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WORKING PAPER

The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN):
Its History, Organization and Functions

10 June 1969

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SCOPE

The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): Its History, Organization and Functions, 10 June 1969, 83 pages plus a 4-page Table of Contents, a 3-page list of abbreviations used, a 6-page attachment summarizing schematically COSVN's organization and personnel, a similar 3-page attachment concerning the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), and a 15-page index of all personal names cited. The paper, after a brief review of the steps leading up to the formation of COSVN in October 1961, discusses in detail the organization, functions and personnel of the various COSVN components, both civilian and military. In many cases, biographic data are included on the individuals mentioned. The paper ends with a discussion of the role of the NFLSV in the communist insurgency and the nature of COSVN's relations with its subordinate echelons. The paper was prepared by a CIA research unit in the field on the basis of all information available to it. A discussion of the sources used constitutes the first paragraph of the body of the paper.

LIMITATIONS

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

APT's	Armed Propaganda Teams
ARVN	Army, Republic of Vietnam
BN	Battalion
CAC	Current Affairs Committee
CAPT.	Captain
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
CI	Counter-Intelligence
CICV	Combined Intelligence Committee, Vietnam
CMD	Capital Military District
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CMPS	Capital Military Proselyting Section
CNC	Cac Nguisa Cuu (North Vietnamese Intelligence Service)
CO	Commanding Officer
COL.	Colonel
COSVN	Central Office of South Vietnam
DPO	Deputy Political Officer
FRS	Field Report, Vietnam, Saigon
GOV	Government of Vietnam
HQS	Headquarters
ICC	International Control Commission
JGS	Joint General Staff
LF	Local Forces
LSA	Liberation Student Association

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

LT. GEN.	Lieutenant General
LWA	Liberation Women's Association
LYA	Liberation Youth's Association
MAC	Military Affairs Committee
MACV/SRA	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam/ Strategic Research and Analysis
MAJ. GEN.	Major General
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MR	Military Region
NFLSV	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NIC	National Interrogation Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
PLAF	People's Liberation Armed Forces
PO	Political Officer
POW	Prisoner of War
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRYG	People's Revolutionary Youth Group
b1 b3 (S)	[redacted]
REGT.	Regiment
RSG	Rear Services Group
SEN. GEN.	Senior General
SUB-R	Sub-Region

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

SVN	South Vietnam
SVNLA	South Vietnam Liberation Army
TTH	Tri-Thien-Hue
U.S.	United States
VC	Viet Cong
XO	Executive Officer

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. CAVEAT

1. While some original research has gone into the preparation of this report, the bulk of it is based on other reports. Due to a short due date for the report and the extremely broad range of coverage, the compilation could not be especially critical either. In some instances, for example, parts of other reports were incorporated without any significant changes. An attempt has been made to credit some of these sources within the text. In general, the most used sources were NIC and CMIC interrogation reports, FVS's, Documents and Research Notes No. 23 and 40 by [redacted] CICV Newsletters and Special Studies, MACV J2 SRA Newsletter 11, the [redacted] study on Security Sections, CDEC Translation Summaries, and [redacted] Memoranda. (See the list of abbreviations for the above acronyms.)

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2. Given the Viet Cong (VC) propensity for clandestine working procedures and their use of pseudonyms, an itemization of COSVN leadership is tentative at best.* In addition, there never has been any one source of information on COSVN as a whole, therefore, the information is spotty. Nor is there an abundance of current information; much of what is available is out of date. The currency gap is particularly a vulnerable drawback because under the current pressures of the war and peace talks, it is certain that COSVN has undergone even more than the usual number of alterations.

3. The whole VC structure always has been flexible and subject to continuing reorganization, and COSVN is no exception. Thus, the major value of this study is that it pulls together under one cover the products of numerous other studies. As such, it should be viewed and utilized more as a framework for future compilations and as a background against which future changes can be measured, rather than as a definitive study of COSVN.

4. At present, the VC flexibility seems to be evidencing itself in a trend toward closer control by COSVN personnel in the forward areas around Saigon and to a lesser extent in the Delta. This is particularly true in the staffing of the Sub-Regions (SR) surrounding Saigon and Forward Military Command Posts (Fronts). Another area where COSVN personnel appear in great numbers in exposed forward areas is in the field of espionage and intelligence. Particularly vulnerable in this

*See Attachment A for a listing of COSVN leaders.

[illegible] are cadres assigned to Military Intelligence, Military-[illegible]elyting, and Security. Even more vulnerable are its communication links between the COSVN base areas and [illegible] undercover cadres, although COSVN appears to be turning to radio and other electronic means of communications to overcome [illegible] weakness. However, the fact that cadres are operating out of COSVN is no guarantee of their importance since COSVN [illegible] and does draft people from lower echelons.

5. The bulk of this paper probably will preclude a complete reading by any but the most dedicated. For this reason, it should be pointed out that the introductory section and the discussion of the members of the Current Affairs Committee are of general interest. At the end, the discussion of COSVN's relationship with its subordinate regions and SVN's is also of general interest although less so. The detail contained in the intervening discussion of the sections of COSVN, civilian and military, and of the Front are not designed for the casual reader.

II. BACKGROUND

6. During the Viet Minh period (1946-1954), the whole of Vietnam was divided by the Vietnamese Communists into six inter-regions. With the exception of two provinces, the area of SVN was covered by two of these; Inter-region V (Southern Trung Bo) and Inter-region VI (Nam Bo). The two exceptions were Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces which were part of Inter-region IV. In 1951, the Nam Bo Regional Committee was replaced by COSVN as the key communist control element in South Vietnam (SVN). After the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, COSVN was dissolved. Control of communist activities was again divided between the Trung Bo and Nam Bo Regional Committees. In May 1959, the Politburo of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party formulated its plans to wage war to recover SVN. On 10 September 1960, the NVN Third Party Congress adopted the resolution that led to the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and the re-establishment of COSVN. The NFLSV was brought into being on 20 December. On 15 February 1961, the South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA) now "officially" called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), was christened and COSVN was re-established in October 1961. As such, COSVN became the central organ for the entire Southern Branch of the Lao Dong Party, as distinct from control over just the Nam Bo region during 1951-54.

7. When the Communist People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)


I
II
III
IV
V
VI
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Bắc Bộ
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Inter Regions
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Saigon
CENTRAL
WESTERN
COCHINCHINA
Nam Bộ


Viet Cong
Provinces & Regions
1967
KONTUM
5
GIA LAI
BINH DINH
WESTERN HIGHLANDS FRONT
(B-3 FRONT)
PHU YEN
DAKLAK
KHANH HOA
10
6
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GIA DINH
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE
MR Boundary


Việt Cong
Provinces & Regions
QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG DA
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
(B3 FRONT)
PHU YEN
DAC LAC
KHANH HOA
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
SR-5
SR-2
U-1
SR-6

was established on 1 January 1962, COSVN then became the Central Committee of the new Party for the South with its highest leaders making up the Standing and/or Current Affairs Committee of the PRP. Establishment of the PRP was a tactical maneuver prompted by Hanoi's strategy of depicting the revolution in SVN as a movement strictly indigenous to the South. Actually, the PRP operated as the Southern Branch of the Lao Dong Party. Since COSVN was re-established in 1961, most members of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee (CAC) also have been members of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. In addition, most senior military officers at COSVN and the SVNLA headquarters are also members of the high command of the Army of North Vietnam (NVN). It is by means of such an interlocking organization that COSVN is able to control the Party, the Front, and the SVNLA simultaneously.

8. COSVN has been a mobile and dispersed headquarters. Located in "War Zone D," north-northeast of Saigon in the early 1960's, more recently it has moved to "War Zone C," a heavily forested area in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border, and part of COSVN now is believed to be in Cambodia. The different components of COSVN are generally dug-in and widely dispersed under triple canopied jungle. According to one source, it took four days to travel by foot from the site of the Organization Section to that of the Finance and Economy Section.

9. It is possible to approach the subject of the organization of COSVN by separating it into four components: the Central Executive Committee and its CAC; the "civilian" Party sections of the Central Committee; the Military Affairs Committee (SVNLA or PLAF Command); and the Front organization. These four components will be the basis for the organization of the text that follows. The fifth and final section of the paper will deal with the relationship of COSVN to its subordinate sections.

III. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

10. Leadership at all levels within the VC Infrastructure is provided by the PRP, through Party Committees set up at each echelon. According to the statutes of the PRP, the Central Committee-or more formally, the Central Executive Committee-is the highest decision-making body of the PRP between Party Congresses. A Congress is supposed to convene

every four years to elect a new Central Committee, though there is no evidence of any Congress having taken place since the inception of the PRP in January 1962. The Central Committee, in turn, is supposed to elect the Party secretary and deputy secretaries and the CAC. Although the composition of the Central Committee has never been announced publicly, various sources report that 30 to 40 persons make up its membership. Aside from the secretary and deputy secretaries, they probably include heads of the functional sections under COSVN, regional secretaries, and the top military officers. In addition to full members of the Central Committee, there are a number of alternate or candidate members.

11. An isolated Central Committee would be useless. There has to be a method of control. Apart from the actual dispatch of investigators, supervisors, and trouble-shooters, the VC system seems to rely primarily on a constant flow of directives down the chain of command matched by an equally constant flow of situation reports up the chain of command. The cardinal principle in the VC managerial system is the "steering" concept. The directives generally are broad enough to allow their recipients considerable leeway for local conditions. The principle is that senior echelons guide or steer lower echelons until the final echelon has the action. This principle is in effect from Hanoi to the smallest liberated hamlet.

12. Hanoi exercises its control principally by the placement of its own cadres, including Lao Dong Politburo members, in command positions in SVN and the use of directives and resolutions. In the military field, particularly north of Nam Bo, NVN also appears to exercise considerable direct tactical control. In the political sphere, the normal procedure at the highest level is for the Lao Dong Politburo to formulate the strategic policy and guidelines, usually after taking into consideration representative views and recommendations of COSVN. If fundamental enough, then this policy will be placed before the NVN Central Congress resulting in its becoming a Resolution and being given a number, such as Resolution 12. In other cases, the policy is sent South as a Politburo Resolution. In theory there is a difference, but in fact the end result is the same since the Central Congress acts largely as a rubber stamp. Often the decision hinges on whether the subject matter has international implications (such as a statement on the Sino-Soviet rift) or is devoted solely to the war in SVN. In the former case, a Central Congress Resolution is the rule, while in the latter it is not.

13. These broad policy statements either may be carried physically to COSVN or they may be sent electrically. Both methods have been used. In any event, once they reach COSVN, the COSVN Central Executive Committee will meet to discuss the policy. They are free to make changes, particularly those that reflect an appreciation of local conditions under which the policy is to be implemented. Although not universally followed, COSVN also may issue its own number to the policy. In addition, as the policy filters down the chain of command, other echelons also may utilize a different numbering system, thereby further disguising and confusing the issue.

14. Following the high-level COSVN discussion of the policy, it is then presented to the other COSVN personnel. This is sometimes in writing, but apparently more often it is by briefing. At this time, or sometimes at the next stage, leading cadres are called in from the next Communist organizational echelon, the Military Regions (MR) and Sub-regions (SR), for briefings and discussions on the policy. This pattern basically is repeated at each level. For example, the Region Party Committee interprets the broad COSVN policy decisions in terms of regional differences or special requirements, passing a somewhat modified or mission-type directive to provinces for action. The Province Committee formulates specific directives for implementing COSVN policies. The District Committee translates these directives into specific actions; thus, it is the indispensable link between COSVN, the Region and Province Committees, and the villages. The Village Committee executes orders received from the District Committee, and exercises final authority over use of village guerrillas.

15. Although at the lower levels there may be more specificity concerning what is to be done locally, there also is a higher degree of generalization and propaganda concerning the overall strategy and its rationale. Indeed, at the lowest levels, only the barest glimmer of the original statement remains. Unfortunately, it is from these lower levels that most of the information is obtained on these policies.

16. In addition to the high-level resolutions and directives, each echelon and element of the VC apparatus issues and receives numerous other orders, directives, reports, and the like from higher levels and from lateral sections of the infrastructure. This is particularly true when speaking of the Party's functional sections. For example, the Region Party Committee might discuss a COSVN resolution, but a facet of it might be the responsibility of the Military Intelligence (MI)

Section of the Military Staff of the Military Affairs Committee. And, to implement this facet, the MI Section may need to coordinate with the Party's Security and the Military Proselyting Sections, both of which deal with penetration agents. A second example, the Party's Finance and Economy Section must be firmly coordinated, almost daily, with both the local Party Secretary and the Forward Supply Council; it also must maintain contact and account for its actions with the next higher echelon Finance and Economy Section, while supervising the activities of the next lower echelon section simultaneously.

17. All this criss-crossing of papers places a great load on the commo-liaison system. In addition, such heavy reliance on bureaucratic decision-making slows reaction time and makes the commo-liaison an all-important, yet vulnerable, link in the overall operation. COSVN uses three basic means to communicate: couriers, land lines, and radios. Land lines are almost never used outside secure base areas (and even then tend to be buried or otherwise camouflaged). Radios are used primarily as a means of coordinating wide-spread military operations, although there are indications COSVN would like to expand the use of radios, especially in the MI area. For the vast bulk of the paper flow, couriers are used and these couriers often are required to pass through hostile territory. The larger the flow and the more reliance placed upon it, the more vulnerable the VC apparatus will be.

IV. CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (CAC)

18. Meetings of the Central Committee are supposed to be held at least once every six months. In the interim, the daily business of the Party is conducted by the CAC. Ten men or so reportedly comprise this committee. As the highest ranking leaders of COSVN, and many of them concurrently members of Hanoi's Central Committee, they constitute the highest Communist leadership in SVN. Although the CAC members must follow the overall guidelines established by the Lao Dong Party and the PRP Central Committee, they enjoy considerable operational independence in the day-to-day execution of policy. Their authority is exercised not only by means of the broad Resolutions and directives issued in their name, but through their supervisory roles as well. Each top leader usually functions either as the actual head of a functional section or agency, or he is assigned a sort of general supervisory role over one or more areas, such as finance, proselyting, or military. At this level, personalities probably play an important part and the actual position an individual occupies may not reflect his true power or role.

19. Though theorectically not paramount, the actual leadership of the CAC apparently is vested in the Secretariat. At present, the three members of the Secretariat appear to be Pham Thien Hung (aka Pham Hung, Cao Dang Chiem*, Bay Hong), Nguyen Van Cuc (aka Muoi Cuc, Muoi Ut), and Nguyen Van Dang (aka Hai Van, Pham Xuan Thai, Hai Ram).

A. Muoi Cuc

20. From 1962 to 1964, the chief member of COSVN and Secretary of the PRP apparently was Muoi Cuc. Like so many other NVN and VC leaders, Cuc's revolutionary career extends far into the past and is interwoven with that of other leaders. About 1935 or 1936, Cuc was arrested and imprisoned on Con Son Island. Taking advantage of the general confusion prevailing among the Japanese authorities just after the end of World War II, Cuc and several other high-level prisoners escaped. They located a large Japanese boat, repaired it on their own and successfully navigated to Soc Trang, a distance of some 75 miles. The escapees included the future secretary of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan; and the entire Secretariat of COSVN in its earlier stages, Cuc (secretary), Hai Van (first deputy), and Vo Chi Cong (third deputy who has since returned to NVN for medical reasons).

21. Cuc's childhood consisted of his being orphaned, raised by an uncle in Tonkin, and later sent to Saigon. By 1956, he was reported to be the deputy secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee and Party secretary of the Saigon-Cholon area. During the period from 1957-1959, he operated out of Phnom Penh, Cambodia where he contracted lung trouble, forcing him to give up smoking. He was among those allegedly elected to the Lao Dong Central Committee in 1960 and, according to one source, secretly elevated to the Lao Dong Politburo in February 1967. Personally, Cuc appears to be a studious, quiet, and serious sort. He is well read, able to read French and some Chinese. His COSVN office is full of books. His preferences run to Party literature (which he also writes), philosophy, works on foreign lands, and novels. He is considered to be affable, warm in his relations with his colleagues, and receptive to their ideas and problems. Le Thi Rieng, a leading PRP cadre arrested in 1967, has described him as an imaginative leader, though not quite as sharp as his friend, Le Duan. His wife, Ngo Tui Hue, is a member of the NVN

*The name "Cao Dang Chiem" apparently also is used by one of the members of COSVN Security Section. To further confuse the situation, the same name also appears to be used by a NFLSV cadre operating in IV Corps.

National Assembly.

22. During 1964, the evidence indicates Senior General (Sen. Gen.) Nguyen Chi Thanh arrived from Hanoi to assume command of COSVN. This change probably was not meant to reflect on Cuc, but rather on the tremendous increase in the numbers of NVN military being infiltrated at this time. Thanh possessed unusually strong credentials for the job. He was considered second only to Sen. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, and they were the only two holding this rank. He was a member of both the NVN Defense Council and the Secretariat. Cuc probably stepped down to the position of first deputy secretary of the Party. Thanh appears to have concentrated more on the military issues, and Cuc may have possessed considerable latitude on the civilian side. When Thanh died in late June or early July 1967, possibly from a B-52 raid, Cuc probably resumed charge of COSVN. But recent reports indicate that Cuc soon stepped down again (about September 1967) when Pham Hung, first deputy Premier of NVN, arrived in the South to head COSVN.

B. Pham Hung

23. If Sen. Gen. Thanh could be described as Giap's right-hand man, Pham Hung certainly could be considered the protege of NVN Prime Minister Pham Van Dong who has been described as the protector and benefactor of Hung. Apparently born in SVN in 1912 (Long Ho District, Vinh Long Province), Hung went to school in My Tho. In 1920, he joined the Revolutionary Youth Group and in 1930, the Communist Party. In 1932, he was arrested and sentenced todeath in My Tho for complicity in a "Secret Society" and for his role in assassination plots. The sentence was commuted to life and he was sent to Con Son Island where he remained until September 1945. His initial assignment on his return seems to have been as commander of a detachment of the Viet Minh 18th Division at Sadec. He quickly moved to the civilian side and by 1947 was the deputy chief of Security for Eastern, and then all of the Nam Bo Inter-region (including Saigon-Cholon).

24. From 1949 to 1951, Hung reportedly was in NVN attending the assembly that established the Lao Dong Party and replaced the Nam Bo Regional Committee with COSVN. Hung was elected to the Central Committee and appointed to the Southern Affairs Bureau. It was at this juncture that he began his association with Le Duan, then head of the Southern Bureau. From 1950 to 1952, he appears to have been in charge of security for SVN. In 1952 he married Mai Khanh, chief of the Women's Association of

Can Tho Province. And from 1952 to 1954, he assumed the position of Secretary and Commander of the Eastern Nam Bo Region. In 1954, after the Geneva Accords, Hung was given the rank of Colonel (Col.) and named to head the military mission to the International Control Commission (ICC) in Saigon. Actually, this last appointment appears to have been a cover to allow him to travel in the Saigon area so that he could direct clandestine operations against the Government of Vietnam (GVN). As of 1955, his true position appears to have been NVN Minister in charge of SVN affairs.

25. In 1956 he apparently returned to NVN where he served as a minister, ostensibly without portfolio. In 1957 he was elected to the Lao Dong Central Executive Committee and a year later promoted to Deputy Premier. In 1958, the NVN press identified him as Chairman of the Drought Prevention Commission and in July 1959 as Chairman of the National Reunification Board. During this period (1957-1960) he served on a number of top-level delegations to foreign countries. In 1960, he was appointed chairman of the Agricultural Bureau and elected to the Party Secretariat. In 1963, he transferred chairmanship to the Trade Bureau. In July 1964, he was reelected Deputy Premier after which little was heard of him until he assumed control of COSVN.

26. It has been said of Hung that while he assumes the correct or popular role in public, he actually is authoritarian and presumptuous. He also has been accused of possessing a surly facial expression and acting arrogantly. On the other hand, he has been described as an able administrator and an exceptional planner. His record would indicate that he is more of a political animal than his predecessor, Sen. Gen. Thanh. What is more, unlike Thanh, Hung apparently has placed a powerful military commander between himself and the SVNLA in the person of Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Hoang Van Thai. Where this leaves Muoi Cuc, the politician, is not clear although he continues to be first deputy and politically oriented. Cuc is said by one source to have supervisory responsibility for the Propaganda, Culture and Indoctrination Section.

C. Hai Van

27. The third member of the Secretariat, Hai Van (aka Nguyen Van Dang, Pham Xuan Thai, Hai Ram), has been identified as a COSVN deputy secretary since its inception. He was second deputy until Cuc moved down to second deputy and the third slot was vacated by Vo Toam (aka Vo Chi Cong, Nam Cong). Vo Chi Cong

reportedly specialized in proselyting activities and also acted as Party secretary of VC MR-5 until August 1966 when he is believed to have returned to Hanoi for medical treatment. Not much is known about Hai Van, despite the belief that he holds the overt position of chairman of the NFLSV's Liberation Federation of Trade Unions Association under the pseudonym of Pham Xuan Thai. About 52 years old, he apparently was born in Vinh Long Province. He apparently remained in SVN at the time of the 1954 regrouping. Party organization, security, and propaganda are said to be under his general supervision. He also has been reported to be a member of the Lao Dong Central Committee as well as an overt member of the NFLSV Presidium.

D. Others

28. Eight other names have been associated with the COSVN CAC. Three of them have at one time or another been considered to be in charge of the military side of the show. They are Major General (Maj. Gen.) Tran Phi (aka Hai Hau, Tran Luong, Tran Nam Trung /overt name/, Tan Phi), Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, and Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai. Tran Phi is known to others mostly by the names Hai Hau and Tran Luong. Since both he and Tran Van Tra have used the alias Tran Nam Trung (which apparently goes along with the position of head of Front Military Affairs Committee), and since their assignments often placed them simultaneously in the same geographical area, much of their earlier activities were attributed to a single individual.

29. Hai Hau. It now would appear that Hai Hau was born Tran Phi about 1910 in Quang Ngai Province. His revolutionary career began about 1930 at which time he was arrested and detained at Ban Me Thout, Lao Bao, and Lao Xa in Hanoi. In 1944, he was sent to the Ba To prison in Quang Ngai where he gained his freedom in the Ba Tu uprising of February 1945. In August 1945 he was deputy secretary of the Viet Minh Inter-Region V Committee. Sometime during 1950-1954 he received military training in Communist China. During the period 1946-1954, his primary responsibility was Party dealings with the Montagnards. In 1954 he reportedly regrouped to NVN. His wife and six children still live in Hanoi.

30. Hau returned to SVN by 1961 and reportedly was a member of the first NFLSV Central Committee (under the name of Tran Nam Trung and as the representative of the SVNLA) and also of the first COSVN CAC. From this period to 1967, Liberation

Radio and similar sources placed him in the positions of deputy chairman of the NFLSV Presidium and head of the NFLSV Military Affairs Committee. Returnee Lt. Col. [ ] believed Hai Hau had been both Commanding Officer (CO) and Political Officer (PO) of the SVNLA from 1961 to 1963, but was replaced by Nguyen Chi Thanh in 1964. At this point, Hau appears to have dropped out of the military picture, although he continued as a member of the CAC. Some sources claim that financial and economic affairs have since become his major area of interest. As Tran Nam Trung, Hai Hau meets with foreigners; his name is used by Liberation Radio; and his photograph is well circulated (one is on the dust cover of Douglas Pike's book on the VC). This might suggest that he may be more of a front man than a nuts-and-bolts military man. However, a rallier, [ ] has stated that Hau [ ] was supervisor of both the military proselyting section and the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section of COSVN.

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31. Tran Van Tra. Such is not the case of either Tra or Hoang Van Thai, who may be in competition for the title of first soldier of the SVNLA. Lt. Gen. Tra (aka Tu Chi, Nguyen Van Tra, Le Van Thanh, Tran Trung Lap, Tran Nam Trung) is believed to have been born around 1918 at Bung Tich, Quang Ngai Province. He attended an industrial school in Hue from 1936-1939, during which period he joined the Republican Youth Movement. Arrested by the French colonial authorities in 1939, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a period of residence under surveillance in Hue. In 1941, he left Hue and made his way to Saigon where he adopted the name Le Van Thanh. He was arrested again in 1944 but was freed by the 1945 revolution. As Tran Van Tra he began to take part in the activities of the Viet Minh. According to [ ] he and To Ky (current status not known, but once was PO of VC MR-3) organized the 14 "Chi Doi" (Viet Minh for Division), and he was the CO. They both reportedly disliked Le Duan. Nonetheless, he became a member of the Current Affairs Commission of the Viet Minh's Committee for SVN.

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32. By August 1946 Tra was commanding Viet Minh Region 8 (in 1946 Nam Bo consisted of Regions 7 to 9, and the Interregions were not established until March 1948). He possibly continued in this command until 1950, although he also had other assignments during this period and record of these is sometimes conflicting. He was reported to have replaced the head of Region 9 and to have taken over the Saigon-Cholon-Special Region. He relinquished the latter post in June 1950 to become

to become CO of Region 7. Tra was accused of forcing out the CO of Region 7 (and falsely, of murdering him - he later turned up alive). By mid-1951, Tra was deputy to the CO of Inter-Region VI (Nam Bo), Nguyen Binh. Binh was forced from his post in August 1951 for suspected Titoist tendencies, and in November was killed by French troops in a situation believed to have been set up by his colleagues. In the period 1948-1951, Tra seems to have successively headed the military commands of all the regions of Nam Bo. From the multiplicity of his assignments, and the fate of Nguyen Binh, and a report that he was not known as a strong military strategist, it has been speculated that Tra served as either a political troubleshooter or a 'hatchet man'.

33. Tra served for a short period as Binh's successor, but later in 1951 when Inter-Region VI was reorganized into two Sub-Inter-Regions (Eastern and Western Nam Bo), he assumed command of Eastern Nam Bo, remaining in that post until the mid-1954 cease fire. By February 1955, Tra was in Hanoi and in September radio Hanoi identified him as deputy chief of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) General Staff. In 1959 he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and in 1960 names as alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, and he possibly replaced Hoang Van Thai in 1960 as head of the Thai Meo Region headquarters at Dien Bien Phu (probably supporting Pathet Lao Operations).

34. Conflicting reports from 1960 to 1963 place Tra in NVN and SVN. Returnee [ ] reported that about the time Hai Hau relinquished his command of the SVNLA (1961-1963), his deputy also left the scene. The deputy was Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang (aka Bay Tien), currently Party Committee secretary of VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. Another returnee, [ ] stated Quang returned to NVN in June 1964 and that both he and Tra used the name Tran Nam Trung when signing documents. Such a change in command made a certain amount of sense. The increase in the NVA presence was being felt. Sen. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh took over command from both Muoi Cuc (former General Secretary) and Hai Hau (head of the Military Affairs Committee /MAC/). In addition, with the increase in Communist Main Force (MF) units, there was a corresponding increase in the number of deputy commanders of the SVNLA, Tra being the senior deputy. The others, according to [ ] were: Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam); Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Den Den, Tam Kien Quoc); Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam, Le Duc Anh); Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh); and the assistant PO, Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, Tran Quoc Vinh).

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35. Tra appears to have continued as undisputed senior deputy until Pham Hung's arrival about September 1967. According to [ ] Hung in effect replaced Tra by giving the command of the SVNLA to Thai. Strictly speaking, Tra was not demoted, however. Nguyen Chi Thanh had held this command himself and with his death it passed from Muoi Cuc to Hung who vested it in Thai. If this was, in fact, what happened (there are indications that Hung retained direct command), then Tra continues as senior deputy, but subordinate to Thai nonetheless. If not, then it is questionable which is the more senior. [ ] had heard that Tra, who was in direct command of the Tet and May-June Offensives against Saigon, had been criticized for their ineffectiveness. [ ] who was captured in [ ] believed Pham Hung and Muoi Cuc were the secretary and deputy secretary of the MAC, while Thai was CC of the SVNLA Headquarters (Hqs.) and Tra was senior deputy or Executive Officer of the Hqs.

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36. Hoang Van Thai. Thai (aka Muoi Khang, Hoang Van Khang, Ngo Quoc Binh, Hoang Xuan Thai) is believed to have been born about 1906 in Thai Binh Province, NVN, and orginally to have been a teacher by profession. Thai reportedly joined the Party in the 1930's and became a close friend and associate of Gen. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap with whom he shared a Chinese exile in 1939. Thai who is believed to have undergone training in the USSR at some time may have re-entered Vietnam in 1941 or 1943, since a NVN source stated he returned with Ho Chi Minh when World War II broke out.

37. In 1945 with the end of the war, Giap set out to build a "new model army" with Thai's help. In 1946 Thai was promoted to Chief of Staff, second only to Giap. In 1952, according to [ ] sources, Thai rather than Giap was directing military operations in NVN. However, by 11 October 1954 when Giap made his ceremonial entry into Hanoi, Col. Gen. (Three Stars) Van Tien Dung was publicly identified as the Chief of Staff and Thai as Dung's deputy. Dung apparently had covered himself with glory, particularly at Dien Bien Phu, and was also intensely loyal to Giap. First identified as Chief of the Military Training Department in May 1958, Thai was named a member of the newly established National Scientific Research Board the following December. He was named chairman of the Central Physical Culture and Sports Committee in May 1959 and promoted to Maj. Gen. the following September. While it has been reported that Thai acquired expensive tastes, he also is reported to be serious and correct in dealings with others. He also is supposed to be a proponent of guerrilla warfare in the spirit of Nguyen Chi Thanh.

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b1 [ ] noted that Thai's position previous to his appointment to COSVN was as head of VC MR-5 (essentially an [illegible] position) where he replaced Maj. Gen. Nguyen Don. When Thai assumed this command is not known definitely, although it appears to have been sometime between October 1966 and April 1967.
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38. Tran Do. A good deal less is known about the remaining identified members of the CAC: Tran Do, Ba Buong, Sau Dan, Hai Xe Ngua, and Tran Bach Dang. The most famous, due to the apparently premature notices of death during the Tet Offensive, is Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, and Tran Quoc Vinh). The name "Tran Quoc Vinh" has been used overtly in referring to Tran Do since he has been in SVN. GVN authorities discovered an enemy body which they thought matched Tran Do's description, but several sources since have sworn they saw Tran Do alive in COSVN after the discovery. From 1945-1950, his career was that of Chief of Staff, CO or PO of a succession of Viet Minh battalions, regiments, and one division, the 312th. In 1958 he was reported to be the head of the NVN Right Bank MR, and in 1960 he was elected as an alternate member to the Central Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party. In February 1965, he infiltrated into SVN, joined the CAC, and became the Deputy Political Officer (DPO) of the SVNLA, Sen. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh retaining the post of PO for himself. Tran Do probably is still the DPO. There is rare unanimity among such sources as [ ] and [ ] on Tran Do being the DPO.
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39. Kiet, Xe, Buong, and Dang. Le (or Nguyen) Van Kiet (aka Sau Van, Chin Dung, Phang Trong Dan, Sau Dan) was secretary of VC MR-4 prior to the late 1967 reorganization of the Saigon-Cholon area into SR's. There were reports he also commanded one of the military fronts during the Tet attack against Saigon. A finance and economy expert, Nguyen Van Xe (aka Hai Xe Ngua, So Le Van, Chu Tich Xe Ngua), reportedly returned to NVN for medical treatment in 1967. According to [ ] Hai Xe Ngua translates as "Two Horse-carts" and Chu Tich Xe Ngua comes out "Chairman of the Horse-carts," which indicates a possible sense of humor. Nguyen Van Buong (aka Ba Be and Ba Buong) reportedly was MR-3 Party secretary from 1965 to 1966, and now may be supervising both the Security and Organization Sections of COSVN. Buong reportedly was one of the prisoners who escaped from Con Son Island in the famed boat in 1945. The last member of the COSVN inner sanctum is Tran Bach Dang (aka Tu Meo, Tu Anh, Nam Quang). He presumably is still a CAC member. His last reported position is as secretary to the CAC of VC SR-6 (Saigon); however, this position is not incompatible with Dang also still being a member of the CAC of COSVN.
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V. THE "CIVILIAN" SECTIONS

40. There are numerous "civilian" functional sections. Each of these is a specialized office which fulfills a dual role. First, each section is responsible for advising the CAC and for developing Party policies within its own area of competence. Second, each section oversees the execution of specific policies by lower levels of the VC Infrastructure. The main functional sections are as follows:

A. Organization Section

41. The Organization Section is the office with primary responsibility for all affairs pertaining to civilian political cadres. It handles problems of Party recruitment and development, and the assignment of personnel at higher levels of the PRP. It has the additional responsibility of maintaining Party discipline. According to returnee [ ] CAC member Hai Van is chief of this section, and Le Tu Nhien his deputy. According to another returnee, [ ] at the COSVN Base), the chief and deputy since 1961 had been Hai Mai and Ba Thanh, and the PO is Ba Nhan. However, [ ] also has mentioned Ba Buong (aka Nguyen Van Buong and Ba Bo) as "supervisor" of the Organization Section. Ba Buong, a COSVN CAC member, also has been reported to be the "supervisor" of the COSVN Security Section and the Rear Services Section.* The chief and deputy chief, according to a 1966 collated study [ ], was Sen. Col. Hiep and Maj. Muoi Tai. The section appears to consist of six sub-sections: b1 b3 (S) b1 b3 (S) b3

a) The Correspondence Sub-section reportedly was headed by Nguyen Van Nhan, according to [ ] (an [ ]). This sub-section is responsible for all incoming and outgoing correspondence, including requests for NVN civilian political cadres. It also censors private correspondence handled by the VC postal system. b1 b3 (S)

*As mentioned earlier, some of the confusion concerning who actually heads a section stems from the ambiguity between the terms "chief" and "supervisor." The chief of a section almost always refers to the individual who is responsible on a day-to-day basis. The supervisor, especially as used by [ ] is a higher ranking cadre who has general responsibility over the section as well as other duties in the Communist hierarchy. b1 b3 (S)

b) The Personal Affairs Sub-section, headed by Nguyen Van An (According to [redacted]), is responsible for the food supply, pay and allowances and clothing for all personnel in the Organization Section. Members of this sub-section cultivated all of the food required by the Organization Section.

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c) The Planning and Policies Sub-section, according to [redacted] was directly under the control of the chief of the Organization Section. Its function was to draft policies concerning civilian political cadres (assignments, training, promotions, citations) and to study GVN policies concerning land development and pacification and determine counter measures to thwart these GVN policies.

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d) The Movement Sub-section, allegedly headed by Hai Thua, conducts investigations of cadre activities at the region and province levels to determine problem areas and to find solutions. According to [redacted] the major problem areas have been defined as allied sweep operations, defoliation, and loss of cadres.

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e) The Cadre Administration Sub-section, reportedly under Ba Nghi, is responsible for maintaining statistical records of cadre strength throughout SVN; assignment, training, and indoctrination of cadres; promotions, awards, and disciplinary actions. According to [redacted] this sub-section did not control the specific assignments given to cadres after they had been initially assigned either to a functional agency or to a region, nor were they responsible for assignment of military cadres. The sub-section also maintains personnel records on all SVN cadres who leave for NVN, and prepares requests for their return.

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f) The Party Construction Sub-section, headed by Hai Que, is responsible for the management of the PRP. It directs the execution of Party policies and monitors and evaluates the activities of Party chapters. It keeps records in the utilization of Party cadres, their attitudes and motivations. According to [redacted] as of October 1966, approximately 40 percent of all civilian political cadres in SVN were Party members. Total membership was estimated at 1,000,000 and some villages contained as many as five chapters with an average membership of 25 to 30.

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3. Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section

b1 b3 (S) 42. Lt. Col. [ ] thought that Hai Van ran this section, as well as the Organization Section. [ ] thought the section was under CAC member Tran Bach Dang (aka Nam Quang), which agrees with [ ] (both referring to time period of 1966). The chief of this section since 1961, according to [ ] is Hai Tau. [ ] also lists a "supervisor" in charge of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section. In this case, [ ] claims that CAC member Tran Luong is supervisor of the section, as well as being supervisor of the Military Proselyting Section. Although [ ] is not sure which individual holds what position, the assistant chief and IO are Tra Hau and To Lam. In October 1968, To Lam was reported as the editor of Tien Phong (Vanguard, the Party's theoretical journal). This section serves as the psychological warfare headquarters and is charged with monitoring the propaganda activities at subordinate levels while producing a great deal of propaganda on its own in the form of Party and Front publications. In addition, this section is responsible for ensuring that Party cadres are properly motivated, and also for supervising whatever school systems may exist in liberated areas. Included in this section's purview are the fields of the arts, press, radio, and cultural dissemination both in SVN and abroad. This section also controls such front groups as the Cultural Association, the Teachers' Association, and the Newsmen's Associations.

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43. An unusually large number of sub-sections have been identified, many with only a vague idea of what their functions are. For the sake of organizational simplicity, these sub-sections could be divided into four broad categories. The first would be those sub-sections which are concerned with the person-to-person approach to influencing people. The second would be those concerned with propagandizing through communications media, and on an international as well as a domestic level. The third category would be the Party's own setup for educating their higher level cadres in Party theory. And the last would be the usual support sub-sections common to any large endeavour. The specific sub-sections then would be:

a) The Propaganda or People/Culture Sub-section (B.7). B.7, the chief sub-section in the person-to-person category reportedly plans propaganda campaigns around cultural improvement programs. It specializes in indirect, subtle forms of propaganda. In 1966, its chief was Tu Om, and its deputy was Chu Tam Map (these and most other names

associated with the sub-sections are taken from

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b) The Education Sub-section (B.18). B.18 is also involved on the person-to-person level and provides administrative and technical support for the VC school system. The support includes obtaining textbooks, teachers, and school rooms. The goal, not always realized, is to set up a school system in all VC-controlled areas. The main emphasis is on school children, but adult literacy is not ignored. Teachers are urged to make classroom problems revelent to the Revolution. For example, math problems might entail dividing the number of punji stakes produced by the number of Liberation Youth Association members making the stakes. In 1968, the chief and deputy of B.18 were Nam Dieu and Huynh Dan (or Dau) Thang (aka Nam Gia). Other members were Liet, Thanh, Hieu, Miss Lam, Miss Cui, Miss Hue, Miss Hang, and Miss Dung.

c) The Entertainment Sub-section (B.5) definitely is involved in person-to-person propagandizing. It reportedly plans the content of, produces, and presents entertainment to both military units and civilians. In 1968 the chief was Bui Kinh Lang. Other members were Tuan Khanh (chief musician), Pham Anh Tuan (musician), Hong Anh and Linh Thu (actresses), and Luong, Bac, Diep, and Dung (all actors). Phan Lac Tuyen, Giang Nam, Lan, Lo, and Anh (a NVN comedy actress). There also were reports of a Montagnard Entertainment Sub-section (B.23). There also may be a Motion Picture Sub-section that travels from place to place with the entertainers, forming a mobile psywar component. Finally there are reports of Painting Subsection (B.20) under Huynh Phuong Dan. Other members mentioned were Tan Song Chau and Trang Phong.

d) The Liberation Radio Broadcast Station (B.6): the clandestine station serving as the voice of the Front is the most well-known sub-section concerned with the mass media. In 1968 its chief and deputy were unknown, but the following members were identified: Phuoc Rau (announcer and reportedly the son of Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman), Hanh (assistant announcer), Chin Nam (editorial announcer), Tuyet Anh (Chinese announcer), Ba Tai, Muoi, and Tan Tong. The powerhouse for the station was itself a sub-section (B.16). Its chief and deputy were Ba Nhi and Tam Tong. Two other members were Hoa and Dung.

e) The Liberation Press Agency (B.6) disseminates information with emphasis on VC victories, for national and international consumption, as well as for use at the Paris peace talks. In 1966, the chief of B.6 was Thanh Nho. Other members were: Tam Rau (in charge of editorials), Ba Do (in charge of information), Truc and Mien Gna (typists), Miss Suong (mimeographer), Cong (editor), Tam Chi (steno), and Nghia (printer).

f) The Foreign Relations Sub-section (B.19) is responsible for propaganda designed to influence foreign opinion.* It handles virtually all of the international propaganda in the name of the NFLSV. It also may be responsible for the content of The Fighting South which is published in English and French. In 1966 the chief was Chin An. He had three deputies: Truc Tung, Le Van Thu, and Ba Binh. Ba Thu was the English teacher. Another member, Chau, has been reported to be a son of the NFLSV chairman, Nguyen Huu Tho. Other members mentioned were Tan, Hai, Sau, Thuong, and Me.

g) The Newspaper Sub-section, according to the SRA Newsletter 11, is responsible for gathering news items pertaining to local, national, and international Communist affairs and editing them as required to conform to VC policies. The sub-section publishes bulletins and small newspapers for public consumption. This may be the element that is responsible for the following three Vietnamese language newspapers Tien Phong (Vanguard, the Party's theoretical journal), Co Giai Phong (Liberation Flag), and Van Nghe Giai Phong (Liberation Arts and Culture). This also may be the sub-section referred to elsewhere as the Publications Office (B.22). If it is, then the chief in 1966 was believed to be Sau Hoi (or Hai Thai). Other members were Dong, Nhao, Khoi, Nguyet, and Duong.

h) The Editorial Office (B.21) and The Giai Phong Film Workshop (B.15) may be closely related to publications, although little is known about them. In 1966 the chief of

*This sub-section should not be confused with Foreign Relations Committee of the NFLSV which is an overt body. The NFLSV Committee is headed by Tran Buu Kiem, currently co-head of the NFLSV delegation at the Paris peace talks, presumably the Front body supervises the NFLSV's overseas representatives.

B.21 was Thanh Nho. Other members were Ngoc Anh, Nat Van, and Muoi Quan. The chief and deputy of B.15 were Hien Lien and Xong Pha. Other members included two cameramen, Hong Son and Pham Khac; and Bu (aka Tran Thanh), a photographer.

i) The Indoctrination and Training Sub-section probably is responsible for training Party cadres in the arts of propaganda and Communist theory, although this is not confirmed. What is fairly certain is that the Propaganda Section is responsible for two training schools. Little is known about one - the Trang Mua School (B.24). The other is quite well-known and goes by Ho Chi Minh's real name - the Nguyen Ai Quoc Political Theorizing School (located in September 1963 at XT 500 680). According to [redacted] the director was Nam Sieu, the deputy was Thanh Nam, and the secretary was Tu Xuat. It is, of course, possible that this school is involved in producing the Party's theoretical journal, Tien Phong (Vanguard). According to [redacted] to attend the Nguyen Ai Quoc School, the trainee must be equal to a member of a Provincial Party Committee or at least a Regimental Commander. The courses lasted 18 months.

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j) The Administrative Sub-section (B.4) probably is first among the support elements. This element probably keeps the records of the personnel, procures and issues supplies, and provides other similar services. The chief and deputy, as of 1966, were Doan Chi Cao (aka Nam Phi, Tu Nam) and Nam Canh. Also assigned to this sub-section were: Tu Xuat (clerk), Hai and Dat (finance), Misses Xuan and Mai (treasurers), Miss Lan (typist), Tam Thi (radio), Du, Hoang, and Hue (liaison), Sau Nho (Party Chapter secretary), and two others, Sau Chau and Hai Thin.

k) The Tran Phu Printing House (B.8) probably handles most of the job orders for leaflets, bulletins, journals and books. In 1966 its chief and deputy were Nam Nam and Nguyen Khac Tu, respectively. There were two zincographers, Ngan and Huy; two bookbinders, Miss Truc Chi and Viet; and a stenographer, Loi. Also assigned to B.8 were Dung, Phuong Nam, and Tu Rau. This sub-section probably includes a printshop element and a photo-offset printing element.

l) The Medical Sub-section (B.13) was directed by Sau Tung and his deputy, Duong Nhon Quy. Its staff in-

cluded three medics; Son, Hung, and Bang, and one other member, Chin Hue. The Radio Communications Sub-section (B.10) was directed by Sau Nghia and his deputy, Chin Chieu. Other members of B.10 were Thieu, De, Phia, Hoang, Huong, Van, Loi, Tho, and Ba Do, an editor. The Production Sub-section (B.11) was led by Tu Lap and his deputy, Bay Ha. Members of B.11 were Buoi, Can, Tong, Be, Sum, and Cu. The Defense or Security Platoon (B.12 or B.14) was under Nam Dua and his deputy, Muoi Quan.

m) A Rear Services Sub-section (B.9) with at least six sub-divisions of its own has been identified in addition to the above support units. As of 1966 the chief and two deputies of B.9 were Muoi Nga, Bay Cong, and Hai No. The Administrative Branch included Muoi Nga again, as well as Bay Cu; another deputy was Tri; two members were Cuc and Miss Sau Chau. There were land and river supply transportation teams. The members of the waterway team were: Sau Sang Hung (chief), Phung (deputy), Tong, Thanh, and Thu. The land team included: Hai Truong (chief), Hai Chau (aka Hai Den) (deputy), Mui (or Mai), Chat, and Be (aka Thanh). There was an Equipment Team consisting of Tinh (chief), Quan (deputy), Miss Nga, Miss Phung, and Viet. The head and deputy of the Rice Mill were Huynh Van Lanh (aka Nam Den) and Buoi. Also assigned to the mill: Ngoc, Minh, Dan, Son, Hai, and Tan. The final element of B.9 was the Warehouse Team of which only one member's name is known, Nam Thang.

C. Finance and Economy Section

44. The Finance and Economy Section is responsible for the overall finances and budgeting of COSVN, and for the guidance and supervision of financial activities of the lower echelons. In 1966, according to [redacted] the section consisted of from 20 to 30 members. Among the section's duties, according to [redacted] was the preparation of the annual budget, including prediction of income and support of those areas expected to operate at a deficit. The section also establishes tax quotas for each MR, and details to subordinate echelons those tax collection procedures that have had the most success and those that have failed. It also prescribes the accounting procedures that will be used at all echelons within the Party structure down through District level, and establishes rules and regulations governing expenditures of funds. [redacted] thought that every

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expenditure of each organization of the Front had to be reported to the section. In addition, each organization (functional and regional only) had to submit a budget request to the section every six months. [ ] section (Organization) usually received only 70 to 80 percent of its requested budget. He believed the ones that always received 100 percent were the Military, Military Proselyting, Civil Health, and Foreign Affairs (as of 1966). b1 b3 (S)

45. In order to perform these tasks, the Finance and Economy Section is reportedly dependent on experienced and extremely well-trained, competent cadres. Lt. Col. [ ] believed the chief of the section was CAC member Hai Xe Ngua (or "Two Horse-carts"). [ ] thought Hai Xe Ngua was the section's "supervisor", as well as being "supervisor" of Rear Services. But [ ] felt that the "chief" had been Chin Phuoc since 1966 and that his assistant was Sau Lau who also was PO. [ ] listed Maj. Tu Tranh as chief, and Senior Captain (Sen. Capt.) Muoi Thiem as deputy, and Tu Tan Long as head of budgeting and financial affairs. b1 b3 (S) b3

46. There are at least eight or nine identified sub-sections. [ ] and the SRA Newsletter II agree on seven; while the former lists a Medical Sub-section as eighth where the latter lists a School Sub-section as the eighth. The major sub-sections are: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administrative Sub-section which presumably handles managerial, secretarial, and minor supply problems. Most COSVN sections have such a sub-section.

b) The Finance and Statistics Sub-section probably is the accounting office and may, therefore, play the most important part in the budgeting process. It also probably is safe to assume that this sub-section plays a key role in levying requirements and checking on subordinate elements both within COSVN and at the regional level.

c) The Currency Sub-section is responsible for foreign currency transactions, including acquisition and distribution. Judging from a number of captured messages referring to U.S. dollars, as well as the actual capturing of American dollars in VC caches, this sub-section must be heavily involved in black market activities, especially in the Saigon area. The VC, however, have their problems in getting near the going rate of piastres for dollars. Several documents

have complained of "gouging" tactics being used against the VC.

d) The Trade or Commerce Sub-section generally is responsible for overseeing commercial activities in its geographic area. It selects sites for tax collection points and regulates the flow of goods through VC-controlled areas. At lower echelons, this sub-section has been known to manage trading agencies which act more or less as middle-men in selected trade activities.

b1 b3 (S) e) The Transportation Sub-section is claimed by both [redacted] and SRA Newsletter II to be responsible for the movement of goods. It supposedly plans the routes, and schedules the time for moves. According to the Newsletter, porters who are used to move the goods usually are supplied by other agencies, especially the Forward Supply Council and the Liberation Youth Association. Actually, this sub-section's existence is somewhat in doubt, at least with the functions enumerated. Current indications are that the movement of goods is the function of Rear Services (for the long haul) and the Forward Supply Council (to meet more immediate needs).

f) The Production Sub-section, a common element in most VC agencies, is to produce food and materials for the immediate use of the section.

b1 b3 (S) g) The Finance and Economy School Sub-section and the Medical Sub-section. The former is listed in SRA Newsletter II, while [redacted] cites the latter. Actually, both would quite logically be found at the COSVN level especially since: (1) the distances between COSVN Sections would indicate the need for a small medical facility, and (2) the special skills required for Finance and Economy cadres would make the presence of a special school almost inevitable, as other less-specialized sections generally have been found to have schools.

D. Forward Supply Council

47. The Forward Supply Council is a special organization maintained until recently at all levels within the Infrastructure. It was designed to aid frontline troops during the Liberation Army campaigns. The COSVN Council is said to be composed of the chief of the Finance and Economy Section, a deputy who is also

chief of the Rear Services Staff of the SVNLA, and cadres from Region-level Rear Services. It could issue directives to both the civil and military sides of the VC structure. According to one study, [ ] under the original arrangement, the Finance and Economy Section was to collect taxes and draft financial plans. The Rear Services was responsible for the procurement, storage, and issue of food and supplies. The Forward Supply Council was responsible for providing civilian labor to military units and for transporting supplies to the frontline military units that could not re-supply themselves from the Rear Services. b3

48. The Forward Supply Councils encountered problems, principally the overlapping functions between it and Rear Services. In late 1967, COSVN issued a directive ordering that the councils be deactivated and its components merged into other organizations as follows: mobilization of material resources to Finance and Economy; civilian labor procurement to the district units; and administration of the Assault Youth units to the Rear Services and Assault Youth command. The decision to deactivate the council below region level was left to the individual provinces, and some continued to operate. The strain created by the Tet Offensive on supply sources caused COSVN to reactivate the councils at all levels around mid-1968.

49. The organization of the Forward Supply Council at the COSVN level is not known, though it may be similar to that found at lower levels. According to [ ] Spot Report [ ] 6 January 1969, at the lower levels each council is supposed to have two elements: the council itself composed of a chairman plus deputies and members; and a Standing Committee with three to five cadres. The council is responsible for mobilizing the manpower and material resources while the Standing Committee is to carry out specific functions based on the general duties of the council. Sub-sections of the council include: (a) civilian labor and Assault Youth; (b) provision procurement and storage; (c) civil health; and (d) organization and planning. b1 b3 (S)

E. Security Section

50. The COSVN Security Section, although subordinate to the COSVN hierarchy, ultimately is responsible to the NVN Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, which supplies the section with many of its members, especially in leadership positions. According to [ ] July 1967, the majority of the section's own cadres are trained in NVN, and their selection is controlled b1 b3 (S)

by the Ministry in Hanoi. In addition, from province upward Security reports directly to Hanoi as well as to the Party Committee at their echelon, and the Security Section at the next higher echelon. In recent years, the COSVN Security Section has grown considerably; an interrogee stated it had 150 members in late 1962, of whom 70 were office personnel. By 1964, it had increased to 250, and in 1965 it reached 481, with a planned strength of 602.

51. The Security Section is responsible for Party internal security and counter-intelligence, physical security of the COSVN area and for visitors to COSVN, for maintaining public order through criminal prosecution, and for clandestine reconnaissance and intelligence missions. The section also maintains a school for personnel training, and a detention camp. Its functions resemble those of the Soviet KGB and the Ministry of Public Security of Communist China. Security case officers from the COSVN level downward are tasked with penetrating Allied security and intelligence organizations and SVN political parties and religious sects. Armed reconnaissance groups assassinate or kidnap GVN officials, especially police and intelligence personnel. Security personnel also are responsible for compiling black lists of GVN officials marked for execution in the event of a VC victory. This section's cover number was C.298, but recently may have been changed to M.40 (which also may refer to COSVN in general).

52. According to Lt. Col. [ ] the chief and deputy chief of the Security Section were Hai Van and Sau Hoang (aka Cao Dang Chiem, Cao Dong Chiem).* [ ] has reported a "Colonel Thai" as chief of this section; this almost certainly is Pham Xuan Thai, one of the aka's for Hai Van. [ ], an intellectual [ ] also stated that Hai Van and Sau Hoang headed the section. A [ ] who served in the B.3 sub-section of the COSVN Security Section from [ ] to [ ] also listed Hai Van and Sau Hoang as chief and deputy chief. The 1966 collation [ ] listed Sau Hoang as chief and Le Van Son (aka Muoi Cong) and Ba Chung as deputies. Finally, according to [ ], the section's

b1 b3 (S)

b1 b3 (S)

b1 b3 (S)

*As noted in the footnote to paragraph 19, this "Cao Dang Chiem" should not be confused with Pham Hung, head of COSVN, who also uses the same aka.

supervisor was Ba Buong: Buong is a COSVN CAC member and also has been reported by [S] to be supervisor of the Organization Section. b1 b3 (S)

53. [ ] listed several other members of the COSVN Security Section, most of whom appear in the discussion of the sub-sections. Some, however, he failed to associate with any sub-section. The principal member of this group is Hai An (aka Hoang), a member of the Security Committee, a former Lt. Col., and CO of the Secret Police in NVN. Another Committee member he mentioned is Tu Trong (aka Tai). [ ] also listed a Tam Nam as head of the Secret Police Service of the COSVN Security Section. The following were listed simply as cadres: Quoc Vu Khanh, Lam (aka Hong Ha), Bui Khung, and Hoa (aka Quoc Hung). b1 b3 (S)

54. According to [ ] the COSVN Security Section was believed to have ten major sub-sections (code named B.1 through B.10). The ten sub-sections are: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administrative Sub-section (B.1). B.1 is divided into twelve elements. Five of these elements have been identified as correspondence, management, food supply, operations, and finance. The sub-section's strength dropped from 96 to 63 between 1965 and 1966.

b) The Internal Security or Political Protection Sub-section (B.2). According to [ ] B.2 is divided into three major parts: an office staff (with 32 men), an armed reconnaissance component (consisting of units 15, 17, 19, and 21, totally 46 men), and a component entitled "Permanent Section (" (with 87 men). In early 1966, its total complement was 165, almost double the number it had a year earlier. According to SRA Newsletter II, this sub-section performs counter-intelligence (CI) functions and has two subordinate elements. The first is the Reconnaissance Element which is responsible for countering Allied sweeps into VC areas, primarily by developing and disseminating intelligence on the raiding forces so other VC units can counter the sweep. The other is a Judicial Element (People's Courts), which administers courts in VC areas. The chief of B.2, according to [ ], is Sau Anh. b1 b3 (S)

c) The "Research" Sub-section (B.3). According to [ ] B.3's staff grew from 4 to 17 men between b1 b3 (S)

1965 and 1966. It maintains extensive files on counter-revolutionaries, including foreign newsmen - Chinese, Cambodian, French, Japanese, and English. More current intelligence indicates that this section, while still often called Research, is actually the Espionage and Intelligence Section, and it is also supposed to be involved in black propaganda, especially misleading documents. Since COSVN Security Section case officers operate in both Cambodia and SVN, there may be a foreign and domestic breakdown. There also probably is a city breakdown, especially since much of the espionage component's activities appear to be centered around Saigon.

Before being sent to Bien Hoa, [ ] was [ ] associated with B.3. from [ ] and is still undergoing (he was [ ] interrogation). [ ] maintained that B.3's chief was Tam Toan. [ ] assignment was to study the activities of [ ] by [ ] their [ ] He said other cadres assigned to B.3 were Hai (aka Anh Son) in charge of studying the enemy situation; Viet Hong (similar duties); Kinh Chau (in charge of code numbering); Kiem Lap (similar duties). [ ] assignment in Bien Hoa appears to have been [ ]

b1 b3 (S)

d) The Guard Sub-section (B.4). B.4 appears to have numbered about 30 men whose duties included the protection of foreign visitors. This unit also has been referred to as a Public Order unit. According to [ ], the chief of B.4 is Nam Tra and one of the cadres is named Le Chat.

b1 b3 (S)

e) The Production Sub-section (B.5). B.5 is the production component common to most VC agencies. Charged largely with growing rice and raising cattle, this sub-section is omitted from distribution of Security Section circulars and from the pay rosters.

f) The Internal Security and Intelligence School (B.6). In early 1965, B.6's staff was top heavy with a strength of 87. Like other components, it came under intense pressure to reduce its administrative personnel in 1965. By 1966, only 24 staff members remained. This

school does not have regular semesters. Classes start at irregular intervals with as many as four going on at the same time. [redacted] mentioned two Security Section instructors who probably were assigned to this school; Toan Thang and Sau Hoc (aka Doc). He also named the chief of B.6, Hai Binh, but did not refer to him as associated with instructing. b1 b3 (S)

g) The "Organic Mobile Unit" (B.7). Sub-section B.7 may be the "organic mobile unit" occasionally appearing in documents. In 1965, its strength was 102 with a planned complement of 204. This unit also has been referred to as the Border Defense Public Security Unit and presumably would be responsible for border surveillance at COSVN. [redacted] mentioned several cadres of Region C (meaning Cambodia), which may be a possible additional sub-section, but also may refer to B.7 (or less likely, B.3). The chief is Tu Thang who, according to [redacted] also is a Security Committee member. Two cadres [redacted] listed are Muoi Thanh and Ba Kha. While [redacted] called him "Officer Chief of Security," Chin Nghia is probably also connected with the Region C group. b1 b3 (S)

h) Commo-Liaison Sub-section (B.8). B.8 had a staff of 35 in 1966. In 1965, the sub-section reportedly made 164 routine trips, performed 83 unexpected escorts of visitors, transmitted direct and express correspondence, and guided recruits. Permanent commo-liaison corridors appear to have been set up with MR-1 through 4 and with districts and provinces in the area of War Zone C. A document of early 1966 suggests the COSVN-Saigon corridor is one of the most heavily traveled.

i) The Logistical Sub-section (B.9) maintains an armory and food depots, and has a distribution unit equipped with pack bicycles. The sub-section's last known strength was 39 people. The armory's stock of weapons includes silencer pistols and explosives. Besides the COSVN Section, its customers include the regions, and Tay Ninh and Binh Long Province Security Sections. The chief of B.9, according to [redacted] is Chin Cat. b1 b3 (S)

j) The Interrogation and Detention Sub-section (B.10). B.10's last known strength (April 1966) was 35 men with plans to add 15 more. The sub-section is organized to include a leadership committee, an interrogation and indoc-

trination element, a jail administration component, and a guard unit. Reportedly, the number of detainees rarely exceeds 20. They are of two types: VC personnel from COSVN agencies suspected of harboring anti-revolutionary sentiments, and various military and civilian Allied officials, including important Vietnamese.

55. Available information is unclear regarding the organizational subordination of some elements of the COSVN Security Section. A signal component almost certainly is present, because of the large amount of radio equipment mentioned in Security Section documents. Some of the radio operators seem to have been trained in NVN. It also seems likely that the Security Section has its own cryptographers, because lower echelons have been identified as having them. [ ] mentioned the names of several radio operators: The Minh (in charge of radio communications), Sau Hai (chief of the Secret Code Cell), Ten Leo, Ten Thuy, Ten Trieu, and Bay Thanh (all cadres of the Secret Code Cell). A "Guerrilla Unit," code-named "Village 5," also has been mentioned as part of the Security Section. Apparently the unit is not a permanent formation, but seems to take shape only when Allied sweep operations threaten War Zone C. A report of May 1966 listed its armament as four machine guns, 14 submachine guns, and 114 rifles.

b1 b3 (S)

F. Military Proselyting Section

56. The Military Proselyting Section draws up and disseminates instructions concerning the proselyting of enemy soldiers and civil servants. Its goal is to motivate these personnel to desert to the VC, or remain at their posts as fifth columnists or undercover agents. [ ] noted that this section is a civil agency of COSVN, although up through 1964 it had been one of the four sub-sections of the SVNLA Headquarters. There still is a small military proselyting section (most often referred to as the Enemy Proselyting Section or Branch) under the Political Staff of the SVNLA Headquarters.

b1 b3 (S)

57. Supervision of enemy proselyting activities by lower echelons appears to be the section's principal function. In performing its task, the section prepares propaganda materials to be used by lower echelons, forwards instructions on policy and techniques, and maintains special advisory teams at lower echelons. Whether the COSVN Section conducts penetration operations or whether all such activities are transferred to

Military Intelligence or Security is not clear. At lower echelons, it is known that military proselyting often has provided undercover agents for Military Intelligence and possibly Security, and that they run innumerable low level penetrations themselves. However, at this level the sections seem more oriented toward recruiting fifth columnists to be used to sabotage equipment or help overthrow isolated outposts at the crucial moment when they come under VC attack. Such fifth columnists can be transferred to more sensitive posts in the GVN and thereby become a distinct intelligence asset.

58. Military proselyting elements also are responsible for running prisoner of war (POW) facilities, as distinct from Security Section detention and reform camps which are oriented toward incarceration of criminals, spies, "wicked elements," and counter-revolutionaries. In these camps, the Military Proselyting Sections are responsible not only for maintenance, but for interrogation and thought reform, and determining what prisoners should be released, retained, or punished. Some evidence suggests the COSVN Section may operate camps for high level SVN and foreign prisoners.

59. Lt. Col. [ ] [ ] and [ ] are in rare agreement on the name of the chief of this section - Tran Van Du (aka Bay Du), a CAC member. Bay Du is believed to have been born around 1927 and to have come from Ben Tre Province where his wife (Le Thi Tuyet) was a village level cadre. His name has been associated with the Military Proselyting Section since COSVN was organized. There are reports that he may have been replaced by Nguyen Van Thoi (aka Nam Thoi) to free him for service on the SR-1 Committee. There also was equal agreement over the name of the former deputy. [ ] listed Ba Cung (aka Ba Xe) as of 1968. [ ] listed Tran Van Thanh (aka Ba Cung), but said he had been relieved by a person unkown to [ ] [ ] did not know who the deputy was, but did state that the overall supervisor was CAC member Maj. Gen. Hai Hau and/or Tran Luong.

b1 b3 (S) b3 b1 b3 (S)

60. According to SRA Newsletter II and [ ] there were seven sub-sections in the Military Proselyting Section, and apparently an eighth has been added recently: b3

a) The Administrative Sub-section provides both administrative and logistical support. The sub-section consists of eight elements; Secretarial, Finance, Liaison, Transportation, Mess, Cadre Protection, Medical and Security.

In 1966, according to [redacted] the chief was Lt. Nam (or Lam) Quang. There were two deputies, Ha The and Hoang Vinh Sung. Lt. The was in charge of the secretariat. Hong was responsible for records. Hai was in charge of transportation and security, and Bay Co was his assistant. Cu Can Ky was responsible for production. b3

b) The Training Sub-section, headed by Capt. Ba Thung, provided training aids and other instructional services for the section. It consisted of two elements: School and Documents.

c) The Propaganda Sub-section consisted of five elements: Photo, Press, Information, Leaflet, and Book. According to [redacted] the chief was Maj. Muoi Tai (aka Tu Kien) and the deputy was Khiet. Tho was responsible for leaflets and Trong for newspapers. According to [redacted] the chief of the Propaganda Sub-section is Tu Hao. Tu Hao reportedly studied English as a student in Hanoi during the French Resistance period. Apparently around the beginning of 1966 a new "combined proselyting plan" was initiated which placed greater emphasis on proselytizing U.S. troops, especially Negroes. Tu Hao was charged with preparing the line to be used in leaflets directed against U.S. troops as part of this plan. b1,b3(S) b3

d) The Fifth Column or Penetrations Sub-section supervises the recruiting of in-place agents and sympathizers within the ranks of the GVN and ARVN. It is believed that there are three subordinate elements: Urban, Rural, and Enemy Installations. In 1966, the chief and deputy were Sau Vu and Tu Viet. In addition, there may be more specialized elements operating either under this sub-section or, more likely, in close coordination with it. One of these is the Military Officers' Proselyting Sub-section, and another is the Capital Military Proselyting Section (both of these are discussed below).

e) The POW Sub-section has been known to include such functional elements as camp security guards, camp administration, an interrogation and indoctrination element, and a production element. This sub-section is responsible for determining which POW's should be released,

retrieved, or punished. The total POW population is usually spread over several smaller camps. In the case of high level or foreign POW's, the number of POW's is restricted to a low of ten or less. And it would be safe to assume that only the most important prisoners are the concern of COSVN. In 1966, its chief and deputy were Capt. Chuong and Tu Quy.

f) The Organization Sub-section is responsible for maintaining the personnel records of Party members serving in the section. It constitutes the Party's version of the Administration Sub-section. In 1966, its chief was Capt. Ba Hung.

g) The Research or Management Sub-section is supposed to analyze performance and plan operations for the section. The three elements of this sub-section are: Reports and Analysis, Enemy Installations, and Directive Writing. In 1966, its chief was Bay Kiem.

h) The Military Officer Proselyting Sub-section. This sub-section was established in late 1965 and was tasked with recruiting selected GVN military personnel. Bay Nghia, a senior PRP cadre, was detailed from VC MR-2 to head the sub-section. He was supposed to report directly to Tran Van Du (aka Bay Du), Chief of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section. About four months after the sub-section's formation, another cadre, Ba Ke, was assigned to assist Bay Nghia. According to [ ] who was a [ ] of the [ ] until early [ ] the sub-section was ineffective, primarily because experienced cadres were not available to conduct high level proselyting operations. By late 1967, the situation had deteriorated to the point that Bay Nghia issued orders that the sub-section was to concentrate on general propaganda activities, if it could not implement an effective officer proselyting program. b1 b3 (S)

i) The Capital Military Proselyting Sub-section (CMPS). The CMPS is a new sub-section of COSVN's Military Proselyting Section. The creation and operation of the CMPS offers considerable insight into the modus operandi and vulnerabilities of COSVN forward elements operating in the Saigon area (most particularly those operating out of Military Proselyting, Security, and Military Intelligence). Information on the CMPS was provided by [ ] b1 b3 (S)

[ ] had been [ ] at the time of his capture [ ] was [ ] for Ben Tre Province when in November 1967, Bay Du contacted him regarding recruiting cadres for operation in Saigon. [ ] said Bay Du at the time was deputy chief of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section. It was not until a meeting held in Long An Province in March 1968, that [ ] learned the cadres he had recruited (all from Ben Tre) were to be part of the new CMPS.

b1 b3 (S)

61. A review of the formation and operation of the CMPS affords considerable insight to the mechanics of COSVN's modus operandi; and its ad hoc nature. At the time of the March 1968 meeting, the May Offensive was imminent so the organization of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) was paramount. It is interesting to see how COSVN went about setting up these APT's. Bay Du gave [ ] a letter of introduction to take to the deputy chief (Tu Quy) of SR-3's Military Proselyting Section at Long Phung Village, Can Giuoc District, Long An Province. It was Tu Quy who arranged for equipping APT and coordinating its activities with SR-3's military forces. [ ] was dispatched to Saigon ahead of time, but the APT failed to link up with him.

b1 b3 (S)

62. During early August 1968, [ ] and the seven remaining members of the APT were escorted to the Ba Thu Base in Cambodia [ ] lost control of the APT at this time because the members were dispersed to other elements of the COSVN Section. Bay Du did not attend the reorganizational meeting because he was no longer the chief of the CMPS. As reorganized, the CMPS consisted of six key cadres:

b1 b3 (S)

Chief: Tu Kien (aka L10, a member of the COSVN Section)
Deputy: Ut Hao (aka N30)
Deputy: Hai Be
Member: Sau Cong
Member: Nam Hau
Member: Tu Minh

63. Ut Hao, Sau Cong, and Tu Minh were assigned particular GVN and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) installations which were highly desirable targets for penetration. Ut Hao was assigned the ARVN Joing General Staff (JGS) and Capital Military District (CMD) Compounds. Besides the personnel of these compounds, he was also to recruit civilians who lived in the areas

surrounding the compounds. All of these personnel were to be utilized to recruit additional sympathizers, to provide information concerning the installations and, if opportune, to smuggle in explosives for sabotage purposes. In addition, the civilians could be organized into propaganda teams to spread leaflets in the areas around the compounds. Sau Cong was assigned Independence Palace, the National Police Directorate and the Saigon Radio Station. Tu Minh's targets were not known. Nam Hau and Hai Be continued to perform their previous assignments, the former as Tu Kien's assistant, and the latter as leafleteer. Each member was to make periodic progress reports to Tu Kien who, in turn, was directly responsible to Bay Du at COSVN. With the exception of those personnel operating under each of the cadres, this comprised the CMPS's entire organizational system.

64. Ut Hao set up his base of operations at Tu Kien's base in My Thanh Village, Cay Lai District, My Tho Province. From this location, Ut Hao communicated with his personnel in Saigon by commo-liaison runner and also personally. His organization consisted of five cadres, eight sympathizers, and seven commo-liaison runners. Two of the cadres had not begun operations; Tu Tien and Hai Tot. The other three had; Sau Trung (aka Tuan), Tu Phuoc, and Tam Duc.

65. Sau Trung concentrated on the JGS Compound and had successfully recruited three ARVN soldiers, known to [redacted] as 1002, 1003, and 1004; one of whom worked in the JGS. Tu Phuoc concentrated on the CMD Compound. He recruited three sympathizers: Loc, Thinh, and an ARVN Lt. Thanh. The latter worked in the CMD Compound. [redacted] accidently discovered a letter written by Thinh to an ARVN Major requesting a different "intelligence assignment," so [redacted] ordered Phuoc to break contact with Thinh and Loc. Tam Duc also had recruited three sympathizers: Khiet or Thiet, a National Policeman named Be, and Hai Sang. None of these personnel were effectively exploited by Duc. b1 b3 (S)

66. [redacted] communicated with Sau Trung through a letter drop at the home of Hai Truong, a sympathizer whom he had known from the Ben Tre days. This was where he met with Tu Kien, the deputy chief of the CMPS. To establish contact with all of these agents, [redacted] utilized the commo-liaison runners originally recruited in Ben Tre, including Tu Moi, Muoi Chanh, Ba Ut, Thu (aka Hong), Huynh Le, Tu Tien, and Bai Hoa. One additional runner, Ba Ro, was recruited by Tu Phuoc. There was no system employed in the use of the runners; they were used as needed. b1 b3 (S)

To avoid being conspicuous, [ ] did not send these couriers to the base very often. Two more cadres were assigned to [ ] by Tu Kien in late January 1969. He was enroute to Hoc Mong District to make the initial contact with them when he was apprehended at a control station for possession of a false ID card. b1 b3 (S)

67. [ ] made some interesting admissions to the authorities. As a result of the August 1968 meetings at Ha Thu, Cambodia, he clearly recognized that the use of APT's during the May Offensive had been a failure. He also recognized that the General Uprising in the cities could come only as a result of vigorous and continuous proselyting. However, his morale was quite low as he had experienced many difficulties. Chief among these was the antipathy towards the VC shown by the people of Saigon. It simply was not possible to recruit them readily. Most of his associates were people he had recruited or known in Ben Tre. The population control exercised by the GVN through checkpoints and public security forces was particularly difficult to outmaneuver. The checkpoints proved to be a constant limiting factor on his mobility. He had lived in constant fear of being apprehended and was convinced that he eventually would be captured while traveling. False identification cards (ID cards) were expensive and difficult to procure. (This is corroborated by a [ ] who also experienced a great deal of difficulty procuring ID cards, despite the fact that COSVN is supposed to be able to forge them.) b1 b3 (S)

68. Because [ ] and most of [ ] personnel were from the countryside, they had difficulties adjusting to the city and finding their way around. They feared they would be recognized as strangers and be turned in to the authorities. Because of the strong population control and the likelihood that [ ] personnel would be apprehended, his organization had to operate under a compartmentalized system, thereby lessening his control over [ ] cadres' activities. Furthermore, [ ] experience with Trinh and Loc made him very apprehensive of the possibility that [ ] organization would be or had been penetrated. Although he anticipated that it would take a long time to establish his organization, he felt that the results of his efforts from September 1968 to January 1969 were very meager. b1 b3 (S)

G. Civilian Proselyting Section

69. One of the principal functions of all levels within the Infrastructure is the recruiting of personnel. COSVN has

different sections devoted exclusively to the function of proselyting. Although each is often listed as a separate entity, it is possible that all sections except Military Proselyting are grouped into an overall Civilian Proselyting Section (sometimes referred to as Front Section, especially in older documents). According to [redacted], there was such a section headquartered in Tan Lap Village, Tay Ninh Province with a total personnel strength of 20 to 25 persons. [redacted] maintained that the section was composed of three major sub-sections --Farmers, Women, and Youth-- which prior to 1966 had been separate sections. [redacted] stated that the function of the Civilian Proselyting Section was to send cadres into the villages to establish Liberation Farmer's, Liberation Women's, and Liberation Youth's Associations. As soon as the organizations were established, the section cadres withdrew, relinquishing their leadership function to the local people. b1 b3 (S)

70. The collated study, [redacted] listed former Under-Secretary Vo Chi Cong as the Chief of the Civilian Proselyting Section in 1966. This was logical since at the time Cong was the overt PRP representative to the NFLSV, a function now performed by Tran Luong under his overt name of "Tran Nam Trung." Indeed, one source has reported that this section is now headed by "Tran Nam Trung." Lt. Col. [redacted] believed that the "Front Section" was under Rau Kem. [redacted] did not know who headed the section. He believed that the chief of the Farmer's Proselyting Sub-section was Nguyen Huu The (aka Tu Gia), who also is a member of the NFLSV Presidium. [redacted] also estimated that the total membership of the Liberation Farmer's Association in 1966 was 22,000 to 25,000. At the time, the Women's Sub-section was headed by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Gieng.* Other important leaders were Mrs. Ma Thi Cu and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Lu. Total membership in the Liberation Women's Association (LWA) in 1966 was estimated at 40,00 to 50,000. Nguyen Thi Dinh, an NFLSV Presidium member and DCO of the SVNLA, currently heads the LWA. [redacted] believed the Youth Proselyting Sub-section was headed by Nam Quang (who he thought was also chief of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section). He directed the activities of both the Liberation Youth's Association (LYA) and the Liberation Student's Association (LSA). Total estimated membership of these two groups in 1966 was 60,000 to 70,000. At the present b1 b3 (S) b1 b3 (S)

*This almost certainly is Le Thi Rieng, a leading PRP cadre arrested in May 1967 and subsequently killed, apparently inadvertently, by the VC during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

time. Tran Bach Dang, a COSVN CAC member and also a member of the NFLSV Presidium, is LYA Chairman; while Tran Van Kiem, a member of the NFLSV Presidium and currently in Paris heads the LSA.

71. [ ] mentioned that the People's Revolutionary Youth Group (PRYG) membership in 1966 was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000. [ ] quite correctly noted that the PRYG chapters came directly under the supervision of the local party chapter. He might have added that PRYG chapters in the SVNLA came under the unit's Party chapter. The PRYG, therefore, was not part of the Civilian Proselyting Section's responsibility. But there was a close tie-in because PRYG members at the local level were responsible for much of the active leadership of the Liberation Youth or Student Association chapters and cells.

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72. There have been reports of a Chinese, a Workers, a Religion, an Intellectual, and a Montagnard Proselyting Sub-section. From time to time, cadres of such sub-sections at lower echelons have been captured or firmly identified; especially at the Saigon-Cholon echelon. In addition, NFLSV organizations are known to exist for these and other segments of society in South Vietnam, and the usual practice is to assign the responsibility for proselyting in a given segment of the population may be assigned to a member of the Civilian Proselyting Section, a separate sub-section may be created to perform this function, or the responsibility may be given to a closely affiliated section (e.g., the Newsmen Association appears to come under the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section). An overlap of personnel undoubtedly exists between all of these proselyting sub-sections, and the NFLSV Committee (discussed later). The actual Liberation Associations technically are a part of the NFLSV structure, while the organizing cadres work out of the proselyting sub-sections. Often the same individual works both sides of the house, sometimes operating under the thin cover of pseudonyms.

E. Civil Health Section

73. The Civil Health Section provides medical care to the personnel of COSVN and provides guidance and supervision for subordinate civil health sections, hospitals and dispensaries at lower echelons. It also has some responsibility for the supply of medical equipment and drugs to lower echelons, and for processing of bulk pharmaceuticals into useable drugs. A facility is maintained for training medical technicians, first-aid personnel and pharmacists. In addition, the section

establishing a program of continuing medical education by disseminating training bulletins on medical techniques to interested associates. The supervisory responsibility also appears to include the use of inspection teams. A plan captured in 1968 proposed the dispatch of an inspection team to undertake a thorough survey of village medical facilities to determine the progress being made in improving public health system. Other aims of this inspection mission included acquisition of first-hand knowledge of local medical facilities and the selection of pilot villages where measures would be instituted for improving leadership.

74. According to [ ] a Civil Health doctor, personnel working in the Civil Health Sections in SVN were classified into four categories. [ ] expertise is the product of experience. He received his medical training in [ ] NVN. On graduation in [ ] he infiltrated in SVN, eventually becoming the chief of the [ ] Civil Health Section. [ ] rallied on 5 May 1968. He reported that the four categories were: (a) doctors and highly trained druggists; (b) medical practitioners and intermediate druggists; (c) nurses and druggist assistants; and (d) first aid personnel and midwife assistants. The COSVN Section had to furnish intermediate and high-level doctors and druggists for the Regional Civil Health Sections who, in turn, had to provide similar personnel to the Provincial Sections. The provinces had to provide the districts with medical practitioners, nurses, and druggist assistants. The districts supplied nurses, midwives, midwife assistants, and first aid personnel for the villages.

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75. [ ] believed that as of May 1968, there was an adequate number of doctors and qualified druggists, but there was a shortage of medical practitioners, intermediate druggists, nurses, midwives and their assistants, and first aid personnel. In May 1968, Provincial Civil Health Sections usually had three or more doctors, depending on the size and importance of the province, and one or two mobile surgical teams. Each team was composed of one surgeon, one or two medical practitioners, and two or three nurses. The District Civil Health Section usually had one or two medical practitioners. Village Sections were staffed with no more than two nurses and two midwife assistants, and three to five first aid personnel. Some Village Sections were operating with only a third or less manpower, due to desertions and losses, and inability to effectively recruit in GVN areas.

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76. [redacted] stated the chief of the COSVN Civil Health Section was Nguyen Van Thu (aka Ba Thu, Nguyen Van Chi). Early in 1967, Ba Thu returned to Hanoi because of tuberculosis and Dr. Muoi Nang, the section's PO, took over as acting chief. An earlier source, [redacted] also reported Nang as chief in August 1967. According to [redacted] the chief was Phung Van Cung; but the section actually was managed by Ho Thu, a pharmacist and member of the CAC.* In 1966, the chief and deputy, according to [redacted] were Dr. Nguyen Van Vy and Hoa (aka Hoang). b1 b3 (S)

77. The SRA Newsletter II listed eight sub-sections, the first four of which correspond roughly with the six sub-sections listed by [redacted] The sub-sections were: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administration Sub-section (B.1) is called the "Civil Health Headquarters" by [redacted] According to the SRA Newsletter, it keeps medical records and charts, maintains supply levels, and assures an adequate level of medical personnel. b1 b3 (S)

b) The Hospital (B.2), according to [redacted] is responsible for treatment and convalescence of civilian cadres of provincial Party Committee rank and above. [redacted] described COSVN's surgical facilities as primitive. He stated the operating room was set in a trench four meters deep, six meters long, and three meters wide. It was covered with parachute cloth. A bicycle lamp was used for illumination which was powered by turning a bicycle wheel. b1 b3 (S)

c) The Dispensary (B.3), according to [redacted] is provided for civilian cadres and personnel, regardless of branch. The SRA Newsletter lists a Hospital and Dispensary Sub-section which at least in name would combine the activities of [redacted] B.2 and B.3. The Newsletter states that the sub-section is responsible for physical and technical support such as obtaining proper sites, building shelters, issuing supplies, and performing routine hospital duties. b1 b3 (S)

*Phung Van Cung is head of the presumably overt NFLSV Public Health Commission; this probably is the basis for [redacted] contention. It should be noted, however, that the NFLSV position and chief of the COSVN Civil Health Section may be identical. b1 b3 (S)

d) The Bacteriological Institute (B.4), according to [redacted] cultivated bacteria to make vaccines for use by subordinate echelons against such diseases as cholera, typhoid, and smallpox. b1 b3 (S)

e) The Pharmaceutical Factory (B.5 or B.29), according to [redacted] produced medicines for B.2 and B.3. The Newsletter also listed this sub-section, stating its functions to be obtaining drugs and medical supplies through production or via the black market, for distribution by the Pharmaceutical Sub-section. According to [redacted] the raw material for the preparation of Western medicines came from Hanoi. The COSVN factory also produced Oriental medicines. Apparently, some pharmaceuticals are sent to lower echelons while others are not. [redacted] mentioned leucorrhea and cataplasm which were reserved for B.2 and B.3 until 1968, at which time COSVN began to supply them to regions and provinces. b1 b3 (S)

Regional Health Sections produced nearly the same medicines as COSVN. Even provincial Civil Health Sections make pharmaceuticals, particularly those near enough to the border to set up their facilities in Cambodia. At the district and village level, GVN products frequently are purchased. [redacted] stated the VC were able to purchase medicines through the use of prescriptions issued by GVN doctors. They also gave written instructions specifying type and quantity of medicines to sympathizers to buy for them. They also organized groups of regular purchasers with connections with drug stores and hospitals. GVN-recognized nurses often were used to do this. They easily could buy any quantity of medicine, and receive a good profit in the bargain. b1 b3 (S)

[redacted] was not clear in his delineation of duties between B.4 and B.5. For instance, he stated B.5 produced a "secret" medicine called "subtillis" made from bacteria cultivated from meat and eggs and used to combat several strains of bacterial infection. It would seem that this medicine would more likely be produced by B.4. This medicine, incidentally, had been provided to the regions and provinces since 1965. [redacted] also stated that neither NVN nor the VC had been able to produce penicillin. b1 b3 (S)

f) The Cadre's Formation and Advanced School (B.25) was the name given by [redacted] to what the Newsletter des-

scribed as the Medical Education Sub-section. The Newsletter described its functions as providing printed information and oral lectures to midwives, technicians, and nurses and in general supporting the Military and Civil Health Sub-sections. [redacted] had more detailed information. From 1964 to 1966, it trained nurses to become medical practitioners. In that period the school conducted three courses for 100 students. Since 1967, the medical practitioner training had been entrusted to Regional Civil Health Sections. MR-1, 2, and 3 had conducted seven courses for 350 students selected from experienced nurses. Training lasted from six months to a year. Further down the line, midwife assistants were selected by provincial sections to attend the midwives and nurses courses which lasted from two to three months. District Civil Health Sections trained for one to two months. Since terminating the medical practitioner courses, COSVN began training medical technicians to become doctors. Two courses had been held. The 1966-1967 session trained 22 doctors, and a September 1967 to September 1968 course provided 27 more.

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g) The Drug Preparation and Storage Unit was the final sub-section mentioned by [redacted]. It did not correspond to any mentioned in the SRA Newsletter. This unit's functions were storing medicines and medical instruments supplied by Communist countries for distribution to regional and provincial dispensaries.

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78. The following four sub-sections were mentioned in the SRA Newsletter, but not by [redacted]. In the case of the last two, their functions are such that they probably do exist, and probably were of no interest to [redacted]. The existence of the first two (Military Health and Civil Health) is more problematical. However, since their functions also are less medical than sanitary, they also may have escaped the attention of [redacted]. The four sub-sections are:

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h) The Military Health Sub-section insures that hygiene and sanitation programs are initiated and followed within the armed forces.

i) The Civil Health Sub-section specialized in preventative medicine and sanitation programs in VC-controlled

areas.

j) The Printing Sub-section produces printed material on medical topics for use by the populace under VC control, as well as by members of VC military and civilian agencies.

k) The Protection Sub-section provides physical security for the Medical Section.

VI. THE "MILITARY" SECTIONS

79. The COSVN Military Affairs Committee (MAC) originally was a special committee of the Party which met on a regular basis (said to be monthly) to resolve major problems of military police, distinct from operational details. About 1965, as the tempo of military operations increased, a separate military headquarters was required and the SVNLA Headquarters (Hqs.) was established as a working organization. The MAC continues to exist in name, but is virtually synonymous with the SVNLA Hqs. Technically speaking, the MAC handles Party affairs, while the Hqs. handles the military. The Hqs. exercises command of the Main Forces (MF), Local Forces (LF), and guerrilla units. It is the central command organization through which the military policy of the SVNLA is executed. It is subordinate to the CAC of COSVN, but can also communicate directly with the NVA command in Hanoi.

80. Returnee Lt. Col. [redacted] provided a list of the commanders of the SVNLA Hqs. from 1961 to 1968. While the individuals he cited may not have held these exact positions (for biographic sketches and further explanations, see the CAC section of this paper), they probably occupied positions quite close to those he named:

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1961-1963

CO & PO — Maj. Gen. Tran Phi (aka Hai Hau, Tran Luong, Tran Nam Trung, Tan Phi)

Executive Officer (XO) — Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang (aka Bay Tien)

1964-1965

CO & PO	Sen. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh (aka Sau Di)
XO	Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra (aka Tu Chi, Tran Nam Trung, Le Van Thanh, Tran Trung Lap)
XO	Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam)
XO	Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Den Den, Tam Kien Quoc)
XO	Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam, Le Duc Anh)
XO	Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh)
DPO	Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, Tran Quoc Vinh)

September 1967 to 1968

CO & PO	Pham Thien Hung (aka Pham Hung, Bay Hong)
XO	Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai (aka Muoi Khang, Hoang Van Khang, Ngo Quoc Binh, Hoang Xuan Thai)
XO	Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra
XO	Lt. Gen. Le Trong Tan
XO	Nguyen Huu Xuyen
XO	Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh
XO	Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh
DPO	Maj. Gen. Tran Do

81. Col. [redacted] who was [redacted] on [redacted] had a slightly different way of looking at the leadership of the SVNLA Hqs. He separated the membership of

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the MAC from that of the Hqs. The secretary and under-secretary of the MAC were Pham Hung and Muoi Cuc; and the members were Hoang Van Thai, Tran Van Tra, Tran Do, and Le Trong Tan. The head of the Hqs. was Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai. His deputies were Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Huu Xuyen, and the ever present female representative, Nguyen Thi Dinh. The PO was Pham Hung, with two deputies Tran Do and Muoi Cuc.

82. Most of these military leaders were discussed earlier in the section on the CAC. Some will be discussed in the section that follows on the operation of the Staff Departments. The remaining deputies who are not covered in either place are: Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Huu Xuyen, and Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh.

83. Le Trong Tan. According to [redacted] sources, Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam) was director of the Hon Gai (north of Hai Phong city in NVN) police under the Japanese occupation. At the end of 1947, he appeared as the CO of the Viet Minh 97th Regiment and of Region XIV with the rank of Lt. Col. During the period 1948-1949, he was DCO of the Tonkin Inter-region X. From 1950-1951, he was CO and PO of the 209th Song Le--"Claire River"--Regiment (Regt.), which was the basic unit of the future 312th Division. He commanded this unit from its formation and became a Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) in 1952. From 1957 to 1960 he was commandant of the NVA Ground Forces Officers School at Son Tay. In 1960 he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and attended a Communist Chinese War College. In 1961 he became a deputy chief of the NVA General Staff. b1 b3 (S)

84. [redacted] alleges that Tan became a deputy chief of the SVNLA in 1964-1965. In 1966 he was reported to have the additional duty of chief of the Combat Operations Staff (B.1). He is now believed to be acting as commandant of the VC Ground Forces School. He is a member of the Central Committee, and has written numerous articles on military subjects, one of which was on the subject of strengthening on-the-job training of officers. These articles appear regularly in Hanoi newspapers. Training, rather than combat or staff work, would appear to be his current speciality. He has been described as very nervous and he seldom speaks. Tan reportedly dresses in khaki uniforms. b1 b3 (S)

85. Nguyen Huu Xuyen. Not much is known about Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Den Den, Tam Kien Quoc). [redacted] mentioned a b1 b3 (S)

Col. Xuyen as deputy SVNLA commander and stated that formerly he had been CO of VC MR-1, but that he was sent to NVN in June 1964 because he thought it unnecessary to use regular troops for battles. [redacted] heard he had returned to SVN in October 1965. [redacted] mentioned a deputy CO named Tam Venh Venh or Tam Xuyen in charge of Rear Services. This probably was Xuyen since his most used aka is Tam Don Don, the "Venh" being mistakenly substituted for "Don." From such lackluster early reports, it might be concluded that Xuyen's star is on the wane. But according to more recent reporting [redacted] 21 April 1969), as far as direct command of the forces earmarked for use against Saigon, the role envisaged for Xuyen is second only to that of Tran Van Tra.

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86. Nguyen Thi Dinh. Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh) is the only SVNLA DCO whose position also is overt. Although there is considerable conflict in detail, in general terms her background is fairly well established. She apparently was born in 1920, either in Nam Dinh Province (NVN) or Ben Tre Province (SVN). In either event, she spent her early years in Ben Tre. In 1937, she and her husband Bich joined the Ben Tre Popular Front stationed at Ba Tri. They were arrested in 1939. He was sent to Con Son Island and died, possibly as early as 1940. She was sentenced to forced residence until 1943, when she was allowed to leave.

87. She immediately rejoined the Resistance and next was heard of as participating in the August 1945 uprising in Ben Tre Province. In 1946 she and other cadres were in Hanoi to receive weapons and training for stepping up the guerrilla war. By 1954 she was reported to be Chairman of the Liberation Women's Association (LWA) in Saigon-Gia Dinh. Other reports describe her as Secretary General of the entire LWA. On 8 March 1965, at the alleged first convention of the LWA, she was elected its Chairman, a position she still holds according to overt reports. In 1960 she was appointed deputy secretary of Ben Tre Province. Other sources, including [redacted] designate her as Province Party secretary. In 1961 she was elected to the Executive Committee of the Nam Bo NFLSV and presently she is an overt member of the NFLSV Presidium. In May 1965 she was appointed DCO of the SVNLA, although according to [redacted] she assumed this position in 1963. As SVNLA DCO, Dinh appears to specialize in guerrilla affairs.

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88. Another source stated that Dinh was a cadre for Ben Tre from 1950 to 1960, and for MR-2 from 1960 to 1965, and that

She married twice. According to this source, Dinh had four children by her first husband (she is supposed to have lost one, and that he was reportedly killed in 1962). While source [redacted] also stated that she was a Lt. Gen., whereas [redacted] reported she was a Lt. Col. She was last reported to have taken personal command over MR-2 sometime during the summer of 1968, but this is unconfirmed. b1 b3 (S)

89. Most sources do agree on her personal description. She has been described as stout or fat, frank, talkative, outgoing, and folksy. She prefers field trips to office work, and does not wear make-up or jewelry. She does not smoke and drinks little. Her military abilities reportedly are not very great, and there exists a feeling that she may be more of a figurehead to inspire female recruits than an actual military activist.

VII. THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS

90. Three staff departments are included in the SVNLA Hqs: Military, Political, and Rear Services. According to [redacted] when COSVN was reactivated in 1961, these divisions were designated as sections (ban). They later were changed to offices (phong). By 1964 they had been up-graded to departments (cuc). Under the present military structure, the term cuc is used in the south only at COSVN and in MR-5; all other MR's use the term phong for the corresponding sections of their staffs. b1 b3 (S)

A. The Military Staff Department

91. The Military Staff Department is the equivalent of the American G-1, G-2, and G-3 Staffs. It is responsible, according to [redacted] for troop replacement, including infiltration and assignment of recruits. It prepares the annual training program for main, local, and guerrilla force troops. Further, this department provides guidance to the Rear Services on weapons and materiel distribution priorities. It collects intelligence and advises the SVNLA Hqs on strategy, operations, and tactics; and it also trains military cadres and specialists. b1 b3 (S)

92. There is remarkable agreement among the major sources on the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the Military Staff Department. [redacted] all agree the chief of staff is Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam). There was some difference of opinion with regard to his rank, ranging from [redacted] Maj. Gen. to [redacted] Col. Sau Nam b1 b3 (S)

is believed to be a member of the Central Committee. He formerly to have been an assistant chief of staff on the NVA General Staff. Major [redacted] on 6 January 1969 described Sau Nam as easy going, an excellent staff worker, a regrouper, and former chief of the Military Forces Department of the NVA General Staff. Sau Nam also was reported to be CO of a Vanguard or Forward Hqs operating during the 1968 General Offensive which had control over units in SR-1 and 2.

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93. Col. Tran Dinh Xu (aka Tran Minh Ho, Ba Dinh) consistently has been reported as a deputy chief of staff. [redacted] and [redacted] list him, but [redacted] thought he had been replaced in June 1965 by Lt. Col. Ba Tran. According to [redacted] Xu left his post to become military commander of VC MR-4 in June 1965. Indications are Xu currently holds the position of SR-1 CO, and may still be a deputy chief of staff at COSVN.

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94. The man whom [redacted] said replaced Xu was Lt. Col. Ba Tran, who formerly had been deputy chief of the MI Staff (B.2). The major source on B.2 at this time [redacted] corroborates that Ba Tran made this change, differing only in that [redacted] believed Tran had been chief, not deputy chief of B.2. [redacted] listed Ba Tran as deputy chief of staff and concurrently chief of B.2. [redacted] listed Ba Tran as a deputy chief of staff, and a Lt. Col. Tu Binh as deputy chief of the MI Staff. [redacted] lists Col. Tu Binh as deputy chief of staff, concurrently chief of the MI Staff, and a former deputy chief of the MI Department of the NVA General Staff. There are reports that Ba Tran and Tu Binh are the same person, but this evidence is not conclusive. The biographic record of Ba Tran (aka Tu Binh) suggests that he was born around 1927 in SVN. During the French resistance, he reportedly was a MI chief in a province in Eastern Nam Bo. He regrouped to NVN where he served in the NVA MI Staff, and then returned to SVN "sometime in early 1960." Presumably he served on the COSVN MI Staff, either as chief or deputy until 1965 when he was made assistant chief of the Military Staff Department. He may have reached the rank of Brigadier General. One source has described him as big and robust; a man of few words, with a weakness for cigarettes.

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95. Another deputy listed by [redacted] is Col. Hai (or Nguyen) Nghiem. [redacted] noted that Nghiem formerly had been a deputy in the Combat Operations Staff (B.1). [redacted] thought Nghiem's position was that of chief of B.1, rather than

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deputy chief of staff. [ ] described him as about 50 years of age, heavy set, wore glasses, and was very handsome-looking part French. He was very good-natured, extroverted, and well educated (speaking French, German, and English), and was fond of European music. b1 b3 (S)

96. [ ] added a final candidate for an assistant chief of staff not mentioned by the others, Sen Col. Hoang a Cam (aka Nam Thach); who [ ] believed was concurrently CO of the 5th Front (in SR-5). Cam reportedly was born in Hung Yen, NVN, around 1927. He also was reported at one time to have been the CO of the 9th VC Division. b1 b3 (S)

97. According to [ ] the Military Staff Department of COSVN was located, as of October 1967, within a twenty square kilometer area bounded by map coordinates XT 4883, XT 4888, XT 5283, and XT 5288; map sheet 6232 II. Chuoc's Battlefield Preparation Section was located (map coordinate XT 4968, map sheet 623 II) just north of the intersection of Ba Chiem and Dong streams. b1 b3 (S)

98. Combat Operations Staff (B.1). This staff, according to [ ] was supposed to keep the Hqs. posted on the friendly and enemy situation, draw up operation plans for subordinate units, provide operational support to these units, and deliver orders to units directly subordinate to COSVN and to the MR's and SR's. In addition, this staff was supposed to analyze and draw lessons from past battle experiences. b1 b3 (S)

99. [ ] listed Col. Nghiem as the chief of the Combat Operations Staff. [ ] listed Lt. Col. Vu Ba as a deputy. [ ] listed Lt. Col. Van as deputy, as well as five assistants: Lt. Col. Thanh and Sen. Capts. Tuoc, Kohn, Minh, and Xam. [ ] allotted the chief's role to Lt. Col. Ho Tam, a regroupee and former member of the Training Staff of the NVA General Staff. His assistant chiefs were Lt. Col. Vu Ba, Maj. Mai Thanh, and Maj. Hai Bang. All were regroupees. Mai Thanh was in bad health; he had been a member of the Combat Operations Department of the NVA General Staff. b1 b3 (S)

100. [ ] maintains that there were ten subordinate sections of the Combat Operations Staff: b1 b3 (S)

a) The General Combat Situation Staff (A.1), whose chief was Maj. Chin Do; age 40 years, heavy build, quiet, and well educated. He spoke French, Russian, and some German, and reportedly spent seven years studying in a

Command and Staff School in Russia. This section received information such as casualty reports (enemy and friendly) and victory reports from independent units and those of the MR's and SR's. The MI Staff also was used as an information input, primarily for verification. All of the information was checked and passed up to this staff by means of immediate, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports. This section also evaluated strengths and weaknesses of friendly units and forcast future enemy moves.

b) The Planning Section (A.2) under Lt. Col. Yu Ba, concurrently assistant chief of the staff. After receiving both the objectives from the Military Staff Department and the battlefield situation report from the General Combat Situation Section, this second section would plan the general timing, duration, and areas of operations for the main force units directly subordinate to COSVN. The Planning Section dealt in the higher level aspects of operations. This section also maintained some control over MR and SR units.

c) The Main Force Section (A.3) was led by Maj. Ho Xuan (aka Nam Xuan), of whom [ ] described as 42 years of age and a regroupee from Thua Thien Province. This section advised the Military Staff Department on the personnel and materiel strengths, missions, and general activities of the divisions and independent regiments directly subordinate to COSVN. One group of cadres kept track of each Main Force Unit. b1 b3 (S)

d) The Local Battlefield Section (A.4) was under the direction of Maj. Bay Thanh, 40 years old, half-Chinese, and a regroupee. This section was similar to and complimented the Main Force Section in that it had the same mission, but covered area forces. This section informed the Military Staff Department on strengths and activities of Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla forces in the MR's, SR's, and independent provinces in all of SVN.

e) The Campaign Section (A.5) was headed by Maj. Hai Bang, concurrently assistant chief of the staff. This section studied large American sweep operations to learn how to escape with the least damage to VC forces. The section proposed ways to neutralize sweep operations with counter-sweep operations or by avoiding contact. The primary emphasis had been on a study of the Junction City

Operation.

f) The Tactical Research Section (A.6) was under Maj. Ba Tran, 40 years old, with three years of college in Hanoi and a regroupee from Binh Duong Province. This section collected battlefield information about United States (U.S.) tactics and VC responses in an attempt to determine what responses were most effective. The results were disseminated to field units and training cadres. This section primarily studied U.S. tactics because it was felt the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) used the same tactics.

g) The Combat Control Envoy Section (A.7) consisted of about ten cadres and 20 to 30 guard personnel. The chief was Sen. Capt. Tam Thua, a 40 year old regroupee from Ben Tre Province. The cadres of this section carried special messages from the Military Staff Department to battle units. Generally they were used when some form of explanation was required with the messages, such as the reason why some very important request was turned down. These cadres were to reinforce the order and lift the morale of recipients of orders and messages. This section, according to [redacted] was not used very often.

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h) The Battlefield Preparation Section (A.8) was headed by Maj. Tu Hiep, 42 year old regroupee originally from Ben Tre Province. In this section there were 13 cadres, 15 security guards, 3 draftsmen, 2 cooks, and one medic, totalling 34 persons. The cadres were: [redacted] current information on the operation and organization of the COSVN Military Staff Department); Sen. Capts. Xuan, Cau Cuong, Hai Phan, Tu Dung, Kien, Bay Dai, and Vu Coi; and Capt. Hai Phoc. This was a relatively long-range planning section. It sent out cadres to reconnoiter terrain and enemy installations in large areas. For example, [redacted] reconnoitered the U.S. installations in Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. This section covered VC MR-6, MR-10, parts of Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces, as well as Long Khanh, Ba Ria, and Tay Ninh Provinces. After the reconnaissance, the cadres recommended the type and size of unit and tactics that could best be utilized against the target. The Combat Operations Staff reviewed their recommendations, and prepared tentative plans for the Military Staff Department. If the Military Staff Department and Hqs. approved the plan, it was sent to the MF units in the area which then ran their own reconnaissance

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preparatory to executing the mission. This section drew up plans only for units directly subordinate to COSVN; the MR's and SR's planned their own targets.

i) A.9 was the Administrative Section. It had two main functions. First, it took care of the paperwork and typing for the Combat Operations Staff. Second, it supplied food and clothing to the other sections of the staff.

j) A.10 was the Map Section which maintained the combat situation map for the Combat Operations Section. It also made map overlays and enlargements, and printed maps in three scales; 1:25,000, 1:50,000, and 1:100,000.

101. Military Intelligence (B.2). B.2 is the equivalent of the U.S. G-2, but actually it is more than that. VC MI has its own penetration agent nets, armed reconnaissance units, base areas, commo-liaison, radio and crypto personnel, and analytical personnel. It is responsible for coordinating the activities of the "People's Military Intelligence Nets." In addition, when the situation warrants it, MI probably also processes intelligence gathered through Military Proselyting agent operations, as well as from the activities of Special Action Units. Finally, there are very firm indications that since the May-June offensive, the old B.2 MI office spawned a strategic counterpart designated B.22. (See [redacted] 3 April 1969). While it is not clear as yet, B.22 appears to be a conglomerate of NVN Intelligence Service Cuc Nghien Cuu (CNC) espionage nets (at least in the Saigon theater of operations), the more strategic of B.2's espionage nets, and any support or miscellaneous personnel and facilities that seemed particularly suited to strategic, rather than tactical, collection activity. b3

102. The capture of documentation on B.22 and several of its agents since December 1968 has revealed considerable information about the operations of the new organization. But for an overall description of the operation of MI at the COSVN level, it is necessary to refer to the now dated information supplied by Sen. Capt [redacted] In May 1964 [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] where he remained [redacted] He was [redacted] a Reconnaissance/Sapper training cell of the then newly-activated Special Action Force. b1 b3 (S)

103. According to [redacted] B.2 had the responsibility of collecting and following up daily and hourly activities on the military situation, tactically and strategically. It was supposed to anticipate enemy combat plans and provide guidance to the Military Staff Department in the preparation of their plans. In consideration of B.2's important operation, the Department reserved all priority facilities for B.2, such as supply and engineering developments. The chief, Anh Tu (cover name), was assigned in April 1965 to replace Ba Tran who was reassigned as an assistant to the Department. Tu's assistant was Hai Nguyen.*

104. The MI component of the Military Staff Department has several operational elements:

a) A.1, the Enemy Situation Study Section. Its chief and assistant were Maj. Hung and Sen. Capt. Thanh respectively. The cadres were Sen. Capts. Thong, Tai, Dung, and Thao; Capts. Son (aka Son Vang), and Long (aka Hung); and Sen. Lt. Tho, as well as others unknown to [redacted] The section consisted of several cells responsible for the political situation, military situation, cultural-social-economic situation, "recapitulation," and translation. This section was supposed to study all information received on military, political, economic, and cultural activities, keeping COSVN abreast of the situation of the GVN and the latter's policies, along with suggested countermeasures. It was also responsible for studying and commenting on intelligence received from subordinate units, and disseminating this intelligence to subordinate units. The intelligence was supplied by the regional level MI; MI tactical, campaign, and technical (radio intercept) reconnaissance elements; and espionage agents.

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b) A.2 was the Reconnaissance Section. The chief and assistant were Maj. Son and Sen. Capt. Mieng. The training cadres were Sen. Capt Hai (aka Hai Ham); Capts. Son and Dong (alias Thi), and Trong [redacted]; and Sen. Lt. Tu Kieng. The battlefield study cadres were Sen. Capt. Bich and Capts. Luan, Ngu, and Van; and Sen. Lt. Thanh. The "Major Reading Cadre" was Sen. Lt. An. The subordinate

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*For a discussion of whether Ba Tran and Tu Binh are the same individual, refer to paragraph 94 above.

elements were the Training Teams, the Battlefield Study Team, and the Map Team. This section was responsible for controlling the reconnaissance activities of the C.252 Combat Reconnaissance Battalion and of Main Force Regiments, for studying prospective campaign battlefields. A.2 also prepared training materials and followed up on reconnaissance training activities.

c) A.3 was the Espionage Section. This section had no chief because it was directly under the control of the chief of B.2, An Tu. Capt. Tam was responsible for espionage activities in Saigon and other cities. Sen. Capt. Kien was responsible for suburban and contested areas. b1 [redacted] knew of two other cadres; Hoa (a northerner), and b3 Vinh (from central VN). A.3 was supposed to administer (S) and guide all espionage agents and their rear base areas, and also to process and revise the intelligence furnished by these agents. It was this section that most directly involved in the establishment of B.22.

d) The Crypto Section was A.4. The chief and deputy were Capts. Thuan and Phung. This section was a company-size unit, but instead of having the organization of a company, it consisted of 7 or 8 cells. Each cell was responsible for ciphering and deciphering messages passed between B.2 and other agencies, battlefields, or MR's.

e) A.5 is the Administration Section under Capt. Sau and his deputy, Lt. Thanh. It consisted of about 30 men divided into three squads. The Communication Squad (A.12) maintained liaison between B.2 and its various divisional, tactical, and strategic teams. The Correspondence Squad (A.9) was responsible for internal liaison. The Transportation and Troop Feeding Squad (A.10) appears to have been responsible for food production and messing. This section was responsible for routine personnel administration of B.2, procurement and issue of facilities and equipment, and maintenance of communication lines between B.2 and its subordinate sections.

f) A.6, the Political Section, was under Sen. Capt. Nam Son (aka Son Den); and Sen. Lts. Tran Lo, Tac, and Huy. There were four sub-sections: Organization, Cadre, Propaganda and Training, and Security. A.6 was responsible for maintaining the records of all MI cadres, including those assigned to MR's. A.6 also was responsible for the place-

ment and reassignment of MI cadres, for their awards and promotions, and for their Party records.

g) The People's Intelligence Section's (A.7) chief was Sen. Capt. Huynh Long, and Lt. Tam was deputy chief. This section was charged with organizing and controlling people's nets in liberated, contested, and suburban areas. It also received information from those nets for study, evaluation, and processing and dissemination.

h) The A.8 Technical Section forged various types of documents for use by agents. It also compiled and analyzed captured documents for possible use. The chief was Sen. Lt. Truong. There were two platoon leaders, Dung and Hoang Anh. There were three sub-sections: documentation and photo reproduction; document and photo compilation; and document and photo forgery.

i) The Signal and Radio Communication Section (A.13) actually was a Signal Company, but it was not organized like a military unit. It had a strength of about 100 and included a Receiving Sub-section, a Transmitting Sub-section, and a Radio-and-Equipment Repairs Sub-section. A.13 transmitted messages between B.2 and the MI sections of the MR's and the campaign and tactical reconnaissance teams.

j) The Technical Reconnaissance Section (A.29) actually was a cryptanalysis battalion and organized like a combat unit of three companies. The chief was Sen. Capt. Duy Tien. The three companies were supposed to monitor all GVN or ARVN transmitting stations and decipher all coded messages. It was generally held that the personnel of A.29 received special treatment because their intelligence had proven to be highly valuable and accurate, particularly in their monitoring of ARVN communications. For example, this section monitored ARVN fire mission requests and troop maneuver (both withdrawal and attack) movement traffic. In April 1965 when [redacted] he heard that there were plans to set up another Technical Reconnaissance Battalion, code named A.28, equivalent to A.29. He also heard that Sen. Capt. Ba was appointed PO of this unit. More current information on the Technical Reconnaissance Section was provided by [redacted]

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[redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted]. He maintained that the Technical Reconnaissance Section provided the bulk of MI information. According to [redacted], the section was composed of approximately 400 men who monitored all Allied radio nets on a 24-hour basis. As a radio message was intercepted, it was written down and immediately passed to a man known as a decoder. The decoders were guarded constantly by a three to four man group which always moved with the decoders. [redacted] maintains that the chief of this section, [redacted] that code books used by the decoders contained basic Allied code terms obtained from NVN, the USSR, and Communist China. [redacted] had heard that Col. Tam Si had been trained in France. The section also obtained code information through paid informers within the Allied community. Once the decoder received the message from the interceptor personnel, he decoded it, and sent it to the MI Staff commander who would then disseminate it on a need-to-know basis.

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k) Campaign Intelligence Teams, according to [redacted] also fell under B.2's purview. There were four teams with each being a battalion-sized unit. The teams and their chiefs and deputies were: (1) A.16 under Capt. Nguyen and Sen. Lt. Sau Thi; (2) A.20 under Sen. Capt. Sau Tri and Sen. Lt. Bay; (3) A.22 under Capt. Dang and Capt. Bay Hieu; (4) A.30 under Sen. Capt. Nam Tra and Sen. Lt. Nam Chinh, as well as Capt. Giau, the PO. Their general mission was to study the battlefield for prospective campaigns and follow developments as they occurred. However, they also ran agent nets, especially near ARVN and U.S. base camps and installations. [redacted] heard that once the team concerned had organized the net, it transferred its operational control to the Espionage Section (A.3), but still acted as a liaison and support unit. Actually, current information indicates these teams may have been the Forward Command Elements of A.3 (Espionage Section), especially since the Sau Tri who [redacted] commanded A.20 may be the Sau Tri who now is considered to be the deputy CO of B.22.

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According to [redacted] A.16 operated near the SVN-Cambodian border (Bacham and Tapang Robon - map coordinates XT 015 445). It was responsible for maintaining contact with various espionage units which were operating on Cambo-

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Gian territory and with various NVN CNC teams. Part of A.16's mission was receiving and transmitting agents and supplies. A.20 operated in the Loc Thuan (Don Thuan) and Cu Chi areas (map coordinates XT 620125). A.22 operated in the Phu Hoa Dong, Ben Co, and Phu An areas (map coordinates XT 700335 and XT 740330). A.30 possibly was operating in the areas northeast of Vung Tau. [redacted] had heard A.30 had been a NVN CNC Strategic Intelligence team reporting to Hanoi until September or October 1964 when it was subordinated to B.2. A.30 had its rear base in the Vung Tau area and was the largest of the four campaign teams. A.30 reportedly possessed a company-size combat reconnaissance element, a radio element, a crypto element, and a cryptanalysis element. b1 b3 (S)

l) "Tactical Intelligence Teams," according to [redacted] included: (1) A.14 under Sen. Lt. Hoang Thao and Lt. Thinh; (2) A.15 under Sen. Lt. Tang (aka Tan); and (3) A.32 under Sen. Lt. Man. Each team had from 30 to 40 men and consisted of two elements, one for reconnaissance and the other for combat and security. Team leaders had the rank of company commander. They were to collect information on ARVN activities and submit daily reports to B.2. Tactical teams also were responsible for espionage gets, whether organized by the team or assigned by B.2 for watching specific ARVN units or positions. A.14 operated in Ba Den mountain area (Tay Ninh Province), A.15 near the Binh Duong Province capital, and A.32 in Bien Hoa. b1 b3 (S)

m) C.252 Combat Reconnaissance Battalion. This unit had been led by Maj. Sau Duyen until his death during the battle of Binh Gia. The deputy, concurrently XO, was Sen. Capt. Nam Thanh. [redacted] heard the names of two of the company commanders, Sen. Lt. Long and Sung. The battalion consisted of about 400 men armed with light weapons. There were three companies with rumors of a fourth in the making; among the company commanders were Sen. Lts. Long and Sung. C.252 was responsible for preparing the battlefield for COSVN (in compliance with plans issued by the Military Staff Department) by tracing the courses of action prescribed for long-range campaigns. They were to survey terrain conditions, defense obstacles, and coordinate with MR and Main Force Regimental MI and reconnaissance units. In case a terrain survey was extremely important, it would be conducted by the CO of C.252, such as the Binh Gia battle. C.252 usually operated in units of platoon and company strength. b1 b3 (S)

They were trained in stealthy infiltration, handling unusual weapons, close combat techniques, observational techniques, map drawing, and field survey techniques.

105. Describing the communications undertaken by B.2, [redacted] noted an upward and downward vertical channel and a horizontal channel. Upward was the NVA MI; downwards included the six MR's, four campaign and three tactical intelligence teams; espionage elements, MI sections of divisions and regiments subordinate to COSVN and the C.252 Combat Intelligence Battalion. B.2 maintained horizontal communications with the Combat Operations Staff (B.1), the Cryptographic Staff (B.8), and the NVN CNC Strategic Intelligence Teams, and the Security and Military Proselyting Sections of COSVN. B.2 received and transmitted intelligence through the Radio Signal Section (A.13) after it was deciphered/ciphered by the Crypto Section (A.4). All messages [illegible] passed by the Radio Signal Staff (B.3) also had to go through B.8, the Cryptographic Staff. b1 b3 (S)

106. [redacted] reported that quarterly reports were submitted to the NVN General Staff, but he did not know how they were transmitted. Most messages concerned reports on organization and activities, request for support, or the transmittal of directives. Contact with subordinate elements was daily, but [redacted] did not know how contact was made. Contacts with the Combat Operations Staff (B.1) were made many times daily by various means, including telephone and messenger. These contacts covered information received from NVN, the battlefield situation throughout SVN, and information coming from the MR's and COSVN's Main Force units. During combat operations, every piece of information had to go through the Forward Command Post. In this instance, B.2 directed its subordinates to s[illegible] their information to the Command Post which then would be responsible for relaying the information back to B.2. b1 b3 (S)

107. At the time of his interrogation [redacted] stated that it [redacted] normal for B.2 to be informed ten to fifteen days in advance of important ARVN operations. He was told that in some cases, the information was received as soon as the operation planning was completed. The NVA MI provided the most accurate information on ARVN strategy and deployment, large-scale operations, B-52 bombings, and GVN policies. AT 0500 hours each day, the NVA MI sent a message to B.1 and B.2 on the deployment of ARVN units, regimental size or larger. Espionage elements often provided accurate information on ARVN operations, as well as on major policies of the GVN. Cryptanalysis units collected very b1 b3 (S)

accurate information on planned artillery and aerial attacks by monitoring messages requesting such support as they were relayed from sector to division to corps and JGS. Cryptanalysis also proved effective in determining both advances and retreat of ARVN units during operations. They had more trouble with U.S. messages because the majority of cryptographers had a very poor command of English.

108. The Formation and Functions of B.22 (Strategic Intelligence Office). According to one of several captured documents in June 1968 a "section" (possibly all or part of A.3) was separated from B.2 and combined with C.2, (probably a cover for NVN CNC units) to become B.22 (aka Doi 22, N.22). The C.2 is probably an abbreviation for Cuc 2, a term which has been used by MI personnel to refer to the CNC and its operating elements. B.22 was dubbed the Strategic Intelligence Office (also referred to as Bureau Department and Staff). It was to serve not only the SVNLA, but the leadership of the "Central level" and the "Central Military Party Committee" (probably here referring to Hanoi), as well. Besides military intelligence, it was charged with covering the political, economic, and diplomatic fields as well.

109. Just exactly what this split did to the organization of the two parts is not clear (See [redacted] and [redacted]). Judging from the interrogations of the chiefs of three intelligence collection detachments, most of the reorganization consisted of doubling numbers. Apparently B.2 retained all its old sections, while B.22 duplicated five of them, doubling their code numbers in the process. The new sections appear to be A.33, A.55, A.77, A.88, and A.99. A.33 corresponds to B.2's A.3, or the Espionage Section. According to [redacted] this section included three former NVN CNC cadres; Sen Capt. Tu Kien, and Capts. Ba Tam and Ba Thu, plus one SVN MI cadre, Tran Thang. The former [redacted] stated that this section's code number was A.3 and it was called the Operations Section and was headed by Ba Tam and his deputy, Tu Kien. Actually, the section could be called either since its function was espionage operations. It probably was numbered A.33 since all other numbers were doubled; and since there are indications B.2 still has responsibility for some espionage detachments, certainly for those engaged in tactical intelligence collection.

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b1 b3 (S) 110. [ ] (of A.42) referred to A.55 as the Rear Services Section, while Ba Minh (of A.20) referred to it as the Administration and Rear Services Section. Actually, from [ ] description of B.2's Administration Section (A.5), both rear services and administration functions would be appropriately combined.

b1 b3 (S) 111. Both [ ] and [ ] referred to A.77 as the Political Section. [ ] thought its chief was Cao Van. According to [ ] A.7 was the People's Intelligence Section and A.6 was the Political Section (under Sen. Capt. Nam Son). Both [ ] and [ ] also agreed that A.88 was the Technical Section. [ ] said it was headed by Thu and Duc. A.88 would correspond nicely with [ ] A.8 Technical Section in charge of document compilation, reproduction and forgery.

112. Both [ ] and [ ] referred to A.99 as the Signal Section. [ ] listed its heads as Duc A and Duc B. [ ] called A.9 the Correspondence Section and A.13 the Signal Section. He listed the chief of A.13 as Sen. Lt. Duc. A.99 might be related to either. The functional responsibility for A.9 was for internal liaison within B.2. Both [redacted] and [ ] mentioned that B.2's Commo-liaison Section (A.12) continued to function under B.2, but that it closely supported B.22. b1 b3 (S)

113. When it comes to listing the Intelligence Detachments (called "cun") of B.22, there is less agreement among the sources and the picture becomes more confusing. [ ] thought the A.3 (probably should be A.33) Operations Section oversaw the operations of the detachments under B.22. The only detachments he knew of were [ ] A.42 and two others; A.24 (chief, Nam Van), and A.30 (chief, Ha). [ ] thought the Operations Section under B.2 was A.54, headed by Tu Sac and his PO, Bay Anh. The only element he knew of that was subordinate to A.54 was A.34. b1 b3 (S)

114. Another source, [ ], has been in charge [ ] for A.54 before him [ ]. He knew nothing of B.22, indicating only that COSVN had ordered the amalgamation of two former MR-1 MI units and another, numbered A.38, in July 1968. The former MR-1 units were renumbered A.34 and A.44. The new organization was called A.54. Another unit was added later, A.40. A.54 operated closely with SR-1 and the 9th Division, and may have corresponded to a Campaign Intelligence Unit. It did, however, have espionage nets [ ] listed A.54's chief, deputy, and PO as Tu Sac, Ba Song, and Bay Anh respectively. The chiefs and b1 b3 (S)

identities of the others were: A.34, Tu Trung and Ut Thanh; A.38, Nuoi So and Ly Van Ri; A.40, Muoi Rau; A.44, Chin Tan; and two cadres, Tu Lan and Rang.

115. According to the former chief of [ ] prior to the B.22 reorganization, there were several NVN CNC units operating in SVN, including B.44 in Central SVN and B.46, B.48, B.49, B.50, and B.52 in the Saigon area. B.44 was led by Maj. Nam Den (aka Xuan); B.48 by Maj. Hung and Sen. Capt. Hai Thang; B.49 by Maj. Nguyen Thanh Tung (aka Huynh Kim Trong, Muoi Tung, Muoi Co, Phung Co); and B.52 by Maj. Phan. [ ] was an [ ] for B.49. He identified the following cadres: Maj. Nam Tam (PO); Maj. Trung Tien (Chief of Research); Sen. Capt. Doanh (Chief of Training); and the following Sen. Capts. [ ] --Ba Can, Tam Nam (aka Nam Sach), Ba Lieu, and Ut Dong.

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116. In late 1968, those CNC units operating in the Saigon area were slated to be merged into the newly formed B.22. In August 1968, a conference of B.49 was held in the Ba Thu-Ta Noi area of Cambodia. [ ] presided. [ ] indicated the CNC espionage organization might possibly be merged with the COSVN MI Espionage Section. The process of merging B.48 with B.49 began in October 1968, and the four resulting agent nets (or cums) were to be numbered A.68, A.69, A.70, and A.71. The command section was designated A.72 under Maj. Muoi Tung, the former chief of B.49. The former head of B.48, Maj. Hung, was ordered back to B.22. By December 1968, the merger was completed with some assets and agents and one agent net chief of

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B.48 merged with B.49. The [ ] were Ba Can (A.68), Nam Sach (A.69), Hai Thang (A.70), and Ut Dong (A.71). b1 b3 (S)

117. [ ] maintained that the chief of B.22 was the colonel who presided over the conference, Tu Hiep. The deputy was Col. Sau Tri, and the PO was Col. Tran Van My (aka Tam My). [ ] agreed with this lineup, except that he lowered everyone's rank one grade. In this, [ ] has been consistent and probably in error. [ ] also noted Sau Tri had been former chief of A.3, and that Tam My was former PO for B.2. [ ] only knew that Sau Tri was the deputy, but he added that the command staff of old B.2 was: Tu Binh (chief); Nam Nam (deputy); Son Map (deputy); and Chin Loc (political officer). b1 b3 (S)

118. It should be noted by way of conclusion that documentation on the creation of B.22 and the merger of B.48 and B.49 indicates that these reorganizations were implemented as part of a general trend toward upgrading strategic capabilities. The documents and interrogations reveal that the communications breakdown during the first two offensives led to the assignment of radio and crypto men and equipment to enable agents to maintain contact when regular liaison links become blocked. The documentation also reveals an increased concern with strategic reporting. According to the captured documents summarized in [ ] 11 April 1969, this concern with strategic reporting has reached the point where both Security and MI are re-evaluating their agents' strategic potential and are attempting to guard the better agents from premature exposure. Such exposure apparently occurred during the initial stages of the General Offensive. Now, with the cold reality of the situation sinking in and an eye cocked toward the Paris talks, the VC appear to be digging in their agents for the long haul. b3

119. The Signal Staff (B.3). The next subordinate element of the Military Staff Department is B.3, the Signal Staff. [ ] agree that the chief of B.3 is Col. Tam Nam. The deputy chief, according to [ ] is Maj. Oanh. According to [ ] the functions of the Signal Staff include drafting the annual plan for the establishment of signal units, telephone and radio communications, and couriers for Regional and Main Force units. It also is responsible for training cadres and organizing communications between COSVN and the Regional and Main Force units. This staff also is supposed to change communication codes every three months and organize an emergency communications system. Other functions are planning for radio requirements and checking the daily communication procedures of the different radio-telephone stations. b1 b3 (S)

120. According to CICV Report ST 69-01, 10 March 1969, B.3 has a reported strength of 565 personnel including two companies and the 44th Signal Battalion. Formerly considered a combat support element, recent documentation places the 44th subordinate to B.3. The battalion consists of three companies; one each for radio, telephone, and courier communications. Each company numbers about 85, for a total strength of 265. The remaining elements appear to be two signal companies of 75 men each, a signal liaison element of 25 persons, and an administrative element.

121. The Military Personnel (or Armed Force) Staff (B.4). According to [redacted] the chief of this staff is Col. Duc, and the administrative staff chief is Maj. Minh. [redacted] listed Duc as the chief, and a Maj. Hoat as the deputy chief. Again, according to [redacted], the functions of B.4 consisted of drawing up plans for writing Army regulations, inspecting lower echelons to insure compliance with regulations, keeping records of platoon leaders and their assistants in all of the units subordinate to COSVN Hqs. except cadres in the MR's. B.4 also was responsible for drawing up an annual manning plan based on COSVN requirements for the reception and assignment of recruits from NVN and the MR's. Depending on the situation, these strength requirements were changed quarterly. Additional duties, according to [redacted] were to inventory weapons caches, make arrangements with the Ordnance Branch to maintain weapons, and to provide weapons, ammunition, and signal equipment to the MR's and other units.

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122. The Engineer Staff (B.5). According to [redacted] the Engineer Staff is headed by Col. Ung Rang. [redacted] thought its chief was Maj. Bui Tue. [redacted] listed the chief as Maj. Nhan and the PO as Maj. Ky. According to [redacted], the functions of B.5 were to draw up plans for training activities for all engineer units under COSVN, to prepare specialized research for the Engineer Branch for all campaign activities, and to study combat engineer techniques. These techniques included employment of mines to support attacks, construction of air raid shelters, and methods of sabotaging bridges.

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123. Formerly considered combat support elements, according to CICV ST 69-01, the individual engineer companies subordinate to B.5 now fall under the definition of administrative service. The staff consists of a 55 man Headquarters Section, four engineer companies, and an engineer school. The strength of the remainder is estimated to be 70 for C.23, 60 for C.24, 55 for C.25, 65 for C.26, and 45 for H.18 the school. The total strength is set at 350 persons.

124. The Military Training Staff (B.6). [redacted] thought the chief of B.6 was Lt. Col. Tam, and the deputy was Maj. Cang. [redacted] believed its chief was Lt. Col. Bang. This staff is supposed to organize and guide discussions on past experiences, record those of tactical value, and disseminate these to lower echelons. B.6 also draws up the infantry training program for COSVN units and gives training guidance to the cadres of training schools at the platoon and company level of main force units. According to CICV ST 69-01, B.6 includes in its staff the 76th and 80.A Training Regiments with 850 personnel between them. b1 b3 (S)

125. The Political Staff (B.7). Little is known about the Political Staff. It is listed in the CICV Study ST 69-01. Lt. [redacted] however, called it B.9 and listed its chief as Lt. Col. Bay Phat, the deputy chief Sen. Capt. Thuan, and the chief of organization as Sr. Capt. Lan. b1 b3 (S)

126. The Cryptographic Staff (B.8). Both [redacted] and [redacted] agree its chief is a Maj. Hong or Hoang. [redacted] listed its functions as compiling codes, training and assigning crypto personnel to the MR's and other units directly subordinate to COSVN. B.8 also is charged with investigating and prescribing rules of security in communications procedures, decoding and recording all messages received and sent by COSVN, and uniformly organizing all crypto units employed in combined military operations. b1 b3 (S)

127. The Adjutant Staff (B.9). CICV Study ST 69-01 lists B.9 as the Adjutant Staff. Neither [redacted] mentioned an Adjutant Staff, although [redacted] dated 18 June 1966 did, stating in addition that its chief was Tu Do. [redacted] thought B.9 was the Political Staff. b1 b3 (S)

128. The Message Center (B.10). CICV Study ST 69-01 lists B.10 as the Message Center. [redacted] mentioned an Administration and Message Center as B.7. [redacted] listed its chief as Capt. Tam Phuong and the following minor members: Thi Phuong (typist), Thi Lan and Thi Ry (supply), Hung and Tho (security). [redacted] listed an unnumbered Administrative Branch that logically would have followed as B.10. Its chief was listed as Capt. Khon. Sen. Lt. Phuong was listed as in charge of administration, Sen. Sgt. Tuan for supply. b3

129. The Chemical Staff (B.12). Although listed in the CICV study, neither [redacted] or [redacted] mentioned a Chemical Staff. [redacted] did, however, stating its deputy chief was Maj. Dung b1 b3 (S)

two and five years of college, had studied chemistry in Russia and was formerly a member of the NVA Chemical Staff of the General Staff.

130. The Military Postal Service (B.14). B.14 is the new Military Postal Service (aka Office of Postal Service and Communications) which is responsible for the maintenance of courier service and other communications. This responsibility originally belonged to the Postal Transportation and Communications Section of COSVN's CAC, but on 25 August 1966, COSVN issued a directive transferring the section to military control and changing the name to Military Postal Service. However, the directive never has been fully carried out throughout SVN, and many echelons still retain the system as a civil function.

131. The courier system not only handles written communications and mail, but also moves certain goods and furnishes guides for visitors to the COSVN area. Although it operates directly only in the COSVN area, it also supervises the system throughout SVN. No limitation is placed on the number of private letters that can be sent through the system and no stamps are required. The Party District Committee where the addressee is located is responsible for final delivery of letters to the addressee. All letters are censored by the Correspondence Sub-section of COSVN's Organization Section.

132. The primary mission of the COSVN Postal Service is to control the infiltration of personnel and goods to intermediate stations within its own area of responsibility. At the intermediate stations, the infiltrators and goods are turned over to MR or province comms-liaison systems. This transfer may take place at an infiltration staging area, such as the one located at Ba Vau in the Parrot's Beak of Cambodia which is used extensively for the infiltration of people and goods into MR-2 and MR-3.

133. According to CICV Newsletter No. 4, 5 June 1968, the COSVN office is divided into three subordinate elements; a Military Staff Department, a Political Section, and an Administrative Committee. The Military Staff Department appears to be in charge of the movement of men and material. It also is responsible for the Binh Long Corridor Section which maintains infiltration routes leading from Cambodia to VC Binh Long Province in MR-10. The Political Section reportedly has the responsibility of supervising Party activities. The Administrative Committee acts as both a clerical and personnel office. There is no information available on the current leadership. Back

In 1968, under the old Commo-liaison Section, the chief was reported to be Ba Cao, and his deputy, Ngo Van Chuyen (aka Muoi Chuyen).

134. Others. [redacted] all list a Militia Staff, [redacted] cites it as B.10. The CICV Study ST 69-01 and [redacted] omit it. [redacted] listed the chief as Maj. Nguyen and the deputy in charge of operations as Sr. Capt. Chuoc. [redacted] thought the chief was Col. Hien. [redacted] listed the chief as Col. Tu Hien, and its mission as one of drawing up developmental plans for guerrilla forces and making quarterly inspections of these forces. On the one hand, this staff was to gather experiences and disseminate reports on guerrilla activities. On the other hand, the staff was to coordinate with mass organizations such as the Youth's, Farmer's, and Women's Associations to seek support for the guerrillas.

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135. Both [redacted] listed an Artillery Staff under the Military Staff Department. [redacted] (a former [redacted] of the 58th Independent Recon Platoon of the Artillery Hqs. and/or U69) maintained there was a separate artillery command directly subordinate to the SVNLA Hqs. which [redacted] called U69. [redacted] on the other hand, noted that in NVN the Artillery Branch was large and rated a command separate from the General Staff, but that in SVN it was still subordinate to the Military Staff Department. [redacted] stated that this staff's mission was to plan the establishment of artillery forces in SVN, supervise those units directly subordinate to COSVN, prepare tactical guides, and provide equipment and other facilities for the COSVN Artillery Branch.

b1 b3 (S)

136. [redacted] allegation that the Artillery Hqs. is separate from the Military Staff Department is bound up in his description of that Hqs. CO, Sr. Col. Nguyen Minh Khanh (aka Hoang Minh Khanh, Tran Soan Dau, and Tu or 4th Khanh). According to [redacted] Tu Khanh [redacted] listed Tu Khanh as the head of the Artillery Staff) had been DCO of the SVN Artillery Command during the Resistance. He regrouped toNVN and became DPO of the NVA Artillery Command Hqs. In 1963 he returned to SVN to establish another SVN Artillery Command called U69. In 1965, Col. Ba Bich, CO of the NVA Artillery Hqs., came south as Khanh's deputy in charge of the actual military operations, leaving political affairs to Khanh. When the NVA Artillery Hqs. was divided to form a new Missile Command in November 1968, Bich was recalled to take over the new Missile Command. Khanh then resumed command of U69 until 1967, when

b1 b3 (S)

newly-infiltrated Sen. Col. Ba Vu [ ] listed two DCO's: Lt. Cols. Phuc and Bui Khac Vu) took over and Khanh again resumed his duties as PO. [ ] stated that Tu Khanh had suffered from trachoma since Resistance days. His condition is serious and he suffers occasional near-blindness. He is thoroughly disliked and a known locher with the nickname Vua Gu "King Flirt" and Vua Ai Tinh "King of Love." According to [ ] he is considered unknowledgeable in artillery, bull-headed, a perfectionist when it comes to his own comfort, and not especially dedicated to duty.

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137. [ ] and [ ] also listed a Sapper Staff, but gave no 'B' number. The existence of this organization as a part of the Military Staff is not confirmed. With the increased emphasis on sappers, it may exist as a separate command, like the artillery command. [ ] believed the Sapper Section was under Sen. Capt. Mai. [ ] thought its commander was Lt. Col. Tu Cang, and that its functions were to draft plans establishing and organizing sapper units, provide training programs and aides, conduct research on sapper objectives, and evaluate past experiences.

b1 b3 (S)

B. The Political Staff Department

138. Despite, or perhaps because of, the relative importance of this department, little is known about its operations. [ ] provided some information on this department's overall mission. It is responsible for developing Party membership within the military, monitoring troop morale, and suggesting methods for eliminating morale problems. It is charged also with preparing and guiding programs for political indoctrination and disseminating current events information by radio and paper. Further, the Political Department drafts COSVN resolutions and sends them to MR Party Committees and independent unit Party Committees. This department also gives guidance on maintenance of security for the MR's and independent units, and it maintains records on cadres from battalion level on up, especially the regimental level.

b1 b3 (S)

139. There is little agreement on who heads this department. [ ] and [ ] list Maj. Gen. Tran Do. Lending credence to these assertions is the well-confirmed fact that Do is a deputy PO of the SVNLA, and at lower levels, the chief of the Political Staff; consistently also is a deputy PO. [ ] lists Sen. Col. Le Chau (aka Le Chau) which agrees with [ ]

b1 (S) b3

[redacted] lists Ba Thang (who he says may have been replaced by Sau Kham). [redacted] lists Ba Thang as a deputy chief. Both [redacted] and [redacted] list Col. Tam Tran as a deputy. Both the [redacted] and [redacted] list Sen. Col. Hai Tuong (aka Hai Chau) as a deputy. [redacted] lists a Sen. Col. Nam Tan (aka Nam Thanh) as a deputy. [redacted] listed still two more deputies: Col. Ba Luu and Tran Quoc Hung (aka Nam Thai). Finally, to further confuse the issue, [redacted] a VC rallier from [redacted] lists Ba Hung as chief and Bay Phuong as deputy chief. b1 b3 (S)

140. Although there is not much agreement on who heads the subordinate staffs of the department, there is general agreement on the existence of the first six of its component staffs:

a) The Propaganda and Training Staff (B.1). [redacted] alleges that the functions of this staff include monitoring troop morale and preparing papers on problem areas, compiling training and indoctrination documents, and disseminating information through newspapers and radio. This staff also is responsible for guiding paywar, entertainment, and movie groups. [redacted] believed its chief was one of the deputy departments heads, Sen. Col. Hai Tuong. [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Le Dinh Le (chief) and Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu Minh (deputy). [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Sau Khiet (chief) and Capt. Ba Huong (deputy). [redacted] gave the following breakdown: chief, Lt. Col. Chuc (or Truc); deputy, Maj. Minh; press, Sen. Capt. Thuong; information, Capt. Nguyen Van Hich; documents, Capt. Tan; recreation, Capt. Ta; and photography, Sen. Lt. Hy. b1 b3 (S)

b) The Enemy Proselyting Staff (B.2). Neither [redacted] nor [redacted] mentioned it, but the existence of a Military Proselyting Staff is fairly firm. [redacted] listed its chief as Sen. Capt. Binh. Not much is known about its operation at the COSVN level, although several of its directives on treatment of prisoners of war are available. It appears to be the military version of the Military Proselyting Section. As such, its responsibilities probably are chiefly directed at indoctrination of VC troops in an attempt to convince them of the advantages of capturing prisoners and treating them well, and at organizing military interrogation and detention facilities. It also would be responsible for activities aimed at encouraging the enemy to desert or surrender, usually a matter of using bull horns, leaflets, and the like. b1 b3 (S)

c) The Organization Staff (B.3). According [ ] this staff had to keep track of the overall number of Party members in the military. This staff also prepared plans in the development of the Party and prepared training programs and documents. It also is responsible for monitoring the morale of Party members in the military. [ ] said that the staff supervised the H.25 Agency, a Transient Facility for military officers awaiting re-assignment. [ ] believed the chief was Col. Lan. [ ] said the chief was Lt. Col. Ba Lan (aka Ba Luu). While this would indicate they agreed, [ ] listed a Col. Ba Luu as head of the Cadre Staff. [ ] listed Maj. Ba Lam as chief of the Organization Staff; Ba Lam may be identical with Ba Lan, although the ranks involved are not consistent since [ ] rallied long before [ ]

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d) The Cadre Staff (B.4 or B.7). [ ] thought the chief of the Cadre Staff was Lt. Col. My, and [ ] thought it was Col. Ba Trang. [ ] listed Bay Thuong as chief and Nam Duc as deputy; a 1963 captured document confirmed that Bay Thuong was connected with the Political Staff Department. [ ] described the functions of this staff. It was supposed to keep abreast of the development of cadres from platoon up to COSVN, prepare plans for the assignment of cadres from regiment upward, and maintain records on military cadres from battalion upward. In addition, this staff received and reassigned NVA cadres. It also was responsible for training schools for cadres company level and up, and for formulating policy on promotions and discipline of cadres, and aiding their families.

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The Security Staff (either B.4 or B.5). [ ] [ ] and [ ] all agree that the chief of this staff is Col. or Lt. Col. Thai (aka Ba Thai, Nam Tai, Tran Quoc Hung, Quoc Hung), a former assistant chief of the Security Department in NVN. [ ] listed the deputy as Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Sen, and [ ] as Sen. Capt. Mai Thang. This staff, according to [ ] was responsible for formulating plans for the organization of security systems in troop units throughout COSVN, and for the maintenance of the SVNLA Hqs. security system. This staff also keeps records of and investigates personnel suspected of being enemy agents, and drafts plans for security preservation during military operations.

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f) The Administrative Staff. Little is known about the Administrative Staff. [ ] listed a Maj. Tu Van as its chief. [ ] listed Sen. Capt. Khoa as its chief with the following subordinates; Sang (Security), Hoang (Food Supply), Hieu (Liaison), Lt. Hoi (Supply), Chien (Medical), Lap (Printing), and Tuy (Secretariat). b1 (S) b3 b3

141. In addition to the six staffs above, the [ ] also listed an Intermediate Political School Staff under Sen. Capt. Viet Hung. [ ] listed an Entertainment Staff under Capt. Xuan Hong and his PO, Sen. Capt. Bay Hien; and [ ] listed a Militia Political-Mission Staff under Lt. Col. Do Khanh Van which specialized in ministering to guerrilla forces. b1 (S) b3

142. The existence as separate entities of the three staffs above cannot be considered especially firm, although they may well exist as subsidiaries of other staffs. [ ] for instance, also mentioned an Intermediate School of Political and Military Affairs (cover number 86/R) which might be the one referred to in paragraph 141 above. But [ ] listed it under Schools, rather than the Political Staff Department. He had heard that the school was built in late 1961 and specialized in advanced training in political and military affairs for cadres of company level and up. [ ] in [ ]. He stated the students came from various locales, and that the school gave two five-to-six month courses yearly. Its organization consisted of a seven man Party Committee and a three man Board of Directors. There were three agencies subordinate to the Board: Military Training (11 persons), Political (12 persons), and Rear Services (25 persons). The director was Lt. Col. Phi Hung; the PO was Lt. Col. Thanh, and his assistant was Sen. Capt. Minh. Three tactical instructors were Sen. Lts. Bien, Ha, and Minh. The political trainers formed one company and the military trainees formed two. These companies ranged from about 80 to 90 persons each. [ ] knew of four other schools: Signal Training, Engineer Training, Reconnaissance Training, and the Nguyen ai Quoc Political Reasoning School (referred to under the Propaganda Section of the COSVN CAC). b1 b3 (S)

C. The Rear Services Staff Department

143. The Rear Services Staff Department is the equivalent of the American G-4 Staff. It is responsible for providing logistical support to the armed forces. According to [ ] b1 b3 (S)

this staff ultimately is responsible for insuring the adequacy of materiel support based on the requirements of the Military Staff Department. Among its functions are supervising ordnance repair and production facilities, supplying and controlling expenditures of Main Force units of COSVN, and training cadres for the Quartermaster Branch. This staff also transports, distributes, and maintains all types of ordnance and military equipment infiltrated from NVN, and it manages a system of caches in COSVN's operational areas. Finally, it is this staff which manages hospitals and provides care for soldiers of COSVN's Main Force units.

144. As was noted in CICV Study ST 69-01, the Rear Services consists of the Headquarters Staff and subordinate Rear Services Groups. These groups are responsible for providing all logistical support to the Main Force, combat support, and administrative service units throughout the area directly controlled by the SVNLA. The composite strength of the overall staff element, not including the groups, is about 1,000. According to the CICV Study, there has been much documentation indicating an increase in the strength of the groups during the past year. There is a great deal of overlapping control between elements of the groups and the Rear Services Staffs of the SR's; many of the operations of the groups cut across SR boundaries.

145. Most sources appear to be referring to the same individual as chief of Rear Services. [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Tu Hoa; [redacted] and [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Nam Hoa, and [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Nam Thi. [redacted] listed Col. Ba Ngoan as DO and Lt. Col. Nhan as DPO. [redacted] listed two DCO's: Cols. Sau Ngap and Phung. [redacted] and [redacted] listed Nam Quoc Dang (aka Nam Thuoc) as a DCO; [redacted] also listed Hai Vo as another DCO. b1 b3 (S)

146. According to CICV ST 69-01, there are nine sub-divisions of the staff element, and a school, security guard, and an induction station. The nine sub-divisions are:

a) The Plans Staff (B.1) [redacted] believed B.1 was headed by Col. Sau Ngap. [redacted] described its functions as one of advising other staffs on making out their plans in coordination with the general plan of the department. b1 b3 (S)

b) B.2 is The Political Staff (B.2) which presumably handled Party affairs for the staff.

c) The Quartermaster Staff was B.3. [redacted] thought its chief was Sen. Col. Hai Chanh. [redacted] maintains this b1 b3 (S)

staff dealt only with units directly subordinate to COSVN. It was supposed to draft plans for, and organize the collection and purchase of, foodstuffs for these units. It also organized the transportation system, the network of caches and warehouses, and the deployment of the quartermaster network for operational purposes.

d) B.4 is the Ordnance Staff which, according to [redacted] was responsible for drawing up plans for the transportation and distribution of weapons and ammunition to the units of COSVN and the MR's. This staff supervised the workshops that produced weapons in accordance with the Military Staff Department requirements, and arranged for the issuing of the weapons to all subordinate units of COSVN. The staff provided technical guidance on the invention of new weapons and notified the MR's about the invention of new weapons. The staff also advised the MR's on transportation, maintenance, and replacement of weapons, and constructed caches and transported equipment during military operations.

b1 b3 (S)

e) The Medical Staff was B.5. [redacted] believed the chief of this staff was Dr. Hue, a Major. This staff was responsible for training medical cadres, planning the organization of the military medical staff and setting up medical stations during military campaigns. This staff also prepared medicines and instructed the MR's on how to do the same. Finally, this staff was responsible for treating the wounded and sick soldiers of COSVN's military units.

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f) B.6 was the Financial Affairs Staff. [redacted] thought this staff was directed by Maj. Ba Hoan and his assistant, Sen. Capt. Ban. [redacted] maintained this staff provided funds only to units directly subordinate to COSVN. It received these funds from the COSVN Finance and Economy Section. It was supposed to account for or settle all its expenditures with the COSVN Section.

b1 b3 (S)

g) Supply, Transportation, and Secretary Staffs. The Supply Staff (B.8), according to [redacted] receives the purchase applications of the departments of COSVN, and organizes these purchases in accordance with the requirements of COSVN. It supplies COSVN units with such items as office supplies, medical instruments, and signal equip-

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ment. [redacted] also alleges that it is this staff that deals with transporting goods from legal areas to the Secret zones. This would more likely be the function of B.9, the Transportation Staff. b1 b3 (S)

147. Rear Services Groups. The Rear Services Staff Department, according to CICV ST 69-01, consists of seven Rear Services Groups (RSG) plus one special Transportation Group. The RSG's are numbered 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 100, and the Transportation Group is number 70. Very little is known about Transportation Group 70. There is one report that Cao Phong is the group's CO. The CICV Study noted that the documented strength of RSG 81 was 2,226, but that only about 70 percent of these were available for duty during the fall of 1968. This group operates in the War Zone D and SR-5 areas. According to [redacted] Muoi Thiem is CO of RSG 81; however, a captured VC document dated April 1969 listed Nguyen My as head of the Party Committee and Command Committee of RSG 81. b1 b3 (S)

148. The total strength of RSG 82 is reported to be 1,816. This group operates in War Zone C and in Tay Ninh Province. [redacted] stated that Muoi Bi was CO of RSG 82; however, two POW's and a captured document list Muoi Bi as CO of RSG 83. [redacted] in RSG 82 who [redacted] in September 1967, hold that the CO and PO of RSG 82 was Maj. Nguyen Huu Tan; that the DCO was Ba Van; and that the two DPO were Chi Trung and Ly. b1 b3 (S)

149. The estimated strength of RSG 83 is 885. Muoi Bi has been identified as the CO of this group by two POW's from RSG 83 and from a captured document. One of the POW's listed a Ba Son as DCO in 1966, while both of the POW's and a 1 August 1968 document listed Doan Sau as the group's PO. Conflicting reports exist concerning the CO of RSG 84; an April 1966 captured VC document listed Le Minh Thinh in this position, while a December 1966 document had Nguyen Van Hue as CO. RSG 85 was activated in February 1965 and its current estimated strength is 400. It operates primarily within Binh Long Province and northern SR-1 and SR-5. RSG 85 is basically a trucking unit. At one time, it was thought that RSG 85's transportation mission had been assumed by Transportation 70, but it now appears that they operate in adjacent areas, with Group 70 operating along the Cambodian border. According to one field study, as of the beginning of 1968, the CO, XO, and PO of RSG 85 were Vo Van Chanh, Luu Van Luong, and Nguyen Kim respectively.

150. The mission of RSG 86 is one of logistical support

the COSVN combat elements operating in Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces, including elements of the 7th and possibly the 1st NVA Infantry Divisions. This unit has an estimated strength of 2,450. A possible additional transportation group operating in the same area as RSG 85 was formed from the D.4 Transportation Battalion, formerly attached to RSG 86. The unit growing out of the amalgamation of D.4 with other smaller units is Transportation Group 70. Its area of operation extends from the Cambodia/Binh Long-Phuoc Long border south at least as far as Route 13. The personnel strength has been documented at 302. According to one report, RSG 86 is commanded by Tran Van Trung, however, a [redacted] rallier from [redacted] stated that a Lt. Col. Dang headed the group. b1 b3 (S)

151. Although RSG 100 is subordinate to COSVN, this administrative service organization of 600 personnel was formed from a nucleus of elements of the Rear Services Staff of SR-2. Its primary operating area is SR-2, which serves from base areas in Cambodia and Tay Ninh. Its major depots and transportation lines are also located in SR-2. This SR provides the easiest access into the capital from base areas in Cambodia and therein lies its importance as a key communications link. One of the most extensive logistical bases in the III Corps Tactical Zone area is Ba Thu village which is located in Cambodia just across the border from SR-2.

152. The brief but checkered existence of the Forward Supply Council took another turn in the latter half of 1968, when it was officially reactivated from COSVN down to the village level. This reestablishment necessitated a transfer of personnel to it from the Finance Economy Section and the Rear Services Section. The latter probably provided military personnel with experience in two specific areas of activity of the Forward Supply Council: manpower (civilian labor and Assault Youth) and food provisions. Some of the personnel transferred at this time may have originally been members of the Forward Supply Council, for one document mentions that certain members of COSVN Rear Services Group 81 were to resume their former functions. The top echelon of the Forward Supply Council at the COSVN level is the permanent section consisting of a chief, who is a member of the Party Current Affairs Committee, and two deputies, one of whom is a high-level Rear Services official. Possibly one or both of the members in charge of manpower and provisions may also have a concurrent Rear Services function. Coordination between the Forward Supply Council and the Rear Services probably takes place through members of the permanent section who were

formerly, or still are, attached to the Rear Services organization. This coordination is vitally needed for the Forward Supply Council to fulfill its primary role of supporting the battlefield operations with supplies and the civilian laborers to move them.

VIII. THE "FRONT"

153. In the preceding section, the subject was COSVN's Party Committee with its functional sections. Each echelon below COSVN has a similar, if less elaborate, Party organization. No matter what the level, the decision-making power rests with the Party organization. But, wherever the Party meets directly with the uncommitted masses, it prefers to operate through Front groups whose connections with the Party are either wholly camouflaged or made to look less dictatorial than they really are. VC infiltration of an otherwise nationalist Buddhist Student Group would be an example of total camouflage. The NFLSV, the first among the Front groups, would be an example where only the extent of Party control is disguised.

154. There are at least four reasons why the Party prefers to operate through the NFLSV. First, for international appearances the NFLSV is used to mask NVN and Communist direction of the insurgency. This tactic is used to gain sympathy from foreigners for an alleged internal movement for liberation from an oppressive "puppet" government. The NFLSV handles foreign affairs. Not being openly connected with the Party, its international appeal is more widespread. Thus, while part of the Front's task is traditional diplomatic representation (especially in other Communist states), it has the additional task of drumming up international support such as liaison with international trade unions or U.S. student protest movements.

155. Second, the Front also is used to mask Party control of the insurgency at home. Everything is conducted in the name of the Front, rather than the Party. Tax receipts, execution judgments, and other documents meant for public consumption are invariably signed and sealed in the name of the Front! This charade even includes the actions of the SVNLA. As mentioned above, the SVNLA is called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) when acting publicly. Thus, Liberation Radio broadcasts PLAF announcements in its own name, as well as those of the alleged PLAF sub-divisions. These latter generally may or may not correspond to an actual VC military command. For instance, when the VC released three U.S. prisoners in December 1968, in

widely publicized rendezvous with U.S. military representatives in Tay Ninh Province, the prisoners were released in the name of the "People's Liberation Armed Forces Command, Eastern Nam Bo."

156. Third, the Front represents an attempt to mask the real leadership of NVN and the PRP*. Although the facade has long since worn away, the Communists continue to utilize the Front. What is done publicly is done by a Front leader. This also allows the Party to utilize "notables," a term often used by the VC to denote individuals of public renown. For example, while the Communist Party is avowedly athiestic, it is still able to enlist the services of such Buddhist and Catholic representatives as Thich Thien Hao and Joseph Mario Ho Hue Se respectively. There also are Hoa Hao and Cao Dai members among the NFLSV leadership.

157. The use of notables naturally leads to a fourth reason for the Front; its capacity for allowing the VC to appeal to a broader mass of people than would be the case if they relied on Party members and well-known sympathizers alone. Recruitment of non-Party members is principally accomplished through such mass organizations as the Farmer's, Women's, and Youth's Liberation Associations. While it is the Party's proselytizers that direct the establishment of the mass organizations and supervise or directly engage in recruiting, this is done in the name of the Front. Thus, while the Liberation Youth Association is a Front group, its direction comes from the Youth Section of the local Party Committee's Civilian proselyting apparatus. It might be worth noting that at these lower echelons, the Party will also use non-members to staff its functional sections. In fact, this is one of the more common ways the Party gains new members.

158. According to a former senior Party military cadre who had spent from [redacted] at COSVN, the top NFLSV personalities were satisfied with their roles. He also claimed that

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*In theory, the PRP is only one component of the NFLSV. As such, it is overt and since 1966, Tran Nam Trung (aka Tran Luong) has served as the overt PRP representative to the Front. (Vo Chi Cong held this "distinction" until 1966.) Denigrating the PRP's effort to disguise its control, Tran Nam Trung also is the overt chairman of the NFLSV's Military Affairs Committee.

the special treatment given to the Front leaders did not unduly antagonize realistic Party cadres. The outstanding characteristic of these Front personalities is that they are representative of large segments of the population and, therefore, valuable to the Party. This representative factor outweighs all others, including executive ability which can be supplied by more anonymous Party cadres serving in the NFLSV mass organizations. In the same vein, this source felt acceptance of a man like Nguyen Huu Tho into the Party would be foolish. The news could not help but leak out and erode Tho's Front image. [ ] however, claims that Tho in fact is a PRP member, and [ ] stated that Tho was a member of the COSVN Civilian Proselyting Section--a position which roughly would coincide with most valuable on-the-ground aspect of the Front.

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159. To handle the affairs of the Front, the Party attempts to create a Front Committee to correspond to the Party Committee at every echelon from COSVN down to the village. Thus, there is an NFLSV Central Committee that corresponds to the COSVN Central Committee, and a Presidium that corresponds to the COSVN CAC. This Presidium appears to have an additional off-shoot called the Secretariat which may be the Party's principal organ of control.* The sub-divisions of the Central NFLSV Committee that have been identified are: the Military Affairs Committee, the Information, Culture and Education Committee, the External Relations Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee, the Commission for Public Health, and the Korean Relations Committee. The NFLSV's regional sub-divisions, corresponding very roughly to the VC MR's, are the Central Committee of Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh, Eastern Nam Bo, Western Nam Bo, Central Trung Bo, and Tri-Thien-Hue. The province, district, and village committees follow in line. The principal leaders and NFLSV-associated organizations are listed at Attachment B.

160. The Party's control over the NFLSV apparently has become so transparently obvious that even the PRP felt it necessary by the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive to create another

*It is likely that Tran Nam Trung (aka Tran Luong), the official PRP representative to the NFLSV and a PRP Central Committee member, and Pham Xuan Thai, a PRP Deputy Secretary and member of the Front Presidium, perform the function of insuring that Party control is maintained.

nationwide Front group in conjunction with their initial Tet 1968 Offensive. Called the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces, this group was created not only to broaden the base of popular support, especially in urban areas, beyond that of the NFLSV, but also apparently to provide a negotiating element possibly more acceptable to the U.S. and the GVN. The Alliance relies almost totally on the Liberation Radio for its official pronouncements. Moreover, the Alliance and NFLSV issue joint communiques. Finally, Trinh Dinh Thao, Chairman of the Alliance, was once a law partner of NFLSV Chairman, Nguyen Huu Tho. The movement to form alliances in various urban areas has been very weak to date. There are chapters in Saigon, Hue and Danang.

161. At the lower levels, the Communists have created People's Revolutionary Councils and People's Liberation Committees. This effort constitutes an attempt on the part of the VC to establish their long-promised legitimate government. As such, the councils more or less are powerless. The committees, however, do exercise some control. Thus, it is not surprising that the various sub-divisions of the Committee, such as Security, or Finance and Economy, still generally are directed by individuals who already head these sections within the Party Committee structure.

IX. COSVN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS SUBORDINATE ECHELONS

162. Historically, Vietnam has been divided into three parts: North, Central, and South. The Viet Minh began their operations with fourteen regions that they reduced to six inter-zones in March 1948. Inter-zones 1, 2, and 3 formed North Vietnam (Bac Bo); 4 and 5, Central Vietnam (Trung Bo); and 6 was South Vietnam (Nam Bo). The division between NVN and SVN provided by the Geneva Accords of 1954 ran roughly along the 17th parallel which split off the two southernmost provinces (Quang Tri and Thua Thien) of NVN's inter-zone 4, leaving them in SVN. Also remaining in SVN were inter-zones 5 and 6; i.e., the southern half of Trung Bo and all of Nam Bo. When the NFLSV was proclaimed on 20 December 1960, six sub-divisions of Nam Bo and Trung Bo were established: South Trung Bo, Western Highlands Autonomous Region, Eastern Nam Bo, Central Nam Bo, Western Nam Bo, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were placed under the jurisdiction of Southern Trung Bo.

163. Officially in 1961, COSVN was formed from an amalgamation of the Nam Bo and Trung Bo Committees. Initially, a lack of staffing at the regional level left the inter-zone the primary level of planning and coordination. COSVN probably did exercise nominal control over the Trung Bo area, but with the inter-zone 5 committee still remaining largely independent. As for the Western Highlands Autonomous Region, the VC Montagnard policies were largely unsuccessful, and it appears probable that the entire region initially remained subordinate to inter-zone 5 and now is subsumed in the B-3 Front area.

164. With the passage of time, the effectiveness of the regional level increased. This was due in large measure to the difficulties in coordination caused by extremely poor transportation and communications. In May 1963, the inter-zone echelon was completely eliminated. Inter-zone 5 was divided into two regions, MR-6 in the south and MR-5 in the north. The sub-divisions of the Nam Bo inter-zone remained unchanged, but were assigned numbers as follows: MR-1, Eastern Nam Bo; MR-2, Central Nam Bo; MR-3, Western Nam Bo; and MR-4, Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. At this time, MR-6 came fully under the control of COSVN, but the remaining portions of former inter-zone 5 continued to exercise a great deal of autonomy. In 1964, probably due to the enormous distances involved, MR-5 created two SR's. The southern SR covered VC provinces Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Daklak. The northern SR included Quang Tri and Thua Thien.

165. In mid-1965, the U.S. entered the war and Hanoi began infiltrating integral NVA units. This change led to an upgrading of the military committee system and an increase in Hanoi's direct control of MR-5. By the spring of 1966, these new strengths led to a major reorganization of VC administration throughout SVN, including the formation of MR-10 and the Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTH-MR), the Western Highlands Front Command (B-3 Front), and the consolidation of districts and provinces in MR-1.

166. In April 1966, recommendations were made by the MR-5 Party Committee to Hanoi that the MR be divided into three sub-divisions. In June of that year a formal sub-division was made, creating the TTH-MR and the B-3 Front, leaving as MR-5 the remaining provinces along the coast. It appears the Western Highlands did not have a Party Committee as did the TTH-MR, and for this reason was a Front Command with MR-5's Party Committee remaining responsible for the political side of the war in VC provinces Kontum and Gia Lai. Daklak Province of the southern

SR falls under the B.3 Front militarily and the SR politically. To the north, it was simply a case of elevating the northern SR to full MR status. According to [redacted] this MR also controls the central part of the Laotian panhandle and has occasionally been referred to as the Tri-Thien-Central Laos MR. There are also indications a connection may exist between this MR and the NVN province of Quang Binh, resulting in the name Binh-Tri-Thien MR. Military control of these areas is almost completely in the hands of NVA Front Commands. However, they are still considered to be nominally subordinate to COSVN, if only to maintain the facade of the NFLSV being the guiding hand of the insurgency.

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b3
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167. If the net effect of these changes in the North was one of lessening COSVN's influence, the opposite is probably true in the South. COSVN had already inherited MR-6 which, prior to 1963 had been part of inter-zone 5. In October 1964, shortly after the formation of the B.3 Front, MR-10 was established by merging one MR-6 province, Quang Duc, with two MR-1 provinces, Phuoc Long and Binh Long. According to a captured diary, the establishment of base areas, control of the southern end of the infiltration route, ethnic minority problems, and land development for the large plantations in the three provinces were the principal problems to be solved by the new MR.

168. The reorganization of the remainder of MR-1 appears to have occurred in response to Allied operations. The attrition of VC cadres made the consolidation of existing structures necessary. Tay Ninh was the only province not affected. Binh Duong and most of Phuoc Thanh provinces were merged to form Thu Dau Mot Province. Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Ba Ria were merged into Ba Bien Province. The Rung Sat, a heavily forested swamp lying astride the river mouths leading to Saigon, was also reorganized in the spring of 1966. Before it had formed two districts under Bien Hoa Province, now it became a special zone numbered T-10 with the mission of constructing a strong base area and interdicting the water lines of communication to Saigon. This eliminated the need to staff two District Committees whose political responsibilities encompassed a sparsely populated swamp. There was little reason to alter the VC organizational structures in MR-2 and 3 in the Delta, south of Saigon. This area was still firmly controlled by COSVN.

169. By November 1967, COSVN had ordered a major reorganization of all areas contiguous to Saigon to facilitate the planned general offensive against Saigon in January-March 1968.

The territory of former MR-1 (minus Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces), MR-4 and MR-2's Long An Province were divided into six SR's. SR-1 through 5 formed wedges around Saigon-Cholon, which became SR-6. For the first time, the traditional Nam Bo divisions were ignored and established provinces dissolved to create entirely new entities. If anything, this reorganization resulted in COSVN taking even firmer control of this area, one in which COSVN had always shown special interest.

170. The boundaries of the old MR-4 enclosed an area too limited for the concealment of VC forces during Allied operations in the area. This situation became especially critical after the VC decided to move from guerrilla warfare into a new phase of conventional warfare which meant not only larger military units, but Rear Support bases as well. The new SR arrangement gave each SR a common border with the city and a large rural hinterland for base areas. The breakup of MR-1 and MR-4 also enabled the VC to place relatively high-level personnel from these organizations into the SR's, thus improving the quality of leadership farther down the line. This was also achieved by the direct placement of COSVN personnel down on the SR level on a temporary basis.

171. At this time there were indications the VC also planned to turn Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces into SR's, but never did so. There were also indications that an MR-4 type organization was performing some sort of intermediate headquarters function between COSVN and the SR's, although it now appears that this experiment has been dropped. The overall effect remained, however, one of a COSVN-directed attack against Saigon on several fronts, the coordination of which was the responsibility of Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra. Despite the close control exercised by COSVN, according to [ ] the VC command believed the Tet Offensive was marked by a lack of coordination between the military and political forces, a lack of central control over military forces under the SR's, and an inability of the SR's to provide reinforcements. b1 b3 (S)

172. In March 1968, COSVN apparently assumed direct command over all military forces in the SR's by turning the military headquarters of each SR, except SR-6, into a Front responsible only to the SVNLA Hqs. As a result, the SR Party Committees no longer exercised command over their own military forces, a departure from normal Party practice. Rather than create a Front for Saigon, SR-6's sapper units and area of responsibility

were divided between the outside SR's. This was probably due to the lack of coordination that occurred between the outside units infiltrating Saigon and their SR-6 support guides during the Tet Offensive. The May-June Offensive proved to be just as ineffective, despite the further reorganization, but it remained evident that with regard to operations for the Saigon area, COSVN intended to assume direct control to the point of placing its own cadres in roles of direct command.

173. COSVN was similarly tightening its grip over the Delta. As outlined in CICV Newsletters No. 5 and 7, 27 July 1968 and 14 October 1968, the COSVN was troubled by decreasing cadre strength and loss of population control in the Delta. On 6 April 1968, there was a meeting between COSVN representatives and high-level cadres from the Delta. Attending were: Dong Van Hieu, a COSVN representative; Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, deputy CO of Hqs. SVNLA; Nguyen Tri Hung, MR-2 representative; and Tran Van Lap, MR-3 representative. One major topic discussed at this meeting was a plan to reorganize the political boundaries of MR-2 and 3. These changes consisted of shifting districts about to accommodate for the change in emphasis resulting from Long An Province being divided into SR-2 and 3. Where, for instance, Tan An city had formerly been a focus of VC efforts in Long An Province, it was now suffering neglect due to the concentration on the Saigon area. Therefore, the district containing Tan An was shifted to My Tho Province. Then, to relieve My Tho Province from the responsibility of administering three large cities - My Tho, Tan An, and Go Cong - a new Go Cong Province was split off eastern My Tho. Further south, MR-2's Ha Tien District was transferred to MR-3, giving MR-3 complete control of supply routes passing through Ha Tien on the way to MR-3. The COSVN representatives also discussed closer coordination of military operations. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh reportedly took personal command of MR-2; with the former deputy CO of the SVNLA, Maj. Gen. Dong Van Cong taking over command of MR-3. In addition, COSVN ordered 90 percent of all Delta village and district forces to be formed into battalions directly subordinate to COSVN.

174. Further reorganization of the Saigon area followed in the path of the May-June Offensive. As mentioned previously, there are indications COSVN's original SR plan envisaged turning Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces into SR-'s, but the plan was never carried through. There also appeared to have been

sporadic and unsuccessful attempts to set up a new version of MR-4; at the same time, a new MR-7 was created, apparently successfully. Captured documents indicated that between late May and early June 1968, COSVN formed these two MR's (designated T-4 and T-7) with T-4 controlling the territory west and north of Saigon (SR-1, 2, 3, and 6) and MR-7 controlling the territory to the northeast, east, and southeast (SR-5, 9, and 4 including the Rung Sat Special Region). SR-8 was the U-1 Province, and SR-9 was Ba Bien Province (aka Ba Long Province). A general lack of further commentary indicates the MR-4 portion of the reorganization never got off the ground. The existence of MR-7, however, is relatively firm.

175. In fact, a great deal of the reorganizational activity undertaken by COSVN in the Saigon area during this period assumed a sort of trial-and-error, Alice-in-Wonderland quality. Take for example U-1: according to [redacted] and of the [redacted] of U-1, he had learned in December 1967 that MR-1 had been dissolved and U-1 had been redesignated SR-8, reporting directly to COSVN. The U-1 Party Committee* complained that it could not function as an SR with territory including only one district and the province capital of Bien city and an inadequate infrastructure. COSVN apparently agreed because after May, U-1 continued under the old designation. There are indications that U-1 eventually fell under the control of T-7, and T-7 began to function sometime around or after the May-June Offensive.

b1 b3 (S)

176. Apparently T-7's creation was designed to enable COSVN to more effectively control this side of the Saigon area of operations by dealing with one rather than several headquarters. It may also be of some significance that during the February 1969 offensive, the incidence of heaviest action shifted from the T-4 to the T-7 theater of operations. The command pattern of that latter offensive was familiar. In the estimation of Lt. Col. [redacted] the Bien Hoa Front was led by Gen. Song Hao, formerly with the Political Department of the NVA General Staff.** Under his command were combined

b1 b3 (S)

*In 1955, MR-1's provinces were given "U" numbers. In late 1964, the capital city of Bien Hoa Province was separated from U-3 Province and assigned the code U-1. Except for U-1, the U Series was dropped when the MR's were superceded by the SR's.

**There has been no corroboration that Gen. Song Hao is in SVN, and [redacted] allegation therefore appears doubtful.

b1 b3 (S)

independent COSVN maneuver elements and MR-7 forces.

177. This disposition of forces also reveals another interesting pattern. There were three offensives during which the VC made a major effort in the Saigon area - Tet, May-June 1968, and February 1969. In the first, SR-1 and 2 supposedly had the crucial role. In the second, SR-4 and 5 had the principal roles. In the third, what would have been SR-4, 8, and 9 played the major role. As far as local force units were concerned, this arrangement allowed them to share the honors and the losses, as the thrust of the attacks moved from east of Saigon to the coast, to even further west. Apparently SR-3 was experiencing too many internal difficulties to be of much aid.

178. A larger pattern also seems to be forming. As NVN assumes more and more responsibility in the Trung Bo area, COSVN is able to concentrate its personnel on the problems of the Nam Bo area. It also would appear that with the new emphasis on urban areas, harrassment of the Saigon area has become the principal concern of COSVN. Possibly never before have so many COSVN level cadres appeared in the Front areas of Saigon, increasing the chance of their being captured or being able to defect. COSVN's Military Intelligence cadres are particularly vulnerable in this respect.

ATTACHMENT A: COSVN LEADERSHIP

COSVN

Secretariat

Pham Thien Hung

Muoi Cuc Hai Van

Additional Current Affairs Committee Members

Hoang Van Thai, Hai Hau, Tran Van Tra,

Tran Do, Ba Buong, Sau Van, Hai Xe Ngua, Tran Bach Dang

Additional Central Committee Members

Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Thi Dinh, Hoang Duc Anh, Tran Van Du, Tam Than, Cao Dang Chiem (Sau Hoang), Le Tu Nhien,* Nguyen Van Don, *Le Minh Chau, Le Man, Muoi Bung

Additional Leaders at COSVN

Tran Trong Tan, To Lam, Hong Viet, Chinh Ngu, Nguyen Huu Tho, Muoi Khanh, Cuu Long, Quoc Tuan, Sau Ut, Tam Tu

*possible, position unconfirmed

ATTACHMENT A:

COSVN Functional Sections

Current Affairs Committee*

Organization Section	Propaganda/Culture/Indoctrination Section
Ch: Hai Van or Hai Mai	Ch: Hai Van, Nam Quang or Hai Hau
D/Ch: Le Tu Nhien or Ba Thanh	D/Ch: Tam Rau or To Lam
PO: Ba Nhan	PO: To Lam or Tam Rau
Finance-Economy Section	Forward Supply Council
Ch: Hai Xe Ngua, Chin Phuoc or Muoi Thiem	Ch: Hai Xe Ngua, Chin Phuoc or Tu Tranh
D/Ch & PO: Sau Lau or Muoi Thiem	D/Ch: Nam Hoa
Security Section	Civil Health Section
Ch: Hai Van, Sau Hoang, Ba Buong or Ba Nam	Ch: Phung Van Cung or Nguyen Van Vy
D/Ch: Sau Hoang, Muoi Phan, Le Van Son or Ba Chung	D/Ch: Ho Thu or Hoa (Hoang)
Civilian Proselyting Section	Military Proselyting Section
Ch: Tau Kem	Ch: Tran Van Du or Nguyen Van Thoi
D/Ch: Nguyen Huu The (Farmers)	D/Ch: Ba Cung (formerly)
D/Ch: Nguyen Thi Gieng (Women)	
D/Ch: Nam Quang (Youth)	

Military Affairs (see attached)

*Organization Section reportedly under "supervision" of Ba Buong. Security Section reportedly under "supervision" of Hai Van and/or Tran Luong. Propaganda/Culture/Indoctrination and Military Proselyting Section reportedly under "supervision" of Hai Hau.

ATTACHMENT A:

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (HQS. SVNLA)

CO & PO: Pham Thien Hung
XO: Hoang Van Thai
XO: Tran Van Tra
XO: Tran Do
XO: Le Trong Tan
XO: Nguyen Hau Xuyen
XO: Hoang Duc Anh
XO: Nguyen Thi Dinh (Not to be confused with Nguyen Thi Binh, presently deputy chief of NFLSV delegation to Paris talks.)

Military Staff

COS: Hoang Duc Anh
DCOS: Hai Nghiem, Tran Dinh Xu, Hoang Cam or Tu Binh

(see attached sub-sections)

Political Staff

COS: Tran Do, Ba Thang, Le Chau, or Ba Hung
DCOS: Ba Thang, Bay Phuong, Tam Tran, Hai Tuong, Nam Tan, Ba Luu or Tran Quoc Hung

(see attached sub-sections)

Rear Services Staff

COS: Nam Hon, Tu Hon or Nam Thi
DCOS: Nam Quoc Dang, Hai Vo, Sau Ngap, or Col. Phung
PO: Ba Ngoan
DPO: LTC. Nhan

(see attached sub-sections)

ATTACHMENT A:

MILITARY STAFF

Combat Operations (B.1)

COS: Hai Nghiem or Ho Tam
DCOS: Vu Ba or Van

Military Intelligence (B.2)

COS: Anh Tu
DCOS: Hai Nguyen

Personnel Staff (B.3)

COS: Tam Nam
DCOS: Maj. Canh

Personnel Staff (B.4)

COS: Col. Duc
DCOS: Maj. Minh or Maj. Hoat

Engineering Staff (B.5)

COS: Ung Rang, Bui Tue, or Maj. Nhan

Sapper Staff*

COS: Tu Cang or Capt. Mai

Training Staff (B.6)

COS: Col. Bang or Lt. Col. Tam
DCOS: Maj. Cang

Political Staff (B.7)

COS: Bay Phat
DCOS: Capt. Thuan

Cryptographic Staff (B.8)

COS: Maj Hong (or Hoang)

Adjutant Staff (B.9)

COS: Tu Do

Message Center (B.10)

COS: Tam Phuong

Chemical Staff (B.12)

DCOS: Maj. Dung

Militia Staff*

COS: Tu Hien or Maj. Nguyen

Artillery Staff*

COS: Ba Vu
DCOS: Bui Khac Vu or Lt. Col. Phuc
PO: Tu Khanh

Military Postal Service (B.14

COS: Ba Cao
DCOS: Ngo Van Chuyen

Strategic Intelligence Office (B.22)

COS: Tu Hiep
DCOS: Sau Tri
PO: Tran Van My

* Possibly separate commands.

ATTACHMENT A:

POLITICAL STAFF

Propaganda & Training Staff (B.1)

COS: Le Dinh Lo, Hai Tuong or Sau Khiet

DCOS: Nguyen Huu Minh or Ba Huong

Enemy Proselyting Staff (B.2)

COS: Capt. Binh

Organization Staff (B.3)

COS: Ba Lan or Ba Luu

Cadre Staff (B.4 or B.7)

COS: Lt. Col. Ky, Ba Trong or Bay Thuong

DCOS: Nam Duc

Security Staff (B.4 or B.5)

COS: Tran Quoc Hung

DCOS: Nguyen Van Son or Hai Thang

Administrative Staff

COS: Maj. Tu Van or Capt. Khoa

ATTACHMENT A:

REAR SERVICES STAFF

Plans Staff (B.1) — Political Staff (B.2)

COS: Sau Ngap

Quartermaster Staff (B.3) — Ordnance Staff (B.4)

COS: Hai Chanh

Medical Staff (B.5) — Financial Affairs Staff (B.6)

COS: Dr. Hue

COS: Ba Hoan
DCOS: Capt. Ban

Secretary Staff (B.7) — Supply Staff (B.8)

Transportation Staff (B.9) — Rear Services Group
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 100

ATTACHMENT B: NFLSV LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

I. Internal Organization

a. Central Committee Presidium:

Chairman	Nguyen Huu Tho
Vice Chairman	Y Binh Aleo Phung Van Cung Huynh Tan Phat (DP) Tran Nam Trung (Tran Luong) (PRP)
Members	Nguyen Thi Dinh, possible vice chairman (once reported) Thich Thien Hao Tran Bach Dang (PRP) Tran Buu Kiem Pham Xuan Thai (Nguyen Van Dang) (PRP) Nguyen Huu Tho Nguyen Van Ngoi (reported as CC member only, in 1968) Dang Tran Thi (not noted since November 1967)

b. Additional Central Committee Members

Tran Van An	Hoang Bich Son
Ho Hue Be (aka Joseph Marie)	Huynh Van Tam (Chin Nam?) (PRP)
Nguyen Thi Binh	Le Van Tha (RSP)
Rochom Briu	Le Quang Chanh
Ma Thi Chu (Mrs.)	Ho Thu
(Mac. Nguyen Van Hieu)	Nguyen Van Tien
Nguyen Ngoc Thuong (RSP)	Ung Ngoc Ky (Vuong Ngoc Cung) (DP)
Nguyen Van Hieu (RSP)	Dang Quang Minh
Vo (Vi) Nhu Le	Tran Hoai Nam
Nguyen Van Ngoi (?)	Nguyen Van Tu (Ti)
Ho Thu	Ho Xuan Son (DP)

c. Secretariat

Secretary General	Huynh Tan Phat (DP)
Assistant Secretaries	Le Van Huan Ho Thu

ATTACHMENT B: (continued)

Members Ung Ngoc Ky (Vuong Ngoc Cung) (DP)
Ho Xuan Son (DP)

d. Other Functional Departments

1) Foreign Affairs Commission:
Tran Buu Kiem, Chief

2) Communications, Postal and Transportation Branch

3) Organization Committee:
Ung Ngoc Tuyen, Chief

4) Public Health (or Civilian Medical) Committee:
Dr. Nguyen Van Chi, Chief

5) Military Affairs Committee:
Tran Nam Trung, Chief

6) Korean Relations Committee

e. Regional Organization

1) Western Nam Bo:
Duong Van Minh, Chairman

2) Central Nam Bo:
Nguyen Trong Xuat, Chairman

3) Eastern Nam Bo:
Nguyen Than Long

4) Southern Trung Bo

5) Saigon/Gia Dinh:
Huynh Tan Phat, Chairman

6) Central Trung Bo

7) Tri-Thien

8) Southwest Highlands MR

ATTACHMENT B: (continued)

2. Component Parties

a. People's Revolutionary Party

1) Tran Nam Trung - Representative to NLFSV

b. Democratic Party

1) Ngo Ngoc Sang, Chairman (not reported in recent years)

2) Ho Xuan Son, Vice Chairman

3) Huynh Tan Phat, Secretary General

c. Radical Socialist Party

1) Nguyen Van Hieu, Secretary General

2) Nguyen Nhoc Thuong, Deputy Secretary General

3) Le Van Tha - Representative to NLFSV

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