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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

3 March 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Khrushchev's ambiguous remarks on Germany and Berlin in his Djakarta press conference on 29 February did not in fact modify his previous statements on these subjects, which have carefully avoided directly linking a threat to sign a separate treaty with the outcome of the summit meeting in May. His deliberate ambiguity was apparently designed to elicit the Western press speculation that Soviet action is dependent on the summit results. Moscow's strong reaction to reports that the United States would resume flights in the Berlin air corridors above 10,000 feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this as an opportunity to test Western unity in the pre-summit period and, if possible, inject the East Germans into technical discussions on flight procedures.

The confusion in press accounts of Khrushchev's statement arose from the fact that his reference to the USSR's intention to conclude a separate treaty occurred at the end of a passage which opened with a reference to the forthcoming summit talks. Soviet leaders frequently resort to this device of calculated ambiguity when they wish to create an impression abroad that some drastic unilateral action is imminent without actually committing the USSR to take such action. This technique was employed effectively during the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Syrian crisis in 1956 and 1957.

In contrast to such psychological warfare maneuvers to generate a sense of urgency in the West regarding the importance of preventing a failure of the summit meeting, other statements by the Soviet premier in Indonesia reaffirmed his interest in maintaining personal contacts with Western leaders. His joint statement with President Sukarno noted that the May conference would be the first of a series of such meetings. He told his press conference that although one meeting could not deal with all the issues under dispute, the May session would "make a good start."

[REDACTED] Khrushchev said he was not optimistic over the prospects of achieving any "practical results" on disarmament or the German question at the summit meeting in May.

[REDACTED] He blamed Adenauer for forcing an "unaccommodating" position on the West, but he added that he had not given up his effort to reach an understanding.

[REDACTED] the USSR's only choice in the event of an impasse on the German and Berlin problems would be to sign a separate peace treaty. Soviet spokesmen have attempted to soften these public and private remarks by implying that unilateral action would not necessarily mean an abrupt end

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to the present situation or produce an acute crisis for the West.

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Khrushchev's effort to discredit Adenauer [redacted] were reflected in an official TASS statement on 25 February which seized on the announcement of the West German and Spanish military talks to allege that Bonn's policies "involuntarily bring to mind the military alliance of Hitler and Franco." Stressing that the Soviet Government has constantly warned about the "sinister danger of German militarism," the statement concluded by declaring that this collusion with Spain, aimed at obstructing an East-West agreement, "again underlines the urgent need for a peace settlement with Germany."

Moscow's prompt and strong reaction to press reports that the United States will resume flights in the Berlin air corridors above 10,000 feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this as an opportunity to test Western unity in the pre-summit period and, if possible, inject the East Germans into any technical discussion on flight procedures.

The warning by a Soviet spokesman in East Berlin that flights above 10,000 feet, in the absence of an agreement with both the USSR and East Germany, would be regarded as a "unilateral violation of East German air sovereignty" and existing four-power agreements probably is aimed at inducing the Western powers to postpone such flights and agree to tech-

nical discussions on flight procedures with East German participation. Moscow will probably attempt to increase pressure for negotiations, as it did in 1959, by hinting that possible "incidents" might result. On the flights in the spring of 1959, American C-130s were harassed by Soviet aircraft.

The impasse over the new passes for the Allied Military Liaison Missions accredited to the Soviet forces in East Germany continues. The Soviet Union has not yet replied to the Western protest notes delivered to the Soviet commander in East Germany on 19 February, which contended that the passes violated the 1947 agreement setting up the missions.

Privately, however, the Soviet officials have continued to minimize the problem, insisting that the passes are normal administrative action and do not constitute recognition of East Germany. Soviet mission officials in Frankfurt took this approach with American army officers. They asserted that the passes are really not new but merely recognize a historical fact.


New officers assigned to the Soviet mission in Baden-Baden indicated that they planned to be in West Germany a long time, suggesting that they do not anticipate that the missions will be withdrawn soon. This pose, however, may have been intended to suggest Soviet confidence that the Western reaction to the new passes is temporary.

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