SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

March 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow's effort to maintain a conciliatory attitude prior to the summit was evident in its handling of the issue of passes for the Allied military liaison missions accredited to Soviet forces in East Germany. The announcement on 14 March, which rescinded the passes containing references to registration with the "German Democratic Republic," appears designed to portray the move as a pre-summit concession, in order not to "worsen the atmosphere between the great powers."

Moscow probably considered that the highly publicized dispute had become counterproductive, particularly in the light of Khrushchev's public statement of 5 March calling on all states to refrain from any action which could endanger the favorable pre-summit atmosphere. The Soviet leadership probably concluded that the American announcement that there would be no high-altitude flights to Berlin at this time and the Western statement on 12 March recalling Khrushchev's statement placed the USSR in an increasingly unfavorable position on this issue.

Privately, Moscow has attempted to gain some advantage from the dispute by linking the duration of the validity of the original passes to the over-all solution of the questions at the summit. General Vorontsov informed the Western military officials of this on 14 March. Moscow apparently intends to retain this issue as an element of pressure on the West.

Soviet efforts to appear conciliatory were also apparent in the prompt rescheduling of the Khrushchev visit to France in order to forestall speculation of a possible "diplomatic illness." Khrushchev's illness appears to be genuine.

Germany and Berlin will be the main items in Khrushchev's talks

with De Gaulle, the Algerian question will be raised by Khrushchev and not the French, but that this will lead to a general discussion of Africa-particularly Guinea. Disarmament will also be on the agenda,

Soviet bloc officials are also continuing their efforts privately to encourage Western apprehension over some definite Soviet action on a separate peace treaty after the summit conference. An East German official spelled out the detailed "consequences of such action," listing specifically road tolls and rail transit fees among the measures that East Germany would undertake to isolate West Berlin.

SECKET

Approved for Release