equipment, and spare parts to the Pakistani Army, as well as machinery and raw materials to the ordnance factories on a cash basis.

Pakistan also has established friendly relations with several Arab states and with Iran. The Pakistanis probably cannot expect to receive much in the way of material assistance from any of their Arab friends. The Arabs may be willing to furnish moral support and, in the case of Libya and Saudi Arabia, some money, but not much beyond this.

[REDACTED] in addition  
Iran probably could fill an important role by serving as an intermediary in procuring military supplies from Western countries. The Shah, however, almost certainly


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will not become directly involved in the Indo-Pakistani struggle by involving his armed forces.

India's Sources of Aid

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


In addition, Gromyko gave an assurance in the UN of support for India, including use of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, if some aspect of the crisis is considered. Dhar gave no indication, however, that the Soviets guaranteed support in a situation in which it was not clear who initiated hostilities. Gromyko reportedly also suggested that an Indian delegation go to Moscow with a military shopping list and promised speedy negotiations and delivery in return.

If Moscow at a later date should decide to delay military equipment and spare parts deliveries to India in order to bring about a cease-fire, the impact on Indian military operations would be minimal for the first month or so. During this time, New Delhi could rely on its own production and stockpiles for many spare parts. India has the facilities to overhaul most types of ground equipment and aircraft.



**Possible Areas of Conflict in a New Indo-Pakistani War**



Possible Scenarios in a Confrontation

In the East

If hostilities should occur, the contest in the air in East Pakistan is likely to be short lived. The Pakistani Air Force has only one overstrength squadron of F-86s there--stationed at Dacca. Against this the Indian Air Force could employ four fighter squadrons and three fighter-bomber squadrons--about 100 aircraft--and India would undoubtedly move to destroy the Pakistani squadron as quickly as possible. From then on the Indian Air Force would be free to roam at will on bombing missions and to support Indian forces on the ground. The primary concern of the Indian Air Force would probably be the Indian-Chinese border.

Pakistan, realizing that it is badly outnumbered in the air, might attempt raids on Indian airfields, near the India-East Pakistan border (see map, facing), in hopes of duplicating its 1965 successes when it caught both Canberras and Hawker Hunters on the ground.

On the ground, India could attempt a thrust to seize the northwest corner of East Pakistan bounded on the east by the Jamuna River and on the south by the Ganges. Pakistan has a division-size force--about 18,000 troops--in this area, but they are spread thinly. India probably would need to commit a force of about a division and a half--some 27,000 troops. Terrain in this area of East Pakistan is favorable for a quick strike, while the Jamuna River would hinder quick reinforcement and resupply of Pakistani forces. New Delhi might find an operation to seize this corner of East Pakistan attractive because it would provide land for the refugees, and it would solve India's military problem of the narrow Siliguri Gap, which, if seized by Pakistan, would prevent India from being able to supply its troops in the northeast.

A thrust into the area south of the Ganges to seize Jessore and Khulna also might be considered by the Indian military, but probably would not be undertaken as a



the coast of East Pakistan, to harass Pakistani shipping going into East Pakistan, or to attempt a blockade of East Pakistan. Inasmuch as Pakistan has limited facilities in East Pakistan for its major combatants and no ships to replenish its major combatants at sea, the Pakistani Government is unlikely to move any of its ships into the Bay of Bengal as a counter to Indian moves.

In the West

The bulk of the action in the event of hostilities is likely to occur in the west, and there is little reason to believe that the tactics and objectives will be very different from what they were in 1965.

In the air, the Pakistani Air Force probably would try to destroy as many Indian aircraft on the ground as possible. Initially Pakistan would direct its air attacks against the five Indian airfields--Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara, Jaisalmer, and Jamnagar--designated as primary targets. At the same time Pakistan might also send its bombers against New Delhi.

India is likely to reply with air attacks on Peshawar, Chak Lala, Sarghoda, and Shorkot Road, with its major effort as in 1965 directed at Sarghoda. India's strategic bombers are likely to be sent against Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Karachi.

On the ground, either side could initiate hostilities in the west. Either might launch a preemptive attack against the other since minor operations--regarded by both as essentially defensive--could get out of hand. Pakistan might launch an attack to relieve pressure on East Pakistan, or to win a part of Indian-held Kashmir. India--especially if fearful of Chinese intervention--might attack in the west in hopes of shortening the war.

Most of Pakistan's 200,000 troops in the west probably would be committed to action from Lahore north into Kashmir. Pakistan does have one armored division, however, that is presently unopposed on the Indian side of the border. If this situation should prevail at the onset of hostilities, this division could be used to attack Indian

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troops in Kashmir from the flank. It could also be used for a more dramatic attack on New Delhi.

India for its part is likely to aim a counterattack at Lahore with the avowed purpose of cutting West Pakistan in two. India currently has about 200,000 troops in the Kashmir-Punjab area that could be used for this purpose.

Ground action farther south along the India-West Pakistan border is likely to be limited to occasional probes.

Only minor naval action would be likely in the west. The navies of both sides probably would do little more than normal wartime patrolling off their respective coastlines. Pakistan might, however, find it tempting to respond to an Indian blockade of East Pakistan with a raid on one of India's west coast ports such as Bombay. Pakistan might also use its three Daphne class submarines to attack Indian shipping in the Arabian Sea.

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